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FORE~RD
This is a report concerning a group of people during a crucial
period in their experience; it is not a report on the policy or opera-
tion of the Government agency which played a considerable role in the
crucial experience. The group consists of one of America t s minority
peoples, and the crisis was the loss of self-determination. Implicit
in the account is the assumption that any sort of people would have be-
haved in much the same way if they had been dealt with similarly. The
fact that a minority of the people were brought up in Japan is signifi-
cant for interpreting minor aspects of their behavior during the crisis,
but chiefly for understanding the behavior of Americans towards them.
The report deals specifically with 4 years in the life of Japa-
nese Americans--from 1942 to 1946. The Prologue attempts to show what
in their relation~ with other West Coast people led to their being
singled out for evacuation and placement in the relocation centers. The
body of the report takes up in outline the experiences of the people in
the relocation centers: first, the period of MOving In, from May 1942
through January 1943, which was a time of conflict and tension as people
made the adjustment to living in artificial communities under Government
supervision; second, the period of Being Sorted from February 1943 to
November 1943, during which new tensions arose in respons~ to the
Government program of separating the loyal and the disloyal; third, the
period of Settling Down from about November 1943 to December 1944,
during which the majority of people completed their adjustment to life
in the artificial communities; and fourth, the period of Getting Out
from December 1944 to December 1945, when the communities broke up. In
an Epilogue the attempt is made to sketch the process, as it appeared
in early 1946, of transition from Gover~nt supervision tq life in free
comlmmities.
The writing of the report, as well as the gathering of data, has
been a cooperative enterprise. All those who ever worked in the
CommunitJr Analysis Section of the iVRA have contributed; in addition many
evacuees and other WRA staff members have participated. The report is
designed not as an exhaustive analysis of the attitudes and organization
of the eVacuees in the relocation centers, but rather as an outline of
major developments. It seeks to report what, at the time of the liqui-
dation of the agency, seem to have been the most important psychological
and social effects of the crisis vihich Japanese Americans have undergone--
most important, that is, for an understanding of what happens to people
when democratic processes go wrong and a Government seeks to set them
right. .
Note: This report prepared by E. H. Spicer, Head, Community Analysis
Section, and other members of the Section including K. Luoma1a,
A. T. Hansen, and M. K. Op1er.
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,r.~WGUE
The 2 months after Pearl Harbor were black for all America, but
California and its two neighbors to the north knew literal blackness
when the air raid sirens cut the ear and lights flickered out over the
cities, which then waited, with traffic and radio stations quiet, for
whatever might happen. Planes began to roar back and forth overhead
with searchlights stabbing them from the ground. Vlere these enemy
planes? Was this at last the beginning of the expected attack from
the Pacific? The panic-stricken reaction to a careless neighbor's
light during a black-out was that saboteurs and fifth columnists were
signalling the enemy.
T~e shock of Pearl Harbor did not fade, and the rumor-ridden
mystery of what had really happened in Hawaii grew deeper. It was all
the more acute for Californians because they identified their defense
problems with Hawaii, which had been so close for the past century
through business and friendly ties. The open sesame of conversation
was the whisper, "A friend of mine heard a sailor in a bar (or an
officer's wife) just back from the islands say that * * * ."
During those two months after December 7, HMS Resolute, Guam,
Vlake, Colin Kelly, Hongkong, and Manila were in the headlines. Below
the headlines was the familiar box with instructions for what to do in
an emergency attack. Rumors of what had happened at Pearl Harbor grew
more horrifying; more and more ships Vie~e being listed. The Pacific
Coast was more vulnerable than it dared imagine.
People flocked to sign up fo~ civilian defense, but nv one knew
what 'to tell them to do-except wait to be called. Runs were started
on flashlights, batteries, buckets, and shovels. Dirty bags of sand
for incendiaries littered city sidewalks and buildin8s. Signs on
stairways, "This Way to Air Raid Shelter," made one look with new eyes
at familiar buildings to judge their relative safety under bombing.
People coming from the movies talked of where to go and what roads to
take if there should be an attack. i'lomen rushed to stores to buy
nylons and rubber girdles; grocers began to limit sales on sugar,
coffee, and canned goods. A few people complained about "Made in Japan"
goods in dime stores. Others excitedly called th~ir friends about the
sacrifice sales on Orien~al art in Japanese-owned stores. There would
be no more such art until after the. war, perhaps never, and they were
now a barga~n-and better than a bargain if you quibbled about the
price with the owners who seemed inclined to accept any price offered.
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IQuisling had become an international noun 2 years before, but
it and the concept of fifth colunmism had for Americans the garbled
slickness and fascinating unreality of a Sunday feature story. That
was before the Sunday of Pearl Harbor and the rumors (later proved
false) of fifth columnism in Hawaii. Americans then began to reproach
themselves, IJTNe're such trusting suckers." But yet to believe that a
fifth column actually existed was to deny faith in the Nation at a
time when the urge was for unity and to take the first step in helping
the enemy to divide and conquer. It became a painful dilemma, but the
American people had (and continued to have), by and large, a phenomenal
willingness not to solve the dilemma between faith and distrust for
themselves. They let the FBI investigate their reported suspicions
about neighbors and fellow workers. They tried to put suspicion on an
individual basis rather than to direct it against any particular group
as a whole. In contrast to the behavior at the time of the last war,
they hesitated to suspect people just because of their descent and to
assume that people born in a nation now at war y.'ith the United States
must therefore be disloyal.
World Viar I was not so distant that people had overcome their
shame about the witch hunting of Americans of German descent 25 years
earlier and the hysterical excesses of renaming sauerkraut, changing
Schmidt to Smith, and banning German music. Lack of complete confi-
dence in war news, especially atrocity stories, lingered on from the
last war together with a determined skepticism and sophistication about
any kind of propaganda. Only t~e oldsters of \'lorld War I called for
parades, flying flags, military bands, and a rah-rah war~ For most
people, the depression, unemployment, years of isolationism and paci-
fism, debunking of war and the exposure of war-making munitions indus-
tries, and the speed of the Axis military machine topped by Pearl
Harbor made this a different kind of war.
These attitudes, and confidence in the FBI to investigate sus-
pected individuals, helped, during the two months after Pearl Harbor,
to break \~atever runaway emotions a frustrated nation, not yet geared
for war, might have turned upon its own people. Later it was to be
some of the leaders, not the people as a vmole, who decided to judge
a part of the population as a group, irrespective of citizenship and
loyalty, rather than as individuals.
~he Process of ScapegOatirlF.
Nonetheless, persons of German and Italian ancestry on the Viest
Coast ;.ere uneasy during the first two months of the war. Those of
Japanese descent were even more uneasJr. Their Oriental faces identi-
fied them in a region whose greatest physical danger was from that part
of the Vforld V/ar beine fought in the Far East. Also, it was the
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surprise attack by Japan that had made America take sides and had
~atapulted it into war with the Axis nations. Before America had made
her decision, some of the less vlell-assimilated residents with ties
through birth or descent with countries later to become our enemies,
had taken one side or another about the war in the old country. Most,
however, were indifferent. A few Italians praised Mussolini; others
denounced him. A small proportion of Germans (largely pos~qorld War I
immigrants or disaffected citizens) believed Hitler to be the savior
of Genwany; others called him a menace to the world. Some Japanese
collected funds and tinfoiJ. to help Japan fight China; others picketed
American steamships loading scrap iron for Japan.
The lines of these differences also cut across the general
public regardless of nationality or descent. Americans whose ancestry
was as complicated as a patchwork quilt formed societies with first,
second, and third generaltion Americans to help the United States by
helping England fight the Axis. People whose former homeland or par-
ental homeland had been ravaged by the Axis were prominent among those
taking sides. For example. after the Manchurian incident, some Chinese
boycotted Japanese-ovmed stores in ~liforni~, wore s~gns saying, flI am
a Chinese American," and sent money to help China fight Japan. Other
Chinese said, "This is America and no plaee to fight with other
Americans over old country politics." People of many nationalities
agreed with that point of vievl. Either they desired to emphasize their
identification with America over former ties, or they believed that
anything happening outside America was none of America's business.
As insults by Japan to Americans in the Far East grew in the 2
years before Pearl Harbor, the tide of public opinion on the West Coast
began to rise against Japan. And, nearly 50 years of McClatchy and
Hearst propaganda against the California Japanese began to fester like
an old sore and lead some Americans to identify people of Japanese an-
cestry in California with those in Japar!. American school girls and
boys of Oriental appearance somet,iJnes had the experience of being spit
on and cursed because of their ancestry. People of German and Italian
descent, being less racially visible, had fewer such experiences.
However, the antagonism rising as Hitler swept over Europe made them
feel self-conscious, although like most of ~he German aliens in Califor-
nia in 1941, many of them, too, had been refugees from economic and
political oppression.
By the time Pearl Harbor, these hostile undercurrents with their
paradoxes and dilemmas were part of the mental climate of the West
Coast. To be normal, that is, to maintain the values and thoughts of
the half hour before one heard about Pearl Harbor was now the height
of abnormality, because it violated the instinct for self-preservation.
The abrogation, or at least the restriction, of some civil rights was
(4)
I
i
expected, tolerated, and by a feYl even desired as proof that the
higher authorities, after the failure at Pearl Harbor, once again had
their hands firmly on the wheel. However rough and mysterious a
course they pursued, survival required that the secret knowledge which
they could not share with us for security reasons dictated that course
which was best for. our preservation/as a people and as a Nation. They
knew too, as part of the secret knovlledge, what our losses, which now
placed the V{est Coast in such extreme jeopardy, had been. v1e took for
granted that their shame, eagerness to get into action, and instinct
for survival was as strong, if not stronger, than our oym.
Within a few days after Pearl Harbor, the assignment of
Lieutenant General J. L. DeVlitt as Commanding General of the Vfestern
Defense CornQand was announced. 1'he very name, Western Defense
CoImnand, was both terrifying and reassuring; the West Coast was a
theatre of war but would be defended; there would be organization,
plans, and leadership. West Coast.residents breathed a little more
evenly as they read that the general was firm, determined, a stickler
on the job, even a martinet. CuriouslY, the word then seemed to lack
a derogatory connotation. It suggested instead that he would leave
nothing undo~e to 'prevent a second Pearl Harbor.
The Vfest Coast was frightened. An ordinary person could do
nothing to stop the nightmare progress of the Japanese in the Pacific.
Rushing down to enlist was and could be an outlet for only a small part
of the population. The story of the blocked roads of France seemed
about to become our story too. In case of attac~, should vre stay home
like rats in a trap so that the roads would be free for the Army, or
should we flee to the Sierras? The only authoritative general order
given for a long time (if more were given, they never reached the or-
dinary person) was to keep lights out during a blackout. Even so, in-
etructions were always so complicated or so changing that no one ever
was sure which siren meant "all clear." To settle the family quarrel
by following what the people across the street did might be, for all
we knew, following a fifth columnist. The very rarity of orders made
those which \vere given all the more acceptable, respected, and reason-
able to an unmobilized, frustrated people, who still complained~
chiseled, and scurried about for the easier way butralso wanted to do
something cons tructi ve and heroic.
Differences about foreign politics faded as everyone rallied to
the United States. It is one thing to defend and aid the old country
when the United States is at peace, but when the adopted land and the
homeland are at war, discretion and common sense make conformity and
unity with the adopted land a necessity. He who had argued Italian
or Japanese politics like a lion with the rest of the fishing fleet
suddenly became, within the hour on December 7, a confused, weary ~
(5)
frightened old man with stumbling English and the frightful label of
enemy alien. Was the freedom of speech so vociferously enjoyed
earli~r a sugar-baited trap of the democracies? Or would people under-
stand that an old man liked to argue with his cronies about old country
politics when that country and America were still friends and not ene-
mies?
Before sunset of December 7, the intelligence authorities had
started to pick up individuals on their lists who were suspected of
disloyalty. 1dost were enemy aliens. Enemy aliens and their families
\vere anxious. Vfuo would be next? The senile, German-speaking mother-
in-law who hysterically demanded that they leave this dan&3rous coast
and return to Germany was kept out of sight as much as possible. The
Italians played up their fun-loving, innocuous ~alities and illiter-
acy. Some Japanese, hearing that books and mementoes of the old coun-
try were duspect, undertook a frightened burning of valuable books,
irreplaceable family portraits, and prized collections of dolls. What
little the general public Y~ew about the pick-ups had the dual effect
of giving them confidence in the alertness of the authorities and of
shocking them that a trusted neighbor or business ac~aintance of
German, Italian, or Japanese descent was a traitor, as suggested simply
by the FBI picking him up and holding him until they could get around
to questioning him. Many were released but their neighbors rarely came
tc know exactly what happened. Doubt about them lingered on.
Indirectly the public felt more strongly the effect of another
restriction on enemy aliens, particularly on the Japanese. On
Dece.~ber 8, funds of enemy aliens were frozen. Vfuen the public learned
that the sudden scarcity of fresh vegetables and fruits and their sky-
rocketing price was due to frozen funds of enemy aliens among the Japa-
nese, there were murmurs of protest. Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt, who
visited the Coast immediately after Pearl Harbor, was popularly cred-
ited with getting the order relaxed so that enemy aliens could get
enough cash to meet necessary business and living expenses.
During those first two months' after Pearl Harbor, the people of
the West Coast, despite their genuine fear of attack from outside and
the possibility of fifth columnism at home, were remarkably calm.
They shared the feeling of unity which had swept the nation. That
.unity precluded unreasonable suspicion of fellow American residents.
State and local officials as well as the general public acceded to the
request of the FBI that it handle investigations of reported subversive
activities in order that witch hunts might be prevente4, counter-
espionage not hindered, and possible patteFns of fifth columnism not
obscured.
(6)
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1People who before the war had not hated fellow townsmen because
of their descent did not do so when war was declared. Those who had
denounced them before the war as Dagoes, Germs, and Japs continued
their former pattern of belief and speech with more fervor and noise,
and sported windshield stickers, "Open Season on Japs, It directed
against the Californian Japanese. Vllien civilian defense units were
organized, Nisei (American citizens of Japanese descent) were prominent
in many of them. A Modesto unit spontanepusly elected a Nisei as their
chairman. As they tell it now in Modesto, it began to dawn on them that
their chairman was of the same ancestry as the most feared enemy. They
suffered a little bemused and amused embarrassment because "well, he
was a darn swell guy, better American than some of the rest of us," but
still, "it sure made us feel funny when! it struck us that he was a Jap
and here we had picked him as the best one for the job; we didn't YJ10W
what other people would think." The matter was left to limp along.
But events beyond the control of the community were to make the
decision and ~ive needle sharpness to the dilemmas and paradoxes.
Under the Presidential Proclamations of December 7 and 8, the
Department of Justice was responsible for coptrolling enemy a.liens in
the continental United States and Alaska. It had the authority to ap-
prehend and intern dangerous enemy aliens; to seize short-wave radios,
guns, ammunition, and other articles declared contraband to enemy
aliens; and to exclude enemy aliens from certain zones. However, enemy
aliens who brought contraband to 10cal1aw enforcement officers were
often turned away as full-handed as they had come because the officers
were not prepared to receive, receipt, or store such articles. Instruc-
tions to them and to aliens were slow to percolate. Aliens were handi-
capped by the almost entire suspension of their language newspapers and
the absence of those leaders who had been picked up. Nevertheless, the
collection of contraband was progressing toward the deadline of Janu-
ary 5, and the FBI was busy apprehending aliens and citizens suspected
of subversive activities. No areas from which enemy aliens were to be
excluded had been announced; apparently the Department of Justice felt
its vigilance and knowledge of conditions in crucial areas made this
extreme measure unnecessary.
Californians debated among themselves about how to protect
effectively the thousands of miles of western coastline. Campers
thought of !tdandy invasion coves," difficult to guard. It seemed
~easonable to them as armchair strategi.sts, that the enemy would bypass
obvious ports of entry in favor of infiltration. Heavily popUlated
ports knew they would receive the first attack. Each city and hamletOn the ~oa~t or in the mountains, felt, with local Pride fierce~ '
turned ~s~de out, tha~ if the enemy got control of a certain nearby
yoad or ~stallation, ~t would have the key to California. To succeed
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in these ~chair strategies, the enemy would need fifth columnists.
Had each community w~ich regarded itself as the key to California
asked to be declared a restricted zone, most of California would have
been included. But there was no storm of demand for such action. Dis-
cussion continued, in most regions, tu have an academic or cracker-
barrel qaality. Feelings about enemy aliens remained diffuse and un-
crystallized.
Because the authorities freqaently changed and inadequately
communicated their instructions about alien travel, funds, and related
matters, enemy aliens a~d their families fell prey to anxieties, inse-
curity, rumors, and nervous speculations about the future. For their
own sake and that of their childrem most of the aliens wished to ob-
serve the regulations and behave in the way satisfactory to officials
and the general public, but conflicting advice and information handi-
capped them.
, Aliens had, in general, three possible courses of action--to
; ,..; withdraw into a shell, to stress loyalty to the United states, or to
continue about usual affairs as normally as possible. Citizen coun-
selors themselves did not agree on the best course. Conseqaently,
aliens and their families were caught in a cross-fire. Whatever they
, did was sure to displease some valued adviser. If they kept to them-
, c" selves, as some police officers advised them, in order not to attract
curious kibitzers and perhaps "trouble," they were c~iticized by those
Deople who felt that if they had nothing to conceal they should partic-
iDate more tully in the community life to prove their ~ericanism.
i1hen they attempted to do that, their alien origin or obvious race led
occasionally to their being turned away by civilian war relief groups.
These rejections were so multiplied in the telling that even the thick-
est skinned individual was discouraged. Just to act normal was impos-
sible since official restrictions and nervousness affected home life
and business.
. As to the general public, the aliens felt relieved that the
pattern of Vlorld War I hysteria was not being repeated. While some
of the public might be curious and watchful in the way that some people
are about the misery and anxiety of others, very few were openly hostile.
Most had the attitude of reserving judgment and in the meantime of con-
tinuing whatever courtesy or kindness they had shown before the war.
Many were indifferent to everyone but themselves because of the sudden
". changes in job, residence, and family readjustments which the war was
making in their own microcosms. It was easy to note casually but not
to inquire about the glumness and sorrow on the Italian barber's face
or the disappearance from the flower kiosk on the avenue of the old
Japanese woman and her high-school son. People who ordinarily would
have concerned themselves with the welfare of those who were on the
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peripheries of their microcosms of personal life now felt too oppressed
by their own problems. When an employee of alien birth or parentage
quit his job after customers had made unpleasant 'remarks about enemy
aliens, or when such a person dropped out of the choir, the employer or
fellow choir members often felt relieved, much as they might like the
individual personally, that this embarrassment and uncertainty was over.
However, if they had aggressively befriended the individual they felt
hurt at being rejected and would vindictively condemn his entire na-
tional group.
The Attorney General of the United States, Francis G. Biddle,
was determined that enemy aliens should not become scapegoats any more
than any other group. As long as they obeyed the regulations pertain-
ing to their status, they need not be afraid, he assured them. They
would be judged individually, not categorically. A month or two before
Pearl Harbor, he had said:
"In tense times such as these, a str.ge psychology
grips us. Vl& are oppressed and fearful and .apprehen-
sive. If we can't get at the immediate cause of our
difficul ties, we are likely to vent our damned-up
energy on a scapegoat. That scapegoat may be someone
whose views are contrary to our own.' It may be some-
one who speaks with a foreign accent, or it may be a
labor union which stands up for what it believes to be
its rights. That sort of psychology is the very essence
of totalit~ri~sm. On the other hand, civil liberties
are the essence of the democracy we are pledged to pro-
tecta Insofar as I can by the use of the authority and
influence of my offi.ce, I intend to see that civil liber-
ties in this country are protected; that we do not again
fall into the disgraceful hysteria of witch hunts, strike-
breakings, and minority persecutions which were such a
dark chapter in our record of the last World Ylar."
After Pearl Harbor, he pressed forward in his battle, this time
against those who were discharging aliens and citizens from jobs only
because of their ancestry. He said:
"War threatens all civil rights; and although "we have
fought wars before, and our personal freedoms have sur-
vived, there have been periods of gross abuse, when
hysteria and hate and fear ran high, and when minorities
were unlawfully and cruelly abused. Every man who cares
about freedom, about a government by law-and all free-
dom is based on fair administration of the law~ust
fight for it for the other man with whom he disagrees
(9)
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for the right of the minority, for the chance for the
underprivileged with the same passion of insistence
as he claims for his own rights. If we care about
democracy, we must care about it as a reality' fo~ others
as well as for ourselves; yes, for aliens, for Germans,
for Italians, for Japanese, for those who are with us as
those Who are against us. For ~he Bill of Rights pro-
tects not only American citizens but all human beings
who live on our American soil; under our American flag.
The rights of the Anglo-Saxons, of Jews, of Catholics,
of Negroes, of Slavs, Indians--all are alike before the
law. And this we must remember and sustain-that is if
we really love justice, and re~y hate the bayonet and
the whip and the gun, and the vrhole Gestapo method as a
. way of handling human beings."
Instead of~using his authority to restrict enemy aliens to the
hilt, the 'Attorney General tried to see that every enemy alien (as
well as every friendly alien and every American citizen), if there was
no cause to doubt his loyalty, received every right permissible to him
in wartime. The Attorney General declared that inevitably there were
some disloyal aliens--and citizens-but the Government was aware of i
them and had control of their activities. It would not, however, con- :
demn any alien group wholesale. People would be judged as individuals
and not as members of a race or nationality.
i
President Roosevelt followed up Mr. Biddle's plea with the I
statement:
,
,
"It is one thing to safeguard American industry, and
particularly defense industry, against sabotage; but
it is very much another to throw out of work honest and
loyal people who, except for the accident of birth, are
sincerely patriotic * * * Remember the Nazi technique:
'Pit race against race, religion against religion, prej-
udice against prejudice. Divide and conquer.' We must
not let that happen here. Vie must not forget what we are
I defending: Lioerty, decen~y.. justice."
Most Californians agreed, or at least fell into line. As 1941
drew to a close, certain distinguished Californians, who, under the
. chairmanship of Governor C. L. Olson, had formed the "Northern
California Committee on Fair Play for Citizens and Aliens of Japanese
Ancestry," reported:
"Californians have kept their heads * * * There have
been few if any serious denials of civil rights to either
(10)
.aliens or citizens of Japanese race, on account of the
war. The American tradition of fair play has been ob-
served ~~ * * all the organs of public influence and in-
formation-press, pulpit, school welfare agencies, radio,
and cinema-have" discouraged mob violence and have
pleaded for tolerance and justice for all law-abiding
residents of whatever race."
Federal and local agencies that maintained order and suppressed sub- )
versive activities were praised for their vigor and sympathetic con-
sideration. Private civic agencies had promptly assisted enemy aliens
suffering from wartime restrictions. To most Californians at the end'
of 1941 enemy aliens were not a threat to State and National security.
! Not many were clamoring for any more restraint of aliens than existed.
i They were satisfied that the intelligence agencies and the Department
. of Justice were not overlooking dangerous enemies. The FBI was easy
to reach by telephone. The public had confidence in its respect for
clues reported by citizens and its thorough investigations. Theswiftness with which it had moved after DecemDer 7, indicating previous '
preparation, had much to do with both the public calm and the absence
of sabotage.'
The tense 2 ~onths atter Pearl HarQor marked a high point in
~~erican respect for the civil rights of enemy aliens and their citi-
zen children. This respect existed without endangering N!ational safety
or lapsing into complacency. The excitement of later events has
clouded the fact that the confidence of the people, show~ during the
early period, in the power of danocratic 'ideals to win the loyalty of
residents in America had been justified. The aliens had not betrayed
the trust of citizens in their loyalty or neutrality. Attorney General
Biddle and Secretary of War Stimson announced, in February, that there
were no substantial evidences of sabotage anywhere in the United States.
About the same time, the attorney general of the State of California
stated, '~ie have had no sabotage and no fifth column activity since
the beginning of the war."
Through most of January, the "organs of public influence and
information" continued the policy which had won the praise of the
Committee on Fair Play. But counter-forces, opposed to the confidence
shown in the loyalty of enemy aliens and the scrupulous observance of
their civil rights, were beginning to operate beneath the surface of
the public awareness. Once these forces gained momentum, they ground
on as imperviously, relentlessly, and powerfully as a glacier gathering
size and speed once it was on the move.
The first major engagement in the war between two different
points of view regarding t:tlemy aliens and their children began to take
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-shape late in December with the Attorney General of the United States
on the one side and the Commanding General of the Western Defense
Command on the other side.
To the Commanding General, military security required that
enemy aliens be prohibited from strategic areas and that every piece
of contraband be collected. Late in December, he asked the War Depart~
ment "to acquaint the Department of Justice with the need for vigorous
action along the Pacific Coast." Because he believed that there had 
been "aJJnost complete absence of action on the part of the DeJ::artment 
or Justice over a period of nearly four weeks," he asked it to "act 
with expedition and effectiveness in the discharge of its responsibil- ,
it~es.:" The Army did not Wish, he explained, "impressions to the con-
trary notwithstanding," to take from Justice the conduct and control 
alien enemies. If this became necessary, the Army would accept the
transfer with the greatest reluctance.
In the first week in January, representatives of the Department
whose head had declared that the Bill of Rights protected even enemy
aliens met in San Francisco with the head of the Western Defense Com-
mand. James Rowe, Assistant Attorney General, presented a memorandum
to answer the Commanding General's criticisms and requests. It des-
cribed the progress of contraband collecting, a new registration of
enemy aliens, and requests to Army and Navy to recommend prohibited
areas. The Department was giving ~ under arguments of military safetY
on the issue of enemy aliens, for it agreed to permit a warrant to be
issued with the cause to be met only by the statement that an enemy
alien exclusively occupied the premises to be searched. However, it
continued to hold strictly to the line of the civil rights of American
citizens by refusing to raid and search every house in a specific lo-
cality without first finding out if enemy-aliens or American citizens
lived in the houses entered. It had not abandoned the enemy aliens
entirely, for it was still determined to judge each as an individual
and not to apprehend or search any alien unless there was cause to
suspect him. There would be no mass raids on enemy aliens, taking the
term "mass raid" to mean that eventually every enany alien in the
Western Defense Command would be raided with or without cause. If the
President overruled. Justice on this, it would ask the Army to take ove
the control of enemy aliens in the Western Defense Command.
The Commanding General was responsible for National safety in
his defense zone. Normal processes of law about warrants hampered an
delayed him. To require a warrant, he said, before searching a home
occupied jointly by citizens and aliens might permit suspected indi-
viduals to escape. His eagerness to permit no dangerous person to 
loose no matter how many innocent people suffered or were inconven-
ien~ed led him to prejudge any alien or citizen as disloyal if any
suspicious person reported as such. He also suspected even those ~o
had not aroused suspicions. He asked Justice what control it had over
those disloyal. subversive citizens who had not been detected in aqy
overt act and over dual citizens.
The meeting ended. Justice still refused to make mass raids.
It still required a warrant before permitting houses occupied jointly
bY' citizens and aliens to be raided. HOW'ever, it gave in some more
on the aliens by permitting officers to search and apprehend enemy
aliens without. a warrant. if they would get a warrant l.ater. This was
not enough for the Commanding General. Most of the dwellings he wanted
searched v/ere occupied by both citizens and aliens and not by aliens
exclusively. Until Justice permitted any home shared by citizens and
aliens to be searched without a warrant, he :felt \U1able to protect t.he
West Coast. adequately. Most of the pr~es he Vias" thinkinF: about. he
said, were Japanese.
Three weeks later. the Attorney General announced the first
two areas from which the CommB.nding General had" recommended that ~~
aliens be excluded. They were the San Francisco waterfront and a Los
Angeles rectangle which included the municip~ airport and shore line.
The waterfronts were considered particularly vulnerable to out-
side attack. They also had the 'tactual or potential menace" (a popular
phrase of the time) of large nusr,bers of alien enemies. More and fOOre
the enemy aliens were being called, significant of the change in offi,..
cial thinking, alien enemies. One might assume that all aliens would
be cleared off the waterfronts before being moved from less vulnerable
inland area.s. However, the vlaterfront aliens could stay until Febru-
ary 24; the inland aliens had to m6ve by February 1"5. The reason
given was that the waterfronts had "large numbers of alien enemies,
Japanese particularly, either living or working in them." The obvious
inference was that their welfare required more time for moving. This
contradiction between the urgent needs of military safety and solici-
tude for the welfare of alien enemies believed dangerous. to that safety
reappears in the announcement. It adds that exclusion "not only will
aid national defense but also will protect the aliens themselves."'
An obvious question, left unanswered, is why enemy aliens now
needed such an unusual measure as mass evacuation to protect them when
Californians had, according to the Committee on Fair Play, kept their
heads. Hmlever, the Commanding General contradicts the Committee in
his final report:
n ~ * * press and periodical reports of public attitudes
along the VJest Coast from December 7, 1941, to the ini-
tiation of controlled evacuation clearly reflected the
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intensity of feeling. Numerous Ltlcidents of violence
involving Japanese and others occurred; many more were
reported but were subseqaently either unverified or were
to be cumulative."
Though the Co~nanding General was reporting on a much longer period,
he still contradicted the Committee in regard to December 1941.
Unfortunately, he does not document his remark about "nUlTlerous
incidents." Vlriters differ sharply about how much violence was actu-
ally suffered by enemy aliens between Dece.~ber 7 and the Japanese
evacuation. Those favoring evacuation declare that incidents Vlere
r many, especially toward persons of Japanese ancestry. Those opposing
I evacuation declare incidents were f~7 and due largely to long-standing
[ bad relations between California Filipinos and Japanese, aggravated by
Christmas liq11or and the fall of Manila. No objective account has
been published as yet of the number and nature of verifiable incidents
reported to local, state, or national law enforcement officials as
distinguished from wild, barroom threats of violence which came to
official ears.
February climaxed the war of nerves against the three enemy
alien groups. Intense anxiety and disorganization afflicted the ap-
proximately 120,000 German, Japanese, and Itali'an enemy aliens on the
Vfest Coast. From one day to another they did not know what new regu-
lation or area would be announced, or whether the new area would in-
clude their homes, or if they had already had to leave, their new
residences. The Commanding General states, " * * ~u,blic excitement
in certain areas reached a high pitch, and much confusion, the result
of cOnflicting reports and rumors characterized the picture." Rumors
flew that this piecemeal dislo,~ging of aliens was the forerunner of a
mass evacuation of all German, Italian, and JaIJanese aliens from the
Pacific Coast. Most of the aliens were adults with children who were
An.erican citizens and not subj ect, to the regulations, but since they
were still dependent on their parents they had to move too. Other
aliens were aged and dependent on adult citizen children who felt
morally obligated to move vnth their parents to care for them. People
such as these lived in the homes occupied jointly by aliens and citi-
zens, which the Department of Justice would not raid vdthout a search
warrant.
As early as mid-January, efforts to ride Germans and Italians
out of herd of enemy aliens and to concentrate on rounding up Japa1 ese
aliens and their citizen children became evident. The glacier was
gaining momentum to sweep all persons of Japanese ancestry off the
Vlest Coast and into camps guarded by barbed wire and a~ed soldiers.
The overt dynamic reasons were tha;:. they needed "protective custodyr'
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.from other Vlest Coast people and that since the authorities could not
dist-inguish the loyal from the disloyal it was necessary in the inter-
est of military security to remove all. Although serious considera-
tion continued to be given until March to the mass evacuation of the
Germans, and Italians, they were not, to the authorities and general
public, qQite such an undistinguishable mass as the Japanese or in as
much danger from hoodlums. The earlier promise of Attorney Gener&l
Biddle that no alien group would be condemned wholesale was to be kept
in mind for the Germans and Italians but completely forgotten, ex.cept
by a relatively few people, in regard to the Japanese.
The general public began to feel actively sorry for the &~rman
and Italian aliens described in the newspaper human interest stoIies
and whom they knew personally. The most publicized of the alien
enemies evacuated from the San Francisco vlaterfront were the Italian
parents of San Francisco's popular favorite, baseball player Joe
DiMaggio. The numerous politically important leaders of German and
Italian descent plead~ for the aliens of their nationality. The
Japanese aliens, who under American laws have never been permitted to
become naturalized citizens of the United States, had no mature leaders
of their ancestry in high political, social, and financial circles to
apply pressure; their children, who were citizens, were too immature
and disorganized to be effective. The five-decade old hostility cul-
tivated by certain sections of the Vlest Coast population toward the
Japanese and other Asiatics inhibited stories about them as human
beings with names, personalities, and roots in America. Though
westerners had knowh many Japanese personally for some thirty or forty
years, they had a mental block which made them think of Japanese as
mysterious, inscrutable, and latently dangerous and not as a group
made up of persons ~ individual and different as the ones they did
know.
February was the month of decision about mass evacuation. It
was to end with the general public w~tching the boys and girls, young
men and women, and older people of Japanese descent stand by piles of
baggage waiting for Greyhound buses to take t~m to camps on former
fair grounds' and racetracks. The public ~as not as passive as it
appeared. It merely felt worn but relieved. A scapegoat was carrying
off the baggage of their fears, anxieties, doubts, and frustrations.
Attorney General Biddle's forgotten words echo:
II In t.ense times such as these, a strange psychology
f?;I'ips us. Vie are oppressed and fearful and apprehen-
sive.' If we can't get at the jJnmediate cause of om-
difficulties we are likely to vent our dammed-up energy
on a scapegoat .ok * *"
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Vlhat happened in February to make people forget their inten-
tion not to "again fall into the disgraceful hysteria of witch hunts,
strike-breakings, and minority persecutions which were such a dark
chapter in our record of the last Vlorld Vlar," and which the Attorney
General had warned about?
The Philippines were going. The enemy Japanese were rapidly
pouring through the Malay jungles the British had called natural for-
tresses. \Vho can forget the February evening when the ne\1Spapers re-
ported that residents of Singapore were dancing at the Raffles Hotel
while waiting for ~heir Japanese conquerors to enter the lobby? Up
in Placerville, California, people in the lo~y of the hotel named
after the one in Singapore gathered around the radio to listen to
President Roosevelt's speech. Even as he talked, ,a Japanese enemy
submarine fired a~ the oil tanks near Santa Barbara. People gossiped
that local- Japanese had signalled the submarine. The Commanding
General received "hundreds of reports nightly of signal lights visible
from the coast, and of intercepts of unidentified radio transmissions."
The Battle of Java Seas came and went, an"Allied defeat. "Too little
and too late" became too familiar. America in her haste to convert
to \var was mixed up in her own hands and feet and short-tempered.
There was reconversion unemployment, shortages, crowding cities, emp-
tying villages. On a farm near Auburn, Californ~a, a tall boy in his
best clothes met the bus, a lo-year old handed up his sui tcas e, told
him to come back a sergeant, whistled for his dog, and as the bus
pulled away ran into the field crying. People told each other, "Vfuat
we need is a bomb to wake us up. Some people don't.know there's a waron." .
The chairman of the Tolan Committee told San Francisco late in
February when it came to investigate the evacuation of enemy aliens
and citizens of Japanese descent,:
"It is possible that the entire Pacific Coast may be
evacuated. They tell me baclc in Washington that it is
not only possible but probable that the Pacific Coast
will be bolllbed. That has come to me from men who are
supposed to know."
Over and over, the Committee told its witnesses, 1f'lre can lose this
war. They tell me in Washington we can lose this war."
More people were talking like the District Attorney of Madera
County vlho v{anted martial law by the Army vdth its first act to be
the removal of all persons of Japanese descent. He said:
'"
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"Our State and Federal laws, supported by a bill of
rights are entirely inadequate to meet the situation.
If we are not to run the risk of disaster we must for-
get such things as the \'lrit of habeas corpus, and the
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures.
The right of self-defense, self-preservation, on behalf
of the people, is higher than the bill of rights."
It was getting so that anyone 'who thought of protecting the
constitutional rights of anyone, let alone of persons of Japanese
ancestry, was accused of being unpatriotic. The Attorney General of
the United States with Edward Ennis and James Rowe who were on his
staff, and others who fought with them to hold back the tide of
hysteria were called !'cookie pushers" and enemies of national security.
People were reluctant to protest about any regulation connected in any
way \~th national defense for fear of being labeled communist, fascist,
or fifth columnist, or of being told, "Don't you know,there's a war
on." A spokesman for a small coastal city vlith a grievance about a
prohibited zone boundary y,hich excluded enemy aliens, most of them
Italians, from a shoppinB district vThere all doctors' offices, hospi-
tals, the principal stores, the prison, and the jail were located,
started his remarks to the Tolan Committee with the statements, "Local
authorities appreciate that we are at "Tar, but -1:- * *" and, "While iTe
are all-out for the Army, and appreciate that many people hesitate
asking a question about any ruling for fear of be~g accused as a
fifth columnist * * *."
'rhere VTere dissenting voices, however, which spoke out loudly
for the Japanese. The Secretary of the Corrunittee on Fair Play de-
clared:
"Our citizens of Japanese parentage are just as trust-
worthy now as they Vlere a fe,v v,eeks ago vlhen Governor
Olson and other publicists paid tribute to their loyalty
and civic devotion. Has the set-back given to the Allied
arms by the military machine of Japan made bur political
leaders in state, county, and municipality play the bully
and turn against our Japanese citizens as scapegoats for
the remote culprits, in Japan, v:hom our Japanese-.l\n1erican 
citizens, have repeatedly denounced?"
These dissenting voices fre~ently saic. that economic self-
interest and not fear of d'anger to military security prompted some of
the talk about disloyalty of persons of Japanese descent and the ne-
cessity for evacuating than. 1'\n Oakland attorney stated to the Tolan
Committee:
.
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"I find no popular dE¥nand for the efforts to drive the
so-called alien enemies from California. (Chester
Rowell, ~ prominent San Francisco columnisilhas also
stated this as his impression). The clamor seems to
come from chamber of commerce, Associated Farmers, and
the newspapers notorious as spokesmen for reactionary
interests. In view of this tact, effort should be made
to determine whether there is any connection between the
clamor for the dispossession of the Japanese farmers and
the desire of these clamoring interests to get possession
of the Japanese farms and the elimin8.tion of the Japanese' .' 
competition * * * So far the Attorney General has resisted
the mad pressure; but the mad pressure mounts. Even now
we hear the rumble of the threats of martial law for all
of California--a State of' ~, which would abolish the
rights of all of us and make many wonder whether totali-
tarianism is to be fought with the same and 50 reduce the
struggle to an abstraction."
Leading the demand for the removal of the Japanese was the
California Joint Immigration Committee which ~ed as its sust~
bodies the American Legion, the California State Federation of Labor,
California Grange, and the Native Sons of the Golden West. Originating
in 1905 as the Japanese and Korean Exclusion League, the Committee had
the assistance of both the Hearst and the McClatchy papers to keep
aliv~ fears of the "Yellow Peril." It declared:
'~'e were largely instrumental in the passage of the 1913
Alien Land Act * * * and * * * instrumental, in 1924, in
securing the adoption of the present immigration law
which now excludes any Asiatics from a quota, as such as
distinguished from the quota of 100 that is accorded to
all nations if there are people therein eligible for cit-
izenship."
It considered the granting of citizenship to Negroes after the Civil
War a "grave mistake." Unlike Adolf Hitler who had similar doctrines
about citizenship for the white race only, the Committee stated that
it did not claim that the white race was superior to another. Its
strongest foe, in getting the EXclusion Act passed, it said, was the
Federal Council of the Churches of Ci~ist in America.
On February 13, 1942, the Committee which through December and
most of January had not been able to turn the West Coast upon the
persons of Japanese ancestry in their midst stated, "Neither fear,
timidity, nor cost should delay action. Japanese should be removed
now 1 " It demanded that the entire Pacific Coast as far inland as j
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necessary and such other interior regions as necessary be called a
combat zone from which all Japanese aliens and American citizens of
Japanese ancestry should be removed. All civil State authorities
should be required to help the Federal authorities in this program.
At this time the Commaming General was still wrestling with
the problem of how to protect the Western defense zone while handi-
capped by Department of Justice regulations about having a search
warrant before entering and searching a home occupied jointly by citi-
zens and aliens. The problem, he said, required immediate solution
and called for measures not then in being.
He had recommended to Attorney General Biddle that virtually
all the territory lying west of the Cascades be declared a prohibited
I zone. The Attorney General replied that since Portland, Seattle, and
. Tacoma were included, it would involve a mass evacuation of many
thousands; no reasons were given for such a mass evacuation; and if it
were contemplated the War Department would have to do it itself beca~ e
the Department of Justice did no~ have the equipnent and personnel.
The Attorney General took the occasion to add a reminder of the dis-
puted issue. He wrote:
"The proclamations directing the Department of Justice
to apprehend, and where necessary, to evacuate alien
enemies, do not, of course, include American citizens
of the Japanese race. If they have to be evacuated, II believe that this would have to be done as a military
necessity in these particular areas. Such action, there-
fore, should in my opinion be taken by the War Department
and not by the Department of Justice.1t
In his final report, the Commanding General points out that the
western theatre would still not have been made secure even if the
Attorney General had accepted the Washington and Oregon recommendations.
There would be no security as long as more than two-thirds of the
total Japanese population on the ,{est Coast was not subject to alien
enemy regulations. These two-thirds were American citizens. American
law at that time had no provision for treating its citizens as alien
enemies.
A way was to be found. On February 14, 1942, the Commanding
General'wrote to the Secretary of War about the "Evacuation of Japanese
and other Subversive Persons from thE: Ylest Coast." He requested
authority to name military areas from which he could exclude all alien
enemies, American citizens of Japanese ancestry, and all other sus-
pected persons. He asked for authority to requisition the services of
any and all other Federal agencies, and for a law to provide penalties.
(19)
On the previous day, the West Coast congressional delegation in
Washington had recommended to the President that ~ persons of Japa-
nese lineage and all others, aliena and citizens alike, who might be
d~ed dangerous should be evacuated. It will be recalled that a
third petition using' almost identical language had been prepared and
issued on the same day by the California Joint Immigration Conm1ttee.
Thus, by mid-February, those forces which ha4 long been deter-
mined to move all persons of Japanese ancestry off the West Coast had
converged. They got results. On February 19, 1942, the President of
the United States as Commander in Chief issued Executive Order 9066,
which closely follows the wording and ideas in the three petitions.
The Secretary of War and the military commanders he designated were to
prescribe military areas in such places and of such extent as he or the
coJlmlanders might determine. Any and all persons could be excluded from
such areas. All agencies were to assist in implementing the program.
Within a month Congress passed a law, Public Law 503, to provide the
penalties for disobedience. Lieutenant General J. L. Dewitt of the
Western Defense Command was appointed by the Secretary of War- as one
of the military cOOKnanders.
On March 2, the CoJllnanding General announced the two military
areas in his CoJnlJ1Md from which all persona of Japanese ancestry,
citizens and aliens, were to leave voluntarily. Nine thousand left
voluntarily to go inland, but the dislocation of the evacuees and the
new communities to which ~hey went caused so much trouble and confusion
that on March 27, all Japanese were ordered to remain within Yllitary
Area No. 1 until plans had been completed for t~ir controlled evacua-
tion by military and civil agencies to assembly centers from which they
would be transferred to relocation centers. The Western Defense Com-
mand established a civil agency within itself, the Wartime Civil Control
Administration, to take charge of evacuation. A few daya later the War Relocation Authority was established to take charge of the relocation 
center phases of evacuee life.
The greatest mass migration of American residents in history wa
to follow, far greater than any movement of American Indians from
tribal lands to reservations. America had learned something about
human engineering since the Indians were moved. The human engineering
exhibited in the evacuation of the Japanese from the West Coast was a
magnificent tour de force, as different and superior in technique and
administrative management from the transfer of Indians as the oxcart
differs from the latest bomber.
A Vlest Coast Dil~
The two princi~ arguments for the wholesale evacuation of the
Japanese involved (1) doubt of the ability of anyone to distinguish
between the loyal and the disloyal and the disloyal among persons of
Japanese ancestry, whether born in Japan or in the United states; and
(2) doubt of the ability of non-Japanese residents of the West Coast
to safeguard the Japanese residents from vigilantism (the traditional
California term of Spanish origtn for mob lawlessness).
The first Japanese immigrants arrived on the Pacific Coast
nearly 50 years before World Vlar II. People born in Japan pioneered
the wilderness of California, Washington, and Oregon with people of
many other nationalities. As on all American frontiers, the pioneers
were young and of diverse origins-Old Americans, European immigrants,
Mexicans, Chinese, Japanese, and a few Negroes. They built the rail-
roads together, cut the lumber, broke the soil for farms, and gave
three Pacific States to the Unior.. They established homes and tRlBi-
nesses. They hired each other and worked for each other. They met in
stores, schools, churches, theatres, and homes. Their children went
to the same schools.
.
The West is a new and young country. )(any pioneers were still
alive in 1942.During 50 years of pioneering, of home and State
building, and of raising a generation or two of children, the West
Coast people, though of different races and nationalities, had shared
many experiences through which they should have come to know each othe~
well. Yet when the crisis of World War II came, some looked with the
narrowed and suspicious eyes of strangers at the elderly Japanese
among them. and even at young Americans whom they had knO1ln from birth.
The doubters asked, WWho is who among the Japanese? Who is loyal to
the rest of us? Who is a traitor? We must be sure. Remember Pearl
Harbor. How can we tell which is which?"
Why should anyone have such doubts atter so many years of shared
experiences? Why should people suddenly begin to look at Japanese
neighbors and acquaintances as if they were sinister strangers whose
bowing, gifts, and many friendly services had cloaked espionage? Many
residents, of course, simply ignored the climate of doubt and suspiciol1
about their Japanese friends. They were eyre of them, but what of the
other Japanese they did not know? They perhaps were the ones about
whom rumors and disturbing anecdotes were going around, like the one
about the old gardener in the next block who, when jokingly addressed
as "Captain" by his employer, a Navy officer, straightened up, looked
him in the eye, and said, "Admiral to you," and then disappeared for-
ever, preswnably to carryon nefarious activities elsewhere.
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-Suddenly it seemed that the Japanese had always lived to them-
selves with a one-way screen between them and the Caucasians. Thescreen permitted the Japanese to see and understand the Caucasians and \
to calculate carefully what action to take toward them, but made it
impossible for the Caucasians to see any farther into Japanese life
than they permitted them. A Washington banker spoke to the Tolan
Committee about his many and he hoped (but he was not sure) loyal, old I
friends of Japanese descent. He said that he found it "exceedingly I
difficult to divine the oriental * * * their mental processes may not
be identical with our own." The word "alien" and parti cularly "enemy
alien" became synonymous with the word "Japanese" in 1942.
Doubts of loyalty had been stimulated and multiplied by decades
of anti~iental propaganda of the Hearst and McClatchy newspapers
and the California Joint Immigration Committee. Even people who had
dismissed the Sunday feature stories about the "Yellow Peril" who were
"infiltrating" into California to raise potatoes around Stockton and
strawberries on the wasteland of Florin began to wonder if there might
not have been a grain or two of truth in the inflammatory articles.
The mayor of Tacoma, Vlashington, said he thought he could tell
which Japanese were loyal and which were disloyal because" * * * a
man I s background, regardless of who he is, very generally has much to
do with what he is gping t9 do. If born tn this country; if a Chris-
tian; if employed side by side with others who ft11 that same classi-
fication * * *; if educated in our schools; if a producer now and in
the past; if maintained in a position of production--I should think
that person could be construed to be a loyal American citizen." He
d.id not think eye slant or skin color had anything to do with loyalty.
The chief of police of Los Angeles Collnty where one-third of
all AII1erican Japanese lived, did not agree. He said, " * * * I feel
that ~hey (American citizens of Japanese descent) present as difficult,
if not a more difficult, problem than the enemy alien. They are cog-
nizant of the American custom of living; they are capable of under-
standing the American language and inference; and subject to small
limitations, are allowed to associate and mingle with the general
American public * * * In addition to the family traits and the patri-
otism for the native country of Japan, you have racial characteristics,
that of being a Mongolian, which cannot be obliterated fram these
persons, regardless of how many generations are born in the United
States."
The attorney general of California also thought the American-
born Japanese, the Nisei, were more dangerous than the Issei, their
Japan-born alien parents, because there were twice as many Nisei as
Issei and most Issei were over 55 years of age. Singled out for
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special suspicion were the Kibei, those Nisei who had lived in uapan
and had attended school'there for a few years before returning to the
United States.
The pioneers of the West Coast had not always got along together
amicably during their decades of shared experiences. At "different
times, the Armenians, Italians, Portuguese, and Dust Bowl in-migrants
as well as the Chinese, Japanese, Negroes, and Mexicans were called
undesirable foreigners and treated as outcasts. Some still are. Many
share traits and attitudes resulting from discrimination. Though in-
tense at times, prejudice and discrimination never became codified or
rigid on the West Coast for any of the nationalities. One Community
differed from another; one individual differed from another; one decade
differed from another. Minority groups learned from experience which
communities and individuals were friendly and avoided the others.
To non-Caucasians, prejudice and discrimination were as real
and concrete a factor in their lives and fortunes as weather and taxes.
They learned to let the Caucasians make the first move, for the
Caucasians had two standards, one for themselves, one for non-Cauca-
sians. Only the unusual had a single standard. This waiting led to
reserve, caution, mys teriousness, ins cru tabili ty, deviousness, or
sinisterness, or whatever word one chooses to call the one-way screen
which came to separate, as the result of prejudice, Caucasians and
Orientals. Experience taught the Japanese and Chinese, as it taught.
other minority group members, that the burdens of adjustment were on
their backs. If they could not get them off they would hhve to leaxn
to carry them as easily as possible.
What \Vest Coast residents, including some Japanese, called
"Japanese psychologY" did not have: a "Made-in-Japan" label but a "Made-
in-Cali.f'ornia" stamp. This Japanese psychology would have been unrec-
ognizable as native Japanese in Tokyo or in Hiroshima. It had its
roots in American attitudes toward non-Caucasians and had been fed with
old -country values reinterpreted in the light of decades of West Coast
living.
Japanese immigrants inherited the patter~ of fears, suspicions,
and jealousies which some whi~ 'pioneers had whipped up on the West
Coast toward the Chinese because of desire to eliminate as much
economic competition as possible in the rich new land and because of
the primitive fear of strangers who ar~ bizarre and externally differ-
ent, as the Chinese were from Westerners in facial characteristics,
pigtails, clothing, language, food, and manners. Other Caucasians pro-
tested the mistreatment of the Chinese and the passage of the Chinese
Exclusion Act because of desire to get them, like European immigrants,
as cheap labor, because of humanitarian reasons, as well as fear of
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international cQnplicatioos with the Far East over discrjJnination
against Asiatics.
~Vhen the Chinese were excluded, the Japanese were brought into
a ready-made climate ot hatred and tension toward Orientals. Organ-
izations were waiting to get the Japanese excluded as they had the
Chinese. The Chinese Exclusion League changed its name to the Japa-
nese and Korean Exclwion league and went to work. Later it took the
name ot the Cali£ornia Joint Immigration ComMittee. It substituted
the slogan lIThe Japs lIDlSt go" £or the slogan "The Chinese must go."
At times the excesses o£ the anti-Qrientalists were so notorious that
Presidents o£ the United States had to request the ~'{est Coast, led by
Cali£ornia, to moderate its behavior because of the threat to American
relations with Japan and the Far East in general. Protests o£ church
and educational leaders as well as Presidents, did not prevent restric-
tive and discrimi~to~ State and r:ational legislation £ram being
passed. The alien land laws prohibited the Chinese and Japanese from
purchasing f~ land. The E:x:cl~ion Act of 1924 denied Japan tl1e
token number o£ 100 immigrants a year, a courtesy extended to all oth-
er nations with limited immigration. Some o£ the same pe~le and same
organizations were still active in 1942, led the demand for wholesale
evacuation, and saw their slogan, liThe Japs must go," temporarily
realized. I
.
. Had it not been for their race, or rather had it not been £or
those who made an iSsue of race, Americans generally would have wel-
comed the Japanese immigrants, the Issei or first generation, as de-
sirable newcomers. Their high standards of literacy, education, in-
dust~, thrift, f~ly idealS, community cooperation, respect £or law,
and desire for sel£-~provement were qualities admired by an American
with Puritan and pioneer traditions. Although many immigrants ~ame
from the Japanese peasantry, a goodly proportion were younger sons
from middle-class families. Of the men still alive and in America
in 1940, 80 percent had received, before leavirg Japan, the equivalent
of American high school education; 10 percent had been to college
either in Japan or the United States; most of the others had been to
prima~ schools.
The Issei put their roots down in America. Like most immigrants
they saved their low wages from heavy labor on ranches, railroads,
mines, and lwnber camps to start their O\"in .farr.1S, small bu.sinesses, and
professions. The cultural background and character traits of the
stable and adaptable Issei insured that they did ndt remain the 19v1er
economic and ~ocial stratum. They soon moved up the scale to climb the
various rungs of the middle-class ladder. Their pioneer period from
1870 to 1908 ended \vith many of them financially able to send back to
their native prefectures for vlives and to go into busil1ess for them-
selves. Relatively fe~1 rer,~ined bachelors and lived as trwwients
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: folloi'~ing the crops.
During the second period from 1908 to 1921 they built families
and businesses and nurtured sentimental and economic bonds with the
adopted countrJ. Ma~ who failed, or had made the money they had came
for, went back to the old country. The hardy and successful remained
to build up a stable conmronity life, to adopt American modes of liv-
ing and business practices, and to given their children i~~rican edu-
cations. The peak of the birth. ro.te occurred in 1921. From 1921 to
1941 the Issei VJere busy raising and providing far their American-born
children, the r~isei, or second generatiDn, most of .molfl were :barely
on the verge of Iuaturity when Pe~rl Harbor came. After 1924 vihen the
Exclusion Act Vlas passed, agitation and persecution of Issei by anti-
Oriental groups quieted down. Few Nisei, therefore, had much first-
hand experience ~ith discrimination except in getting white ~ollar
and professional positions until Pearl Harbor. Stories oi burned
homes, smashed windows, and IBrsonal attacks were familiar to them
only froIfi reIKLniscences of their parents about the old rough and
tw.ilile days of the California frontier.
Like other immigrants, Issei sought out people from their O\'in
country and particularly from their own pre:fecture. In their pioneer
days they worked in gangs under a boss vlho sel~ed thenl as business
!n<.1.nager and negotiator with employers. uter vvhen theY' married they
drew together into cOf,1mUnities either in scattered rural districts
or in coPgested city areas. During the years just before Pearl Harbor,
SOIne were moving into better residential dIstricts." away from the
Japanese cofmnunity.
San Fpancisco, the original nucleus because it was the major
'p,qrt of entry, was replaced as their population center by Los Angeles.
When southern California began to boom, the Japanese, like millions of
other American residents, were attracted to the region. Japanese set-
tlements sprang up also in Washington and Oregon. Because northern
discrimination never vias ~ virulent as California, the Japanese to
the north were better assirnilated and tended to belong to a higher
income and educational level than those to the south. Around Hood
River, Oregon, a few acquired land, before the alien land law was
passed, in partial payment for clearing off the forest. This land
they developed SO well that their less energetic neighbors have tried
to get it away from them ever since.
Like other immigrants, the Japanese clung to their native lan-
guage and depended on their American-born children to aid them in af-
fairs outside the colo~ which required a knowledge of English. They
also tried to pass on their language apd cultural values as.a heritage
to their children. Their emphasis on respect for age and family ties
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-created a strong and tight discipline within the family until the
maturing Nisei began to rebel and reach out more successfu~y all the
time for the independence they saw other American adolescents enjoy-
ing.
Though the Issei had attitudes and experiences similar to
those of other immigrants to America, two factors gave their pattern
of life peculiar emphasis, created paradoxes, and fostered much of
the Caucasian uncertainty and suspicion so noticeable at the time of
Pearl Harbor. The first major factor is the discrimination and prej-
udice which certain V{est Coast groups showed the Orientals from the
time they first came to America. The second roajor factor is the Nat-
uralization Statt!te of the United States, dated 1790. Its effect is
to deny Japanese aliens the right to become naturalized citizens of
the Nation where they have chosen to establish businesses, make homes,
live out the major part of their lives, and raise and educate children
who are legally American citizens. More than anything else this has
determined the essential nature of the psychology of the Japanese ~
migrants in America.
Because American citizenship is denied them, the Issei are in-
voluntary subjects of the Emperor. If they do not want to become
people without a country, they must ma~ntain their citizenship in
Japan, the country of their birth, since the country of their choice
will not give them legal st~tus as its citizens. ~e hostility of the
anti-Orientalists has driven home to Issei the need for a national
power to protest for them to the highest American authorities whenever
violence and mistreatment occur. They must have a country to which
they can return if the ever-present spectre of deportation constantly
dangled before them ever becomes a reality.
On the foundation stone dated 1790, West Coast anti-Oriental-
ists have built a pyramid of discriminatory State legislation which
permits only citizens and persons eligible for citizenship to own and
rent agri,cultural land and to acquire certain commercial licenses.
Not only Oriental aliens but American citizens wishing to trade with
them have been handicapped. In an interlocking and complex society
like the United States, economics ignore racial barriers when it is
profitable to do so. A network of evasive techniques to carryon
business within the letter of the law has developed side by side with
counter techniques to detect and prosecute evasions whenever political
capital can be made of the "Yellow Peril." Since the Issei could not
buy land in their own names, they bought it in the names of their
American citizen children, thus depending more than most immigrants on
their children for aid in business.
(26)
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In the early years of the century, vicious attacks on Issei in
San Francisco streets 'led President Theodore Roosevelt, at the re~est
of Japan, to protest to California about the attacks and the attempt
to segregate Oriental school children. At this same time the Issei,
feeling that Japan was too distant and they must cultivate self-reli-
ance, began to give their separate prefectural societies (kenjir~ai)
a superstructure called the Japanese Association for the purpose of
protecting fellow countrymen in America from anti-Japanese factions.
Almost every community had its Japanese; Association. It served as
economic and agricultural coordinator, social service agency, chamber
of commerce, town council, intermediary with the larger American com-
munity, and source of leadership.
The Association, the prefectural societies, and the producer-
marketing cooperatives created a closely knit community wherever the
Japanese lived in any number. This highly organized colony with its
bonds tightened by the need to unite against discrimination made the
Japanese known to the West Coast as a people who stuck together.
They often ~arreled bitte~ly among themselves, especially over eco-
nomic matters, but when friction and dissension~ whatever the cause,
seemed in danger of being known to the outside, the leaders said,
"Let's forget it. After all, we are all Japanese together." Community
solidarity together with strong parental control over the family re-
sulted in an almost negligible rate of crime, juvenile delin~ency, and
dependence on public assistance.
The concentration of the Japanese into their own colonies and
their specialization in food-raising and food-distribution occupationsfocused attention on them as a special group, though numerically they
were an insignificant percentage of ~he total West Coast population.
Caucasians could not dismiss them with 8lmlsed contempt as they did some
minorities who survived only as cheap labor or tourist curiosities.
They endowed Japanese success in the face of legal, social, and eco-
nomic restrictions with the same aura of mysteriousness and sinister-
ness as their personalities. A Tulare County resident, who with other6
had formed the Orosi Home Guard after Pearl Harbor to protect Crosi
from the men, women, and children of Japanese descent who lived in thearea, told the Tolan Committee that during the depression when "good, .
hard~orking white people went broke in the Orosi community, the Japa-
nese did not." Nobody in the community, he said, could figure out how
they did it except that they must have had help from outside--from
Japan. White farroors around Hood River when hit by the depression
asked, "How did the Japanese happen to find out that one could make
money on pears while we were going broke on raising apples?" That "you
have to ~et up early tn get ahead of them" was literally true. much to
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the indignation o.f white .farmers who would rather have sta1"ted to
market with theil- fresh produce after dawn than be.fore like their
Japanese competitors.
Because o.f discrimination and inability to get Aaerican citizen-
ship, the Issei could not let themselves be swept along almost uncon-
sciously by the tide o.f assimilAtion like European iumigrants who can
be naturalized and toward whom prejudice gradually dies away as the
years pass. An unnaturalized European can dri.ft along thrwgb the
years, raising a f'amily, buying land, and be buried on AI!1erican soil
without his legal status in America being questioned until, as in
World \.lIar I~, the unnaturalized among the Italians am Germans .felt
the sting of' the label "enemy alien" despite decades of' American res i-
dence.
The Issei have never been permitted to forget that they are not
American citizens and are not eligible to become American citizens.
Reminders face them at every turn-in the law cwrts, at city hall
license windows, in real estate offices, and at the polls.
Each new discriminatory law or wave of discrimination in the
three Coastal states forced them to halt and review the paradox. They
had to reconsider their involuntary dilemma between protecting their
legal status in Japan and making secure their American home and the
country of their children. Every time that their American roots were
threatened, their legal insecurity in the United States was driven
home to them afresh. Their sense of being a minority group was sharp-
ened. They strengthened their community solidarity to survive in
America. A few more gave up bucking the American system and went back
to Japan. Others wondered how far discrimination might go some day.
Would they really be sent back to where they came from, as the anti-
Orientalists constantly threatened to do? They had to be prepared for
either the chance of living out their lives in America with their
American citizen children or the possibility of having to return to the
old country. They must write to the half-forgotten relatives in Hiro-
shima, perhaps send over a child to strengthen the sentimental bond be-
tween grandparents arid parents, and claim their share in the property
. which had till then seamed too insignificant to bother about. It was
a vicious circle. When persecution drove the Issei farther behind the
, one-way screen, the prejudiced among the Occidentals berated them for
being unassimilable as Americans and for being pro-Japan.
The ~acuated People
Between 1931, the date of the Manchurian Incident, and 1941, the
mounting tension between the United States and Japan was etched on the
moods of the Japanese communities in America as if by a seismograph.
(28)
Several splits of varying depth and importance in the community, though
not caused by the Sino-Japanese war, deepened under tension. Issei
were differing from other Issei; Nisei quarreled with Nisei; and Issei
and Nisei were at odds with each other. It was harder to keep the
differences from the larger American community and present the calm
front of the past. Some of the members were acting as individuals or
in groups without consulting the Japanese Association. Individualism
was loosening community solidarity.
The old dilemma of the Issei ached again more poignantly. They
were also concerned about the behavior and future of their children.
Vlhen the United States in 1940 re~ired all aliens to register at the
post office, some of the Nisei were shaken by this reminder of the
complex and insecure status of their Issei parents in America. Regis-
tration of aliens - when the United States was at peace with the world
was for:eboding to both generations in view of the Far Eastern trouble.
Throughout America, people were taking sides in the turmoil of Asia
and Europe. Some of the Issei collected funds and materials for Japaqrelief, often working through relief societies. One called the .
"Military Virtue Society" was renamed "Cherry Blossom Societyf' when
Issei worried that American public opinion, to which decad~s of living
with their paradox had made them keenly sensitive, would object if the
warlike title c~e to their attention. Many such societies and col-
lections were abandoned by 1940 for a variety of reasons. Some Issei
decided that since the United States was obviously becoming more sym-
pathetic to China in the .conflict, they, as residents of America but
citizens of Japan, should be neutral. Others gave up the attempt to
balance themselves first on one side of the' dilemma and then the other
and decided to accept wholly their beclouded American status with its
danger of becoming stateless. All Issei were concerned about their
children who, through birth on American soil, were American citizens.
They wan'~ed to protect and enhance their children's interests. The
boys were being called up in the draft to serve in the United States
Army. The coIlUnunity gave them big parties, alternating "banzais" with
"God Bless America" and congratulating the draftees on the opportunity
to serve the United States and thereby satisfy both the ancient Japa-
nese tradition of loyalty and the authority under which one lives.
What Issei worried about in regard to their Nisei children was
that they "sometimes seemed like strangers to them in their language,
manners, and attitudes. The Japanese language schools had been of
scant value, after all in teaching the children enough Japanese to talk
with their parents. The broken English of some parents and the halting
Japanese of the children could not bridge the gulf between generations,
particularly immigrants and their children of a group with unusual
problems. The Issei had expected after the Nisei had proved themselves
8&ture and responsible to relinquish gra~ually the control of the ~
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community, the family, and the business to them. Most Nisei, however,
were still of high school age or youpger, so that this was still for
the future. The children, for the most part, had distinguished them-
selves in public school to the pleasure of their parents for their
good scholastic attainments, excellent behavior., and attractive appear-
ance. They were kept busy with school and chores at home and a round
of picnics and other social activities sponsored by the public school,
language school, Buddhist and Christian Sunday Schools, prefecture
societies, produce companies, Boy and Girl Scouts, and teen-age clubs
called names like Aces and Acettes.
Among~the older Nisei were some who were called "reg'Jlar Issei
type" while among the Issei were men and women with the point of view
of "typical Nisei." By and large, the major lines were by generations.
The older Nisei often argued among the~elves and rebelled against
community and Issei. control. The conservative Issei leadership as rep-
resented by the Japanese Association was still unshaken, but more and
more Nisei businessmen were organizing their own service clubs and
chambers of commerce to do business outside the colony without consult-
ing the Association.
One Nisei organization was the Japanese American Citizens
League which in 1941 had some 50 chapters in the United States, most
of them on the vVest Coast. Unsympathetic with the Issei desire to see
Nisei interpret to other Americans what Issei saw as good in Japanese
culture, it considered its function to be that of aiding Nisei to
solve those mutual problems which could not be settled by individual
effort. Because of their heritage of social and economic problems
caused by American hostility toward the ISsei, the JACL Nisei hoped
through organization not only to protect their own civil rights as
American citizens but to alleviate and improve Issei status in America.
Essentially they turned their backs upon Japan and tackled the problems
)f life in America for persons of Japanese descent. The conservative
Issei, cynical from their long-time paradox, often viewed the JACL
critically and skeptically. They wondered if the !N.tsei should, or ever
Mould be permitted by Caucasians, to forget that tH~y were Japanese.
'tlhile the JACL may have seemed bold -and rGsh to some Issei,
there were a few college Nisei about the time of Pearl Harbor who 
dubbed the JACL as reactionary and criticized them for their frequently 
close relations with the American Legion, chambers of commerce, D.A.R., 
and similar groups. JACL leaders often regarded such Nisei (for
example, some who joined Young Democrat clubs), in turn, as intellec-
tuals, radicals, and even communists.
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The Kibei--tiisei who had received some education in Japan--had
their own groups. Those who did join the JACL often organized their
own chapters. They felt "different" and were regarded somewhat as
outcasts by Nisei whose education had been entirely in the United
States. The Kibei were no more homogeneous as a group than the Issei
and the American-educated Nisei. Some Kibei saw eye to eye with
elderly Issei. Others bitterly condemned their parents for having
sent them to Japan which did not want them and because when they re-
turned to America they were handicapped by their poor Eng~sh, greater
emotional maturity, and un-California-like manners. Diverse reasons
had led the Issei to send one or more children to Ja~-to please the
child t s grandparents, to take off some of the parents t economic burden
until they had established themselves, to be cared for if one parent
had died, to learn Japanese language and culture to prepare for export-
ing and other positions. .Vhatever the parents treasons, the returning
Kibei often exhibited the psychology of a rejected child who finds it
difficult to adjust himself to the parents and siblings who had rejected
him earlier. Some Nisei claimed that the Kibei were like bats in the
old folktale of the war between mammals and birds; whichever side was
winning would be joined by the bats.
Not all, even of the mature Nisei, Kibei, and Issei, had taken
well-defined stands on the issues that faced them regarding the future
of both aliens and citizens of Japanese origin. Most persons, and the
Japanese in America were no exception, drifted along, vaguely arguing
at times over the international and national problems affecting them,
but usually living from day to day and settling ~estions as they
arose. By the time of Pearl Harbor, the groups described were fairly
well outlined. They were bickering with each other, and when the
crisis of the declaration of war came the splits were to tear the dis-
integrating community asunder.
Despite the long strained relations between the United States
and Japan, Pearl Harbor was as much of a shock to the West Coast Japa-
nese as to the rest of. the United States. They too heard the news
with incredulity. They had the additional anxiety, however, of what
it would mean to them as individuals with Japanese faces and as members
of a group with the same racial origin as the enemy. Over and over,
retrospective accounts of this period use the same stock phrases to
indicate shock, confus~on, and apprehension, "Then, ocx)Ml Pearl Harbor.
We lived in darkness after that."
A high school boy wrote~
liMy first thought was, what will people think or feel
toward us at school tomorrow. All day long, I moped
around the house with a face longer than a horse, but
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the incident that knocked the wind out of me was when
the man my father was working for was taken by the FBI
because they said he was an enemy alien and very dan-
gerous to the country * * * The morning after, at school,
I am proud to say that everyone treated us like Americans
which we are."
The events of the month after Pearl Harbor were a surprise both
to Issei and Nisei. Many older people had the same experience as the
school children. Their Caucasian ac~aintances and friends went out
of their way to reassure them that they drew a distinction between
them and the enemy in Japan. Most restrictions under which Issei and
Nisei lived during December 1941, were self-imposed. They wished to
be as inconspicuous as possible, a course of protective action for
themselves recommended by some civic authorities who. had not grasped
the attitude of watchful tolerance most Caucasians were adopting
toward the Japanese. Through the months, the exceptions mounted;
nonetheless, those West Coast people who spat upon the Japanese, made
obscene remarks, and kept them off streetcars an~ buses were exceptions.
The principal restrictions on enemy aliens, which the Issei now
were, included the freezing of funds, the closing down of foreign
language newspapers, and prohibition on travel beyond a few miles.
Many Issei who had been- prominent in societies to collect funds to aid
Japan in the Sino-Japanese war were picked up by the FBI. This the
Japanese communities considered expectable. Nisei, though not subject
to any restrictions since they were American citizens, were fre~ently
requested, because of their Japanese appearance, to show birth certi-
ficates or other evidences of citizenship.
By late December, fear began to spread through the apprehensive
Japanese communities as the result of rumors of Filipino attacks on
California Japanese. Though such attacks were extremely infrequent,
the atmosphere of fear and inability to get reliable information led
to the multiplication of rumors. In January, the FBI stepped up its
raids for contraband, which received headline attention and focused
new public attention on the Japanese communities. The old pack of
anti-Oriental propaganda cards was being reshiJvffled, so ithat by the
end of January the anti-Oriental newspapers and org~zations were
again at work and c~ for the removal of all Japanese aliens from
strategic areas on the West Coast. The first restricted zones were
announced by the Attorney General of the United States. Japanese,
along with Germans and Italians, left homes in these zones and moved in
with friends outside. This period saw the first widespread rumors
about a mass evacuation, not of Japanese aliens alone but also of
Germans and Italians. Little was said, even by the most bitterly anti-
Oriental counties and organizations of removing the American citizeD
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children of any enemy aliens. That was an aspect of mass evacuation
which blazed up like a flash fire. It was more than the anti-Japanese
factions, who had been operating tOY 50 years, had ever dared to hope
for.
February, the low point of American failures in the Pacific war
and of morale in the United States, was a month of panic for the Japa-
nese communities. All adult men among the fishermen of Terminal Island
near Los Angeles were picked up by the FBI on a blanket warrant without
warning. There were more and more pick-ups everywhere. No one knew
why certain men were picked and others left. Those who were left were
regarded suspiciously by the communities as informers. When they in
turn we~e apprehended they felt a sense of relief that at least the
onus of being informers on ~1nnocent men had been lifted from them. A
little girl wrote, "I heard that the FBIs were taking all Japanese
fathers to detention camps and I was thinking that they were going to
take my father too." An Issei father with a reputation in the commu-
nity for his anti-fascist convictions was interned for 6 months. He
,aid:
WWhen I was first taken by the FBI I felt very mu~
ashamed. I thought, 'What have I done that this dis-graceful thing should happen to me. Bad men will be .
interned and I will be among them.! I felt very sad.
But when we got to jail I saw there all tne leaders of
the Japanese community, men who were respected an~ whom
I knew would not do anything wrong. I felt that I was
in good company and did not feel so bad about it any-
more."
The people who were left behind suffered from lack of leadership.
Rwnors of ill treatment by the FBI, which was equated with the dread
"thought police" of Japan, spread. There were stories of pretended
FBI agents who entered homes to steal money and possessions. Men re-
viewed their past and racked their brains to figure out what they might
ever have done which to a Caucasian would be suspicious or dangerous.
Any"thing connected ~th Japan and any paper with Japanese writing, even
account books, were rumored to be suspected by the inte~gence agen-
cies. Families burned their collections of Japanese dolls, books,
family photographs, anything and everything that would suggest Japan
to a Caucasian. Men who had not yet been picked up had packed suit-
cases waiting since no one knew who would be next or why.
The community had lost its old and respected leaders. The of-
fices of the Japanese Association had closed after Pearl Harbor. The
office of the Japanese Consul was, of course, empty. The people left
behind had no one to go to for advice and information. They turned to
~ -
the JACL which the American authorities were coming to regard their
liaison with the Japanese communities. I~ general, the JACL advocated
full cooperation with the American authorities, objected to opposition
to any regulations, and, whatever occurred, told the people to endure
it as part of their contribution to American war effort.
In puzzling over the reason for the apprehension of leaders
whom the community was certain were not dangerous to the United States, .
people concluded that there must be informers among themselves who were
twisting the truth and lying to get these leaders into jail. The rumor
that the FBI paid an info~er $25 per head created the additional rumor
that informers were turning in people whom they had personal grudges
against. Most suspicion centered on the JACL. It was rumored that
they were advocating evacuation of the Issei in order to buy out Issei
holdings and entrench themselves economically. They were accused of
charging exorbitant prices for legal services which an alien could have
performed for nothing at the post office&. For lack of knowing why
their communities had been so disrupted bl the FBI, people turned upon
the JACL and used it for a scapegoat. In the meantime, despite the
hostile rumors, they depended upon the JACL to represent them and keep
them advised of what the authorities wanted them to do.
Community solidarity and org~zation crumbled. People still
had an intense bond with each other since they were still "all Japanese
together," but the splits had divided them. The greatest public airing
of them came at a Tolan Convnittee hearing when one of the "Young Demo-
crats" sent a letter to the Conmittee attacking the JACL and discred-
. iting it. The unhappy Issei shook their heads. The Nisei had been
demanding to be boss for a long time; they had their chance, and they
were making a mess of it. Both Nisei and Issei, as well as separate
i factions among them, still retained enough of the old "We are all Japa- .
I nese together" feeling to fear that hotheads among them might do some-
thing wild and rash which would plunge the entire group into danger.
As February turned into March, the communities began to fear
that even the American citizenship of the Nisei, which had been so
highly regarded both by their parents and themselves, would not protect
them and that they too would be evacuated. Uprooted people from the
prohibited zones were creating a leaven of despair. No one knew which
area would be named next. Regulations changed from one day to another.
Authorities denied that there would be maSs ~vacuation. The newspapers
said that there would be. Then, early in March, the Western Defense
Command announced that all persons of Japanese descent, regardless of
citizenship, were being encouraged to leave voluntarily the western
half of the Coastal States. People got ready to move. Many households
now consisted of only a non~nglish speaking Issei mother and her im-
mature children. Upon them fell the burden of packing, selling, and
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tak~ng care of property. The ISsei father in jailor already 1n a deten-
tion camp was unable to assist them.
As Japanese began to move into the eastern half of the Coastal
States and over the Rockies, protests began to rise from these areas
against being "dumping grounds." Even some of the Japanese communities
east of the Rod<ies protested. They did not want any "Japanese Okies"
! from California disrupting their life and endangering their situation.
! So great ~as the protest that voluntary evacuation was ordered stopped
until plans could be made for mass evacuation of the remaining Japanese
into reception centers and later into more permanent camps.
March was a nightmare period for people of Japanese descent. Same
Nisei in the American Army were being discharged, and local boards were
referring others; their American citizenship had not protected their civ-
il rights. They were being removed only because of suspicion, but the
very fact of their being removed at all was beginning to make the larger
American community feel that there must be cause for suspicion. Issei
saw the business and security of a lifetime vanis~. However, it was the
little things, the small day-t,o-day incidents that hurt far II:Iore than the
mass rejection qy America of a people who had helped pioneer the West.One of the evacuees wrote: '
"1 think ~ome of us were a little relieved to be away fran
the minor irritations, the insults, slander, and the small
humiliations unthinking people heaped upon us after Pearl
Harbor. Many people may say, 'Well, that's to be expected,'
but to be unable to go out in the streets, or just to the
corner store, without the fear of being insulted, and being
all tense inside with that sam~ fear, was one qf the most
humiliating things * * *. What could we do? Nothing. Just
endure in silence. Those are the things that are locked in
the hearts of many of us. Not big things, but many small
things. We became 'sullen and morose' but can we help it?
We were not sullen and morose, just leery of any kind ad-
vance.n
Another wrote later z
wrou can't tell me anything about military necessity in con-
. nection with evacuation * * *. One man down in ]ro?erial
Valley broadcast how muQh of a menac~ and danger the Japanese
were. His brother was running up and dOYm the Valley buying
up Japanese land cheaply. In northern California they let
the Japanese put in all their crops. Then about 3 days be-
f°:t:e harvest, when the Japanese had put in all the 1fOrk and
money, they discovered a 'military necessity' and evacuated
them. Others got the benefit of their investment and efforts."
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.A woman said:
"Everybody took advantage of us. Some people took things
when we wefe not watching. While we were packing inside the
house, these people would go a round the back and take every-
thing they saw * * *. It was difficult to keep our tempers.
For seventeen years, Dad and Mother had struggled to build
up their business. Every profit they made was put into the
store for remodeling and improving it little by little. At
the same time they were raising four little kids. When they
finally reached the peak of their business success and had
nothing to worry about, 19hen they finally succeeded in rais-
ing four children and sending them through high school and
even had one attending college-Boo.I came evacuation and our
prosperity crumbled to pieces * * *. The precious 48 hours
notice we had in 19hich to pack passed like a nightmare..
Rumors spread that even the citizenship of the Nisei was to be
taken from them. Some did not see what difference it made. It seemed
unnecessary irony.
The buses gathered in town after town on scheduled dates-or lat~
--and the Japanese departed. The other townspeople saw them go, some of
them for the first time realizing what was happening as they saw hundred.
of their friends, customers, and anployees of many years with their bun-
dles and suitcases, which was all they could take, getting on trains and
buses to leave. Some evacuees remarked the kindnesses of strangers 19ho
brought them cups of water when the buses came to a temporary halt, and
harked back to the day in Terminal Island when the bus driver dropped
his cap and sl<M'ly picked it up to give the women atxi children a chance
to say goodbye to the men who were being taken away to internment camps.
Rumors were floating about of the bad conditions at Manzanar, one of the
reception centers. Some people said the United States was gathering all
Japanese into a few places; then 'Iilen the Pacific war got wnrse they woo:
bomb them in retaliation.
A puzzled young Nisei aske~:
"What had I, or, as a mat ter of fact, what had the rest of
us dom, to be thrown in camp, away from fmniliar surround-
ings, and familiar faces? What had there been in my life
that made such a thing happen? The only answer is, the acci-
dent of my birth--my ancestry. There is no other 199ical
answer."
He wondered how he ever came to be going to a camp fUll of Japanese,
aliens and citizens alike, with nothing much in common between them and
himself except the color of their skins.
()6)
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The Federal, state, and lreal authorities who had evacuated them
answered, and their answer was reDeated to the Nisei and the Issei by the
JACL:
~ou are not being accused of any crime. You are being re-
moved only to protect you and becaus e there might be one of
you who might be dangerous to the United States. It is your
contribution to the war effort. You should be glad to make
the sacrifice to proVe your loyalty. n
It is notable that sworn statements f~om Honolulu police and FBI offi-
cials declared that all rumors of resident Japanese in the Hawaiian Is-
lands assisting the enemy on December 7 or hindering the American forces
were false. The resident Japanese, on th( contrary, had cooperated
with American officials in every way. The attorney general of Califor-
nia had said there had been no sabotage of any kind in that State since
the war. There were no charges against thE West Coast Japanese, thAr~-
fore, of disloyalty, espionage, t)r sabotage- Only suspicion, fear, and
~certainty motivated their ranova1l by thE ~'Uthorities.
Thus ended one chapter in the history of the Japanese in America.
The next opened in the dust of Manzanar, the smell of the horse. stables
of Santa Anita, the qniet of the Merced Fair Grounds, and other race
tracks and fairgrounds of the West Coast, where the. people went to wait
until the relocation centers were built.
F
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By late May 1942, all but a f~w thousand of the 110,000 persons
of Japanese ancestry on the West Coast were confined in the Arrow's as-
sembly centers. The places of confinement consisted of 16 converted
fairgrounds, race tracks and atbletic stadiums, 13 of them in Califor-
nia, the others i~ Oregon, Washington and Arizona. In them the 30,000
families were li~ng under crowded conditions, clos~ surveillance and
with no knoi~ledge of what would happen to them next. There were rumors
, that they would be released to seek a living somewhere to the East.
~ere were more rumors of camps being built in remote parts of the in-
terior, perhaps agricultural communities where they could live peace-
fully until the war was over. Other rumors spoke of hot and terrible
places where men who protested about food or other conditions in the
assembly centers were to be sent. There was despair, hope, apathy and
intense speculation, but no one knew what was. in store.
Then in June, with gathering momentum, the next phase of the
forced migration got under way. At ~he former migratory labor camp'do-
ing duty near Sacramento as an assembly center. trains were loaded with
men, women, children and babies and moved northward to unload their car-
go near mE; little town of Tulelake, California. Here the rough bar-
racks of one of the first relocation centers were still under construc-
tion. Farmefs from the rich 'Salinas Valley were transported to the
Arizona desert. San Francisco business men were sent from the Tanforan
race track to the bare, intermountain valleys of central Utah. From
the fertile Central Valley of California to the sandy flat lands of
eastern Colorado, from southern California to the plains of Wyoming,
from the moist coastland of the Northwest to the sagebrush plains of
southern Idaho, from the San Joaquin Valley to the woodlands of Arkansas
-the trains moved during the spring, summer and early fall.
For the involuntary travelers, the break with the accustomed and
the usual was now complete. In the assembly centers, behind fences and
under guard by military police, the evacuees had suddenly found them-
selves, although looking out at familiar hills and highways, in a
strange, new world~6f social relationships. They were outcast, but
still in their own country. Now the new world of human relations was
matched by an ~qually strange physical world. It was clear, as the
trains moved over the wasteland of the mountain states, that they were
to be exiled in desert and wilderness.
Compared with the rapidity of movement from homes to assembly
centers, the second phase of the forced migr~tion was a long-drawn-out
process. Beginning in May, it was not comoleted until NOvember. To
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those still in the assembly centers letters came back from the new
places, stories of 'heat and dust, of fears about inadequate food-and
medical care, but also some mention of new freedoms and nevr possibi1i-.
ties for the future. Three of the relocation centers were filled by the
end of July. The Manzanar center in California merely passed on June 1
from Army to WRA management without transfer of people. Qpening in ear-
ly May, Poston in Arizona received several thousand persons directly
from their homes with no interval of residence in assembly centers. Tule
Lake center in northern California and Gi 1a in Southern Arizona received
their trainloads from the assembly centers in June and July. Another
trio of centers--Minidoka in Idaho, Heart Mountain in Wyoming, and Gra-
nada in Colorado--began to be filled up in August. The last three--To-
paz in central Utah and the two Arkansas centers, Jerome and Rohvrer--
vrere not occupied until September, October and ~rovember.
The length of time that people spent in the assembly centers had
important influences on their adjustment in the relocation centers. In
general the longer the stay in the assembly centers, the more the relo-
cation centers seemed at first like something. of a release. There was a
1i tt1e more freedom of movement wi thin the new places and a little less
obvious restriction in the form of fences and guarding soldiers. More-
over those who spent tyrO to five months in assembly centers learned much
about living with one another. They had made many basic adjustments by
the time they arrived in the relocation centers. Some of the friction
between younger and older people and among long standing factions in the
former communities had been fought out. The adjustment in the new camps,
therefore, went a little more smoothly.
What took place in the relocation centers was also related to the
stage of development of WRA po1i Cy at the time pe~p1e arrived. The ear-
ly occupied centers--Manzanar, Poston, Tu1e Lake and Gi1a--began their
efforts at community living before the framework of WRA policies had
fully crystallized. Employment and resettlement plans, both of major
significance for the adjustment of evacuees to their new life, as well
as less vi tal policies vrere by no means defined through May, June and
July. This made for greater uncertainty, both among staff and evacuees,
in the early centers. In the later centers; on the other hand, the peo-
ple had at the start more definite Unders~nding of the limitations and 1
possibilities of center life. There were fewer unfulfilled expectation! 'i
and false starts.
The ]mpact of the Relocation Centers
-
The .new physical mould into which peopie had to fit was a rigid
one. The relocation centers were built by Army engineers according to
standard plans for housing a young, unmarried, male population. They
were Army camps of a type called theatre of operations, that is, tempo-
rary constructions nA~igned for only a few years' ~-"e:. They consisted
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of tar paper covered, wooden barracks 100 feet long, grouped into What
were cB.11ed blocks. Each block was composed of two rows of six or seven
barracks each, betw~en which were a messhall, a laundry room, latrine
and lavatory buildings, and another barrack to be used as a recreation
hall. Heart Mountain was a variant in that two such units composed a
block of 24 barracks. The families were to sleep in the barracks, eat,
wash clothes and bodies, go to the toilet, and play in the communal
buildings in the center of the block.
At the start each block framed the life of 250.to 300 people.
The usual center consisted of about 30 such moulds into Which the people
were poured, bus1oad by bus1oad, as they came from the railroad stations
to the centers. Lined out with precision, the blocks stretched in rows
and crossrows, with dust and the debris of construction in the spaces
between. At the edge of the outer blocks the view was of desert hills,
sagebrush plains, or, in the Arkansas centers, of dark woodland. Empha-
sizing the newness and the isolation, roads from the railheads into the
camps were still under construction When the evacuees arrived.
At one edge of the blocks, often separated from them by a broad
firebreak, were a few more barracks or somewhat more solidly built
houses where the WRA staff lived and where the offices of the agency
were being established. Here, too, there was usually a common messha11
and laundry room. Some distance away, but in sight of the blocks, was
another miniature Army camp housing the military police whose job it wasto patrol the boundaries of the camp am supervise arrivals and depar- '
-tures.
None of the centers was finished when the first trainloads of
evacuees began to arrive. Construction crews were still nailing on
roofs, building more barracks, finishing up the water installations, or
doing other jobs in the basic construction. At Vinidoka the workmen
kept just one block ahead of the incoming evacuees. At Gila, Heart
Mountain and Granada some evacuees slept in 'laundry rooms or recreation
halls on the first. nights after arrival, because of insufficient bar-
racks space. Not even the latest occupied of the centers WAre thorough-'-
1y ready for their first arrivals.
There were a number of reasoqs for the unfinished condition of
the camps--reasons which reflected ~he nature of the framework in which
evacuees were to live and WRA staff !were to work. In the first place,
the whole movement was planned with it he utmost haste. When the evacu-
ation order was given, Army officia~s had not foreseen the need for re-
location centers for all evacuees. It was-only after opposition ap-
peared to unpo1iced movement of evaouees into the 9tate~ east of Cali-
fornia that the idea of relocation d~nters for everyone crystallized.
Sit~s were selected, and work started on the first center only in early
April' a few weeks before the last assembly q~nters were filled.
rImmediately the problem arose of finding sufficient labor and materials
for construction in a country that was gearing itself rapidly for war-
time production. The scarcity of lumb~r, pipe, stoves. wallboard and
many other essentials was from the first an obstacle ana continued to be
for months after evacuees had been moved into the centers. The fact
that the Army assumed responsibility only for getting evacuees into and
out of assembly centers, while the civilian agency of the WRA had re-
sponsibili~ for receiving and caring for evacuees the moment the Army
relinquished supervision was an important factor. The plans of the two
agencies were not always well coordinated.
Thus the evacuees were unloaded in the centers on the littered,
bare ground of construction jobs yet in progress. Everywhere still
fresh in the dust were the marks of the bulldoz'ers, for the construc-
tion crews had cleared from the sites all brush, trees and whatever
greenery there had been. O'nly in the Ar~ansas centers were a few trees
left in corners of the camps. The earliest impression of almost every-
one'who came to the centers was of drabness and dust. The assistant
project director at Minidoka described the opening of that center:
"It was hot, dusty, desolate. Flat land, nothing growing
but sagebrush, not a tree in sight * * *. Bulldo;ers were
still filling in ditches While registration went on; the
air was chOked with dust; so were the people. The evacuees
had gotten off a train pulled by a c"oal-burning locomotive,
and were black with Boot * * *. Next day the girls on the
L8dvancf!1crew showed up, their hair grey from dust,' but
otherwise clean and fresh; crisp, ironed blouses- that were
spotless * * *. ~!7 have never understood how they man-
aged."
A month after Poston opened a young evacuee wrote:
tt~r mouths are always ~i tty, and the rooms including the
mess halls cannot be kept clean even by closing all the
doors and windows because there are so many cracks in the
walls and floors. From abou~ 1:.30 p. m..daily, the wind
rises, and often we can't see half mole - ahead due to the
dust cloud. Each step we take we stir up dust. Dust set-
tles on the typewriter and is noticeable even while writ-
ing a letter."
The reports officer described the e~rly days of another center:
"There was a dust storm near~y every day for the first two
months * * ~ fine, choking d~st * * * swirled over the center.
Traffic was sometimes forced to a standstill because there
was no visibility. Sometimes. standing in one barracks,
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Ianpther barracks 40 feet away couldn't be seen. People de- 
vised masks and filters of various kinds and plugged their 
ears and noses with cotton~ The various devices made people
look weird in the blowing dust. n
Staff and evacuees alike began their life in the new places with a sense
of desolation in the midst of isolation, but this was momentary as the
urgency of jobs to do gripped almost everyone.
In every center the unfinished condition of barracks and blocks
was an immediate stimulus to individuals to provide the basic comforts
that were lacking. There was a co.ncentration for the first 5 or 6
weeks on this sort of activity. The dC!J1inant mood was one of busy con-
cern with straightening out the details of living. As famiiles and in-
dividuals completed the process of being unloaded with their baggage
from the buses, registering and signing the forms of induction, they ul-
timately found themselves in bare rooms about 20 feet square or in un-
partitioned barracks. There was nothing in the roams but Army cots and
blankets, no other furniture, no running water, nothing with which to
prepare food or the baby's bottle. Everything remained yet to do to
make the places habitable. Makeshift furniture had to be built if one
could fi nd the lumber. The ground around one's barracks had to be
cleaned up. The administration was requesting workers for innumerable
jobs. Generally there was little time for talk or to get acquainted
wi th one's neighbors; people were too busy, too intent on fixing up
their own roams or on making some of the urgent block improvements, such
as clearing away the debris' of construction.
There was nevertheless anpther note in these first days of center
life. It was a note of dejection and apatQf present in many of the
young men and women from the moment. they stepped off the trains. As one
young married man said:
fflKe haven't fixed up our house any; You don't feel like it
* * *. Some of the people have done very good jobs fixing
. up their places, the ones that have the carpenter knack, you
know. They enjoy that sort of thing and the old people who
don't have anything else to do. But I don't know much about 
that sort of thing. There isn't much incentive to impress
a~body. Everybody's got about the same sort of place to
live in. All we've done is just to figure that we needed
sometning more handy for keeping clothes in, so we ordered
one of those little chests of drawers from Sears, Roebuck
* * *. We got tired of reaching into suitcases."
For him and many others like him--younger people who had been s topped in
midcareer--the centers loomed only as a blank interlude in what had been
up to then a purposeful life. For them thera was no sort of incentive
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in any aspect of the relocation center. Tlley fell immedia~ely into a
sort of waiting state~ immobilized by lack of purpose and unresponsive
both to the bright plans of the administrators for community develop-
ment and to the more modest plans Which older evacuees were beginning to
work out for growing vegetables and beautifying the blocks.
For others who were at first stimulated to work a little for
themselves in fixing up their rooms there was frustration~-a new sort of
frustration connected with living uuder Government supervision:
"The administration told us to mop at least once daily and
to keep everything off the floor at least six inches off the
floor. Now, how were we to keep our belongings six inches
off the floor if we had no lumber with which to build stands?
Every time we mopped we had to put our belongings on top of
the beds. We were told not to take lumber scraps or otherwise
we would get into trouble. The administration promised us
furniture at that time. I couldn't believe this promise so
I gathered scraps of lurnber from here and there and tried
my b,st to build some: crude furniture for the home."
This was a type of experience which was to eDCourage the growth of nega-
tive attitude's during the next few months.
There were also young men for Whom the arrival in the unfinished
desolation of the relocation centers was a last straw. The pent-up emo-
tions of the uncertain period before evacuation and the restricted life
of the assembly centers found vent iImnediately on arrival. in the reloca-
tion center.
"Last Tuesday we were stlddenly ordered to this center from
the Mayer Assembly Center * ~ *. GOvernment showed poor
judgment in sending clean-loving Japanese to this dump.
The whole affair reveals lack of careful planning, lack offoresight,' and utter ignorance of Japanese psychology. ' .
Authority are asking for cooperation and suggestion, I un-
derstand, but such will not be ,forthcoming * * *. I can
see no evidence of the muCh ~aunted ~erican sense of fair
play, sportsmanship, et cetera. The Niseis are sore because
IX) distinction has been made between them and the Isseis,
and grumble that citizenship doesn't mean a damn thing.
The Isseis are laughing at the dumbness of the Americans in
treating us this way. The whole mess is rotten, as far as
we know."
This sort of bitterness was most characteristic of the younger men, col-
lege students or men just beginning their careers. Their feelinR of re-ject.ion by t.he rest of the United states, provoked by evacuation, was °.
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deepened by the remoteness of the centers and the abundant evidences of
hasty and inadequate preparation. Their bitterness was to increase and
find channels for expression later on. Initially there were too many
new and confusing experiences to assimilate and consequently too little
clear grasp of the import of the centers for wide crystallization of
such attitudes.
The full impact of the centers on the different segments of the
evacuee group was not to appear for another month or two. People were
too preoccupied with securing the elementary comforts and. getting used
to new climate, new diet, and new neighbors. It .was not until these
basic adjustments were well begun that people could start to measure
the limitations and possibilities of the new way of life framed by the
centers.
The Administrative Shell
The physical framework within which life would be lived was
quickly apparent. The blocks with their barracks and cammon buildings
point~d to an inescapable patterning. Waiting in turn to brush one's
teeth in the lavatory the morning after arrival, it was clear that
neighbors would be more than neighbors. They would be encountered maqy
times a day in all the most intimate operations of living. In one's
roam there was little escape; already the voices of the children
through the wall on one side and the cough of the man through the wall
on the other were becoming familiar. The view of wasteland or forest
at the edge of the blocks gave a vivid feeling of the ultimate limits
of the new world. There would be no coming and going. The life of the
blocks would be the whole of life.
In contrast the social framework was not so obvious. It was
clear enough to the newly arrived evacuees that they would be extremely
dependent on other persons for everything they needed. One did not
choose what he might eat at breakfast, but ate what someone else had
ordered and the evacuee mess crew placed on the board table. One did
not select a doctor, but went to the hospital and waited for whatever
service was available. This dependence on people whom one had never
seen before was definite enough from the first. It was clear that
food, Shelter and medical attention depended on a group of Government
employees who were to be found at the edge of the center in the admin-
istration buildings, but what kind of people they were and how they
would use their authority remained to be seen. During the first weeks,
the nature of these men and women was discovered by only a small minor-
ity of the evacuees, only those who went up to the offices seeking jobs
and those whom the administrators sought out to take jobs. For the
great majority there was little contact.
During the early weeks the WRA staff in the centers had more of
a sense of unity of purpose and satisfactory relations with evacuees
than at any time thereafter. This wa~ true no less in the early centers
than in the later ones. There was ai_spirit of pitching in together to
do the innumerable jobs that obviously could not wait. Almost every
evacuee was anxious to do whatever he could to make himself as comfor-
table as possible and, usually, to help others to do the same. There
was unity of purpose in getting the messhalls into shape for serving
food, in establishing the hospitals on a working basis, in cleaning up
the blocks, in making the continuing flow of newcomers as comfortable
as possible in their barracks. There was so much to do and everything
was so ur~ent that a spirit of cooperation grew up promptly and con-
tinued for several weeks.
In meeting the recurring emergencies, the WRA staff were working
chiefly with a very special group of evacuees in each center--the "vol-
unteers." Young men and women came directly from their homes to the
early centers, volunteering to help make them ready for the later train-
loads. Advance crews volunteered from the assembly centers to the later
centers to prepare them for the mass movem~nts to come. They were gen-
erally young and vigorous with the determinatiqn to make the best of the
situation and to do whatever needed doing. Their smiling acceptance of
condi tions, their industry and anxiety to help impressed the WRA staff.
Working closely with them, staff found their relations with evacuees
smooth and pleasant..
Relying heavily on the volunteers and those of the" others who
were aggressive enough t~ come up and ask for jobs, the WRA staff
plunged into the task of building up an organization ~hat would func-
tion. Particularly in the early centers organization grew out of the
first contacts between staff members and volunteers. There was, for ex-
ample, immediate need for some competent person who could understand
English to carry out the distribution of food to the messhalls. There
was no time to go over all possible candidates Who might have had some
experience of similar work before evacuation. Hundreds of people had to
be fed promptly. An energet1c young volunteer offered to do the job, or
perhaps suggested a friend of his who he knew was "a good man," and he
was immediately given the responsiblli~ and began to work closely with
the chief steward and the latter's assistants. He reconmended others
with whom he knew he could work well. They recommended others. In sur-
prisingly short time, there were truck drivers, clerks to check the food
into the warehouses and out to the messhalls, and people were getting
the food.
There was only a small starr of WRA employees, less than a hun-
dred at the beginning of each center, to handle everything for 5,000 to
10,000.evacuees. Hence there had to be swift recruitment from among the
evacuees if t.ne necessa~ services were to be carried on. Administrators
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chatted WJ.th J.ndividuals as they passed from the buses or trucks through
the induction lines, learned that this one or that had needed skills,
liked their l,ooks, or consulted with a volunteer or same other evacuee
wi th whom they were already acquainted, and so selected men and women to
take over the urgent jobs. During the first week or t~o every adminis-
trator, by design or accident, gathered a number of volunteers or other
evacuees around him who served as advisers in the selection of person-
nel. They came with suggestions, some inspired confidence in the admin-
istrator, and he took their advice. Through this process organization
emerged in vital areas in the new community life.
Not only in supplying food and getting the messhalls running, but
in manning the hospitals, in setting up a skeleton force of police to
insure law and order, in securing typists and clerks for the indispen-
sable paper work of the Govern~ent agency, men and women were selected
and put to work immediately.
I Out in the blocks away from the administration offices, it was
quickly apparent that a special sort of service was needed. The newly
created social units of the blocks were noW full of people who were
looking to some one to provide them with what they lacked or at least to
answer their questions about what would and would not be provided.
Brooms to sweep their dusty roams, mops to clean up the messhalls, an-
other blanket, soap to wash with--dozens of questions and requests were
coming up every hour. Evidently some one was needed in every block to
distribute and keep track of the mops, buckets, brooms and soap--all
Government property--and aoove all to answer the endless questions of
the suddenly dependent people. The office of block manager was created
and the administrators went about selecting evacuees for the jobs. Block
by block, as each filled up, a person was chosen. The administrators
asked their evacuee advisers about candidates, rejected or accepted some
on their recommendation, or perhaps went ahead on their own judgment and
chose men who seemed capable on the basis of a brief chat. Sometimes
the people of a newly occupied block were asked to choose their 01¥n man.
Sometimes a supervisor of block managers was appointed at the start from
among the volunteers or other early comers and his judgments predomi-
nated throughout in the selection of other block managers.
By the end of the first month, or before, in every center the
framework of administration was formed. Essential services were pro-
ceeding and the life in the blocks was linked to the administrative of-
fices--the $ource of .all supply--through the network of block managers.
Order had been achieved out of the chaotic swirl of human beings moving
from train to bus to barracks. Truckloads of food were moving regularly
through the dust from railheads to messhalls, doctors in clean White
uniforms were making rounds through the hospi tal ~ards, tyPewriters were
pounding in the still partially furnished offices. There were no seri-
ous breakdowns in apy centers. It was art impressive piece of
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In July at Poston the top staff were---f:r;jfng to orient themselves.
In brief daily conferences in the rush of heavy duties, the} were ex-
pressing to one another their views on the possibilities of the peculiar
community that was growing up before them. One staff member wrote down
his ideas in an effort to cIJ~stallize what he and the others were think-
ing:
" * * * the success of the Colorado River Relocation Pro-
ject is dependent on ~ong other things the evacuees iJ
willingness, not only to cooperate, but to erect and acti-
vate a governmental, and a cultural structure 6f realistic
democracy, of their own design within the community; suf-
ficient not onr to the present, but geared to the future
as well * * * an1J the ~athetic, but necessarily realis-
tic approach 0 the administrative personnel to the problem
as a whole, as well as in individual contacts with the
group * * *
n * * * there is an opportunity to share in the accomplish-
ment of a modern miracle * * * the eventual return of every
member of the relocated group to their normal place as mem-
bers of the American Community not only as loyal citizens
or resident aliens, but as better citizens, more realisti-
~ democratic in principle, in thought, and in effect:
temperedl perhaps even more keenly than the rest of us, to
carry forward the 11 ving principles of democracy which all
of us, in our fashionl are fighting for now, and for whose
future all of us must share the responsibility."
This statement represents perhaps an extreme expression of the idealism
that was current among staff in the centers after the first flush of ac-
complishment in setting up the communities. The spirit was by no means
unco~on, however. Eve~ center had at least a small group among the
staff Who were looking at the still nebulous communities in this manner.
It was a period when plans and hopes and some degree of this sort of
idealism dominated staff attitudes.
At the same time, however, weaknesses were beginning to be appar-
ent in the structure which they had already reared. Staff members began
to hear cQnplaints from the canmunity about the rudeness of evacuees now
employed in the offices and whom staff regarded as ve~ polite and re-
spectful. There were complaints about block managers who were said to
be ordering people around, complaints about evacuees in important posi-
tions who it was said were incompetent and yet whom staff regarded a8
industrious and cOnscientious workers. These complaints multiplyaf-
ter the first month or two and reached such volume, especially in the
early centers I that there was no ignoring them. There were charges not
only of rudeness or incompetence of dictatorial ways, but also much more
serious charges. Staff began to hear stories of the dishonesty of eva-
cuees they had placed in responsible jobs in the center organization. A
manager of the community enterprises was said to have been known before
evacuation for sharp practice and shady dealings. Another man known to
staff as a hard worker, cooperative and energetic, was said to have
preyed on other Japanese in various ways in the trying period just fo1- ,
lowing the attack on Pearl Harbor. The charges were not sufficiently
clear-cut to prove or disprove, but they circulated widely in the camps.
Along with such charges usually went others, the full meaning of which
did not become clear for several months. The labels "administration
stooge" and "informer" began to be heard, words at first hardly intelli-
gible to staff. It was clear, however, that they embodied. an extreme
and wides~read distrust toward many of the men and women who had been
given places of responsibility in the center organization.
What had happened was that the administrative framework had grown
like a shell over and above the mass of people. They had nolsense of
having built and sponsored it despite the fact that it was composed for
the most part of evacuees. The evacuees who were part of it were the
volunteers and usually the younger, more aggressive persons who! were
thoroughly a t home in the English language, actually persons who were on
the very fringe of the life in the former Japanese American communities.
As people got more settled and after t~e first weeks began to "feel the
administrative shell impinging on them in the form of a block manager or
a supervisor of a work crew, they began tq as~ questions about how these
persons had gotten the jobs they had. Here was a young man -no as block
manager seemed to antagonize all th~ older people in his block by giving
orders and assuming an authority wtach they did not feel he had. Here
was a young woman whose Japanese was wholly "inadequate trying to advise
people concerning changes in housing which they might or might not make.
There was a young man set up as manager of the newly created stores who
acquaintances knew had only a very limited business experience, while
experienced older business men were acting as janitors in the messha11s.
There was a young man who had earned a bad reputation in the county of
his former residence who obviously had the ear of a top administrator
and was presuming to advise about eve~one's needs. People were begin-
ning to say that it was bad enough to have WRA staff, Who were not yet
fully aware of what the people had gone through and what their problems
were, in the ultimate positions of authority (that could not be helped),
But Why should the next level in the hierarchy consist of these young,
untried, a~ qametimes downright distrusted persons from among their own
number? .
Not all those in what had come to be called the "key positions"
were the targets of such disapproval and distrust. Ma~were thoroughly
respecte~ and their relations with other evacuees were good from the
I start. Particularly in the later centers the greater number of the
first selections met with the approval of the community as a whole. Thus
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for example at Minidoka the staff held meetings with evacuee groups
wi thin a few days after arrival from the assembly center and were influ-
enced by the discussion that was encouraged. They became aware of dif-
ficul ties which had up~et the people in the assembly center and accepted
advice in their selections that originated not from among miscellaneous
acquaintances of a few days but from groups and committees of both older
and younger men who had gone through the experience of trying to work
and live together for three or four'months in the assembly center. In
contrast, it was at Manzanar, Poston, and Tule Lake that an administra-
tive shell was formed at first which consisted chiefly of WRA staff as
yet with little knowledge of the people they were to administer and eva-
cuees not only wi th similar lack of understanding but often also with
definitely antagonistic attitudes to the evacuees as a whole.
The growth of - antagonism from wi thin the community to the rapidly
constructed administrative shell was a source of conflict of far reach-
ing importance in the early centers. There were similar antagonisms in
the later centers, but never quite so much feeling of distance and lack
o£ participation on the part of so many evacuees.
Evacuee and Caucasian
Tied up with the antagonistic reaction to the rapidly forming ad-
ministrative structure was a sharp sense of a new status. As the up-
rooted people came into the centers they suddenly found themselves in
communities organized on the basis of two distinct classes of persons--
on the one hand "evacuees" and on the other "appointed personnel." De-
spite individual efforts of WRA staff to act as if distinctions did not
exist, the basic fact was inescapable. At point after point the earli-
est experiences in the centers drove it home. Later, even though dis-
tinctions often became sharper, they also became customary and were ac-
~epted as a part of the scheme of things.
In the early centers occupied by people with little or no assem-
bly center experience, the consciousness of the new status was acute.
Everyone old enough to understand felt it, the volunteers no less than
the others. The first 11 volunteers to arrive in Poston were escorted
after supper to the block farthest from the administration buildings.
As they made ready to sleep on their cots, they saw military policemen
preparing to stand guard over them through the night. The soldiers were
friendly enough, but they had guns and none of the new arrivals could
forget the fact. A few hours before the young men and women had re-
garded themselves as loyal citizens of the country anxious to help out
in an emergency. Now suddenly after pleasant chats with the WRA staff
they found themselves unmistakably set off from those people and under
guard. The close guarding was quickly eliminated and, at Poston as at
other centers, the military police confin~d their sentry duty to the
outside 'borders of the center, but. other signs of the new status were
jl1st as vivid.
The great majority of evacuees had their first taste of restric-
tion not in the relocation centers, but in the assembly centers. -For
them there was a feeling of some release as they came into the reloca-
tion centers. The military police were far less in evidence. The co~-
finement was not so close. Fences surrounding the centers had not yet
been built. There was consequently some feeling of relative freedom.
Nevertheless the sense of restriction involved in being an evacuee
quickly closed in on them. For fences and armed guards constituted on1)"
the more obvious forms of restriction. Every activity of daily life
i seemed at first to have some reminder of the new status and consequently
J nf the old freedom that had been lost.
As evacuees loOked at their barrack rooms they began to compare
them with the homes of the WRA staff. At Manzanar and TIlle Lake and
other centers many of the staff lived comfortably-in nearby towns and
came and went daily to the centers. Those who lived in the c enters oc-
cupied barracks little better in appearance than the evacuees, but they
were supplied with furniture. At Poston the top staff had well-built
little family houses also supplied with Government furniture. In the
four centers within the Western ~fense Command area, whatever evacuees
ordered from Sears, Roebuck or elsewhere had to be opened for inspection
in the presence of military police. No evacuee could have a camera, and
hence the new babies, the children, and the brides could not be photo-
graphed. Although WRA staff came and went freely, no evacuee could at
first leave the early centers, except for emergency f~ily or business
reasons and then only in the company of someone who was not of Japanese
ancestry. '!here was no fence around Poston until November and there was
90me little freedom to take walks into the surrounding desert or river
botton land. On the other hand at Manzanar which was originally an as-
sembly center there were fences and watchtowers for guards from theI .first. It was, however, equally cammon for the young men of Poston as
for those of Manzanar to speak of the centers as jails and prisons. The
feeling of being prisoners permeated the centers from the first.
It was not only the restrictions, little and big, that defined -
the new status. Being an evacuee involved being in a subordinate posi-
.
tion, a fact Which became apparent as soon as one went to work in the:
center. At first there was uncertainty as to what the wages would be,
but by JUne it was clear Ulat so long as one was an evacuee he could get
no more than $19 a month, whether he was a doctor in the hospital or a
laborer on the farm. At Ule same time it was clear that white-skinned
doctors and laborers beside whom evacuees worked were getting regular
wages for what they did. Mareover 1~ every job an evacuee found himself
supervised ultimately ~ someone nou an evacuee~ Only the lowest level
of supervisory jobs could be occupied by anyone of Japanese ancestry,
regard~ess of competency or experience. The subordinate position of all
evacuees in relation to the WRA statf was an inescapable fact of center
organiza tion and one which irked moa~ intensely Ule evacuees who had
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professional training I long experience or former positions of authority.
The sense of subordinate status was aggravated at every point at which
there was i~competence, lack of experience, or prejudice among the hast-
ily recruited WRA staff.
The subordination and restriction of the evacuees inherent in the
WRA organization not only antagonized evacuees. It also constituted a
contradiction for the WRA staff itself. The national policy which was
taking form was developing around the idea that the relocation centers
should be "as nearly like normal communities as possible," that restric-
tions should be at a minimum, and that those which co~ld not be elimina-
ted should be de-emnhasized. Many of the most flagrant and troublesome
restrictions, especially those in the western centers, were insisted on
by the Army. Others, such as the low wage level, seemed insurmountable
to WRA policy makers because of the political pressures which were shap-
ing the program. Accepting these as inescapable, the policy makers en-
couraged center administrators to promote a spirit of cooperation and
equality in relations with evacuees in the centers. The attitudes of
most top staff were generally in line with the spirit of national poli-
cy, but such a spirit was contradicted at innumerable points by the ac-
tual facts of cente~ organization.
In line with national policy, center administrators attempted to
eliminate some sources of antagon1sm felt by evacuees. Thus the term
"Jap" quickly became a taboo word among the staff. '!be Tule Lake pro-
ject director became famous among evacuees for his vigorous condemnation
of the word. Recognizing it as distastefUl to evacuees and a source of
bad feeling between staff and evacuees, he outlawed it in staff meetings.
It similarly became taboo at other centers. Even the term "evacuee" was
felt to be undesirable by staff as calling attentio~ to the evacuation
and a reminder of the present status arising out of that event. They
substi tuted various terms for it. ~esidents" became the official term
at Poston, "colonists" at TUle Lake, and they were widely used at other
centers. Nevertheless same staff members at every center continued to
use "Jap" in referring to evacuees in conversations among themselves,
and "evacuee" continued as probably the most generally used of all
terms.
A need was felt by staff also tor a term by whiCh to call them-
selves which did not emphasize their superior status. '~ites" in con-
trast with "Japanese" began to be used in the early centers, but quickly
came into disfavor. In its place the term "Caucasian" steadily increased
in usage. However, this W88 not felt to be in harmony with national
policy since it emphasized' racial dj fferences. In August a menorandmn was
issued from WaShington banning its ~se, and center staffs were instruc-
ted to use "appointed personnel" in its place. The latter was somewhat
clumsy, and although its official u.e became firmly established, it nev-
er superseded "Caucasian." Both sta~' ~d English-speaking evacuees
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.fell increasingly into the use of the two terms "Caucasian" and "evacuee"
in referring to themselves and to each other. Japanese-speaking evacuees
used the Japanese equivalents of the terms "whites" and "Japanese," namely
"hakujin" and "nihonjin.';
At the same time that staff were attempting to find words which 
would minimize the existing differences, they were led by the nature of 
the situation into practices which emphasized them. In the early months
in all centers there were either stated regulations or tacit customs ex-
cluding evacuees from eating in the "personnel messhalls." Some staff
members objected to joint eating on the ground of racial prejudice, but
to the responsible administrators it merely seemed like good organiza-
tion. The evacuees, they felt, had their assigned places to eat and
their food needs were taken care of by the systematic operation of the
agency. If evacuees were invited by friends among the staff to eat in
the personnel messhall, the privilege might be abused or it might appear
as favoritism to other evacuees who were DOt invited. At same centers
the commanders of the military police announced that there was to be "no
fraternization with evacuees." Some project-directors also let it be
known among their staff that they did not encourage close personal rela-
tions with evacuees. Such measures, Which were not dictated by national
policy and varied in interpretation in every center, arose from feelings
that they were nece.ssary for the good of the qrganization. Many staff
members supported them, feeling that they were in line with the existing
distinctions embodied in the national policies of different wage levels
and Government provision of housing and other facilities for evacuees. 
A few on every staff, however, felt them as unnecessary, restrictive on
themselves, and an obstacle to the development of mutual confidence and
good working relations. l-1hatever staff felt about it, there was no
doubt that a real but varying line existed between the two groups based
on the distinctions which had been institutionalized in the organization
of the centers. The contradictions inherent in it were a source of minor
but persistent conflict among staff and of atti~udes among evacuees which
had far reaching significance for the over-all program of the agency.
For evacuees the feeling of subordinate and restricted status
colored the whole early experience in the centers, but it was felt dif-
ferently depending pretty much on the age of the evacuee. The older men
and women looked at the distinctions in the center more as a confirma-
tion of old prejudices and discriminations Which they had experienced on
the West Coast for a generation. The sense of being up against a "col-
or line" was bardly a new thing; it was only the definiteness and the
official governmental sanction of it that was new. There seemed little
to do but learn how to live with this latest manifestation of it. For
the younger people, particularly those of high school and post high
school age, it was hardest to accept. For them, catapulted suddenly out
of school and college where they had seen nothing quite comparable to
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the discriminations their parents had endured, the organized discrimin-
ation of center life was an unforgetable shock. }1.ost at first reacted
bitterly. Young boys became cynical over ni~ht. A young evacuee in
one center wrote:
"In the warehouse *' * * area * * * where maintenance con-
struction and supply crews are headquartered, resentment
is particularly keen against 'obvious preferred treatment'
of 'whites.' Typical comment: 'You can't eat in the
Caucasian messhall; they call this democracy where every-
one is supposed to be equal; look at our housing * * *
and the Project Director ordered his quarters completely
re-made ' . ,r
It was not only bitterness and resentment that the situation encouraged.It went further than that, stimulating a-whole new trode of thought. The
same young man wrote:
"A perennial discussion topic among virtually all groupings
of Manzanar residents is tie '~olor line.' The~e is common
tendency to refer shortcomings or faults of J.ndividual ad-
ministrators as attributes of the entire 'white race'."
Work arrl Wages --:
,
the new way of looking at themselves and at their relationship
to the WRA staff became quickly apparent as evacuees went "to work.
With arrival in the centers, making a living suddenly ceased to be a
problem, at least in the ~ense of feeling any relationship between
one's job and What one might have in the way or necessities and com-
forts. Wi th shelter, food, and other needs taken care of, work
promptly lost much of its old meaning. The artificiality of the new
si tuation was enhanced Qy the early efforts of the WRA to provide jobs
of some sort for everyone able to work. Original policy held that
there was to be no sca~ity of jobs in the centers. The agency began
wi th a plan for a work corps in which everyone could emlist under an 
agreement that one would work on assigned jobs for the duration of the
war and 14 days thereafter.
. Evacuees coming into Poston in the first weeks signeci agreements
to join the work corps. At Manzanar and Tule Lake such agreements
were not signed, but pamphlets distributed to the incoming evacuees
described the work corps. The basic principle was that jobs would be
provided for everyone who wished to work under whatever conditions the
Government would stipulate. The Government's obligation was to provide
jobs; the evacuees' obligation was to work in those jobs whatever they
might be. The idea of the work corps involving the generalized agree-
ment between evacuees and the Agency was abandoned a.fter a few months,
b~t the concept of full ereployment regardless of the operations needs
of the centers persisted for the whole f~rst year. It contributed to
a feeling of evacuees that they were in a make-work situation.
The work corps concept, despite its early abandonment, also cre-
ated confusion in the minds of evacuees in the early centers. Many
went on believing that the agreements they had signed itJ Poston were
still in effect. As late as October some were stj.ll asking whether
the "cash advance" mentioned in the agreements as monthly payment. would
ul tima te1y have to be paid back to the C~vernment. Employment wa~
gradually put on an application and referral system in the early cen-
ters and was officially on that basis in the later ceaters from the
start, but uncertainty about the conditions of employment persisted in
Manzanar, Poston, and Tule Lake, and was also apparent in Gila. The
confusion was added to by delays in paying the monthly wages in all
centers. On into the winter of 1942 there were lags of several months,
persons being paid for their first month's work two, three, or more
months later. This added to the feeling for the majority of evacuees
that the work situation was not a real one related to any economic
necessities.
After the first burst of activity in making tile blocks 1jvab1e, .
lack of interest and dissatisfaction set in, especially among the
young men. It appeared among volubteers who felt that agreements in
regard to wages had not been lived up to at Manzanar. At Poston and
Tu1e Lake, young men who had not been in on the early distribution of
"good" jobs were bitter. In early June one such young man wrote that
the WRA staff
"don't know what our wages will be, how they are going'
to finance the project which they want to be (according
to their interpretation) a cvoperation or partnership
wi th the Govermnent. The whole thing stinks * * *. 
Fault probably not due to local autilori ties but to the 
system--the system starting with a bang on a grand idea
without attention to details.
"I am not working yet. I don't feel like working. If 
they force me to, I might have to * * *"
Young men in this mood were numerous in all the early centers. They
were not in touch with even the partially formulated plans of the
administrators at that time, because if they had decided to work at
all they were working in their block messhalls or elsewhere at some
distance from the administrative offices. They and their associates
. were confused also because WRA policy on employment had hardly crys-
tallized by June. They felt strong resentments against "the system"
because they did not feel themselves at all to be a part of that
system. When, In June. they did become aware of the fixed wage scale
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Iof $12, $16, or $19 ~ month, they became all the more resentful and
cynical about work in the centers.
In strong contrast to the bitter young men of this type were a
fringe of other young men and some older, including many of the volun-
teers who had secured better jobs at the start and who were respondi~g
eagerly to the opportunities in the centers. They took the attitude
that the low wage was irrelevant. Some were anxious "to work for the-
people"; some were enjoying the rew feelings of responsibility,
prestige, or authority. They undertook assigned tasks and worked
tirelessly, filling those jobs in the agency hierarchy next below
those of the Caucasian staff. They remaired more in touch with the
plans and intentions of the administrators and tended consequently to
move away from the intense bitterness and withdrawal' of those who did
not feel themselves to be participating in the development of the
centers. r
On the other hand, thousands of evacuees in each center were I
faced with the prospect of occupying indefinitely the routine jobs of
center operation. Among them, as they tentatively felt out the new
situation, a complete reevaluation of work and working conditions toOk
place. The economics of center life became sharply different from the
economics of normal life. The attitudes and relations which determi~
the new economics were not obvious to WRA staff at first and, when the
were sensed, were often misinterpreted. The adjustment of staff to the
evacuee reevaluation of work was a slow and painful process never fully
accomplished, but the adjustment proceeded, however erratically, as
the montils went by.
The determinants of economic life in the centers came into
operation in the earliest weeks. Th~y did not spring from embittered
young men chafing at the injustice of evacuee status or the rneatting-
lessness of center life so much as from the older, experienced men.
The attitudes of the ]ssei toward work in the centers crystallized
quickly am remained dominant throughout. As ore of them put it in
July:
"Fresno was a sand-dune fifty years ago. Japanese turned
it into a fertile land. The Issei pioneers made great
sacrifice in human life * * * in developing Fresno. When
I visited Parlier ;near Fresno7 recently, the driver told
me that Japanese awned this and that land and it made me
happy. 'Let us make ita gooC place here {!n the centeiJ,'
someone is reported to have said.
"But Poston is different from Fresno. For $16, we
should not work like we did in Fresno. For $16 and $18,
.
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we should not work so hard. Of course, we should all
work. But we must not think this place is the same 
as Fresno." i
This staterent was made in a public meeting in which leaders,
both Nisei and Issei, were attempting to arrive at some common con-
ception of the meaning of the centers as guide for their behavior in
working out community government. It expressed the feeling of the
majority of the older people. The centers were not, in their view,
places in which to turn their traditional industry into channels laid
out for them by others. They should work to make the centers as com-
fortable as possible, but they were wary of the vague, larger plans
in term~ of which the administrators seemed to be talking. They were
suspicious of the purposes behind such plans, but they could accept
the objective of immediate comfort in the near-at-hand aspects of
center life. Beyond that, the Issei generally did not feel anyobli-
gation, since they had been put in the centers against their will and
were not participating in the formulation of further plans.
A young evacuee observed this approach in operation in his
ck during the first summer:
"The biggest thing that has come up /in the block7 was
the Vegetable Committee. That started back in JUly. I
wasn't on the Block Council then, but I thought that it
wasn't the right thing for us to grow vegetables. The
way I figured it then was that the Government had
agreed to give us certain things like food, clothing,
and shelter in return for which we agreed to abide by
certain rules. I thought that tne Government should
live up to its agreement, and why should we be expected
to furnish food for ourselves? * * *
"Well, the Issei thought we shouJ.a grow vegetables for
ourselves from the first. They talked a lot about-
daikon [F Japanese type of radish much used for food7,
saying it was the ideal thing for us to grow, because
if you couldn't pickle it all then you could dry it,
and use it~hat way. They thought it was a sure food
supply. I don't like the stuff and wasn't interested.
But they went -ahead and got seed of daikon ~d Chinese
lettuce (nappa) and other things. Then they got to
work on it. I have to ~dmire those ISsei. They have
been hanging back from doing - a~hing the administra-
tion told them to do. They would just hang back and
talk about the administration all the time. But when
it came to doing something like growing vegetables,
they sure ~ot out and worked. '!he c; t.v men worked, too,
-~-c---
along with the Salinas farmers in our block * * *. The
young fellows in the block would just work when their
turn came. They only worked to save their face. But
the old men were out there whe~.er it was their turn to
work or not. "I have to admire them for that."
This sort of activity was typical of the older people. It
evidently was unrelated to wage scales. It wa$ guided by a purpose
which the men felt strongly, in this case insurance against what they
felt to be an uncertain food supply and need for "types of food to which
they were accustomed. The work was planned, managed, and carried out 
by themselves" independently of the 1ffiA staff. Similar attitudes were 
apparent in other work which the older people were convinced was neces-
sary to their comfort and welfare in the centers.
There was, however, strong feeling about the Government's obli-
gations which led to a good deal of division of opinion in regard to
the types of work to which the people should apply themselves. In
some blocks older men as well as younger objected to devoting their
spare time to growing vegetables because of their feeling that the" 
Government was obligated to provide food. 'nlere was also some objec-
tjon to working on the construction of schools, even though the older
people were deeply interested in the provision of good schooling for
their children. Many felt that the schools should already have been
built or that the completion of buildings should be carried out by j
laborers hired at going wages, either evacuees or others, and not at J
the center wages. There w~s even objection to the heavy work of haul-
ing coal from railheads to the blocks on the ground that coal, as well
as other nec.essi ties, ought to be provided by the C,overnment at the
point of use. There was thus at first no universal agreement on pre-
cisely where the evacuee obligatio~ to work began or ended. The older
people did agree that it was their duty to work at jobs which were
clearly directed to fulfilling their needs and comforts in the centers.
It was not their d~ty, however, to work at jobs the purpose of which
was not fully clear to them, such as the long-term agricultural proj-
ects at Pos.ton, the future benefits of which they did not believe would
come to them. There was also rather general agreement that evacuees
ought not-to work on facilities for the 'NR! staff or on the basic facil-
ities of the centers, such as the water pipe systems, which they
regarded as part of the Government obligation to provide.
The reevaluation of work was apparent in the feelings that
developed in" regard to the $12, tl6; ~nd $19 wage scale. Once it
became clear that this was fixed, several views appeared among evacuees.
In some centers there were proposals that the highest wage should be
paid for the most disagreeable work, for example, $19 for garbage col-
lectors and coal haulers, and lower rates for the pleasanter and easier
jobs, such as office work. 'nle prevailing feeling in all centers,
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however, was that there should be no differences in wages. Everyone
should get the sam~, it was felt, because actually everyone was working
merely for the welfare of all in the centers and differences in wages'
were irrelevant in such a situation. There was also a widespread feel-
ing, however, that especially responsible and important work such as
tha t of doctors and rnlrses in the hospitals should be more hi.g,hly paid
than other types of work. Practice in the centers gradually fell into
line with this prevailing feeling. The $16 wage became general, the
$12 wagawas at.andoned (except for learners), and hospital and other
workers whose service was regarded as especially important for the
general welfare were paid $19.
Although they failed at first to understand the evacuee feelings
about the meaning of different types of work and their whole evaluation
of work in the ce~ters, ~ staff were generally inclined to regard $16
a month as insufficient incentive for a good day's work. Some ,foremen
were openly sympathetic with terxlencies to work "not too hard."
However, all foremen were themselves up against the standards o.f the
Government agency of a maximum work output fo~ an 8-hour day, and
moreover were faced with getting specific jobs done. Many, of course,
had no sympathy with any standard other than that set hy the agency.
There was, as a result, persistent trouble as the evacuee standard of
"Let us work, but let us not work too hard" came into conflict with the
standards which fore,men and supervisers were attempting to live up to.
Rigorous foremen foum thenselves up against a sort of passive resist-:-
ance, as evacuee work crews quietly developed their system of rest
periods and early quitting times. They found a general tendency on
the part of evacuees never to allow then-selves to be pushed too hard
and to balk at any signs of inco~siderate handling Or evidences of
racjal prejudice. Some foremen. 4ccustomed to work situations where a
men could be hired and fired, exploded and found that their crews
walked out on them. Friction between work crews and foremen was per-
sistent throughout the early monthg in the centers. l!ost foremen,
however, found themselves compromising gradually with the standards set
by the evacuees, and slowly the evacuee standard dominated the centers.
The sharp limitation on cash earnings gave.rise to other impor-
tant attj.tudes that shaped relocation center econonlics. In Manzanar
and the other early centers there was a strong current of sentiment
against setting up canteens at which evacuees c'ould purchase toilet
articles and other things. There was a feeling that the r~vernment
would, if it had to, provide these things. Many older people felt
that, whether the Government should provide them or not,. there should
be a minimum of opportunity to spero money in the centers. Economic
resources, they said, should be conserved for the ultimate return to
the struggle for a living outside. Issei opinion rather generally held
that spending should be discouraged at every point possible. At first
people de~ermined to layaway their good clothes for the duration of
life in the centers. People were urged to curb the traditional givj.ng
of money gifts at funerals and other occasions. Despite such feelings,
the canteens became an important part of center life and the giving of
gifts of money acc~rding to the old customs continued, though modified
in various ways. Moreover, there were numerous collections in the
blocks from the very first for improvements of the messha11s and other
block facilities or for gifts to highly appreciated cooks or other
block workers. Sent~ent and action never coi~cided on these points.
A World of Rumor
The administration areas and the resident or colo~ areas, as
they came to be called, were places of contrast. Durine: the first
months tile i1nportant difference lay not in the buildings or the physical
appearance. It wa~ to be felt rather in th~ prevailing atmosphere, the
contrasting moods of the two areas. The '!.RA staff were preoccupied with
dj.fficu1t and unaccustomed jobs and most carried a sense of high purpose
into their work. '!he frustrations and the inherent contradictions that
were to dog them in later months had not yet touched them deeply. The
mood was generally one of hopeful embarkation on an important task.
The life of the people in the blocks was taking shape in a dif-
ferent atmosphere. Even during the first weeks of busy effort to
straighten out the disorder of the blocks, the dominant notes were un-
certainty, anxiety, and even fear. Instead of abating after a short
time as people settled into their "apartmepts" and moved into the rou-
tines of block living, the anxieties incrpased as the weeks went on. At
Manzanar, Poston, and Tu1e Lake tensions 'mounted steadily during the
summer and reached peaks in October and November, 5 or 6 months after
the opening of the centers. In the later centers there was never the
same degree of tension and unrest, although all went through periods of
mounting anxieties several months after the first arrivals. Even the
three centers which both staff and evacuees generally characterized as
"quiet"--Minidoka, Granada, and Rohwer--had periods during the moving in
when tension rose and rumor and anxiety swept through the blocks.
The state of mind of the evacuees had its roots in the process of
disorganization that had been going on anong them ever since the attack
on Pearl Harbor. Fear and uncertainty had entered the lives of many
wi th the sudden appeara.nce of FBI officers in their homes to take the 'Ii
family head away to internment. Anxieties had increased steadily in the
following months centering on the question: Will we be evacuated and
interned? 1n the assembly centers, with evacuation an accomplished I
fact, the questions .of the future loomed in terns of: Will we be re- I
leased somewhere outside the coastal states to reestablish ourselves?
Will we be confjned in other places? What trea'bnent can w e expect from
the Government from now on? Now, with the relocation centers enclosing
them, it was not yet fully apparent what treatment could be expected or i
I
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,whether the new situation amounted to internment. Each new event in the
uprooting process, as it shattered long established ties and old bases
of life, created new questions about what the future might be. And
these questions went unanswered for months, leaving the people in a sort
of limbo between a shattered past and an uncertain future.
In the centers no evacuee could answer with authority the Imllti-
plying questions. Only the agents of the r~vernment which had created
the situation could be looked to for some word. Vfuile tlanzanar was
still an assembly center an urgent need developed for some means of get-
ting whatever information there was from the administrators to the eva-
cue~s. In addition to the block managers, an information center grew up
in response to this need. Composed of evacuees who were in touch with
the adw.inistrators and the latest bits of information that came to the
center, it worked long. hours collecting questions asked by the incoming
evacuees, compiling answers when there were answers, and getting these 
back to the people in the blocks. The infonnation center quickly became
an important institution and an influential one in allaying the anxie-
ties which arose over and over again each day." In the early weeks of
Poston many evacuees felt, as one expressed it, that "the authorities
themselves are irrlefini te, and don It seem to know anything." Many ques-
tions could not be answered; they probed a future into which WRA offi-
cials could not yet see any more than could evacuees. By July, however,
means were growing up for at least bringing evacuees in touch with what
could be said with certainty by the staff. An evacuee-organized "Issei
orientation group" arranged meetings at which V,'RA staff talked, describ-
ing what each part of the agency organization was doing and planning in
the center, and anm.ering as best they could the never ending flow of
questions about the present and the future.
In all the centers, the questions came throurp block managers,
through delegations waiting on project directors, j_n meetings called for
purposes of organizing the com~,~nity life. How long would families have
to live doubled up? When would partitions came? Were more blocks to be
built? Why was the food not better? y.fuy did the Government spend money
on shredded wheat arrl cheese which almost no one would eat? How much
money was allowed for food? 'i'las it all being spent? i~'hy had two babies
died in the hospital wards? Vias it true that the Caucasian doctor had
misdiagnosed a case? ¥lhat would wages be? ',Thy was no one being paid
for work done? Who would ultimately get the benefit of land developed
by evacuee labor? Could one visit a sick relative in another center?
Why were incomi~g packages being inspected? Would books and phonograph
records confiscated in assembly centers be returned? Was the mail being
censored? Was it true that the center would he closed and the people
moved somewhere else? 'lere evacuees in the status of prisoners of war?
Did the provisions of tr,e Geneva Convention apply to them? ~'lould Nisei
ci tizenship be fully revoked? ,'iere Nisei to pe drafted? Did the 4-G
classifications Nisei were now receiving from their draft boards mean
700078 0-46--;;
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that they were officially classified as aliens now? Would all evacuees
be deported after the war? ~~ were so many people receiv,ing applica-
tion blanks for repatriation to Japan? Were evacuees all to be deported
during the war? Could they count on the centers as homes for the dura-
tion of the war? The ques ti ons ranged through every phase of life. And
often the administrators had no answers. Frustrated themselves at fail-
ures to get needed naterials, they became wary of any statements or pro-
mises that partitions or stoves or coal would arrive by a certain date.
'!hey fell back on expressions of hope and seemed to the evacuees to be
side-stepping. They could be even less definite about the longer range
problems: the policies of the agencywere not yet established, the
questions were being considered in Washington. But the evacuees went on
wondering~ seekin~ same sort-of certainty on which to build their lives.
. As the relocation centers filled up with questioning people, anx-
iety regan to focus on the tangible and near-at-hand. The larger ques-
tions were still there in everyone's minds, but at least now in the cen-
.. ters the houses people were to live in, the food they were to eat, and
the hospitals in which they were to be cared for were here before them. "
For the first ttne in months there was something definite to live with
and to plan in relation to. In each center, early or late, as evacuees
reached the limits of improving their barrack rooms, their attention and
concern became focused on these immediate tangible bases of life--the
trinity of housi~, food and health.
No center escaped crowding in its earlydays. Manz~nar, the ear-
liest occupied, remained the most crowded on into the winter of 1943.
Poston, the next occupied, regarded itself still in a housing crisis in
December 19/.2. All the other centers suffered acutely from lack of
space at least during the first months. Crowding meant, specifically,
families of four or more living in 20' x 25' single rooms, couples un-
acquai~ted with one another living together in one roam, a family of
three or more sharing a room with one or more individuals, 20 or 30
singl ~ men living all together in an unpartitioned barrack. The plan of
the administrators to have at the barest minimum one room per family was
defea~ed at first by insufficient barracks and by lack of materials for
partitions which would separate doubled up families into smaller, but at
least private, quarters.
The prevalence of crowding did not mean that every block and ev-
ery barrack suffered from the extreme forms of it. r There were many fa-
milies from the beginning who had adequate quarters in the sense that
they had a room to themselves. Crowding in the form of two unrelated
families living in an unpartitioned single room was by no means univer-
sal, but it was common enough to be an important source of friction in
many blocks. The crowding varied from block to block, depending on the
manner in which the block was filled up at first, the desires of friends
to remain near each other in the same block, and the efficiency of
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.operation of the housing departments. Some blocks in each center were
never crowded, but most were at some time during the early months.
For the evacuees who endured the crowding, it meant disorganiza-
tion of family life, frayed nerves, friction and dis comfort from which
there was no relief. A weekly housing report in terms of floor space
per person could hardly convey the real meaning. A Nisei mother wrote
in her diary in September, 4 months after the opening of the center:
"We tried to rearrange the house today. I suppose not much
can be done with 20' by 25', but-we always hope agajnst
hope that we can. Goodness, we certainly could stand just
another room. This being seven in a room Jr.akes privacy an
unknown word. Finally we got it arranged so that we have
at least room enough to wa1k around in. All of us were
tired and out of sorts when we finished."
Another woman described the nature of "doubling up" :
. "Apartment is shared qy one married couple, age around 50
years, and our family of four, one girl just nine and one
ten years old, my husband is out during the day on a jot
* * *. The heat is terrific and the lady in our apartment
is very sensitive to beat, so whenever her washing and
ironing is done 5he is always taking nap--makes it hard for
children to run in and out--for fear it may disturb her.
She is an understanding person, but still there is time she
wished she could have slept just another ten minutes.
"The cook /husband of the woman just described7 takes a napl after lunch. Unfortunately a friend visits us so I must 
beg her to whisper in low voice. It is not very pleasant 
to whisper. I must ask my girls to stay outdoors as much
as they can--but they complain the heat out doors--they
come in continually to get toys to play * * * I must ask
them to be quiet. I feel sorry for the children and the
cook.
" * * * Our rooImnate has eaten something disagreeable and is
vomiting and she has lose stool--she hesitates 'to use chamb-
er--and manages to go to latrine. She is really too weak to
walk. I know she will use chamber if she was the only occu-
pant of the apartment. I got sorne ice for her from the kit-chen. .
,
l "The lady (iiho shares the apartment7 bought some candies--
I she will always share wi th us. In-return I buy fruits and
give them half. This goes on and on. I told them they
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need not do this. But being in the same room, this is im-
possible on both sides. I know we do spend more than we
really should."
The tension created by the crowded living conditions increased.
through the early months and charged the atmosphere of ma~ blocks with
little antagonisms and personal conflicts. Rumors appeared and disap-
peared as staff made hopeful statements that partitions would arrive on
various dates. The staff worked desperately to shuffle the people to re-
lieve at least a little of the crow.ding. Rearrangements- of families were
hindered by the resistance of people in less crowded blocks to giving up
what they had. Eventually partitions did arrive and the housing depart~
ments worked constantly at the task of ad,iusting the space to the people.
The crowding was an important factor in the backrround of most
that happened during the first months. It contributed to the prevailing
state of mind and the mounting tensions in the early centers. It was,
however, around the other two basic interests--food and health--that most
intense feeling crystallized. At the roots of the anxieties lay the ex-periences of the months since Pearl harbor. Most important was a deep .
distrust of the Government and of tr,e Caucasians who composed it and in
whose hands evacuees now felt themselves to be.. If "they" had conceived
and carried out the evacuation of families and children, if "they" had
picked up and separated from their families family heads Who people knew
were not dangerous, if "they" had conceived the relocation centers with
their restrictjons and subordinations, how much consideration could be
expected from "them" now? If "they" had done this much, what more might
"they" not be expected to do? All the necessities of life were now in
the hRnds of the distrusted group, represented qy the WRA staff in the )
centers. The relocation centers were in remote and isolated spots off
tl"le main transportation lines. Here was the perfect setting for harsh
treatment, if that were in the minds of the Caucasians. If the war over-
taxed the transportation system of the country, the relocation centers
would be the first to be cut off. What would happen to the food supply
then? Perhaps, same said darkly, it had been the intention all along to
get rid of the evacuees in this way. These suspicions, not yet known to
the staff and incredible if they had been, were deep, and based on real
experiences. They gained wide currency in the early centers.
Then there wer~- the realities of relocation center life--the ad-
justment to a new diet at first not well chosen to meet the food customs
of the older people, various temporary shortages in a nation that was be-
ginning to feed an army overseas, inevitabl~/.little inefficiencies in the
distribution of food to block messhalls, incompetent cooks and stewards'
assistants in various blocks, inexperienced WRA staff in the s~ewards'
departments, all the weaknesses of new organization in a complex opera-
tion.Similarly in the hospitals, there was lack of equipment at first;
there was inevitable poor management here and there; there was
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difficulty getting staff rapidly; there was the sense of depe~dence on
doctors in whom one had not developed confidence, some of them of the
distrusted group. Out of these conditions grew anxiety and fear, and out
Gf the anxietjes .grew rumors, sometimes fantastic rumors, which increased
the fears as they sprouted and grew in the laundry rooms am the bache-
lors' barracks where people talked and listened.
The anxiety about food rose and fell in relation to actual condi-
tions in the various centers. A succession of relatively poor meals gave
rise to rumors that the warehouses were empty. A shortage of meat or rice
resulted in rumors that the whole American transportation system had bro-
ken down and the food supply had been cut off. A large number of Issei
began to believe that they could not trust the Caucasians to supply them
with food and that consequently they would have to depend on their own
~fforts to raise vegetables in the block gardens. Inequality in the dis-
tribution to messhalls of a particular shipment of food gave rise to sto-
ries on the one hand of favoritism and graft among the evacuees who had
jobs in the stewards' departments and on the other hand to rumors of dis-
honesty among the WRA personnel. The atmosphere of uncertainty and dis-
~rust led cooks and individuals in many blocks to hoard what food they
~id.get against the occasional lean days, or to provide for the imagined
eventual ccmplete break-down in the food supply. The failure of an eva-
cuee to receive a personal shipment of food from a friend in C~lifornia
resulted in a ,'idespread belief that WRA staff members were dishonest and
were withholding and probably selling for their own profit food that wasrightfully intended for evacuees. .
Intense anxieties about health and medical care grew up simulta-
ne9usly with those connected with food. Like the rumors about food,
those about the hospitals were usual+y based on some real event, the
death of an evacuee in the hospital, a shortage of equipment, or an in-
stance of poor ambulance service or discourteous treatment in the hospi-
tal receiving room. At Manzanar during the summer a large number of eva-
cuees came to believe that a mother had died in childbirth as a result of
incompetence by a doctor. At Poston similarly large numbers of evacuees
beliAved that two babies had died because of neglect. There were rumors
that evacuees were being used experimentally in the hospitals; that Cau-
casian doctors deliberately allowed ~vacuees to die.
The world of rumor that flourished in the blocks took into its
purview the outside world as well as the centers. It took each instance
of hostility to Japanese Americans which was reported in a newspaper or a
letter and dwelt on it, magnified it, and elaborated it into a new source
, of fear.
Thus, at every center, the uncertainties of the new life and the
intense concern about present and future welfare led to the construction
of a shifting and fanciful world of additional uncertainties and d istor~ted huma  relatio ships, to more fears, a d to further distrust. .
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!!!e B~o~ks: Foundations of Community Life
From places of dust and bare barracks in May and June, the
blocks in the first centers were transformed rapidly. By August,
Manzanar and portions of Poston were no longer bare. Irrigation water,
the heat of the summer, and the industry of the people had changed
them. The streets between the blocks were still d~sty, and the after-
noon winds raised daily dust storms; but within many blocks there were
already flowers, grass, and carefUlly planned little gardens and pools
for fish. Arbors and shades of various kinds had appeared between the
barrack rows. The blocks looked lived in and vastly more livable than
they had 2 months before. In the midst of the anxieties and antago-
nisms, the people were making determined efforts. In September, be-
tween comments on the horrors of sharing a room with another family, a
mother in one of the early centers was moved to write in her diary:.
"The water came in our block V{ednesday evening--the chil-
dren are excited catching perch and little bass. Our
block resembles city of Venice. At" night the sight is for
supreme. The reflection of the moon is beautiful and se-
rene."
Family efforts and cooperative work of the block people had wrought the
c~ges wherever they toOk place.
The same urge that was creating order and harmony in the block
landscapes was also at work in ordering the social relations of the
people in the blocks, but it was working against greater odds.
The filling of the blocks as the t rain and bus loads of people
poured into the centers resulted in a certain amount of sorting into
groups who had been associated before. The fishermen from Terminal
Island, on their arrival in Manzanar, were placed in a ?;rOUp of adja-
cent blocks. The people from Orange County arrived at Poston on the
same day and filled up a dozen blocks in the western part of the cen-
ter. The businessmen of Sacramento went into adjoining blocks in Tule
Lake. In later centers people from the same assembly centers arrived
together and occupied blocks set aside for them. This resulted in
about the same thing, that is, the grouping of people in every center
in terms of their former localities. The sorting often was carried a
little farther. Families related-to each other, or who had been asso-
ciated with one another before evacuation, made efforts to remain close
together. People not only from the same locality, but also members of
the same church, the same Kenjirikai, or the same business association
had themselves assigned to the same trains leaving the assembly centers,
and sought to be assigned neighboring barracks, or at least to the same
 blocks, in the relocation centers. If they failed at first in the cen-
ters, they often moved as soon as they foUnd where their former friends
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or relatives were living. There. was a great deal of moving and exchang-
ing of rooms in the early days of the centers. The various sorting pro-
cesses that took place served to lay some foundation for the development
of orderly social relations. People often knew a considerable number of
the others in the blocks in which they ultimately settled, or at least
were acquainted with a srr.all group in the same block.
Nevertheless, the people in any one block constituted a heteroge-
,neous assortment. Although it might consist of 300 persons from Los An-
gelas, or Santa Clara County, or Fresno, or Seattle, and although it
might consist of a dozen groups of families each group of whom had known .
each other before evacuation, still the dozen circles of friends often
had verJ little in common. A typical block of count~! people might con-
tain R to 10 faIr,j.lies of well-to-do farmers, 15 or 20 itinerant fann la-
borers, a dozen or more families of poor tenant farmers, a few small
town shopkeepers, possibly a dentist and his family--people who had
lived accordi~g to widely different economic standards, who had gone to
different churches, and who perhaps belonged to none of the ,same organi-
zations. No block had from the beginning a background of common parti-
cipation of all its members in some former community. Every block had
on the contrary a background of differing class, religious, and family
behavior. Antipathies sprang up and ad,iustzr:ents had to be made, as they
adapted the semicommunal framework of the block to their needs.
Moreover, there was no ready-made guiqing pattern for this ad-
justment. The whole si t\1ation was new, not only the messhall system and
the other c~nal ins ti tutions of' the hlocks, but also the dependence
on an as yet. unknown administration, and the uncertainty'of objectives
to work toward in the relocatiQn centers. -if,'hat might a block be? No
one knew the pattern in advance am inevitably there were differences of
opinion ~s the more dominant personalities sought to influence the block
life. The adjustment tock place ind~fferentways in different blocks.
Here it went smoothly as ~eople leaned' on a few like-minded men and wo-
men. There personalities clashed, or divergent views resulted in per-
sistent cleavages that wer~ reflected in messhalls, block councils, and
the Whole 'spirit of a block. Nevertheless, out of the initial disorgan-
ization and uncertainty, a -way of life steadily took form. It was a
distinctive way of life nloulded out of the crisis of evacuation am the
peculiar artificiality of the relocation center communities, as well as
out of deep-rooted tradi tions reaching back to Japan and up through the
.30 or 40 years of experience in the United States. What took place as
people adjusted to one another in the blocks ultimately determined the
nature of the communities wlich cNRA staff and evacuees, in their differ-
entways, had talked of building as the centers opened.
The basis of social life, as before, was the family. Here in the
blocks, however, the family could not be precisely what it had been be-
fore. Dining room, lavatory, and recreation room were all communal, am
hence every home was broken in to three or four distinct places, with all
but the room in which the family slept shared by 60 or more other
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-families. Moreover tQe one unshared spot allowed neither privacy among
family members or wholly from families on the other sides of ~~e parti-
tions. This division of the home and its lack of privacy had immediate
effects on both pare~lts and children. A young father described the sit-
uation during the early months of one center:
"The worst part of it is not being able to bring up the
baby right. He's just eighteen months * * *. Naturally
he cries some. If you were living alone in your own
I house, you could let him cry when he did it and not ~poil
him. But here you've got to pay attention to it. You
don't feel like letting him bother the people on the oth-
er side of the partition. They can hear everything that
goes on. You've got to shut him up some way., So you have
to fuss around with his crying and pay attention to him.
That's not good for the baby."
Parents were feeling the impact of a new discipline, of having to man-
age their children more or less in public instead of in privacy.
In the messhalls the parents' problems often became acute. One
mother said:
"My small daughter and I u8ed to eat at a table where
two little boys * * * ate with their mothers. They had
become so uncontrollable that the mothers had given up,
and let them eat as they pleased. They behaved so badly
that I stopped eating there * * *. But my daughter was i
fascinated. They would come running into the messhall, j
and the first thing both of them did was to take off their - 1
shoes and stockings and jump up and down on the seat.
Then they would s tart yelling for their food. After they
were g~ven the~r food they wouldn't eat it, but would just
play with it * * *. They would often bring toy automo-
biles and trains, etc., with them, making noises as-they
pushed the toys in and out of food that was spil.led on
the table * * *. Now these little boys had 01der bro-
thers aId sisters, and if they had eaten at one table with
both parents, things like that couldn't have happened, for
the older children would have protested out of pride, and
the father- probably would have forbidden it."
Despite valiant efforts of women and others in the various blocks, most
centers failed to work out systems for family grouping in the messhalls.
Early, Tule Lake did work out such a plan and there were individual
blocks in most centers which tried at various times to adopt family
groupings in the messhalls. But in general, eating, under the influ-
ence of messhall conditions, ceased to be a family affair. Mothers and
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smaller children usually ate together, but the fathers often ate else-
where with other men, and the older children joined others of their own
age. Thus family control in the basic discipline of eating changed
character rapidly, and the differing family standards became merged in a
sort of common messha11 behavior. Family solidarity ceased to have the
reenforcement of customary family rituals associated with the meal time
gathering of the group.
There was also some loss of control resulting from the crowded
rooms and the proximity of large numbers of children in the blocks.
With schools not yet open, the children seemed to the parents to be
-rumling wild with their playmates in the blocks. A constant refrain in
the early days or the centers was that children were getting out of con-
trol, that family life was breaking down. '!he constant complaint re-
flected the anguish of the new adjustment more than any real break-down
of the family. '!he public display of parent-child relations, and the
grouping of children around their age mates, rather than their parents,
in the messhal1s, were tending to break down the morale of parents to a
greater extent than they were actually setting new standards of behavior
for children.
The changes in family life affected not only the re1ati9nships of
parents and children but also those of husbands and wives. The position
of both was profoundly altered by the new framework. The husband was no
longer in the position of principal breadwinner in-many families, his
wife and his older children often drawing the same monthly wage. '!here
was an accompanying sense of loss of prestige on the part of the husband
and of independence on the part of the wife. More important for the wo-
meR was the real independence from housework. There was little floor
space to keep clean and no cooking to do unless the woman chose to work
- in the messha1l. Work for the family was confined to washing clothes
and tending children, and often there were women of both generations in
one family to share in these labors. For many young Nisei wives, the
new abundance of leisure resulted in loss of interest and boredom:
"Today has been a rather peculiar day. I wonder if itts
because I didn't have to wash. Funny how one begins to
depend on routine work to pass the day. Mom says it's em-
barrassing for her to save a tub for me all morning. So
she did the' wash today * * *
"The day ended, tt.arik goodness. Reminds me of that dumb
song: 'Twenty-one years and t en more days and we'll be out
of the ca1aboose'_"
Some older women also found time heavy on their hands and often sought
jobs in the messha11s washing dishes, serving, and cleaning. Even such
daytime activities, however, did not take their energies and hence there
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~was a steadily increasing enthusiasm amo~g the older women for new acti-
vities--classes in English, in singing, in flower arrangement, and even
in vlri tinE Japanese poetry. The women be~~an to enjoy the new freedom
early, and at least the older ores beran to find center life stimulating
and interesting.
For most of the older established families, the qe,v freedom of
the women reffi1lted in little disturbance of the relations of husbands
and wives, but for many of the younger there were serious crises result-
ing from the d~ands of the new adjus~,ent. The relations of the coup-
les were not always threatened, but the new situation placed a heavy
strain on the individuals:
I'I get pretty blue ,sometimes. You can't help it. And my 
wife has cha~~ed. It's really tragic. 'j'romen look at the :
practical side - of it more than we do, I guess. They don't
have any philosophy about it. I can talk to her until I'm
blue in the face, but it doesn't make any difference. She's
losing weight. So am I. * -;:- *"
In, other cases, the nari tal tie could not withstand the new strains and
there were separations. -An extreme example was analyzed by a neighbor.
"Right in our blod< there is one middle age couple sharing
room with a very young di-vorcee, her brother and father.
She is very modern and sociable. She brings in her young 
girl fn,ends and practice new Poston dance steps. The mid- 
dIe age couple are very quiet type and the husband is sick
person. There is alvlays a big fi/!J1t and quarrel because the
wife understands the younger set and is too lenient to her
roommate. Now the wife and'husband is separated just be-
cause of the roommate. It is not the fault of either side,
merel~y because the extremes are put in same apartment."
The neON developments in family relationships tended toward the
disruption of established family patterns of behavior, but there were
factors which threw the balance in the other direction. Most families
has achieved a renewed solidarity in I~~eetj.ng the crisis of evacuation,
and the attitudes stirr,ulated by the crisis contj.nued strongly during the
months of uncertaint.y about the future in assembly centers and early re-
location centers. Related faJnilies had, whenever possible, .ioined each
other to go throuf~h the evacuation together. As the crisis developed
and the uncertainty of the future deepened, the need for farrdly support
and family loyalties heightened. Older children began to feel increas~
ingly that their parents needed their presence and supnort in facing the
future. The parents, increasin~ly distrustful of the Government and of-
ten expecting ultimate deportation to JaDan, clung to their children and
emphasized the virtues of f~111y loyalty. Thus, as the support of out-
side groups melted 8~ay from both parents and childre~there ~ a general
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turning to the family group as the ultimate and only remaining source of
support. Parents and older children tl'lrOUghO\lt the first months of cen-
ter life were closer to each other than they had ever been. The new pat-
terns of living in the blocks constituted a threat to the newly achieved
family solidarity and for that reason were felt most keenly by the older
people. They made, however, few real inroads on family solidarity until
new events began to alter the outside relations once again.
: The family controls merged gradually and almost imperceptib1~ with
larger group controls, that is, the public opinion of the block. Eve~-
one's life was lived in view of the block people. The communal f~lli-
ties steadily drew people into intimate relations with one anothPr. Did
some women wish to make the messha11 p1easanter by putting up curtains?
It had to be talked over with the ress crew and the block manager. No
one could move to do anything until a large number of people had dis-
cussed it. Did a man becane enthusiastic about building a little fish
pond in front of his barrack? He had to discuss it with the neighbors
across the way and at least the family heads in his 01m barrack, for
they, too, had claims on the area. Moreover, such .uti1ization of block
space had to be considered in relation to the general plan of the block
people for the use of the total space between the barracks. Block coun-
cils were formed, usually consisting of a family head elected from each
barrack, to decide such questions as whether or not the block area should
be devoted to the growing of vegetables or to recreation places. for the
children, or in what proportion it should be allocated to each of these
uses. Actions which foruer1y required a brief fanily discussion at the
most, noW could be taken only after consultation, however indirectly,
with 250 to 300 other persons. Through this process the blocks steadily
grew into little communities.
Most of the block communities took form and achieved areal unity
and integration within 2 or 3 months. Same foundered on obstructive per-
sonalities or factional disputes and remained crippled and disorganized
for months. Almost universally, the first source of both organization
and disorganization was the messhall. Here took place the first systema-
tic organization of any group within a block--that of the messhal1 crew.
As soon as a block was occupied am its messhal1 equipped for use, its
operation required an organization of 25 to 30 people. How a messhal1
became organized and the personalities of its top administrators, namely,
the chef and the bloCk steward (who served as liaison w1t~ the WRA stew-
ard's department), often determined whether or not the first 4 or 5
months of life in a block were peaceful or wracked with conflict. Chefs
who were able to prepare edible food, to organize a messha1l crew effi-
cient~, and also to cope wisely with the suggestions, criticisms, and
complaints of the miscellaneous b1odc people, were not abundant in a~
center. The scarcity of even reasonably good chefs put those who cared
to do so in positions to exercise a good deal of power. Block people
usually did not care to risk the loss of a competent cook by crt ticising
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or trying to control him. The often repeated reaction of chefs to any
criticism in the early'months was "All right, I'll quit if you don't,"
like what I do." In the f ace of such threats people endured a great
deal.
Many chefs proceeded to assume dictatorial powers, and the result
was usually conflict. Some gathered about them loyal crews of young men
who would do the chef's bidding, but recognized little obligation to
treat block residents considerately or courteously. The messhallbecame
the regulator of life in the block, and people found themselves having to
conform to the chef's schedules set for the convenience of the messhall
crew rather than the people of the block. Suggestions from block resi-
dents became taboo, and offenders found themselves outlaws in the mess-
halls or threatened by the chef's loyal young men. Occasionally clashes
between individuals in the blocks and members of the \crew over some fea-
ture of service were prolonged into factional struggles with all the res-
idents lined up on one side or the other. Block managers sometmes en-
tered the lis t~ and found themselves impotent in the face of the power of
the mess crew.
Gradually, as the weeks went by, people in many of the blocks af-
flicted with mess troubles 1e arned how to control their chefs and mess
crews. Chefs were sometimes allowed to make good their threats when they
offered to qQit, and it was found that some hitherto subordinate cook
could handle the job just as well. Although this sometimes also resulted
in the quitting of a whole mess crew in loyalty to their chef, block res-
idents continued to exercise increasing control over their messhalls.
Through determined groups of wnmen, skillful negotiation by respected
older men when trouble arose, and through the adjustment of the chefs
themselves to their new roles as co~nity dignitaries, the messhall be-
gan to assume 2 position as the block institution of central importance.
The messhall became the focus of interest, comment, and often block
pride. In a sense it became the heart of each block J determining 1 argely
the well-being and tone of block life.
Some blocks found guidance for developing the pattern of block
life in elected councils. Such councils were encouraged by the adminis-
tration in most centers at an early stage in coDUllunity.organization. The
councils were most often informal groups, but sometimes a systematic plan
for organization was followed. In some centers each barrack in a block
had its council, consisting of the heads of all the families living in
the barrack. The block council was then often composed of a head of a
family from each barrack elected qy the family heads of the barrack, con-
sti tuting a group of about 14 men. The group rarely contained women,
$ince W<Den were not regarded as family heads, and the great majority of
the men -were married men with famili~s" although there was often a repre-
s~ntative or two from a bachelor barrack, usually an elderly farm laborer.
Councils such as these, Where they were formed, usually met in response
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-to specific needs felt by the block people, for example, to make a deci-
sion concerning the allotment of block land to recreation or food~growing
purposes, or to organize a cooperative venture of the block people such
as building an arbor. ~ometimes meetings were called in response to a
request of the administration for raising volunteer labor to meet some
center emergency. Often, but by no means universally, the block managerwas the chairman. After community councils were organized, the council- 
man sometimes served as chairman or as joint chairman with the block man-
ager. A few blocks made efforts to have the young men, the American ci-
tizens, represented on the block council, for example~ having both an
]ssei and a Nisei chairman, or equal numbers of Issei and Nisei on the
council. But by far the majority of blocks in all c enters allowed voice
only to family h~ads Who might be either Nisei or ]ssei, and to the el-
derly bachelors. This resulted in an inevitable domination of the meet-
ings by the older men.
Fairly typical of the block councils was one described by a young
married Nisei who was the representative, as a family head, of his bar-
rack:
"I just go tJo block council meetin~ because they want me
to. I figure you can't do anything, because they are almost
all Issei on tile council. Most of what they talk about I
don't care about the results. The only thing I'm interested
in is getting food that is a little more iR American style'
11:1 the kitchen. But we can't do anything about that. The
chef is an ]ssei, too. TWo of the other Nisei on the coun-
cil never say anything at ali. I'm the only one LOf the Ni-
sef/ who ever t~s and I don't say much. We Nisei can un-
derstand the drift of what is said, but we don't get it all,
and sometimes the other Nisei Who talks, and I, can't express
ourselves in Japanese and so we have to use some English.
n * * * the married Nisei, like myself, are closer to the Is-
sei than * * * ~ group of young, unmarried college graduates
in tile bloc~. We learned before we came in here that we had
to work with them. My busin~ss depended for the most part on
the Issei and that's the way it was with the other Nisei Who 
had got started in the world. So we are still clos.er to them. 
We support them more tilan the college people do. The college"
people don't have any representatives on the block council.
Some of them [!ike one in a responsible position in the cen-
ter administratioil don't have much to do with the rest of us
in the block. They are sort of by themselves. * * * It's
the Issei who run the block all right. There are only 15
married Nisei in the block and most of them live with their
parents. I guess that explains why tile Issei run things."
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The block council referred to here concerned itself, typicallY,
with how much block land should be devoted to growing vegetables, the
collection of funds from block residents for curtains in the messhall, !
and other block improvements. The daniLance of the older people in the
discussions, the use of the Japanese language, and the sense of non-
. participation by even the oldest young men reflected the developing char-
acter of life in most blocks in every center. There was overt conflict
between Issei and Nisei in very few block s. Each block strove .for una- 
nimity in its councils and achieved it usually by the withdrawal of the 
younger men.
Although councils were iuportant institution5 in many blocks, met
regularly, and sometimes discussed current issuef in center life, they
were much less vital in block life than the ~ess~lls. Most blocks
achieved existence as the basic social units in the centers through less
formal organizations. A few Issei gradually emerged in the majority of
blocks as shapers of block opinion, arbiters of disputes that arose, and
advisers on family and individual problems. Occasionally such a man
m.ight be block manager or a barrack representative in the block council,
but more often he held no formal office. Frequently the men looked to
for advice were parolees from internment camps and deliberately re-
frained frcml holding any fonnal position. Through position in the fonner
West Coast cC!nI!lunit-y and throu?jl generally recognized soundness of judg-
m~nt, they assumed positions of authority in the blocks and people looked
I to them for guidance. It was around them and their ideas that the blocks
i took form steadily as little village communities.
I
By fall in the early centers and by winter in the later centers,
the blocks had crystallized as the foundations of the Ccmlmunities. Their
unity began to be apparent in their attempts to control the block life Qy
passing on the desirability of persons who wanted to move into them and
sometimes in taking action to eject persons of whom they had come to dis-
approve. 
Conununity C ross-Currents
The harmonizing of differences which people achieved in the course
of adapting block lands, barracks, and messhalls to their needs was not
sufficient to create communities out of the relocation centers. The ad-
justment of person to person in terms of these elementary needs resulted
in the rapid establishment of working relationships and the creation of
30 or more little autonomous communities in each center. The integration
of these into wider communities was another process which involved the
adjustment of the people to divergent points of view among the center
population as a whole. !he process was relatively slow and sometimes
tempestuous, especially in the early centers. Many of the tried and ex-
perienced leaders who might have given direction to this process were
still in the internment Cmlps. The leaders who emerged,although
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spokesme;- for the dominant ideas wi thin the group, too often carried in-
sufficient influence 'and authority.
As the hot summer wore on through July in ~anzanar, Poston and
Tule Lake, there was a growing uneasiness in the air. The atmosphere
was charged with complaint and dissatisfaction. The anxieties a bout
food and healtil were stronger than ever. BIlt tile uneasiness that became
marked in August sprang from other sources. It arose in and spread from
gatilerings which brought together men from different blocks, meetings in
Which men who were emer ging as spokesmen for different points of view
among the evacuees discussed broader issues than messhalls and hospitals.
The uneasiness showed itself in different ways, but in all three
or the earliest centers there was no mistaking its presence. Early in
August in Manzanar some young men called a meeting to discuss a recent
ruling of the 'WBA. A regulation had, been issued from Washington exclurl-
ing Kibei from the privilege of going out from centers to work in tl'le
harvest. The regulation refle~ed the suspicion of officials and others
against Kibei as citizens who had gone to Japan for all or part of their
education. Some Kibei in Manzanar wished to discuss this discrimination
against themselves. Their meeting was attended qy many Nisei Who had
never been in Japan. Quickly the meeting became heated, speaker after
speaker arising to denounce the evacuation, the restrictions in the cen-
ters, tile Army's discriminations a~ainst Nisei, the failure of Nisei to
demand their rights, the "colJ!aboration" of some Nisei leaders with Army
and WRA. All the resentments that had piled up poured out now suddenly
in the speeches. The regulation concerning Kibei and harvest work was
forgotten. One speaker cried that Nisei were no longer citizens of the
TJnited states~
"If anyone, any Nisei, thinks he's an American I dare him
to try to walk out of this prison. This is no place for
us. It's a white man's country."
Efforts of a few to curb the denunciation and take a m6re hopefUl view
of their situation were booed into silence. Finally the meeting became
so tempestuous that an administrator who was present requested the chair-
man to stoP it. Later the project director pronounced the meeting "dis-
gracefUl" and thereafter the use of the Japanese language in public gath-
erings was prohibited. The "Kibei meeting," as it came to be c ailed,
was a manifestation of sentiments that had been steadily crystallizing
ever since evacuation. The currents of emotion that it roused swept
baclc into the blocks.
During August a series of meetings was held in Poston II, the
second to be occupied of the three Poston units. A group of older men
who called themselves the Issei Informal Representative Committee spon-
sored the meetings chiefly for the purpose of discussing a ~~
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memorandum of June 5.. This memorandum, reflecting the desire of WRA 01"-
ficials tQ provide some recognition of citizenship in the center, ~ed
that only ,~itizens might hold the elective offices in the canmunity coun-
cils which were to be established, thus excluding all Issei from holding
suc~ offices. The meetings were conducted for the most part in Japanese.
They were quiet as compared with the Manzanar Kibei meeting. Elderly men
rose and stated quietly that they did not have confidence in the Nisei,
that they felt the WRA ruling was creating a dangerous rift in the commu-
nity, that in this crisis there was need for parents and children to
stick together. Some spoke bitterly of the hopelessness of the Whole
situation into which Japanese had been thrown in the United States. Oth-
ers spoke hopefully of making the relocation center into an ideal city if
only fathers and sons would work together. One urged appeal to the
Spanish Embassy (the neutral protective power for Japanese nationa1s~) in
case the United States Gove~ent did not show sufficient consideration
for evacuees. For the most part serious and dignified, these meetings
brought up into the realm of public discussion the basic issues which the
older people felt faced them in the centers. Leaders not only in Poston
II but also in the other Poston units were stirred and the several points
of view became poles around which many of the leaders crystallized their
ideas. On August 24 the major issue which they had set out to discuss
became an academic one when the exclusion of Issei from elective office
was embodied in an official administrative instruction of the ~..
In Tule Lake on August 26 the ~enter newspaper carried a headline
and news story which began:
"COUNC n. ACTS ro OUTLAW GANGSTERISM
"Deeply concerned over the increasing instances of gang-
sterism within the colony, the Community Council last night
took steps to formulate basic policies to preserve law and
order in the :ommunity."
The account went on to say that the most recent in a series of assaults
by unknown persons agaln~t other evacuees had taken place during the
night in block 26. The persons assaulted .had received threats beforehand
and were said to be on a list of persons scheduled to be beaten. The
yoUng men singled out had been prominent in one wgy or another in activi-
ties of the Nisei organization, the Japanese American Citizens League.
The Kibei meeting, the Issei discussions, and the beatings were
manifestations of a fundamental adjustment that was' taking place among
the evacuees. The various segments of the Japanese American population
had reacted differently to the evacuation and the treatment since evacua-
tion at the hands of the United States Government. Family uhity had in-
creased in the face of the attack from without. The old cleavages be-
tween ~erican and ~Tapanese citizens. children and parents, which ha.d
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characterized the Japanese American communities seemed to have been nar-
rowed as all were subjected to the same treatment. Yet on a different
level from the family the old cleavages widened. There were young men
who refused to accept the treatment as final and spoke vigorously for
their views. The ideas of young and old were now in ferment. There had
been clashes of personalities and new alignments under the stres& of
adjusting to Government supervision. The attitude that the group as a
whole should take to this Government supervision was emerging as a
crucial issue. What was the meaning of the relocation centers for the
future of the Japanese Americans? Around this issue, in one form or
another, revolved most of the broader discussion-of the smmner, and
closely related to it were the beatings which be gar: to take place in
all the early ce~ers toward the close of the summer.
Steadily among the older men during the first mo~ths in the
relocation centers, a conception of what..life should be in the centers
had begun to crystallize. It was a simple and practical approach to
the new situation, strongly influenced by the years of experience with
Americans on the West Coast. It dominated the cooperative efforts many-
had made to convert the blocks into livable places. The view was
simply that the centers should be peaceful havens in whict to wait out
the war. The evacuees should work together to make them as comfortable
and as harmonious as possible. There should be compliance with the
Government's orders. At the same time, h~ever, vigilance was necessa~
to see that the Government treatment did not infri~ge the rj_ghts of
interned enemy aliens, for it was obvious that whatever the Goverrmlent
might call the centers, they were essentially internment camps. The
ISsei in them, like the several hundred Whom the Department of Justice
had interned, had been involuntarily neutralized by the Goverrmlent.
The Government, having brought them against their will to the centers,
had certain obligations, chief~y the provision for elementary needs of
food, clothing, and shelter. Moreover, there must be no exploitation
of their labor, and since the Government had for all practical purposes
classified them as interned enemy aliens it ought not, in accordance
wi th the Geneva Convention, to make them do any work which would
directly contribute to the war effort against the nat1on--Japan--in
which they had legal citizenship. ~ere was rather general agreement
among the older men on this interpretation of their new status and the
meaning of the relocation centers.
This view was to have far reaching consequences in the adjust-
ment of the evacuees to the centers. It was in conflict with the view
which the WRA policy makers were developing in the very month in which
the tensions of community adjustzrent intensified in the early centers.
The ~~ was reaching the decision that the centers should not be con-
sidered internment camps. They were to be, on the contrary, merely a
stage on the way to new adjustmAnt in American life for ISsei and Wisei
alike.
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Moreover, this view of the centers as neut~-waiting "Stationb
was in sharp conflict with the view of another segment of the evacueepopulation. The citizen Nisei, more deeply shaken by the evacuation and :
its implications for loss of citizenship, were less able to reach a sim- II
ple agreement on the meaning of the relocation centers. A majority of
them were angry and resentful, but w~re unable to see any way out. As
their bitterness increased through the summer, they were more and more
inclined to listen to the view of the older men, to accept the centers
(although more bitterly than the Issei) as places "to rot it out" for the
duration of the w~r. Among them, however, there were leaders who wele
inclined to no such view. They vigorously opposed what they felt to be
fruitless denunciation of the type that came out. in the Kibei meeting
and, as well, what they felt to be the sterile acceptance of the si tua-
tion in the dominant ISsei conception. Some of these young men were
leaders in the Japanese American Citizens League, although others were
not. They had come to the camps with the conviction that although evac-
uationlwas misguided it should be complied with as a war measure for the
benefit of the country as a whole. Once in the centers they sought des- Iperately to make the situation have some meaning in relation to what oth-
er Americans were doing and to their own future in this country. Some of
them joined in petitioning the War Department to open the armed services
to Nisei. Some eagerly embraced the opportunity to join in the American
war effort when the Army proposed to establish camouflage net factories
in Manzanar, Poston and Gila. Their conception was essentially that the
relocation centers should be places in which evacuees could demonstrate
that they should not have been placed there. Holding this view~ they
sought to cooperate in all plans of the WRA and inevitably looked to WRA
for support.
There were thus two sharply opposed views in the early centers,
one embodying a static view of center life aloof from the life of the
country and the other seeking some integration of the people in the cen-
ters with all that was going on outside. The first was primari~ the
view of the older people (althOugh not all Issei held it), but the frus-
trations and restrictions of center life were drawing into its orbit a
majority of the Nisei. The second view was held by only a small minority
of the younger men and women~ many of whan had participated far less in
the former Japanese American communities than in the wider community
around them. Some had been activ-ely antagonistic to most that the Issei
leaders of the pre-evacuation communities stood for.
The dominance of the ISsei view was fostered by the Whole emotion-
al aftermath of evacuation~ while that of the Nisei leaders was one that
had to be regenerated through acts of faith~ once evacuation had taken
place. The circumstances of center life, the discharge of many Nisei
fran the Army~ the classification of Nisei by Selective Service boards as
"ineligible because of ancestry," the growing evidences of hostility in
segments of the American public, and ultimat~ly the construction of
(78)
.
~ '. J
fences and guard towers around the centers (Manzanar had been so -feDc~d
from the beginnin~~bi! all these developments gave an increasingly un-
real aura to the ~Jisei leaders' views. The Issei view of the centers as
a sort of temporary dead end, on the other hand, se~ed to fit the facts
both of past discrimination and present growth of restrictions.
Moreover, negative and'static as the Issei view seemed to the cru-
sadir.g young men, it had many pcsitive aspects which seemed obvious to
most Issei and even to many Nisei who had spent formative years ift Japan.
It was a view which, equally with that of the Fisei leaders, r elated the
relocation centers to the war. At tne time it was bein~ formulated inL'
the summer of 1942, the Pacific war seemed to be reoving steadily toward a
Japanese success. Probably all but a handful of ISseibel1eved that the
facts indicated that Japan had ~rw,anently consolidated her position.in
the Southwest Pacific. If this were true and Japan should emerge as a
real world power, then the position of the Japanese minority in the United
states after the war could be expected to improve. Exclusion of the !s-
sei from American citizenship and all the discriminations that accompa-
i nied and flowed from that might well be remedied 1 probably pro~lptly
I through measures that would be taken at the peace table. In the light of
I these beliefs the enforced neutrality in the centers was a happy solution
for famili~s whose members' citizenship straddled the Pacific conflict.
The implications of the Issei view of the centers unfolded point
by point as the evacuees came up against the frame which the ~~~ was de-
signing for life in. the centerS. The most impart~~t implication of the
view was the necessity for solidarity in the face of all that th~eatened
the group. Most Issei felt that there was no intelligent view for Nisei
to take other than that all had now been placed in the same position,
that Nisei interests now coincided, ~s they never had before, with those
of the Issei. The attempts of Nisei leaders to construe the centers as
anything but inter~~ent camps seemed to the Issei both futile and contra.
ry to the interests of the whole group. Many Issei wer~ willing to adu,it
that those Nisei who wanted to had the r;i.ght, for exa.'J1ple, to WOrl'( in the
camouflage net factories and so contribute to American war activities.
So long as there was no attempt to bring all evacuees into such actj_vi-
ties, it was proper for Nisei to engage in them. But Issei generally did
not feel that they could rely on the Ni~~i leadership, which .vas so in-
terested in relating itself to the American war effort, to uphold the in-
terests of the Issei who were not, and had never been permitted to be,
American citizens. They sought a solidarity of Nisei and Issei in the
approach to life in the relocation centers.
The nature of the solidarity which Issei sought became clear in
the discussion roused by the iTitA ruling concerning community councils.
This ruling, restricting electivooffice in the centers to citizens, was
precisely in line with the view of the Kisei leaders that citizenship
should be given some mea.~irig in the centers. It 'Has regarded by Issei
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leaders, however, as a profound threat. They felt that it presaged a
rift in the solidarity of the group and thereby weakened their whole po-
sition in the relocation centers. In the meetings in Poston at which
the point was discus~ed in August, the ISsei viewnoint came out clearly.
One view held that the l\isei had not danonstrated a capaci'ty for sound
leadership of the whole group:
"Since t"he Niseis minds run in different c~annels, even
though they have within their systems a part of our blood,
we feel that we cannot entrust our future welfare to the
Niseis * * *. We feel that after the poor job that the
Niseis have done in California, we cannot possibly entrust
our future welfare to that ~roup."
Others were more conciliatorJ, but still insistent that Nisei not be
misled into acceptance of the proffered status as official representa-
tives of the whole evacuee group:
"()1r Nisei are gradually corning to the front and I am hap-
pyabout it. We parents have had thedesire to make them
good American citizens and, therefore, we are greatly con-
cerned about them. How can we be most helpful to the Nisei?
We want to work together. Vie know the conditions are bad
and so we want to make them pleasant. If we don't have
equal rights, then there may be instances where we may not
be able to work together. I hope the Nisei will under-
stand how much we Issei are thinking and worrying about
them."
The feeling that the Nisei did not understand fully what had happened to
them was strong am there were efforts to wake them up to the situation
as many Issei saw it:
"Will you look forward into the future a little? After
peace, what is going to happen to the Nisei? There is no
doubt in my mind that they will be kicked around like dogs,
as witness the treatment of.the Germans in the past post-
World War period. I don't know if the Nisei realize the
predicament they are in. What we really wanted to hear
from the Niseis was a statement to the effect that. tr.ey
will work hand in hand with the Isseis * * * and fight any
problems * * * which may arise frcml time to time."
The ultimate appeal was in terms of the family relationship:
"The Issei and Nisei relationship is that of parent and
child. It should not be disposed of lightly. Even if the
government reguls.tions l1'ake a distinction, we should all
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cooperate to create an ideal city. Your parents came as
poor in".rnigrants. They sacrificed a great deal if, * *. You
should have pride in your ancestors. I believe you who are
wiEe will welcome the cooperation of all to create an ideal
city here."
This last statement embodied the essence of the Issei approach to life j.n
the relocation centers. It was a turrling in toward th,;; fa..'YIj.ly group and a
limiting of the horizon to the neutral haven of the relocation center
. which then might become "an ideal city."
Over ar.d over again in the months since evacuation the Nisei had
been hearing the refrain that all must now stick together. In the meet-
ings discussing the WRA ruling Excluding Issei from political office they
heard it again in formal speeehes:
"In our block there is no Issei or 1'!isei. iVe only have Jap-
anese in our block.
"VIe will elect J\isei represent.atives. However, we want them
to understro:d that they will be working for all the people
as a Japanese and not as an American."
The Issei conception had become crystallized in all centers in the often
repeated phrase: f!l,Ve are all Japanese together." . 'T'~e evacuation had
done its work. As nothing else could have, that attack on the basic se-
curity of tt.e group was stimulating a solidarity whi('.'l had not t.een
there before. Most Nisei t. egan to accept i t wholeh~artedly or else gave
u~ as they had already done in their attempts to find a voice in the
block councils. Those who s till sought to equate citizenship with commu-
nity leadership came into head-on collisions with the majority sentiment
that had begun to dominate cOOlmUnity life by the end of the summer.
The August beatings at Tule Lake constituted another manifestation
of the drive toward solidarity among themselves as over ~ainst the Cau-
casians who had attacked the group through evacuation. It was a sinister
manifestation outside of and below the political expressions and public
efforts at persuasion. Gangs of young men who threatened, intiffiidated
and sometimes beat other evacuees formed in every center, earlvand late
-" ,
s~e 2 to 4 months after center opening. In their first stages, the
gangs did not operate at random. The men they chose to intimidate or
beat up were carefully selected and for very specific reasons. The ob-
jects of their attacks were leaders of the Japanese American Citizens
League or like~inded Nisei. The reasons for selecting such young men
were v{ell understood qy evacuees.
The leadership of the Japanese ftrlerican Citizens League, after in-
itial efforts to forest~ll evacuaticn, ha.d taken the stand that.
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thoroughgoing cooperation in the process with Army and Government agen-
cies was the only possible course. f'\1blic statements of JACL leader.s
urging cooperation and acceptance of evacuation as the Japanese Amer1can
contribution to the war effort earned the organization the reputation of
having Rcollaborated" with the Government a gainst the best interests of
the whole group. Southern California evacuees were embittered against
some JACL leaders because of what they felt had been efforts on their
part to save tr.e Nisei from evacuation at the expense of the Issei. At-
titudes of antagonism towards specific JACL leaders were fostered by old
long-standing political conflicts in the Calj.forr.ia communities and by
suspicicn concerning activities they had engaged in just before e vacua-
tion. There was widespread belief that JACL leaders had turned over to
the FBI for sums of money the names of Issei co~~lnity leaders and that
such information had led to the internment of the leaders. The sons of
many internees felt bitterly over what theyregarded as urljust detention
of their parents and brutal treatlTlcr!t by the FBI agents. They sought
someone to blame and the JACL leaders served the purpose.
The Japanese American Citizens League "during the montr.s just after
evacuaticn quickly became a scapegoat for all the ulisfortune of the eva-cuees. It w as blamed for all that had happened and its leaders became '
symbols;of betrayal. These feelings increased intensely when some JACL
l~~~~s in the centers began to take the position that the armed s ervi-
cesshould be reopened to Nisei. The petiticns of Manzanar Nisei leaders
to 7iashington officials became known and were interpreted as f~rther be-
trayal of the group. To a majority of the parents the drafting of their
sons after' the falilily; h9-d lost its economic s take and was still in the
relocation center appeared as the ultimate in in,justice and a threat to
the only security remaining, namely, the solidarity of the family. Feel-
~g ran even higher against the ,TACL leaders than it had in the first
months. Young men began to orga.."1ize ,gangs and to set themselves the task
of intimidating JACL leaders into silence and of carrying out vengeance
for the already accomplished acts of "informing" against their fathers to
the FBI and "collaborating" in the evacuation.
The young men who carried out the beatings at Tule Lake were not
caught. Similar attacks began to occur in Poston and MMlzanar. Once
loosed, the undercover intimidaticn assumed a vrider scope. NOt only JACL
leaders heard that their ncnnes were on "the list," but also individuals
Who were merely working cooperatively with the ','ffiA administrators in the
centers, particularly young men who had obtaired "good jobs" dl1ring the
early for'J[.ation of the administrative shell. The t ems "informer," "inu"
(the Japanese word for dog), "administration :stocge" began to be heard
more and more frequently. Evacuees wtl0 .had ha.d no cor~ection with JACL
policies or organization were beaten or threateneq. Fear and suspicion
spread throuch the blocks. I!)cividuals became fear'ful ofgetting or. in-
timate terniS witl-- administrators or urging cooperation in sane project
sug[ested by the arJmir.istr'ation. Some EYacu'ee~ who had been working well
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,with administrators and accepting responeibili tr in center management
withdrew suddenly. Fear was rampant in all three of the early center..
The technique of intimidation was enforcing a solidarity of evacuees ae
against Caucasiane based chiefly on fear. The result was ~ sharper sep-
~ration of evacuees from IRA staff and a sense of tension in m08t rela-
tions between the two groups.
The two relf),ted trends in the evacuee communi ties (the Iesei con-
ception aIKl the intimidation attempts) were converging by different mean8
toward the s~.e result--toward solidarity among evacuees and opposition
to the Caucasians. They were. h~'ever. not compatible with each other.
,The I88ei concept of an "ideal city" had to be built on law and order.
and the Issei ideal was destined to triumph.
The OUtside
--
When 8chools opened in September in one center high school bays
expressed their cynicism by scrawling in chalk on the black tar paper
walls of their classroom: "Jap Prison"; and like inmates of prisons the
evacuees generally fell into the habit of referring to the universe be-
, yond the boundaries of the relocation centers as "the outeide.ft It ~8
a universe wi th which they had steadily lost touch from the moment they
stepped into the assembly centers.
For many evacuees interest in the outside world. as they left the
a8semb~ centers, focused down on the small towns near the relocation
centers. Evacuees who went to Poston quickly became aware of the barber
shop in nearby Parker. Arizona. which had in black cr9¥°n on its door the
words: "Jap, keep out. you rat.- People scheduled to go to Jerome and
Rohwer speculated in the assembly centers and on the trains en route
about racial prejudice in the Arkansas towns, whether or not Japanese
would be equated with Negroes and subject to the same discriminations.
Many of the older people expected extreme hostility in the emall towns
neighboring the centers and felt that the military police would be a ne-
cessary guard against attacks from nearby farmers and townsmen. Once in
the centers. thi8 interest continued, and the nature of preJudice and
good will in the nearby towns became a basis for Judging the attitude. of
all Americans. Except with the WRA staff there was almost no other con-
tact during the early month8 on which to base a judgment. -
The attitudes of the people in the vicinity of the relocation cen-
ters turned out to be much like those of people in the West Coast commu-
nities from whicn the evacuees had come--a peculiar mixture of hostility
and friendliness. There were shops in most of the towns which posted -.0
Japs" signs of one 8ort or another. but as shopping privileges were
granted to evacuees and it became evident that there would be a large
volume of trade such shops generally beCAme a minori ty. Project direc-
tors worked hard to prOmote good feeling and tolerance and to break
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down the inevitable identification of the Japanese American. with the
Japanese with whom the country was at war. Local people were invited to
visit the centers and some mP.de inspection tours of the centers. usua1l7
with the result of offers of various kinds to help the evacuees. The
four western centers--Manzanar. Poston. Gila. and Tule Lake--remained
the most isolated from local conta~ts and the most hedged about by minor
loc~l hostilities. The rela,tions of the later centers with neighboring
people were gener~lly someWhat better.
Nevertheless there were "incidents" of various kinds. In Arkan-
sas someone shot at a Nisei soldier in a town not far from the Jerome
center. In Idaho the Republican Committee of the large tO1m nearest to
the Minidoka center paid for an advertisement advocating rigid super-
vision and detention of all Japanese Americans. In every little town
neighboring the centers from Cody, wyoming, to McGeehSe. Arkansas. some
evacuees at some time or other during the early months encountered dis-
crimination and predujice in some form or saw evidence of it in a letter
to the editor of the local paper. At the same time local ministerial
associations or other groups were proffering aid in the form of contri-
butions of shrubs or flowers to make the center more pleassnt or gift.
of books to the libraries or some gesture at least embodied in an edi-
torial or a public statement of some kind. Such gestures received less
attention in the centers than the evidences of hostility and prejudice.
Each Mincident" was blown up in rumor to large proportions and discuseed
passionatel7 by the evacuees. The news of a discrimination near one
center went b7 letter to other center.. There was little balance. in
the atmosphere of the center8, in the appraisal of the events. The con-
viction grew through the summer that the outside world was increasir~l7
hostile and that evacuees would be better off to remain in the centers.
This feeling was backed up in Septemb~r by the news that Selective Ser-
vice had officially clas~ified all Nisei as ineligible. ,on the grounds
of ance8t~. to serve in the armed forces of the United States.
The conviction of increasing American hostility which settled over
the centers was hardly touched by indications here ~d there of another
trend. Almost at the same time that Selective Service was closed to all
Nisei, the War Department began to recruit young men ~rom the ~enters
for special training in ~v Intelligence schools. Then, as farmers in
the West found themselves faced with a labor short~ at harvest time,
recruiters for the big sugar beet companies began to appear in the cen-
ters with offers to the 7oung men of Jobs throughout the Western States
at going wages. The cotton-growers of southern Arizona also applied
pressure to the commanding general of the western Defense Command to al-
low evacuee. to leave the centers of Poston and Gila to pick cotton.
These developments were interpreted by evacuees in different w~s. A
few welcomed them as opportunities to participate in the United States
war effort. to demonstrate the loyalty that they felt to the country.
To others the recrul tment for Army Intelligence seemed a threat to
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family security. and in sme cases young men who wanted to take the op-
portunities found themselves faced with parental opposition. The offers
of outside work at going wages seemed to most not to be indications of
8Dy good will, but rather of the desperate plight of the farmers. The
cotton-picking was viewed in the same light by the majority and. more-
over. seemed to be with its offer of outside wages. a threat to the co-
operative view of center life, with everyone on an equal basis. which
some leaders were trying to develop. Nevertheless young men did begin
to respond to the opportunities in the beetfields to make something more
than $16 a month. WRA began to issue "seasonal leaveD for the harvest
work and the young men flowed out of the centers by the hundreds. B?
late fall some 10,000 were out of the centers temporarily. making going
wages throughout" the Western States. The cent.ers, whether 8vacuees
wished it or not, were linked solidly with the outside world.
As the pressures for harvest work intensified in the late summer,
the WRA policT mr~ers began to see it as a means for furthering the idea
which had been developing among them that a way out of the centers for
the evacuees should be found. They had already encouraged church and
other groups to help college students among the evacuees to continue
their education in colleges outside the exclusion zone. A trickle of
students had begun to leave the centers for this purpose. Now, with the
growing demands for evacuee labor in the harvest, the WRA developed a
policy of 8leave clearance" to enable evacuees to meet this demand. By
October the National Director of the WRA was making a tour of the relo-
cation centers announcing a general plan for resettlement of the evacuees
outside the centers. At Topaz he said that he hoped to see 20,000 eva-
cuees resettled in normal communities within a year and that he hoped
e~eryone would be out and re-establiehed before the end of the war. For
'. ,
the top policy makers in Washington this announcement marked the culmi-
~tion of a serious weighing of the possibilities for the future of the
whole Japanese American gfoup. It was a decision based on the feeling
that people would deteriorate in the camps and that the best solution of
the problems created by the evacuation 15T in the quickest possible
re-est.~blishment in homes and jobs in normal communities outside the ex-
cluded zone. It constituted a rejection of the idea of internment for
the group and an effort to link them again with the nationM life from
which they had been isolated.
The different segments of the evacuee population reacted in dif-
ferent ways to the new prospect. For the majority the new policy was
not so decisive as it seemed to the administrators. During the same
period that ~e policy makers had been arriving at their decision. the
majority of evacuees. and particularly the more thoughtful" leaders among
the older men, had been with increasing conviction arr,iving at the con~
ception of the centers as quite tolerable havens for the duration of the
war. Those who had spent several months in the early centers hAd been
adjusting themselves systematically to this view. The whole trend,
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usually with the encouragement of WRA center staff, had been to regard
the centere ae war-duration homee and to find w~s of making them liva-
ble and as self-8ufficient as po.sible. Thie view was solidly rooted
among the Issei by the time the National Director made his announcements.
To them, therefore, the new policy seemed,hBrd17.credlblei at least the
plan for resettlement of the whole group did not seem reall7 practicable.
It disturbed them that the National Director should have such a view,
but they had come to feel that "the Government" was ce.pricious and that
sucb an impracticable scheme as this probably would not be carried out.
It introduced mere17 another factor of uncertainty for speculation and
rumor. Moreover, at about the same time that the announcement was offi-
cially made, the Army begpJ! to build fences and watch towers around the
borders of all those centers which did not already have them.
?or many young pe ~le who had been bored and mi.erable in the
centers and in active revolt against having to live with people with
whom they felt nothing in common, the new prospect of leaving the centers
was welcomed with enthusi~sm. The 7oung students e~r to get on with
their education and 7oung Nisei families who hAd friends or relatives in
Denver and Salt Lake Cit7 moved out quickly, as soon as they could get
leave clearance. This trend made for a little more unity and harmony in
the blocks as these people left during the fall.
!'or center .sta:Cf the new policy raised problems which they could
see immediate17. For statf in the ear17 centers it meant considerable
reorientation of their thinking. They bad been struggling with the task r
of lqing the foundations f'or more or leas stable communi ties. Most of r
I
their thinking bad been in that direction eince no other very clear pros- r
pect had been held out to them. Now they bM to cont~mplate what seemed ~an even more difficult Job, name 17 , the, management of an unstable commu- '.
ni ty wbich would be conetantly losing population. There would be read-
justments to be made constantly to the 108s of individuals trained in
some aspect of center operation, the need for constantly breaking in new
persons in responsible jobs, as people should leave. To the sta:Cf in
the early centers the readjustment was more difficult than for those in
the later - ones. In those centers opened after July--all but Wanzanar,
Poston, Tu1e Lake. and Gil~the staff were more or less aware of the
trend in top policy. They were not alread7 set in another direction.
Nevertheless all centers got Bome taste promptly of what the new
policy would mean. New and old centers alike lost hun~~ds of 7~ men
from September to December a~ they responded to the recruiting for har-
vest workers. From Minidoka 2,000 men went out within 6 weeks alter the
center opened. Almost as many left Gr~nada, and all the other center.
lost fraa 800 to 1,200 workers, mostly the more vigorous and able young
men. Although in the later centers this probab17 made for a better long
term adjustment in the comnllmity, as the administrators fell back. on the
older men in organizing the centers, it also gaTe a foretaate of tbe
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o.ifficulties involved in a resettlement program. There were shortages
of l~bor in most centers. difficulties in getting persons to haul coal
and do the he~vy work of center operation. Then there were the problems
of the return of the young men after the seasonal ~ork in the eArly win-ter. Den with money in their pockets who were not too anxious to work, 
and the upsetting of the adjustment that had been achieved in emplQyment
and center organiz'ation. What was to be an abiding contradict1on--the
cross pull of straddling the outside world and the economic vacuum of
the centere--hRd entered center life.
Crisis
~-
As the program of Gove~n.'\en.t supervision unfolded. each suoces-
sue development seemed to create a new contradiction in tae lives of the
evacuees. There were reasone--good reasons in Wa8hington--for the fea-
tures of policy, but that did not make them any less contrad1ctory in
the lives of the people in the relocation centftrs. The classificat1on
of people into evacuees and Caucasians struck at the roots of coopera-
tion and laid the foundations for division of i.nterest and mutual dis-
trust. The leveled wages demanded substitution for economic incentive
of community interest--in caamunities that did not yet exist. The iso-
lation of the centers reared a bafflingly unreal world of rumor and fear
which competed successfully for evacuee belief with a relentlessly real
world outside the communities. The reality of Issei doMinAnce i~ block
life was faced by the unreality of Nisei dominance in community councils.
The majority of evacuees, havtBg progressively adjueted to the concept'
of .ideal citiee,- now were asked to consider the dissolution of the
communities. Resuonsible 8taff members in the centers who b&d been
etruggling through the summer to achieve stability had began to feel the
contradictions as keenly as the ev~ee8 themselves. In October, ad-
dressing a Bisei ma88 meeting called to discuss the most re~~nt evidences
of restriction on citizens, the project director of Tule Lake de-
clared: "I b3ve a thankless job as director of this project.- The mood
of hopeful community building in the earl:, centers was giving way to one
of frustration. ~Zle mood of the blocks had penetrated the administration
area.
The lRter centers. settled in August 9nd after, were still largely
in the stage of development that had characterized the e~ly centers in
May and June. Moreover the evacuees who entered them were settling into
a somewhat different mould. The basic living conditions and the funda-
mental restrictions wore the same. but the framework of policy to which
they must adjust was better defined. They had learned something about
living with one another in the assembl~ centers, and they were to learn
br proxy during the fall from what took place in the less fortunate early
centers. In MAnzanar and Poston the resolution of paradox was moving
toward a climax, which many evacuees sensed as early as September $
(~)
In Poston I after a brief and frustrating false start, a frame-
work of community institutions designed to link evacuees and administra-
tors in co~erative effort steadily grew up during the summer. In M~
and June the a.dm1nistrators, in response to the WRA announcement that
"It will be up to each community to plan its design of con~ity life,-
had stimulated leaders from among both Nieei and Issei to work out a
plan of community organi;ation. ~ey organized a Civic!Planning Board
and by late June had prepared a constitution. Only then did they become
aware of the memoran~um of June 5 which ordered another form of organi-
zation and e~lu~ed Issei from holding elective office. The Civic Plan-
ning Board disbanded and discarded its plan. The project attorney of
the center staff assumed leaderShip in carrying out the Washington plan.
An election was called and 36 young men, all but one under 40, were cho-
sen. one from a block.. to form a Temporary Community Counc1l.
There was little interest among eve~es as the council took of-
fice. Amid talk in the blocks about "administration stooges, I! the coun-
cil beaan work. The chairman had been active in the Los Angeles chapter
of the Japanese American Citizens League. He had also been active in
the S~ta Anita Assembly Center as an outspoken critic of the food and
mesehall conditions. Sensitive to current dissatisfactions ~bout food,
in Poston and aware of rumors that the project steward was engaged in
graft at the expense of evacuees, the council formed a Food Committee.
The committee promptly sought facts about the management of the mess
divisioJIl.. In similar fashion, in response to the widespread anxieties and complaint. about the hospital, a Health Committee was formed and 
proceeded to investigate the hospital. This exploration of the frame-
work within which evacuees had to live was not taken in good part by the
administrator.. They talked of cooperation and of the council' s fun~ tion as getting the people behind the administration to support the ad- 
ministration's plans for community development. They did not see the
council' 8 actions as the real basis of cooperation which they were.
They were convinced themselves that they were doing everything in their
power to make the hospital and the messhalls satisfactory. !hey did not
realize that suspicion and distrust was 80 deep, and that the investiga-
tions sprang from the real need of the..evacuees for Wlderstanding just
how the men in whose hands they had been placed were going about their
busine8s. They refused to let the Food. Committee see the steward's
books and thereby increased the suspicion. They also objected when the
council chairman showed signa of cAr~ing out a wider exploration of the
framework in which evacuees were living. He wrote letters to Washington
officiRls about conditions and needs on the center and BOught to keep in
touch wi th t hem personally and c.ire ctly. The admini strators began to
write off the council as a group which could not be relied upon to pro-
ceed "constructivelyU to get the cooperation of the people.
~At the 8~e time that the young men on the council were incurr1~g
the disfavor of the artministrators. hostility to them was growing up in
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the community. There w~s some appreciation here an~ there of their ef-
forts to find out ho~ the center was m,~ed, but these efforts h~d not
been successful anti most of the older influential men were inclined to
feel that this ~roved the ineptness of the Nisei leaders. The block
m~nager8, who like the council consisted of ~~ group composed of one man
from each bloclc, hll.d become e.n ever more important institution in the
coD\rnunity. Through them the resident!! were consta.ntly getting tl:'..ngible
results from the administration. When they wanted specific things, the
block manager~ reJ-)orted it and they either got tr..e1!1 or got defini te in-
formation that they were not to be had. The councilmen were a some?;hat
confusing element in block life. Sometimes their information e.bout ad-
ministration plans and. activities did not gibe with the block mAn?~ers'
information. Some competition for prestige and position in the blocks
develo1)ed between councilmen and block man~ers. Often from the point of
view of the block resident the councilmP~ seemed superfluous. The wider
ie~ues of center life with which the council attempted to concern itself
did not seem relevant to the real end specific needs of the individuals.
In addition to such criticisms of the council, active antagonism was de-
'velop1ng to specific mel!1bers of the group. The general hostility to the
Japane~e Americ~n Oi ti~ens League played its part. The chairman and oth-
er councilmen had been active in that orga.n12ation. One in particular
had Md A. bad reputation before evacuation and was specifically suspected
of hAving been an FBI informer. In the fall he was reported to be on
"the list" schedulecl, for beating up by A. young men's gang. His reputa-
tion colored the community reaction to the council as a whole. Thus de-
Rpite the efforts of the council to do something about allaying the most
intense anxieties and susnicion$ of the majority of evacuees, people ceme
more and more to refer to them as "a.dministration stooges" or as an inef-
fective "child council." The council was between two fires and was fast
becoming a symbol of the evils of "collaboration," as anti-administration
feelings focused on them.
The top staff was by no means unaware of the antagonism of the
community to the council, nor of the diss8.tisfaction with the ruling
against Issei office-holding. The project attorney who organized the
election of the council aleo encouraged the formation of a group of older
men, called the Issei Advisory Board, which was to act in an adviso~ c&-
pacity to the cmUlcil and the administration. The Issei ~dvisory Board,
which was to act in an advisory caps£ity to the council and the adminis-
tration. The Issei Advisory Board, consisting of one Issei from each
 block, was formed in Auguet, amid considerably more interest in the
block8 than had attended the formation of the community council. It pro-
ceeded to hold meetings separately from the council. The chairman of the
council, e~though he himself met with the board and listened to its ad-
vice, resisted the holding of joint meetings. He feared domination of
proceedings qy the Issei group if that were done. He made it clear that,
although he would work with the Issei board, ,he nevertheless approved o~
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.the IRA di8tinction between citizens and aliens and would seek to main-
tain that distinction in the method of work of the council.
The 1Sgei Advisory Board went on consolidating its position. Its
members were in toucb. as the Ni set council was not, wi tb the deeper
currents of community sentiment. Its members were in fact spokesmen of
those deeper currents. They believed generally in the view of centers
as neutral havens for the duration of the war and in the need for soli-
darity of all segments of the evacuees in order to insure mAking the
center into What they felt it Should. be. They voiced the general dis-
trust of the Administrators, discussed unfulfilled promises such as the
failure to re1ievs the housing situation, and denounced the retention of
unpopular and distrusted young men in key positions in the block manag-
er~ organization. the community stores, and elsewhere. Peeling the
council to be ineffective and feeling lack of sympat~ with their posi-
tion on t~e part of its chairman. the board became increasingly critical
of the cOlDI!1Unity council. 
In this atmosphere of competing political groups. gang elements 
began their campaign of intimidation. Their activities increased
through October and early Bovember. Several persons were beaten up in
Poston I and the beaters were not discovered. Nisei leaders became
fearful. The atmosphere of the blocks becam~ tense. The IRA staff felt
their relatione with evacuees becoming increasingly strained. Attitudes
of suspicion grew on both sides. !he center eeemed to be ripe for some
sort of explosion.
It come on November 18. A few days before. one of the councilmen 
was attacked and seriously beaten. While be 19y in the hospital. FBI
agents came to the center to ferret out the perpetrators of the beating.
They followed leads to various barracks and finally. in an action that
reminded evacuees of the dgys following Pearl Harbor. they picked up two
young men as suspects an~ placed them in the center jail. One was a
popular judo expert: the other W8.e a popular and ci vic-minded young man
who bad been active in community affaire. Por two d~s they were kept
in the jail and rumors spread that they were to be removed from the cen-
ter to the hostile "outside" for tri8.1. Sentiment that the ,.oung men
were innocent became widespread and petitions were framed requesting
their release. Hardly anyone believed that they would get a fair trial
in an outside court. On the morning of the third day a crowd collected
at the jail and announced their determination to prevent the removsl of '
the young men. They refused to disperse st the request of the acting
project director.
Around the jailed men and their defenders community feeling cry-
stallized rapidLv. Members of the Issei Advisory ~oard. personal friend.
of the young men. and others spoke to people in vari~s blocks. SUpport
for the defense of the suspects was marshalled. EUndreds more people
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gathered at the jail d~ring the afternoon, men and women, whole familiea
with their children. From somewhere the rumor spread that there wa. to
be a n strike,. and by noon evacuees were leaving the offices in the ad-
ministration area. In an atmosphere of emotion running high, the Nisei
council met. passed a resolution urging the release of ~e suspects for
later trial, heard the acting project director reject the request. and
resigned in a body. That night the block managers reeigned. As night
came on. in the increasingly determined atmosphere of the crowd around
. the jail, an Emergency Committee of representatives from all the blocks
was formed and immediately dominated by leaders from the Issei Advisory
Board. A general strike of all workers in the center, except those in
the essential eervices of mess. hospital, fire protection, and police
was called. The community was in defiant demonstration against the ad-
ministration and all official channels of communication between the two
groups had been broken. The Issei Adviso~ Board was dominant.
This was.no ordinary strike. such as had occurred with this work
crew or that. I t was a communi ty upheaval and members of the WRA staff
were well aware of it. Some staff members excitedly urged putting the
whole affair down by force, calling in the military police and disper-
. sing the crowd with tear gas or guns. The top staff rejected the idea.
len8ing that rorce could not solve the problems which l~ at the root of
the demonstration. They decided to find some means for negotiation with
the strike le$ders.
Meanwhile the consolidation of the community behind the strike
leaders proceeded. Block m~~agers or Issei advisers or othere. no long-
er acting in administration-sponsored official capacitiee, organized
the1r blocks ror eupport. Regular shifts of men, women, and children
from each block were organized to go 'and stand watch beside the little
fires that had been built to keep warm by. Flags with the Immerals of
the blocks were mounted on poles and rose over each group of block people
around the police station. Pictures of "dogs- (informers) appeared on
the walls of the police station and on placards among t~e crowd--~boll
of betr8¥al or the group which focused the feelings or the ,crowd. As
people relieved each other in continuous streams from the blocks thro~
the night, the leaders held meetings in the adJacent'messhall. Speaker.
denounced" informere- of all kinds; all the host of grieTances of the
people were voiced again and again. Speakers who attempted to speak in
English were denounced and booed to silence. Nisei on the outskirts of
the crowd began to wonder if there were not something in 811 this. ~be
a solid demonstration was needed, and certainly there was a civil rights
issue here since the 70Qng men were being held on suspicion beyond the
legal time limit. Out in the blocks there were men and women who refUsed
to participate, who resented and resisted the pressures that were applied
to them. But they were in a 8inority. Community eent1ments had c~stal-
lized in the demonstration. and for the first time since evacuation there
was a senee or striking back at oppressors.
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The existence of the crowd acting in defiance of administrative
desires had a powerful impact on the WRA staff in their barracks and of-
fices at the edge of the community. Fear. suspicion, and hatred spreng
up among some of them. '!'bey could hear records of Japanese music plqed
through loud-speakers to the crowd. All were distraught and some began
to identity the demonstrators with the Japanese enemy in the Pacific.
The maj ori ty. however, were anxious for some peaceful solution. Ye\,
even though they ~elt disposed to visit friends among the evacuees to
talk and get at the roots of the demonstration, they found as the strike
wore on for several days that there was an invisible line between them
and every evacuee in the center. They sensed quickly that-visiting. an
eV8vcuee in his barr,~k might be dangerous to the evacuee. A friendly
visit challenged the solidarity that the evacuees had momentarily
achieved; evacuees indicated that they m1gnt be beaten if they bad trs~
fic wi th caucasians. Still there were evacuees who crossed the line to
declare loyalty to a friend on the staff or even to offer to finish an
urgent job. SUch offers were quickly discouraged by staff, again with
the welfare of the evacuees in mind. No one crossed the line even for a moment without intense consciousness of it. A 8olidarit7 of the evacuees 
vis-a-vis the Caucasians had been achieved in part by force and intimida-
tion, but for most through the opening of a ~h~ftnel for expression of ac- 
cumulated resentments and frustrations.
As the rift widened between evacuees and administrators, While
both sought a basis for negotiation, the issue broadened. It was evident
that the holding of the suspects was little more than the' catalyst of'
community sentiments which arose out of' still deeper issues. As repre-
sentatives of the administration talked with the Issei leaders of \he
community, it became clear what they wanted. They wanted a real voice in
the management of the community. Primarily, they felt that the wrong
evacuees had been selected for responsible positions in the center or-
ganization; inexperienced and untrustworth¥ persons who did not command
the respect of the community were in too maD7 places of responsibility.
They felt that a board, to be c~led an Honor Court. composed of elected
persons with good reputations, should have tne power to pass on persons
in key position.. If this were done, there would be unity, and la. and
order would replace di~organization and gangsterism. They ~so felt ~t
the administrators had not Shown that they c~ld deal effectively with
the evacuees. The orders and desires of the administration should be
passed down to the people through an executive board of elec\ed evacuees
who understood -the psychology of the people.' This would produce
smoothness and efficiency in the center operations. Finally they wanted
really representative committees or councils, or whatever the adminis-
tration wanted to call them, to discuss and work with the administrator..
Negotiation went on over these points. The objectives of the I8sel lead-
ers--law and order, smoothness in center operation, and real communit7
organizatlon--were precisely what the administrators wanted. They dif-
fered on the nature of the institutions which could achieve these ends,
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and same administrators strongly distrusted the newly emerged leaders.
At the end of a week of discussion during which administrators and ev~~-
ees got in touch with one another as they never had before, the project
director and the strike leaders reached agreement on the major objec-
tives. One of the suspects had alrea~~ been released for lack of evi-
dence and the other was released for trial by the center Judicial Commis-
sion. The crowd at the police station listened to a friendly speech ~
the project director, disbanded, and went back to their blocks.
Within a week after the settlement of the Poston strike, Manzanar
faced an even more serious crisis. The background differed in many im-
portant respects, but the same cross-currents of communi ty life were
present. Unlike Poston, Manzanar had never ful~ accepted the offici9l
framework of community organi~ation as set forth in the IRA self-govern-
ment regulations. The block managers, at first under the Wartime Civili-
an Control Administration while Manzanar was £till an assembly center, .
and later under the IRA, consti tuted the single over-all com~ ty or-
ganization. At first the~ formed a body which was called the »lock Lead-
ers Council. It consisted of both Issei and Nisei, with Issei predomi-
nant. There were members of the group who acquired the name of adminis-
tration stooges, but for the most part the men were respected in their
blocks and were in close touch with majority sentiment. The »lock Lead-
ers Council was to some extent reorganized at two different times, once
in response to the WBA administrators' sug~stion that the leaders obtain
the approval of th3ir blocks through election and again, in preparation
for the election of a community council, to conform to the WRA regula-
tion that block m~rs be appointen by the administration. The name
was changed from »lock Leaders Council to »lock Managers Assembly- after
the second reorganization, but in the main, from April to December, it
was the S8Me institution throughout. In October the community voted
against the institution of a Nisei Community Council, and there was no
Issei Advisory »oard. The political organization of Manzanar was, there-
fore, simple and existed more or less continuouBly as a body of leaders
in close touch with the community and representative of the variety of
opinion in the blocks. It was not from this source that conflict devel-
Oped.
Manzanar differed from Poston in another very important respect.
There was more spontaneoue organization of groups not sponsored by the I
WRA regulations or the center staff. The discord that developed was ex-
pressed chiefly through these organizations. A number of voc~ and ac-
tive young Nisei leaders CAme to Manzanar from Los Angeles. They dif-
fered among themselves; same had been active in the Japanese American Ci-
tizens League, others were known among the Japanese as aka, or left-wing-
era. They did however agree on the concept of making the centerg into
communi ties in which evacuees could contribute to the war effort and on
the necessity for opening up the armed forces to Nisei. In July some of
the leaders formed a Manzanar Citizens Federation which they hoped would
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escape the stigma of the JACL, but which stood for much that the JACL
leAders had stood for. ~he famous Kibei meeting in August was in l~rge
measure an antagonistic reaction to this new group and its doctrines.
The sort of young men who arose in the Kibei meeting to denounce the eva-
cuation and the treatment of citizens in the centers had a vigorous
spokesman in a Nisei who bad fougnt in the first World War and had since
the evRCuation become intensely bitter egainst the United States. He and
his supporters were in constant conflict with leaders of the Citizens
Federation through the summer and fAll.
There was another spontaneous organization in Kanzanar not provi-
ded for in the WRA regulations. This was the Kitchen Workers Union bead-
ed by men who were antagonized by particular memoers of the ~anar
staff and who steAd.ily developed a bitter anti-administration feeling.
One in pArticular became convinced tbat tbere was graft smong the WR1
staff, that sugar and other food meant for evacuees was being appropri-
ated and sold for their own benefi t by members of the steward' 8 depart-
ment and others. The suspicion that developed around food anxieties waa
even stronger in M~nzanar than in Poston. Kitchen workers' leaders 0p-
posed the Citizens Federation leaders less on the ground of their atti-
tudes to the war and the draft than on the ground of their cooperative
atti tudes toward WRA staff.
As in the other centers, gang intimidation grew up in Manzanar in
August and intensified during the fall. When the issue of the establiBb-
ment of a Nisei council came up in October. threatening notes and notices
appeared urging non-participation in self-government and signed by MBlood
Brothers.n The block managers and Kitchen Workers Union in November
pushed an investigation of the use of sugar in the center. Late in No-
vember a prominent JACL lead~r was beaten. He had attended a JACL con-
vention in Salt Lake City and ~s believed to have presented himself as
a r~presentative of all the people of Manzanar in urging that the armed
serviceo be opened to Nisei. On his return he was severely beaten, and
immediately a leader of the Ki tchen Workers Union, who had been act1 ve in
pushi~; the sugar investigation. was picked up as a suspect. He was
lodged in the Jail of a nearby town and then returned to the center Jail
as feeling ran high in the communi ty. A group of young men formed and
they apparently quickly formulated two purposes: to beat up further the
already beaten JACL le~der in the hospital and to ~lease the suspect
froD the center Jail. Military police were called in to maintain order.
One of them fired on the crowd that had formed near the Jail. Two e~
cuees were killed. The center was Shaken for weeks. Working relations
were re-ostabliehed and same community equilibrium restored only after
long conferences between the project director and the block leaders.
The effect~ of these crises within the two centers in which they
occurred were very similar. They cleared an air that had become heavy
with distrust on both sides. They brought the administrators decisively
lI into tftCh with the evacuees' view of life in the centers. !hey reve.ted
unmistakably to both evacuees and at least some administrators the cross-
currents in t~ communities. The specific effects in terms of influence
on community organization in the two centers were quite different in de-
tail, but in both they opened the wq to foundations for sound working
relations between staff and the evacuee oommunity. In Manzanar. in line
with the tradition already establiShed. a simple community organization
now took definite form. It consisted of a single group of block leaders,
elected by the block people without reference to citizenship. !bey began
to work directly with the top adain18trator and constituted clear-cut
n_ftAftnels from their block people up to the t~ administration. In Poston,
also in the tradition already established there, the strike resulted in
aD. elaborate Bet of communit7 institutions with m8n7 positions of statU8
for evacuees. The Iisei council emerged again. but with new leaders and
a close working relationship with the Issei Advisory Board. Other ineti-
tutions, such as a Central lxecutive Board and a Labor Belations Board,
gave wide opportun1t~ for I8sei participation in positions of influence.
Both centers entered more peaceful periods, but through different means.
In Manzanar, following the cri8is, Ii881 leaders of both clashing groups
were removed from the center and commuD1t~ life fell under the domination
largely of I8sei leaders. The chief leader8 were not removed from Poston,
but the strike bad pointed the wsy to means for cooperation between I8sei
and Wi.ei 1n political life. Iew Nisei leaders emersed who had the COD-
fidence of the iD.tluentia1 Issei leaders, and gradual~ accomodation of
interests was achieved.
!be crise. also affected the other eignt centers profoundly. Every
center learned about them quickly aDd speculation grew as to the real
causes. Staff and evacuees in the other csnters knew that the materiel.
for 8Uch explosions were present in their ca8mUnities. The same die.ati.-
faCtions and anxieties were present. In some degree the same croe.-
currents of cO8mUn1t~ sentiment were recognizable. They had felt .1m11ar
tensions to those which preceded the Poston and Mansanar incidents. !here
W88 a feeling tnat the same sort of explosion could occur in 8AV center.
'thus, although it was probably true that comm\m1t~ cr mob ae'ion cwld
oDly be crystallized b~ direct attack on specific individuals as in the
Jailing of suspects in Kanzanar and P08ton. nevertheless the sense of be-
ing on the brink of similar crisis in the other center. served ae a sanc-
tion on both .taff and evacuee actions. Responsible evacuee leaders a.
well as _taft worked more carefully to avoid the precipitation of 8imi-lar incident.. -
!be r6percu8sion8 of the crises in the outside world were far-
reachi~. 'lo .ost out8iders who read of them in the newspapers where the7
8ade tront-page news they seemed to be 8Tidences of subversive activities
in the center.. The complex! ties of communi t~ adJustment that 18¥ back
of tbea were hidden from the outsiders. Particula.rl7 in the regions near
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the centers, the 'riots- gave rise to ruaor. of dangeroue action to be
expected fr~ the eTacuees. Sv8rywbere that the news penetrated the
result was increased misunderstanding of Japanese Americans and more
ammuni tion for the campaign to further restrict the evacueee.
. 
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CHAPrER II
BEING SORTE.D
The decisive action of evacuation set in motion in the
United States two currents of opinion towards persons of Japanese
I anc~st~. On the one hand i t c~st.allized suspicion of the group
far beyond the borders of the Coastal States. On the other hand
'- it stimulated a reappraisal of the assumptions on which the evacu-
ation decision seemed to be based. The two approaches to the
110,000 persons now uprooted in the relocation centers developed
rapidly during the summer and fall of 1942. As the people the~
selves sought to work out some way of life in the isolation of the
centers, the two forces that Ylere shaping their fat~ interacted and
clashed in Stat~ legislatures, in Government offices in iVashington,
and in the Halls of Congress. There was less and less possibility
that the evacuees could remain secluded from the national life.
They were with increasing sureness becoming a n~tiona~issue.
In September an American Legion Convention in Kansas City
took up the issue of the Japanese Americans. The convention dis-
cussed the admission of young men and women evacuees to colleges
east of the evacuated ~one, where certain church groups, encouraged
by the ~'ffiA~ had arranged for them to continue .their education. The
American Legion leadership took the view that the students threatenedthe security of the country. Like many others, Legion spokesmen in- .
terpr~ted the fact of evacuation as proving the disloyalty of the
, whole group. They protested the release of students and of harvest
workers on the assumption that eve~ Japanese American was a poten-
tial saboteur. Not only the Legion leadership, but also influential
newspapers here and there in the ..vest and State legislators in
States into which the student resettlers were going, took up the
c~. They wanted the Japanese Americans, all of them, kept locked
up.
Simultaneously those who had been thrown into close contact
with the evacuated people were reaching a different view. The.iliA
staff, various church groups Who had come to the assistance of the
Japanese Americans during evacuation, and officials of the ~var De-
partment had begun to see sharp distinctions among the group. They
were steadily becoming convinced that only a sn~ll minority, if any,
constituted any threat to the country's security. They were be-
ginning to feel that opportunities should be given to as many as
possible to demonstrate their loyalty and that this could never be
done so long as they were penned up in the relocaticn centers. War
D&partment officials, in particular~ had been made aware of the large
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numbers of Nisei who were embittered by the denial of right to serve 
in the armed forces. They had received petitions from Nisei leaders
to reopen Selective Service, and some officers had had close contact.
with Nisei in their efforts to recruit them for the Intelligence
Service. By January War Department officials were convinced that
they should give Nisei a chance to demonstrate their loyalty.
A plan was formulated to call for volunteers for the Army
from the relocation centers and at the same time to register all
male citizens of draft age. The response to this prog~am was to
serve as a basis for determining whether or not to reopen Selective
Service to all Nisei. Once the plan was settled, the ,reA policy
makers decided to take advantage of it by simultaneous~ conducting
. in the centers a registration of all adults. This would provide a
basis for leave clearance for all those evacuees determined not to
be dangerous to resettle outside the centers east of the excluded
zone. For by this time the itRA had became convinced that the best
solution of the problems of the evacuees lay in getting them out of
the centers and reestablished in the industrial and agricultural
life of the country. Only in this way, reasoned the vrRA officials,
could the evacuees take roots again and reintegrate themselves in
Arrerican life. 
At about the same time that the Army-VillA registration was
being put into execution, the American Legion resolution protesting
the i1fRA IS leave clearance program and recomlJlending transfer of the
. centers to the Army was embodied in a Senate bill which came up to
the Senate Military Affairs Com.rL1ittee for consideration. The two
forces that were sh~ping the evacuees I destiny--one working for 
tighter restriction and the other for restoration to a place in
American society--thus found their ways to the level of national
action almost simultaneously. They were to clash for another 12
months and the conflict was to shake the lives of the people in the
centers as deeply as had evacuation itself.
~il.istration--A New Crisis
Early in February teams of Army officers flew to each of the
ten centers to conduct, in conjunction with the WRA staffs, the reg-
istration agreed on by the Vlar Department and the \Var Relocation
Authority. They went into conference with the project directors and
with the one member of each center staff who had previously been
called to Washington for a hurried discussion of the meaning and
procedures of registration.
.
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To the Army officers and many WRA staff members the registra-
tion appeared to be an important move on the part of the War De-
partment to correct the discrimination against Nisei. It offered
an opportunity to the young men to show their loyalty in concrete
ways. There was to be a call for volunteers. The officers were to
receive applications for service in Army combat teams composed en-
tirely of Japanese Americans. If many volunteered from the centers
that woUld in itself, even before they proved themselves in combat,
indicate to the country the essential loyalty of the group. But
even for those who lnight not volunteer there was another means of
showing loyalty. Every man of military service age was to be asked
to fill out a questionnaire which in addition to basic information
about tHe individual would contain his answers to two questions
dealing with loyalty to the United States. These questions,
numbered 27 and 28 on the questionnaire. farms, were conceived by
the War Department as the general test of loyalty for the Nisei.
They were worded for simple "Yes" and "No" answers:
"No. 27: Are you willing to serve in tl1e armed .
forces of the United States on combat
duty, wherever ordered?
"No. 28: Will you swear unqualified allegiance to
the United States of America atld faith-
ful~ defend the United States frqm any
and all attack by foreign or domestic
forces, and foreswear any form of al-
legiance or obedience to the Japanese
Emperor, or any other foreign government,
power, or organization?"
To the WRA officials in Washington who had been working
with the Vvar Department, the registration of the young men by the
Army seemed to point the way to further reduction of the restrictions
that had been imposed on all the Japanese Americans. They had de-
cided to extend the registration to- all adUlts in the centers. The
same questionnaires, with the same loyalty question concerning
unqualified allegiance to the United States, were to be submitted
to all female Nisei and to all Issei men and women. The question-
naires were simply labeled different~: Applica-tibn for Leave
Clearance. This embodied the basis for carrying out the plan of
the \1RA policy makers to open the way for all evacuees back into
the productive life of the nation. As each person filled out the
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Application for Leave Clearance he would furnish information on
which his eligibility to resettle from a center could be determined.
Thus a basis would be laid for a general speeding up of resettle-
ment, the people could move rapidly out of the center, and so
return to a normal life free from the restrictions of the reloca-
tion centers.
The Army officers who came to the centers to conduct the
registration knew that they had a somewhat delicate job before them.
Each team had been instructed that it was no ordina~ recruiting
job in an ordinary American town. They had been told that they
were asking young men to volunteer in an Army which had already
rejected them once on the vaguest suspicion. They had also been
told that they should consider that they were asking young men to
declare their wi1~ingness tp serve a country which had placed them
and their parents behind barbed wire. Every Army team captain soon
after arrival in the center addressed meetings of evacuees and each
g~ve a speech, prepared in the War Department, which contained these
words:
,
"Vie are here on a mission * * * The effort is not
a campaign or a drive * * * Its fundamental
purpose is to put your situation on a plane
which is consistent with the dignity of American
citizenship.
"You may object tliat this--your life here--is
nOt freedom. The circumstances were not of
your own choosing * * * The only answer which ,
needs to be made to such an objection is that
if there were not many millions of Americans
who agree \vi th your point of view we would
not be here and th is statement would not be
made.
"The present undertaking is of itself an acknow-
ledgment that the best solution has not been
found for you during the present war emergency
in your relation to the United States, which is
the country of your birth and of your residence.
"Your government would not take these steps unless
it intended to go further in restoring you to a
normal place in the life of the count~, with the
privileges and obligations of other American
citizens."
(lOO)
The Army officers,were prepared not only with speeches and in-
structions which showed some Y~owledge of the attitudes of people in
the relocation centers, but also with a set of carefully worked out
questions and answers designed to anticipate the questions that would
come up to them from the young men in the meetings they viould address.
The questions and answers dealt with the details of the Japanese
American Col~at Teams, treatment of t~isei who had and had not been
discharged from the Arrow after Pearl Harbor, and even went on to con-
sider the problems of parents who would be left in the centers when '
the~r sons entered the Army:
"Question: Viill my falnily be perrllitted to return to
the ,Vest Coast?
Answer: Not for the time being.
Question: i~fuat happens to my father who is not a
. citizen of the United States?
Answer: Like all other persons now in relocation
centers, he may file an application for
~eave which .nll be acted upon by the
i'/ar Relocation Authority. It is probably
fair to say that his chances for favor-
I able action will be better by reason of
your going into the service."
In all there were 42 prepared questions and answers. They
indicated sorl1e awareness of the feelings and points of view of lnany
bitter young men, as those views had seeped from the centers to
~/ashington. They also indicated some awareness of a need for jus-
tifying to the young men the decision to place Nisei in separate ~o~
bat teams apart frorn persons of oth~r abcestry in the ArflW.
The center staffs were also for the most part aware that the
task before them was not a simple one, although they were little pre-
pared for the full complexity of the evacuee reactions. At llinidoka,
the staff was not content to talk over only with the Army officers the
best methods for presenting registration to the evacuees. They called
in s orne of the older evacuees on whom they. had come to 'rely in prob-
lel~ of center management and asked their advice. The Issei leaders
worked out a plan for thorough discussion of the questionnaires and
the purposes of registration in meetings in various parts of the
center. The meetings were addressed not only by the Arrny officers
and mernbers of the WRA staff but also by some of the Issei leaders
. themselves. One of the Issei took it on.himself to speak vigorously
in favor of volunteering, saying in the course of the speech which
he delivered at each of the discussion meetings:
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II Americans are not exceptions to the adage that lit 
is hQman to err and divine to forgive.' But when
theJT find they are mistaken, they have the courage
to tI"'J to correct it. If they have made mistakes
in the past, your children, as American citizens,
should share the consequences of these mistakes.
My advice to you is to forget the past and look
to the future. Let the r~isei do their duty toward
. the co1L1'ltry in which they v~ere born and to which
they have allegiance * * *
liThe. princ;:'ple involved is that since our children
were born here, they belong here. Morally speak-
ing, they do not belong to us, but to their country.,
I believe our attitude towards this principle will
be extremely linportant for the future welfare and
happiness of our own race in the United States. We
should J.ook to our own moral code in this !rJ3.tter."
The Minidoka meetings resulted in informing the community !
\videly as to just what the \{ar Department intended in presenting
the Ciuestionnaires. Hundreds of riuestions were asked and answered
at each meeting, and by the time registration actually started most
evacuees in the center knew at least how the ~[ar Department and the
,IRA conceived the purposes of registration and what the implicatioru
were of answering "loyalty" and other questions in various ways.
At the other centers, with the exception of Tule Lake, there were
sjEdlar detailed discussions and efforts, although often not so in-
tensive, to answer the doubts and questions which registrationraj.sed in the minds of the evacuees. Most staff had learned throug I
frustrating experiences during the moving in that an administration
program often did not get far unless there was opportunity to dis-
cuss it thoroughly on the part of the evacuees whom it affected.
The pJ.ans and preparations of the ,jar Department and the ViR
had not, however, taken fully into account the already deep emotion
al effects of evacuation al'ld incarcerati"on in the centers. 'fney we
. not presenting a program to a people who could act as though such
things had not happened. They had happened, and they had affected
profoundly the attitudes of almost every adult evacuee concerning
the Govern.rnent and all its agencies. A new program of that Cfovern-
[lent could be viewed only in relation to what had already taken
plaqe. Confidence in the Government's newly professed intentions
could not be built up in, at best, a few days of discussion and
explanation. The evacuees were faced with being asked to declare
themselves on paper for purposes v:hich were by no means cleur to
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them. The compulso~ nature - of the registration for al~ adults and !
the fact that centers closed do~m all activities for several days
or a week in order to get everyone registered left no doubt of the
great significance ~hich the ~'ffiA attached to the program. ifuat that
significance was h?d to be discovered in part by hearing all that
officials had to say about it and the rest had to be guessed at.
All the suspicion and doubts of Gove~~ent intentions came up in the
centers during registration. All the cross-currents of community
opinions and emotions came into ~lay on one another, for ev~v adult
was required to make a decision of SOlne sort. -Every center vias the
scene of many meetings among evacuees, of impassioned speeches by
evacuees stirred by one issue or another which registration raised.
In some centers staff-evacuee relations were not disturbed, but in
others th~ Whole framework of the community was threatened. \fuether
or not the issues-were injected into the structure of staff-evacuee
relations, however, crises in blocks and particularly in families
were widespread. No center, not even Minidoka where registration
progressed most smoothly, escaped the tur.moil and unsettling of
farnilies split and in conflict over the decisions of registration.
The extreme manifestation of the turmoil into which regis-
,
tration threw the evacuees took place at Tule Lake. Prelimina~
discussions of the sort that were carried out at Minidoka and Topaz
and other. centers were cut short. The Army team met with evacuees
on the evening before registration was to begin, gave explanations
of the program, and read. some of the previously prepared questions
and answers. No time was allowed for discussion from the floor.
The morning following, when registraticn was to begin, found many
evacuees unwilling to come and fill out the questionnaires. After
attempts to persuade a group in one block to comply, it was announced
that they would be compelled to register. There were persistent
refusals and further pascive resistance. Gangs formed and intimi- .
dated young men into not registering or into answering the "loyalty"
questions ne8atively. A group of young citizens who had refused to
register was picked up and removed from the center. Intimidation
and passive resistance spread. The community council and Issei
planning board, who had been attempting to find ways to break the
impasse between administration and evacuees, finally resigned. Reg-
istration was never completed, several thousand ~vacuees refusing
to comply. There were 59 volunteers, a small number for such a large
center, and a large number of negative answers to the "loyalty" ques-
tions. Moreover, the community organization vvas disrupted by the
resignation of the council. Tule Lake, which had been well on the
road to a stable community organization before registration, became
the most disorganized center of all in the weeks following regis-
tration.
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These reactions to what seerJled a sjJnple and clear-cut process
to the ad..'llinistrators are understandable only in the light of what
the various features of registration meant to evacuees "lho were asked
on short notice to register. For them it ,Alas no simple pl~cess ~ It,
; posed fundamental issues, some of vlhich had been sources of conflict
i for years in the Iciest Coast communities.
. The Real I~sues of Registration
"Great chess game, government mal~es all the moves." This re-
ported the project direc~or of Tule Lake during the first days of reg-
istration, was p typical statement of young men concerning the Army-
WRA program. The mood of the statement was engendered by the whole
set of experiences beginning ,vith evacuation and even before. It was
the mood of people who had experienced a progressive loss of self-de-
termination, who felt themselves increasingly to be in the hands of a
- power pver whose actions they had no control and whose purposes had
consistently worked injury to the group. People in such a mood were
suspicious of the motives behind registration. A majority in the cen-
ters lacked confidence in a Government that had conceived evacuation
for 70,000 of its citizens. Experience so far provided a basis for
interpreting the new move of the Government as having behind, it sinis-
ter mt>tives. Were all the young men now to be drafted? Did "applica-
tion for leave clearance" mean that all the fathers and mothers a:1d
small children were to be set down outside the centers, still far from
their homes, to shift for thernselves? There were no answers to these
questions. The Army officers could not say whether Selective Service
~as to be opened up or not; it depended in part, they said, on how
people responded to the questionnaires. The WRA officials did not
make definite statements about the plans for resettlement; they only
said they thought people ought to resettle. The Government kept mak~
ing moves in the great chess game. It was now calling for moves from
the evacuees, but the Government seemed to be making-the rules.
The mood of the centers when registration fell on them ,vas
the mood of people who felt that they had already been well tested.
They had been filling out forms aQ9 giving their life histories to
various officials for months. They had bo~ed. to evacuation and most
had been striving to live peacefully with 'ivRA staff in the centers.
~ost of those who had received applications (without having requested
them) for repatriation to Japan from toe Co~1~nding General of the
Vlestern Defense CorMiwnd had protested only mildly and sen~ the appli- .
cations back without filling them in. The tests had been intricate
and abundant. Now carlle anothe-r test. To an overwhelming lllajority of
the evacuees, particularly among the Nisei, it seemed that the Govern-
ment, rather than then~elves, had to prove good intentions. Was open-
ing up SOf,1e segregated units in the Army to Nisei volunteers really
a demonstration of any new attitude toward Japanese Americans?
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Under the rirst sudden impact of the new situation the great majority
of Nisei, as well as their parents, were doubtful.
It was in this atmQsphere of distrust of Gover~~ent intentions,
of fear of further persecution, and of a pervading sense of helpless-
ness and frustration before an impersonal and implacable power, that
the reactions to registration d~veloped. Yet generally, even at Tule
Lake after a few days, the issues raised b~registra~on were greeted
by a majority of evacuees in a spirit of serious discussi~n. The meet-
ings planned by the administration became forums where most evacuees
tried honestly to present their points of view, the basis or their
doubts, and their problems, as well as to probe as far as they could
into what the WRA staff and the ~ officers could present of the
Government's point of view. The questions were serious and searching
more often than they were defiant or inflammatory. The spontaneous
meetings of the evacuees in blocks and barracks were more emotional,
but they also were the scene of serious weighing of issues and efforts
of leaders to calm the more angry and to curb the hasty.
The issues appeared to the young men in various lights. There
were a few who immediately accepted the War Department view that this
was at last the test of loyalty for which Nisei had asked. "Vfuat we
face," wrote a Nisei in Minidoka, "is the acid test. If we flunk it,
we d~ ourselves and our posterity." There were others who felt much
the same way, but resented the separate Army unit and wished at least
to register their protest against such "Jim Crowism." There were some
who merely welcomed the opportunity to get out of the centers Py vol-
unteering.
It was quickly apparent, however, that the majority among
Nisei of military service age were not ready to accept the War De-
partment program as ~ proper test to be complied with uncritically.
They felt that any test should carry with it some demonstration of
the ~vernment' s determination not only to admit Nisei to the Army
but also to restore the lost freedom of both Nisei and Issei. Will-
ingness to submi. t Nisei to a new test was not enough. Meetings were
called and discussion went on far into the nights, sometimes Issei
and Nisei together, sometimes groups or. Nisei alone. Talk rose to
emotional heights over the questions: Why do we have to reregister?
Didn't they register us all once? uoean't the all-Nisei combat team
mean just more discrimination? Do they expect us to volunteer while
they keep our fathers and our brothers away from their farms in
~California? Why don't they undo evacuation and restore some rights
to us? The Government was promising nothing. In Topaz, in Heart
~ountain, in Manzanar, in Granada, in Jerome the discussion went on,
while WRA staff and Army teams tried to secure more information and
more assurances from Washington. Meanwhile the issue as most Nisei
saw it sharpened into the question: Shall we go ahead and register .
under protest or shall we register only on condition that our full
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rights as citizens ?re restored? Very fe\1 were ready to registe~.
without at least a strong expression of protest against the re-
strictions which had been imposed on them.
At Heart Mountain a group of protesting Nise~ formed a
Citizens' COnf!rAs.q to discu,q.q the issue. 0l1 the night of February 11.
after registration haQ officia~ started there was still vigap~
ous discussion and strong feeling that registration should be con- I:
ditional. The point of view was expressed by one speaker:
I'The minds at many of us are still shrouded in doubt
and confusion as to the true motives of our Govern-
ment when they invite our voluntary enlistment at
the present time. It has not been explained why
some American citizens who patriotically volunteered,
at the beginning of the war, were rejected by the Ar~
Furthermore, our government has permitted damaging
propaganda to continue against us. Also she has failed
to reinstate us in the eyes of the ~rican public.
We are placed on the spot, and our course of action
is in the balance scale of justice; for our Government's
honest interpretation of our stand will mean absolute
vindication and admission of the wrong committed. On
the other hand, if interpreted otherwise by misrepre-
sentations and misUnderstandings, it will amount to re-
newed condemnation of thi~ group.
"Although we have yellow $kins, we too are AII'ericams. We
have an American upbringing. Therefore we believe in
fair play. Our firm conviction is that we would be use-
less Americans if we did not assert our constit utional
rights now; for, unless our status as citizens i~ cleared
and we are really fighting for the high ideals upon
which our nation is based, how can we say to the white
American buddies in th e armed forces that we are fight-
ing for the perpetuation of democracy, especially when
our fathers, mothers and familie~ are in. concentration
camps, even though they are not charged with any crime?
"We believe that our Nation's_~ood faith is to be found
in wheth~r it moves to restore full privileges at the
earliest opportunity."
Such speeches were being made in nearly every center. Conditional
regi~t.rat;ion was still the considered reaction of many Nisei who
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were thinking seriously about the matter. lbe group at Heart Moun-
tain who felt thi s way sent out telegrams to all the centers asking
for cooperation of Nisei in a united stand on conditional registra-
tion. No concerted action \'laS taken in response to the plea. But
groups were acting individually at various centers. The Heart
~lountain group framed resolutions asking for restoration of citizen-
ship rights. At Topaz a Committee of Nine wired Secretary of liar
Stimson for assurance of restoration of rights before going on with
registration. At Granada iVRA staff put a Nisei leader in comnnmica-
tion va th War Department officials to discuss the Nisei objections
to registration.
The statement of the Nisei position did not fall on deaf
ears in Washington. The Topaz telegram brought forth a response
from the V/ar Department:
"The present- prggram is not co~plete rehabilitation
but it is the first step in that direction."
Steadily, finding VmA staff willing to listen and War Department of-
ficials concerned to reply to their protests, the current of opinion
among Nisei began to shift. Many who had stood for conditional
registration began to feel that the only course was to accept regis-
tration as presented. They had made their protests. They had not
taken the new "test" lying down, and their protests had received
serious consideration. A sufficiently strong presentation of the
case had been made. A Topaz Committee of 33 Nisei on February 16
replied to the War Department:
l "We acQept this r-.egistraticn as an indication of the
Government's good faith."
The great majority of Nisei now proceeded to comply with registration
and to answer the questions as presented in their original fo~.
The organized consideration of the issue had focused Nisei feelings,
articulated the basic re§;entments and protests, and, only after such
expression, pointed a course of action which the majority of Nisei
followed in all centers.
The path taken by the majority did not chart the way for thou-
sands of other Nisei. There were hundreds who remained convinced,
like the Heart Mountain orator, that further expression of loyalty
should be made only after the Government shoqld take action to re-
store full citizenship. There were still many who opposed on
principle the segregation of the combat teams. There were more hun-
dreds who remained uninfluenced by the discussions in the block
meeti~gs, or, as at Tule Lake, who had not had any opportunity to
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attend such open di scussicns . There were many who remained sceptical
and defiant in the face of the official assurances. There wer~ some,
as on the outside, who wanted to dodge the draft, as they had already
dodged military service in Japan a few years before. There were a
few also who ~ite definitely, as a result of long residence in
Japan and education there, felt that they wanted to go to Japan and
serve that country. There were many others who were confused when
they were faced with the specific questions in the questionnaires
and did not know how to reply. There were thousands on the wrack
of the community cross-currents--pulled this way by fearful or stern
parents and pulled that way by friends and their OYffi linclinations.
As the concerted Nisei thinking crystallized toward acceptance of
registration unaer protest, individuals continued to assert' themselves
outside 'the area of majority opinion. But each individual was a free
agent only insof~r as he c6uld see his way through the medly of in-
fluences that ylayed on him in each block.
The issues raised for the Issei in registration were not the
same as those raised for the Nisei. The Issei were not directly con-
cerned with the issue of military service on an equal basis with
other Americans, nor were they in a position to suggest obligations
to themselves of a country in which they had no citizenship. Never-
theless citizenship rights of the Issei were at s.take in the 'regis-
tr~on as first presented. Question 28 a.sked them to foreswear al-
legiance to Japan. As soon as Issei saw this question in their
forms, it was obvious to them that the officials who had ,framed it
were ignorant of the legal position that had plagued them for 40
years in the United States. Regardless of how much of a stake in
f~ly and property they might acquire in this country, American laws
had denied them the right to apply for American citizenship. The
Government had forced them to retain their legal tie with Japan
whether they wished to or not; all we~e citizens of Japan and no pos-
sibility of naturalization in this country had ever or was now being
held out to them. To answer Question 28 with a "Yes" would make them
men without a country; to answer it with'a "No" would lead to no one
knew what action by the United States: to deportation or to more
severe restrictions?
In the very first moments of discussion in the centers the
WRA staff were made aware of the impossible position in which the
question placed all Issei. At Manzanar the project director, after
calling Washingtqn on the phone, changed the question to read:
"Are ypu s~athetic to the United States and dovyou
agree faithfully to defend the United States from
any and all attack by foreign or domestic forces?"
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This involved some recognition of the Issei position, and the great
majority proceeded to answer in the affirmative. At other center,s
the issue came up promptly also and imA staff wired washington to
do something about it. Soon they were authorized to change the
question:
"WilL you swear to -abide Py the laws or the United
States and to take no action which would in any
way interfere with the war effort of the United
States?"
This gave full recognition to the Issei legal position, required no
renunciation of the only citizenship which they had, and opened the
way to ~~ answer in line with all that they had been attempting to
do from the start, name~, abide by the laws of the United States.
lath the change. Issei proceeded almost unanimous~ to answer
Question 28 with a "Yes." Like the great majority of Nisei, an even
greater majority of Issei now went through ,ith the registration,
9nce their legitimate objections had been raised and they had met
with some indication of understanding.
There was, however, another point of concern for Issei. This
was the implication of the original title of the form for registra-
tion of aliens: Application for Leave Clearance. Few Issei wanted
to leave the centers while the war was still going on. The general
Issei attitude to the relocation centers as neutral havens was well
crystallized by now. Yet since registration was compulsory, they
felt that they were being compelled to make application to leave the
centers. Their hesitation on this score also was quic~ made known
to WRA staff, wires flew back and forth from centers to washington,
and the announcement was made in the centers that the title of the
form could be changed to "Information for Leave Clearance." '!his
was better. It was at least not an apparent statement of desire to
leave the centers. Nevertheless the intention behind the original
title of the form could be guessed at. Most Issei felt that the of-
ficials who had planned ~egistration must have some plan for getting
everybody out of the centers. If not, why had they first asked every-
one to apply fot'leave clearance? Who could tell now what was in
their minds? The feeling of dealing with men who in the first place
did not understand the simple fact of their lack of legal status in
the United States and in the second place seemed to have some un-
stated purpose back of their actions colored the 1i1o1e Issei reaction.
It focused more sharp~ the feeling that had been growing since the
autumn announcement of resettlement plans that the Government was de-
viously moving in a direction contrary to what Issei felt was in their
best interests.
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ITo the majority of evacuees it was clear enoUgh, as a re- ;
sult of the widespread and sometimes passionate discussion during
registration, where they stood. In general most Nisei wanted a !
positive move from the Government in the restoration or real citizen-
. ship status; the majority were willing, once they had registered
their protests.to accept the reopening of the Army as such a move.
In general mOB t Issei wanted to be left alone until the war was over
and they could see their way to new starts in the country in which
they had their roots of family and property--the United States. But
in every center there was a minority who fell outside the general
patterns of response to registration, who either took the opposite
view of the issues as the majority saw them or were pulled now this
rvay, now that. It was for this minority that registration consti-
tuted the most intense and unsettling crisis.
The minority of Issei were concerned with the possibilities
for return to Japan. Before registration those Who had seriously
considered return consisted of something less than 3,000. These
were for the most part men and women who had been planning before
the war to go to Japan and live out the last years of their lives.
There were also some for Whom evacuation seemed to wipe out a~
possibility for starting over again in the United States. They
had relatives or they had property in Japan and they consequently
made the decision to return and start over in Japan with this help.
They had filled out applications for repatriation and were waiting
for some word from the State Department as to whether they could-be
repatriated during the war. -;fuen registration was announced 1ffiA
officials indicated that those, and those alone, who had made ap-
plications for repatriation would not be required to register. The
reaction to this was prompt and definite at some centers.
At Tule Lake, as misunderstanding and antagonism grew in
the first days of registration, ~VRA staff began to find evacuees in
their offices asking for applications to repatriate to Japan. As
the nL'mbers increased the project director stopped the issuance of
such applications. At Manzanar, also, repatriation requests were
not issued during registration because of the obvious demand for
them as a way to abide by regulations and yet not go through with
registration. The requests for repatriation increased at all cen-
ters. It was clear that repatriation was a definite reaction to the
stresses of the process. This did not mean that the Issei who were
applying necessarily wanted to go back to Japan. It was a way to
avoid registration. But there were also maQy who under the stress of
registration made decisions hastily and thought for the moment at
least that the best way out was to return to Japan. A request for
repatriation meant at least that one would not be pushed out into the
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hostile United States. Chances for getting along in Japan that had
seemed slim a few weeks before now began to appear in a different 
light. Anything was better than the sort of treatment that was, be-
ing meted out in the United States. Thus 3,000 more people, with
various motives but principally as a result of resentment and fear,
were moved during registration to apply to go to Japan.
r The consequences for the, children of the Issei vlho decided
to repatriate under the stress of registration were serious. Same
with great docility or with wholeheatted sharing of their parents
feelings proceeded to answer the "loyalty" questions negatively and
to request tha t they be expatriated to Japan. They were willing togo along vlith their parents. But for many'more there was intense 
conflict. Young men and women feared to go home at night because it
meant painful debate with their parents or an hour of beirg browbeaten.
They themselves had decided to register and answer "Yes." Their par-
ents had decided to.repatriate. The young people had no desire to go
to Japan and often suspected that their parents' judgment in deciding
to go was not good. Children and parent& talked and pleaded with
each other. Two sons in one center persuaded their father, a laundry-
man from San Francisco, not to repatriate before registration was
over, but the whole set of family ties was threatened in the process.
Generally the parents prevailed on unwilling sons and daughters, ap-
pealing to their sense of family duty. Hundreds of teen-age young
men and women in order to keep peace in the family and sometimes in
hope that the Government would never really ca~ry through on repatri-
ation gave in to parents-and answered negatively to the "loyalty"
questions.
Family pressures were 'not the only forces driving Nisei in
directiOl1S which led them to classify themselves as "disloyal" in
the eyes of readers of th~ questionnaires. Just as there were a
minority of Issei who chose repatriation as against compliance with.
registration, so there \vas a minority of Nisei in every center who
chose forceful "No's" to the "loyalty" questions as their means of
protest rather than resolutions and subsequent compliance with regis-tration. . They remained defiant. The word "No" on the questionnaires
stood for them as a symbol of protest--protest against evacuation,
against compulsory registration, against all that had happened since
evacuation. In Tule Lake young men in large numbers refused to reg-
ister at all in protest against the administration's arrest of a group
of young men in one block who had refused to register. In Manzanar
hundreds went defiantly to the registration tables and wrote "No" on
their questionnaires. Some said simply that it was protest, some
said it was because they had given up hope in the United States and
, w~t on then to follow through with requests for expatriation to
Japan, even though they had never seen Japan. In Tule Lake, and to
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a lesser extent in other centers, some of these defiant young men
went about the centers warning other young men that a "Yes" meant
disloyalty to the group, that it was cowardly, that it was taking
mistreatment lying down. Far fewer than were affected by family
pressures, but nevertheles~ a good ma~ young men in Tule Lake,
Jerome, and l~nzanar yielded to such pressures and,.against their
better judgment, put the~elves down with "No" answers.
In some blocks young people remained confused in the welter
of pressures, misinformation, and lack of information, and went to
register in the messhall with no clear idea of the meaning of either
question. In other blocks older men carefully advised young men to
answer "Yes" t'O everything. In others older men advised "No" anSVlers.
I~at block one happ~ned to live in ofte~ deterrained his response to
tne It],qyalty" questl.ons: a "No" answer l.n one block oovious.Ly would
have been a "Yes" answerer in another block. Some blocks held meet-
ings and attempted to get unanimous agreement for the responses eith-
er one way or the other. Individual young men wrestled through the
night with their decisions and came sleepless to declare themselves
"Yes" or "No," having in a few hours gone through the .vhole process
of going to Japan or remaining in the United .States, and then suf-
fered the reality of block life again in the messhalls and latrines.
One yo~ man struggled wi th his J::arents I accusations of "disloyalty"
(to them) for several days, when he indi9ated that he 'would answer
"Yes," then yielded and answered "No" and came eack to feel that
friends in the messhall were now calling him "disloyal" to his coun-
try. It was a minority in every center who faced the dilemmas of
family conflict and an eVen lesser minority who vJrestled with the
-dilemmas of the symbolic "No". But the agonies of the minority per-
vaded many blocks and wrought up whole centers. It \~as a time of
testing, but less a testing of national loyalties than of nerves and
family ties.
'!be Effects of Be~istratiCl1
What happened in the centers during registration could be
stated in statistical tables, in _a numerical ana~sis of the answers
to questions 27 and 28, and in the figures summarizing the numbers
of requests for repatriation and expatriation to Japan in the months
immediate~ following registration. '!bus out of a total of a little
over 20,000 young m,en of military age in all the centers 5000, or
25 percent, gave "No" or qualified answers or refused to answer the
"loyalty" questions. Of the young women citizens about 2,~-#- or
13 percent, answered negatively or refused to answer. Of the older
men and Women citizens of Japan about 1,000 or 6 percent fell into
the same category. This mad~ a rough total of some 8,500 persons
'Who appeared to have behaved in the same way and made the s~ re-
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sponse to the "loyalty" questions" out of a grand total of something
over 75,,000 adults reqUired to register. It might appear from look-
ing at the tables that about 11 percent of the Whole group had failed
to meet what the government officials had presented to the evacuees as
a test of loyalty. .
As WRA officials looked more carefully into the table of re-
turns" the figures alone" without the aid of their real knowledge of
what had taken place" began to reveal peculiarities that challenged
any simple conclusion in terms of lqyalty. From center to center there
were striking differences. For instance" at Minidoka and Granada less
than 3 percent of the young men were "No" answerers while over 50 per-
cent of the young men at Manzanar had answered "No." And so it ranged
through the centers. The conclusion was inescapable that the motives
behind the answers depended on many- things that the questiamaires had
not taken into account. The WRA staff in the centers knew what ~ese
factors were because they had seen the process and they bad begun al-
most immediately to interview the young men to get at the meaning to
them of a "No" answer. They learned in the course of interviewing to
distinguish between the "No" of protest against discriminatioo" the
"No" of proteat against a father interned apart from his family" the
"No" of bitter antagonism to subordinations in the relocatial center"
the "No" of a gang sticking together" the "No" of thoughtless defiance"
the "No" or. family duty" the "No" of hopeless confusion" the "No" of
fear of military serY'ice" and the "No" of felt loyalty to Japan.
Dozens of men am ~men in th e center staffs" like the evacuees them-
selves" began to realize that the numerical counts measured primarily
the individual fNStrati~ and the family confusions that had arisen
in the wake of evacuation and subsequent events in the relocation cen-
ters ~cluding the registration crisis itself. They knew that regis-
tration had ind~ed sorted people; but not in terms of lqyalty to the
United States and to Japan. In terms of feeling about. the United
States Government" it had sorted people chiefly into the disillusioned
. and the defiant as against the compliant and the hopeful. As with arlY'
cross-section of humanity" even while deep in a trough of httter ex-
perience" the vast majority continued to be hopeful.
The experience of. registratia:l _3 as profound and disturbing
for many staff members as for evacu~s themselves. Some who embarked
on their jobs in the centers with little sense of the meaning to evac-
uees of the experience of evacuation had f.e1t that evacuees harked
back to that experience unnecessar~ and too often. As one project
director said" "They have a persecu~ion complex." What was a reality
tor evacuees was not a reality for staff members because they had not
experienced it themselves. Now" after days of interviewing and in-
tensive contacts in meetings, the reality of the evacuees' experiences
was driven into starr members' consciousness. They were nearer than
they had been to interpreting attitudes as normal reactions to the
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reality id which evacuees had been living rather than as delusions of :
persecution. Nevertheless, even though they were a little nearer to
the reality, staff were still confused by the injection of the emo-
tionally charged word "loyalty" - into center life. One staff member
. expressed a widespread type of reaction while still fresh from the ex-
perience: -
"My part in the show was organizing and running the :
machinery of block registration. I saw the whole show, j
back-stage and front. Registration itself went off
- smoothly and quick~. The team captains and block
managers did a good, business-like job of lining up
the residents and running them through on time. The
interviewers were for the most part patient and fair
and accurate. It was conducted on the whole with
dignity and good feeling and an appreciation of the
gravity of the issues. -'I.. * .~!-
"Now we're standirg round looking at what we've dredged
up. All of us I think have been startled by the sweep-
!ing repudiation of loyalty to this country, or of hope .'
of any future here. You expected it among the Kibei, ,
but not among the citizens. And to find, by the hun- j
dreds, pro~ucts of our high schools and colleges who've :
never been in Japan answering No to the loyalty questions
they gave, was shocking. Our first reaction, mine any-
\yay, was anger, I wapte~ to wash my hands of the whole
traitorous bunch and consign them to any concentration
camp the public wanted to set up.
"Now that I've had time to reflect a little, and have
talked with well over a hundred about their attitude
toward this country, and seen the real anguish that ac-
companied maqy of the decisions, ~ the fears that
prompted others--well, * * * I want to see if anything
can be salvaged from the wreck."
The current feelings of evacuees were real for the staff member, even
! if the f~elings of the previous months were not qaite so real. In
every center some staff members at least came into touch with evacu-
ees as they never had before. Issues and points of view which had
been taboo ground had been brought up, and staff and evacuees had met
now on this taboo ground. Staff members had participated in aiding
the serious Nisei who wanted to present their view of things to the
~Var DeI::6.rtment. A new respect for the Nisei position had spread
among staff in most centers, and in others, for the first time, staff
me~ers began to glimpse the position of the Issei as they transmitted
to i'iashington the1r objections to signing away their citizenship.
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There was unquestionably, after registration, a larger area of common
ground on which evacuees and staff could stand to deal together with
co~~on problems in the centers.
Nevertheless the feeling of the Manzanar staff member that
something evil had been uncovered was also present in every center.
The damning word "disloyalty," even to sympathetic staff who had
learned how to distinguish between the symbolic "Nols~" was an obstruc-
tion. "The jungle depths" and "the dark, tangled conflicts," as the
Manzanar staff member called them, which registration had revealed,
were not easily understood. Staff members had suspected them before,
- but when they were able to look directly into the depths and conflicts
they were still flardly understood and to some extent feared. To inter-
pret the~ as the necessary and normal results of actions taken by our
Goverfu~ent and even by the agency of which one was a part required analoofness and objectivity which life in the centers did not permit. 
Most staff, then, fell into a certain pattern of attitude as a result 
of the new, but partial, insights the experience of registration had 
given them. They had more sympathy and a somewhat better understand-
ing, but they needed some protecticn from the vision of "dark, tangled
conflicts." They felt this evil should be got rid of. Even though
they might use "disloyal" with quotation marks around it, in their
awareness of the tangled motives, they still tended to use the term
and to feel that the "disloyal" should. be removed from the centers.
They were the source of evil and should be- put awiY. The "disloyal,"
thought of in a hundred-different,ways by staff but nevertheless
l spoken of by means of the emotionally charged word, became a scapegoat
for staff feelings. Som~how they wanted "them" out and! awaJ:.. and then
the e\ acuees and staff could work together and go on with the task of
building center life.
To some extent registration, like the incident at Poston,
cleared the air of unvoiced distrust in the centers. Insofar as it .
brought staff members and groups of evacuees into closer touch for
honest exchange of views it did that but this differed from center to
center. Much more than in Poston, moreover, it was a one-sided reve-
lation, affectiQg staff members by bringing them on to common ground
with evacuees. At the same time that it did this in most centers ex-
cept TUle Lake, it also increased staff distrust for one segment of
the evacuees. And for the evacuees generally t~r@ 'Still lay behind
the center staff the unplumbed intentions of the "GoverMlent."
Registration was comparable to evacuation itself in its un-
settling effects on the evacuees. The chief difference lay in the
fact that it did not involve any physical ~prooting, that it fell on
people ~o had some sort of home base in the relocation centers. But
the expectation of further physical uprooting was the &entral fact in
the new unsettling. The process injected three new sources of uncer-
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tainty about the fUture into the lives of the evacuees. In the £iret
place it raised the question of the purpose of placing the "loyalty"
questions in the registration forms. What was the Government's inten-
tion in getting answers to these questions? Did they intend to make
a separation of the evacuees on the basis of the answers? There must
be some intention, evacuees reasoned, or otherNise why should they have
included the questions in the forms for Issei and young women as well
as for the meh of mili ta~ age. If there was to be some separation on
this basis, then where would the two groups of "Yes" answerers and "No"
answerers be sent? In the second place there was the question raised 
by the labeling of the forms as applicatj,ons for or information on
leave clearance. What did the WRA intend to use these for? Was it a
plan to move everyone out of the centers? If not, why had they begun
by requiring eve~one to fill out the "applications"? If it was, whom
would they send out first, where would they send them,' and when would
 they begin? Finally, there was the Q.uestion raised by the talk of the
draft. Did the Army intend to draft all Nisei? When would they make
their decision? How would they deal with the "No" answerers?
!
The questions raised by registration had to do with the two ~
securities which had been achieved since evacuation, name~, the in-
creased solidarity of the fami~ and homes in the relocation centers.
Both of these threats were strongest for the great majority who an-
swered the "loyalty" questions in the affirmative and did not make ap-
plication for repatriation or expatriation. For them the probability
of the opening of Selective Service could be viewed as a threat to
fami~ solidarity, and the probability of resettlement outside the cen-
ters threatened the loss of homes in the centers. Thus it was those
who had come through the Government's test with an official classifica-
tion of "loyal" who faced serious uncel'tainties about the future.
Speculation and rumors about "forced relocation" sprang up quickly and
spread through the centers. They were based primarily on the anxieties
arising out of registration concerning the Government's intention to re
settJ e eve~one. As the speculation increased through the spring of
1943 a sense of being at odds with the ~VRA policy m&kers c~~tallized.
macuqes referred back to the lack of understanding of the Issei situa-
tion as indicated in the first form of question 28. The older people
set themselves to hold on as long as they could to the present security
of the relocation center homes and most became convinced that the Gov-
ernment agency did not have their ,real interests at heart. The reac-
tions which a minority had had during registration, such as applying
for repatriation as a means of settling the sense of insecurity about
holOOS for the duration of the war, spread in some centers, particularly
in Tule Lake, Jerome, and Manzanar. The psychological effects of regis-
tration were deep going and long lae~ing. They became increasing~ ap-
parent in their unsettling effects as the Government program unfolded
during the spring and summer.
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~ Emer~ing Framework of ComImlnity Life
Although registration planted a new cycle of anxieties deep~
in the minds of the residents of relocation centers, it did have some
constructive results. MOst of the centers were more in the nature of
integrated cammwrlties after registration than they had been before.
The new fears, unlike the intense anxieties aroused by evacuation, were
at work not on amorphous collections of individuals and families, such
as had originally moved into the camps. Since their arrival, pe~le
had been fonning theJMelves into groups in which individuals found
strength and support. Eyery center had begun to shape as a callDUnity.
The crises of the winter had generally given impetus to that develop-
ment.
The growth of the communities was a process which had two as-
pects. On the one hand the people in each block had to get used to one
another. They had not only to find ways for utilizing jointly the
messhalls and laundry rooms and block lands, but also to discover how
neighbors felt and thought abou~ the things that were most on people's
minds. How they felt about the Caucasians who had put them out of
their homes, what they thought about the obligations of the Government
to them, what attitude they were taking toward their subordination in
the relocation centers, how long the war would last and how it would
come out. On these and other fundame~tal points, a sense that one knew
how one t s neighbors were thinking was growing up in the blocks from the
beginning of the relocation centers. The strike at POston and reg~stra-
tion at the other centers served to reenforce the feeling of unity and
of participation in a. common approach to fundamental probleJM, not alone
wi thin individual blocks but on a center-wide ~asis as well. Important
elements of the common approach were embodied in the majority behavior
of both Nisei and Issei during registration. They had insisted on be-
ing heard, asserted the right to protest ~justice, and objected to
being 'Jpushed around." At the same time they had sought to find ac-
ceptable compromises so that "peace and harmony-" could be restored.
As the sense of a common view of things increased among evacu-
ees, ther.e was a heightened awareness of those few persons in nearly
eve~ block who did not fit into the general pattern of behavior and
fe~ling. Individuals who: held that ev~ryth~ that had been done to
the evacuees was all for the best, who 'Were outspoken in urging accept-
ance of each new feature of the Government program as presented, who
\¥ished to cooperate uncritically with center staff in all they proposed
--such persons became marked. They were suffered in many blocks, but
lived in a certain atmosphere of ostracism. In other blocks they found
life active~ unpleasant and, by the spring of 1943, they sought to get
out of the centers. Some who had volunteered for the ArJIlj'" during reg-
istration found themselves so strong~ disapprQVed that they were glad
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to leave as quickly as they could. The fact 9f having volunteered was
not in itself the issue. It was rather the divergence of the person's
whole point of view from the majority sentiment about evacuation and
living in the centers. The response of neighbors depended to some ex-
tent on the individual's way of expressing himself and to some extent
on the nature of the other people in the block. There were volunteers
who found little antagonism and often a good deal of support. Eve~
block overlooked slight variations of 'opinion and one block differed
from another in what it approved and disapproved in its members. But
a majority sentilnent had crystallized by the 'end of registration, and
the people were beginning to feel a sense of common agreement on what
mattered to them most. The basis for an esprit de corps of blocks and
of centers had. emerged.
Somewhat less surely and progressively the other aspect of
community growth had developed in the month.s since arrival in the cen-
ters. This was the process of evacuees and administrators getting 
used to one another. Up through the crises of the winter of 1~42-43
the characteristic development in social organization consisted in the
growth of block unity and cOJlHnunity consensus. During the following
year the characteristic development consisted in the growth of working
relations between evacuees and staff. The stabilization of these re-
lations could not be accomplished until the ~ations of the people
in the blocks among 1Jhemselves had reached some sort of equilibrium.
Poston had an early start as cQmpared with othet centers as a result
of the influence of the strike on the evacuee community. Immediately
following that crisis, staff-evacuee working relations moved rapidly
toward stability. The Manzanar crisis had similar effects at that cen-
ter. Tule Lake, without the catalytic influence of 'a concentrated
crisis, had been moving in the same direction. Unified sentiment in
the other centers was still in the early stages of growth when regis-
tration fell on the~ For some of them registration acted much as the
Poston crisis had in bringing evacuees together and laying the founda-
tion for stable staff-evacuee relations. Only Tule Lake was not af-
fected in this manner by registration. And at Heart Mountain and
Jero~ 3 or 1+ months were required to complete the unifying process
registration had set in motion.
At Topaz during registratim the nature of an evacuee organiza-
tion which could express and focus community sentiment for action on
important issues was clearly revealed. As soon as evacuees became
aware of the WRA-War Department program, maQy among them realized
promptly the serious implications for the future of the whole group.
Quickly block meetings were held and each block elected two representa-
tives, one Nisei and one Issei, to obtain information, discuss the is-
sues involved, and attempt to arrive at some concerted approach to the
problems. This Committee of 66 discussed among the~elves and with
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members or the administrative staff and the Armw teams every aspect
of registration. They recognized tha t there were different issues in-
volved for Nisei and Issei. And the Nisei members of the committee, .
calling themselves the Committee of 33, discussed the Nisei issues
. separately and prepared their resolutions to the War Department. The
Issei members of the over-all conmdttee considered separately the mat-
ters that seemed to concern Issei exclusively. Previously, in line
with \VRA regulations, a tempora~ community council of Nisei had been
elected. Members of the council individually and the council as a
formal body functi oned in the discussions and played important parts
in giving leadership during the crisis, but the reaction of the co~
munity as a whole in the face of what people consid~red a vital and
crucial problem was apparent. They had not relied on a body formed
for the purpose of dealing with the administrators in center manage-
ment under the WRA regulations. They had proceeded to organize their
own representative groups with direct sanction £rom block opinion.
It was in the Committees of 66 and 33 that the sentiments of the people
as a whole were expressed and that some sort of majority sentiment and
approach was developed. They had quickly accepted the administration's
statement that registration its~lf was to be an individual matter and
that the exerting of group pressures could legally be interpreted as
seditious. Nevertheless, it was the Committees of 33 and 66 that
thrashed out the issues, explained the general viewpoints of evacuees
to administrators, and reported back to their blocks for sanction on
the resolutions framed. Called "rwnp" groups by the administration,
they were actually the effective representatives of majority opinion
during the crisis. When the crisis had passed the Committee of 66
disappeared from administrative notice. It was never recognized un-
der ~'VRA regulations as having any- existence. Yet not only in regis-
tration but also in subsequent crises which evacuees regarded as of
vi tal importance to them, this type of organizatiCXl, tied closely to
current opinion in the blocks, rose again and offered leadership and
means of approach to the problems. Meanwhile, in periods when no
crucial matters were at stake, the council elected under VffiA regula-
tion continued to function as the organized body representing evacuees
to the administration.
\'ihat happened in Topaz during registration was neither new nor
was it to be exceptional in the centers. A very similar sort of or-
ganizatiCXl took place in Poston during the strike there. After the
Nisei council had resigned, an over-all Emergency Committee was elected
with two representatives from each block, usua~ but not in all cases
consisting of one Nisei and one Issei from each. This became the
basis for an executive committee which gave leadership during the
course of the strike. As a unified committ~e of Issei and Nisei, the
over-all group disappeared after the immediate crisis, but the Issei
half of it continued to function as an Issei Advisory Board, and mos t
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of the Nisei members were elected to a comm~ ty council under the
\VRA regulations. The Niaei council and the Issei Advisory Board then
proce~ded to meet joint~, the chief difference from the emergency
strike committee being that the Nisei instead of the Issei leaders
maintained the formal and or~icial relations with the administrators. .
The crisis at Poston had given rise to the same sort of over-all co~
munity organization that sprang up at Topaz during registration.
In one form or another this type of organization had begun to
operate in all centers by the spring of 1943. In some centers it was
not so clearly formalized as it had been at Topaz or Poston. But in
all centers, whatever names the formal bodies took and whatever re-
lationships they bore to WRA regulations, there were apparent four ee-
sentials in the functioning organization of evacuee-staff relations.
(1) It was evident that Issei would not be excluded from
places of dominance in the center organizatial by the regulation pro-
hibiting them from holding office in the community councils. It was
not only that Issei were the shapers of majority opinion in the blocks.
It was also that they were unwilling to allow the younger men to monop-
olize the positiom of liaison between staff and community. They did
not believe that the younger men could interpret fully and truly the
posi tion of the Issei to the administration. They did not think that
the younger men fully understood their problems as citizens of Ja~
with families and economic stakes in the United States. Lacking that
understanding, the younger men could not work in their best interests
for the future.
(2) It was evident that Issei recognized some differences
in the interests of Nisei and Issei. However much they might urge
solidarity of the .hole group in center life, Issei leaders had demon-
strated through the months that they believed Nisei had certain special
interests as citizens of the United States. The more responsible and
influential Issei had insisted that Nisei have places on the over-all
commi ttees that gre'W up in the Poston and Topaz crises. They had even
worked for equal representatial of the two groups. There was' a seg-
ment of Issei opinion which tried to ignore difference~ of interest,
but the dominant Issei opinion in every center recognized it as funda-
mental.
(3) It was evident that certain types of men could not for
. long function in positions of co~ty leaid.rship. Men who vigorous-
~ pushed unconditional participation in the American war effort, who
followed without question all the features of the program as laid out
by the Government agencies, who attempted to take serious~ the regu-
lation excluding Issei from elective office, or who were insensitive
to the Issei probleE of status in Japan and the United States-men
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with such beliefs or qualities could not function effective~ as lead-
ers. It was not necessari~ a question of being Issei or Nisei. True,
a man holding such beliefs was more likely to be Nisei than Issei, but
there were many Nisei who did not and there were even a few Issei who
did. The capacity for effective leadership went deeper than the label
of citizenship. It was a matter of feeling about the whole progres-
sive loss of self-determination by the group and of sensitivity to the
majority sentiment. Staff in the centers, as well as ~ Nisei lead-
ers, had realized well before registration that the centers could not
be managed by individuals who were out of step with the ma-jority feel-
ing, and such individuals were to be found in greatest nwnber among
the Nisei.
(4) It was evident that the councils could not do duty as
representative bodies for the communities under all circumstances.
Even though they might, through various adjustments such as coopera-
tion with Issei advisory boards, function more or less adequate~ in
conjunction with block managers in the day-to-day liaison activities
-with the administrators, they were not ade~te in deeper crises. The
issues of center manag-emem. were on a plane of minor importance as
~omparea with the issues of registration which involved the ~ole
future of the- group. Councils and block managers were elected by the
people to serve a specific function of day-to-day liaison. The me~
bers were chosen for qualities, such as knowledge of English, which
would' be useful in the contacts with administrators. In times of
crisis others, who were closer to the core of community sentiment,
were looked to for real representative functions.
These four principles of cammt,1Dity organization were expressed
in various ways in the ten centers. The formulas for organization
proposed by the WRA-thb r.J~nity councils- and the block managers-
were adapted to them in different fashions. All but three centers had
proceeded to elect Nisei councils under the regulatlQ1S. Then, by a
variety of means they had brought Issei into the community organiza-
tion. Three early centers--Postons Tule Lake, and Gi1a~ad elected
Issei advisol'y" boards which w:>rked closely with the coW1cils. Granada
also e:xperJ.-nted with Issei advisers, but final~ worked out an ar-
rangement whereby Nisei resigned from all block manager posts, and the
two bOdies, a Nisei council and an Issei block manager group, fun 0-
tioned-as the community representatives. At Topaz, Rohwer, and Jerome,
although no such foral agreement was made, the arrangement was sub-
stantially the same. *isei counclle and Issei-dominated block manag-
ers divided between them the functions of liaison with staff. The
later centers thus operated with somewhat less complicated organiza-
tion, since they did not elect Isse! advisory bodies. Three centers
never elected Nisei councilS. The people of Manzanar under the
stresses of the early months refuseu, despite administration encourage-
ment, to accept the WRA. nself-gO:V:AT"nmAnt.n r8g'_u_at.in!!ll. After the
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December disturbance they continued, as before,. to be satisfied with
only a block manager organization, dominated by Issei. Thus, through-
out the existence of the center they maintained the simplest sort of
over-all organization. At Minidoka during the spring of 194.3, large-
ly through the staff's unwillingness to inject a purely Nisei body
into the framework, there was no council. The administrators worked
wi th a S~U predominantly Issei group (who had been set up original-
ly as an Organization Commission to draft a charter for self.-govern-
ment) and the block managers who were also mostly Issei. Heart
Mountain ~versed the Granada arr&n~ement by electing at the very be-
! ginning of the center a so-called tempqrary counci1 composed of Issei
which served until August, 194.3. Nisei filled in the block manager
posts. At all ~enters with the possible exception of Heart Mountain
the efforts to adapt the WRA formulas to the realities of center life
resulted in some strain and complication of working relations. But
by the time WRA, in April 1943, withdrew its prohibition against Issei
sitting in the community councils, the matter of Issei participation
had ceased to be a vital issue. The four principles of organization
had been expressed in a variety of institutions which were answering
the purposes of evacuees and center starf.
While a system of community-administration relation was being
worked out, there was some pulling an~ tugging and sizing up of the
. respective roles of staff and evacuees. In January 194.3, the young
man who had emerged after the strike as chai~n. of the Poston Nisei
council wrote a memorandum: which he titled "One of Poston's :Proble~."
In it he took up the question of the size and competence of the ViR!
center staff. He pointed out that there were evacuees capable of
doing many things which were now being done by less competent Cau-
casians and tha t evacuees were excluded from those jobs by the rule
that the Civil Service supervisory positions could not be held by evac-
uees. He took the position that fewer Caucasians were needed in the
center a~d that evacuees could manage the camp if given the opportun-
ity. Th~ counci1 had the memorandum mimeographed and distributed to
Poston staff and copies were sent to community councils in other cen-
ters. Some staff members in Poston regarded the criticism as legiti-
mate and felt much as the council r.hairman did. A few who saw the
memorandwn regarded it as insubordinate and insolent. The top staff,
responsible for administering the center under the agency's regula-
tions, were a little annoyed by the outspoken approach of the council
chairman, but they had been thinking along the same lines. They had
themselves reached the conclusion that the center operated more
smoothly if they gave evacuees maximum responsibility under the agency
regulations and limited the official contacts of staff with evacuees
to a small number of carefully chosen staff members. Poston had in
fact already moved to keep the number of appointed personnel in Units
II and III to a bare minimum and to concentrate as much as possible
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the responsibility for contact with organized evacuee bodies in Unit I
to a single administrator. This was one way of resolving the contra-
diction of the evacuee-Caucasian classifications.
\
The chairman's memorandum was indicative of the process of ad-
justment of community to staff. It indicated most c1oar~ the sort
of qualities a person, and particular~ a Nisei, must have to achieve
any sort of real leadership in center life. 1be chairman, despite the
bluff, facetious Danner apparent in the meIOOrandum, was deeply criti-
cal of the Whole situation in which evacuees had been placed. MOre-
over, he was willing to express his conviction and to announce his
criticism in terIM of an evaluation of Issei and Nisei as persons at
least on a level of abilit,y and intelligence with appointed personnel
and other Caucasians. 0nl1 if a man took such positions and kept such
points in some way before ~he administrators could he operate as a
community leader. True for Poston after the strike, this became in-
creasingly true in all the centers as community organization developed.
. The {"hairman's memorandwn calls attention to another phase of
staff-evacuee relationS. As evacuees came into contact with staff,
ei ther through the over-all community organizations or as members of
work crews under staff foremen, they made critical appraisals, not only
in terms of competence and relative ability as compared with the evacu-
ees working under them, but also in terms of attitudes towards evacuees
in general. They were looking about, spotting the ones Who seemed to
them to be tainted with ra~e prejudice and therefore unfair in their
dealings with evacuees. By the spring of 1943 they had pigeonholed
staff members according to their own classifications. The nlassifica-
tions were not always just, for work crews were often inc~ned to read
prejudice into rigid adherence to agency regulations or purely per-
sonal antagonisms. But the judgments were ther.~ and the prejudice
and ill will toward evacuees that existed among some staff members in
every center were a topic of evacuee conversation and a source of
friction and difficulty in center operations.
The theme voiced by the Poston council chairman was to be heard
at other centers as staff antagonisms to evacuees crystallized in the
period of disillusionment immediately following registration. An 
Issei at Jerome said:
"I heard ('f.he project directoEl say that since regis-
tration H8 has lost faith in the Japanese * *. I think
it would be a good idea to get rid of most of the Cau-
casians here and let the evacuees run the center the~
selves. (l'hey have the experience of the Co-op and I am
sure they could run the. canp democratically. When this
feeling of compulsion goes away tpen the people will
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cooperate more.
During the spring,work groups at Heart Mountain attelnpted to influence
the project director to remove staff members regarded as prejudiced.
Their efforts ran up against the stone wall of the director1s deter-
mination to do his own hiring and firing and assigniQg of personnel
to jobs.
There was no doubt that evacuees were to have no voice in that /
function and that they were going to have to find ways of getting
along with many kinds of staff members. In May at Granada an evacuee
leader summed up the situation at his center:
"Most of the aI>pointed staff are all right. They try ,
to do the right thing. Maqy times they don1t under-
stand the psychology of the Japanese Americans and
consequentlY make mistakes, but they are honest~
trying to help the evacuees * * *. Vie have o~ two
or three Hitlers among the staff here; and while the)
make it hard for us sometimes, we know we can trust
and work with most of the appointed staff."
Project directors everywhere "Were affected by evacuees I at-
titudes toward staff members and concerned with staff behavior toward
the people. Poston sought to channel contacts with representatives
of the community through carefully selected appointed personnel. On
other projects the problem was dealt with in different ways and with
varying degrees of effectiveness. Staffs were adjusting to evacuees
as well as evacuees to staff.
The adjustment process was aided by what had became a con-
scious17 formulated aim of the evacuees who had emerged into posi-
tions of leadership. When evacuee leaders organized an Assembly ~
mediate~ on arrival in Granada in October they stated that:
"'I'he chief concern * * * was the preservation of
harmony among the center residents and the adminis-
trative staff * * *."
The objective of "maintaining harroony in the centers" was more and
more on leaders I tongues as the months went by and disharmony and
conflict developed. '£he serious break-downs in staff-evacuee re-
lations at Poston and ~~zanar loomed as threats in other centers.
Steadi17 the councils and the various over-all committees began to
see their function as harmonizers of differences among evacuee groups
and as go-betweens in the relations of administration and community.
They had learned that the agency under whose supervision they had
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.been placed would continue to opel'ate relentlessly like a Government
agency, c,ontrolling its personnel, financial, and other policies with
its own hand, 'There was then the problem of interceding between the
agency and the people so that there might be a maximum of ha~ony in
their relationships. The councils and other representative bodies
were rating that function as important.
The Sorting
During the spring of 194.3, as "harmony in the centers" became
the watchword of evacuee leaders, the eyes of most evacuees were
turned outward to a series of events which intensified their anxie-
ties about the "outside.11 'l'he majority of the Issei, who shaped
public opinion in the center~ 1 saw the 9utside florId beyond the ne!~h-
! boring towns chiefly through three Japamse language newspapers pub-
lished in Denver and Salt Lake City. Primari~ concerned during
1942 with reporting developments in the Pacific war, ~~ae papers
in 194.3 began to give increasing amounts of space to events in the
United States. The reason was the emergence of Japanese Americans
as a national is..sue and the consequent abundance of statements by
Congressmen and Senators and other public officials concerning them.
Committees of both the Senate and the House were investigat~ the
relocation centers. In May Senator Chandler, chairman of the Senate
Military Affairs Committee, public~ announced his interpretation of
the committee's investigation into the results of registration. The
Japanese language newspapers gave space to his statement that 20 per-
cent of the evacuees were disloyal to the United Sta~es and, with the
exception of the HDc~ ~himpo of Uenver, heaped scorn on the esti-
mate. Their estimates varied from 2 percent to 11 percent. Senator
Ghandler went on to say that the disl~l evacuees should be sepa-
rated from the loyal. Meanwhile the House Committee on Un-American
Activities went into action to investigate the extent of disloyalty
in the relocation centers, and western newspapers gave wide public-
ity to charges and speculations of the committee members. 'rhrough
May, June, and July' the Jap~se language papers faithfully reported
the vlhole burst of antagonism and suspicion. ~vacuees in the cen-
ters read the stories carefully, discussing the misinterpretation
of registration figures, ridiculing the wild fears of Congressmen
that the unobtrusive neighbors in the next barracks could be danger-
ous because the sons had answered "No" in protest and the parents had
asked for repatriatia1 out of fear for their security in the United
States. Nevertheless, as the attacks intensified in June, most evac-
uees expected that something would be done about the registration
figures. flhey had expected it ever since registration and now the
public clamor seemed to make it certain.
At the same .time they were seeing c'=r1firmation of the other
expectation to which registration had given rise. ~ had concluded
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.then that the WRA was getting ready to resettle eve~one who had an-
swered "Yes" and had not asked to be repatriated to Japan. They knew
that the WRA had established field offices in Chicago, Spokane, Kansas
City, St. Louis, and other places for the purpose of finding jobs and
. paving the way for evacuees to resettle. They kn~ also that young
men and women had been leaving the centers in some numbers during the
spring~ By J~e 1 nearly 9.000 had gone out to settle. in the ~o~t~
States, Midwest, and East. More important than these developments,
however, for the people who were settling into the centers were cer-
tain features of WRA policy. In June the ~shington office announced
a tightening up of employment policy in the centers. Specifically
this was to be a correction of the" jobs for everyone" policy which
had obtained in the early months. The purpose was greater efficiency
in center operations and the means was reduction of working forces to
a minimwn desigmd to eliminate overstaffing. 'I'his was generally re-
garded by evacuees as being aimed at stimulating them to resettle.
Employment curtailment was iJnInediately interpreted as a move toward
"forced relocation." The anxiety had been growing steadily in the
weeks since registration. When the project-director at Uinidoka an-
nounced in June that movies were to be discontinued in the center for
the s~er, this confirmed evacuee fears that they faced indirect
pressures and that there would be efforts to make the centers less
pleasant p~ces in 1tlich to live. Other centers did not follow suit,
but the feeling of impending pres~ure in them was strong.
By late May, as a result of the news of the congressional co~
mittees re~ort".ed in the Japanese language and other papers, the ex-
pectation 01" some move to separate persons classified as loyal and dis-
lqyal ~ intens~ in all the centers. Rumors increased during June
and by the end of the month persons in some centers who had requested
repatriation to Japan were packinR their belo~in2s in preparation f~r
some tort of move. On the sixth of' JuLY the Senate passed a reso.LlltJ.on
urging the separation of the people in the centers on a basis of loyal-
ty. About two weeks later the VillA announced plans for what it called
"segregatioo." The Tule Lake center was designated as the place of
segregation. All persons from the 10 centers who had asked for re-
patriation to Japan and all American citizens who t~d applied for ex-
patriation to Japan were to be sent to Tule Lake. In addition all
American citizens, men and women, who had answered the Arrou registra-
tion " loyalty' I questions with "No" would also be sent there. '£he WRA
policy makers recognized that both these classifications would cut
across some ~amily lines, despite the efforts evacuees had made to
maintain family solidarity in their answers and requests, and so the
provision was made that family members could accompany other members
of the family to Tule Lake. These were to be classified as "volunta~
segregants" and their going to Tule Lake would not be considered an
expression of disloyalty. The VillA policy makers, well aware that the
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categories of persons they had set up included many who were not dis-
loyal to the United States, did not emphasize loyalty and disloyalty
as the basis of segregation in their announcements to evacuees. They
presented it as a move to separate those who "wanted to live as Japa-
nese" from those who did not. This, it was felt, was more in line
with the evacuees own feeling about the separation. The removal, I~
officials explained, of certain groups to Tule Lake was not a punish-
ment for past acts or expressions but rather. a move toward establish-
ing more harmony among evacuees in the centers by placing like-minded
people together. There would now be one center in which people could
live peacefully according to Japanese ideals and way of life and nine
centers in which they could live in the American way. However, many
staff members iR the centers did stress loyalty. The official Wash-
ington interpretation was known chiefly to a few evacuee leaders and
did not penetrate deeply to the people in the blocks.
With the announcement of segregation the tensions of April and
May resulting from the unanswered questions about the future were
somewhat relieved in all centers but Tule Lake. The great majority
of people in the other nine centers would be little affected by the
transfer itself, Only a thousand, more or less, in each were faced
with an immediate move; only for those in the segregated categories
and their relatives did important problems arise. At Tule Lake on
the other hand the great majority of persons were faced with moving
to some other center unless they were on the lists of persons to be
segregated. Tule Lake consequently was thrown into a new tunnoil and
signs that people would put up s orne resistance to beirg moved again
began to appear immediately. It meant for them the third move within
about a year and they did not wish to undergo it, particularly since
they were classified as "loyals." Tule Lake was thrown into a turmoil
which no other center ex~rienced.
In the other nine centers the majority of people accepted the
new development very quietly. There were a few in each, partiGularly
among those Who had emerged in positions of leadership, who regarded
segregation as a desirable thing. They were convinced that among the
repatriates and expatriates there were some who were too antagonistic
to the V/RA administration to make peace possible so lO~ as they re-
mained in their centers. These few leaders wanted to see the strongly
disaffected men eliminated and felt that "harmony in the centers" then
could be more easily achieved. Such feeling among leaders was partic-
ularly strong in Jerome. There a group of young and older men had ad-
vised people strongly to ask for repatriation and expatriation during
registration. They were convinced that there was no future for Japa-
nese in the United States, believed that Japan \vould win the war, and
that Japanese Americans would be wise to prepare to live somewhere in
the Japanese Empire after the war. The first step toward tIns, they
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Iargued, was to declare oneself for Japan.
The relatively few leaders who thought this way in Jerome, some
of them from among a deeply bitter group evacuated from Hawaii, had
met determined opposition from other evacuee leaders. Three of them
had been expelled from the board of the Young Buddhist Association,
and the expulsion resulted in a split in the Buddhist Church of Jerome.
The smaller, avoweQly pro-Japan faction formed its own Buddhist Church,
called the Daijo Buddhists, while the majority, opposing their point
of view and advocat~ a future in the United States, continued to
maintain the Denson (named for the Jerome post office) Buddhist Church.
There were s~m~lAr small groups in other centers--at Heart Mountain
where a similar conflict played a part in the splitting of the Buddhist
Church there and at Manzanar where there was considerable sentiment
during and before registration for preparation to live in Japan after
the war.
Following registration the factional antagonism in Jerome was
strong for a time, but had died down to some extent by JUly. Else-
where the few strong~ pro-Japan individuals had never figured promi-
nently in community life and did not seem ve~ dangerous to other
evacuees--even in connectiCllwith preservation of "harmony- in the cen-
ters." There was, nevertheless, a little sentiment here and there
that segregation would contribute to more peaceful living in the cen-
ters. This was in line wi th widespread feeling among i~ center staff,
who since registration had tended to magnify the disrupting influence
of the "disloyal" among the evacuees. Even staff, however, by the
. time segregation came were beginning to be doubtful as to whether the
removal of anyone would do much to promote the harmony that was al-
ready being achieved. The processes pf community organizatiOP had al-
ready begun to produce a workable cooperation in all centeriS.
If the move to separate the lQyal from disloyal had come ~
mediately after registration, it is like~ that there would have been
much more feeling among evacuees that it could serve some useful pur-
pose. The feeling was stroQger then that there were some sharp dif-
ferences of viewpoint among evacuees and that the differences might
lead to disruption of center life. By the time segregation came, how-
ever, the most wides~r~d feeling wa;s. that, except for a fe\! "qu~r"
people who did not f~t ~nto block l1fe Tery well, the major~ty 01 those
who had answered "No" or asked for repatriation were not essential~
different kinds of people from the rest. They fitted into block life
better than did those ~o thought in terms of unprotesting acceptance
of the Government program. The tenor of majority opinion in regard
to segregation was that it was probably a waste of Government money
to have such a large number of peoPle shuttled back and forth between
Tule Lake and the other centers, that it was an unnecessary move for
those directly affected, and that it was too bad to force friends to
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separate once again.. The program for separation was accepted in the
nine centers by the majority as one more indication of the "Govern-
ment's" lack of understanding of the group and one soore arbitrary
vagary to be endured and made to go off as ssooothly as possible.
For the small minority in each of the nine centers, however, the
meaning of segregation was quite different. For those classified as
"segregants" it meant rooving again, an upsetting and tiresome business
of which there had been too much already. For some among them, par-
ticular~ the older people who had even before registration decided to
go to Japan, the move was welcome because it seemed to lead to definite
securi ty for the duration of the war in a center where no more moves
of any sort would have to be faced. There was a similar welcome secu-
ri ty involved for the several hundred young men who were interested
primarily in avoiding the draft. Also, for the few who were devoted-
ly patriotic to Japan, Tule Lake seemed to hold forth the opportunity
of a place where they could live "uncontaminated" by the "loyals" and
begin to prepare themelves for a future in Japan by studying the
Japanese language and practicing "pure" Japanese customs. For such
persons, wholeheartedly devoted to Japan or perfectly clear in their
minds that their economic security ultimatel,y lay in Japan, the move
to the segregation center could not came too soon. But they consti-
tuted a minority of those scheduled to be sent there.
MOst of those classified for Tule Lake fell into other cate-
gories despite labels which lumped them together. There was the large
class of defiant and protesting young men whose original motive in
saying "No" had been criticism of the United States Government but not
expression of loyalty to or even interest in Japan. ~ were holding
to their "No" answers despite opportunities .given ~ the WRA to recon-
sider. Some of them were beginning to find reasons, which th~ had
not dreamed of at first, for building their "No's" into reasons for
going to Japan. Others still remained uninterested in Japan and were
harried by the idea of being placed with Japanese patriots in Tule
Lake, but their defiance was also still strong and.th~ were reaar
to go through with it and let their future unfold as it might. For
these "No" answerers segregation was further evidence of their perse-
cution by the Government and they greeted it with further defiance an~
cynicism.
By far the deepest problems were far the families whose me~
bers fell into different classifications-sons who answered "No" and
parents who answered "Yes" and hoped to stay in the United States J
parents who asked for repatriation and sons and daughters who were
determined to stay in the United States and had answered "Yes";
brothers, some of whom answered "No" and ~me "Yes11f" and parents who
did not know which way to turn; parents who asked for repatriation and
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.under-age children \'i'lo had not been required to answer anything, but
had been going to school in the United States for years. Many famili~
feeling from the first the implications of the registration decisions,
had tried desperately to get all their members on the same side of the
fence, but many had not been able to agree. Now they were faced all
over again with the same struggles they had gone through during regis-
tration. In every center segregation was a tiJIe of family conflict,
for there were roughly 100 to 150 families in each center who had to
decide whether to go to 'rule Lake as a group or to separate, same go-
ing to rule Lake and same remaining in the relocation centers. A par-
tial way out was provided in the WRA regulation that family ~mbers
could go to Tule Lake without being branded as disloyal, and for the
most part family loyalty prevailed so that families did go or stay as
groups. The question mark of the future hung heavily over thousands
of young people who obeyed the family" will and went to Tule Lake as a
postponement of the ultimate decisions.
.1
The dilemmas of segregation were not confined to the determined j
yOuDu. men and 'Wanen already down as "No" answerers and the parents al- j
ready down as repatriates. On lihe m6.rgin of tbe 4,000 to 8,000 majoritY"
in each center who were down on paper as "l~ls" and faced no official
compulsion to move, there were hundreds who were tempted by the pos-
sible securities of Tule Lake. If Tule Lake was to be the one center
where one could look forward to no more moves for the duration of the
war, why not go there? YVhy not change one's answers to "No" or why-
not ask for repatriation or expatriation and so get into rule Lake?
Then the fear of "forced relocation" would ~lt away"- One could be
sure of not being ptshed out into the hostile United States. Perhaps
one could wait quietly" until the war was over and thm slide back into
the old place on the West Coast. It was a way" to avoid th.e upset and
the danger of being pushed out into Chicago or to Detroit where they
had just had a race riot.
There were rumors in all the centers that Tule Lake was an un-
usually pleasant center. The name indicated that there was a lake
there. The photographs and description sent aI'OWld to the other cen-
ters by" the WRA iooicated that it 8S no worse at least than where one
was, and WRA officials were empnasizing that it was not a place of pun-
ishment. Detention there for the duration of the war would be a wel-
come certaintY" in the midst of all the uncertainty aboot everything
else. People wondered and decided to ask for repatriatim or expatria-
tion since that was the means by which one got to Tule Lake. Decisions
were being made in terms of getting to the security of Tule LakeJ not
in terms of any ultimate future in the United States or Japan. Fami-
lies settled their differences in the compranise of security for the
duration in '1\1le Lake. Friends infiuenced friends to cane along with
them to avoid separatioo and live quietly in Tule Lake. For som in
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the far eastern centers~ like Jerome and Rohwer, it even became a way
of getting back to California; their decisions meant no more than that.Steadi~ the numbers of those sched~ed for Tule Lake increased--fami- -
lies successful in getting their adult members all classified together~
new applicants for repatriation~ "voluntary segregants'J by the thou-
sands accompanying their parents or even parents accomparving their
eldest sons. Tule Lake had become a temporary escape from what the
WRA policy makers conceived as freedom in the resettlement program.
It was a cynosure for people seeking immediate security.
The segregation process in the nine centers moved smoothly~
very smoothly as compared with registratioo. People 'had been prepared
for months; it was no surprise. The majority had to make no new de-
cisions even though tempted sometimes by the apparent securities of
Tule La.ke. There was elaborate preparation for the processing and
movement of people by the WRA staffs. Staff were instructed from the
start to encourage participation of evacuees in making the transfer
arrangements. Evacuee committees were encouraged to gather information
about the details of the segregation cent~r ~ the status of the segre-
gants ~ and the steps necessary for those who were to be moved and to
pass the -information back into the blocks. One project director in-
sisted on eliminating the word "segregation" from all center announce-
ments and bulletins. The process at his center was merely called
"transfer" which well fitted the majority evacuee conception of mat
it was. Center staff were pleased with the coopeoratioo shown in every
one of the nine centers ~ cooperation on the part both of persons sched-
uled to go to Tule Lake and those remaining who did everything they
could to help the process go smoothly. Through September and October
the trainloads left the centers amid farewell parties and little gath-
erings of friends saying good-bye for the duration, while fram Tule
Lake came new trainloads to fill up the barracks again in all the
eastern centers. At Poston~ Manzanar~ and Gila it was a one way proc-
ess~ with segregants leaving but no one coming in from Tule Lake.
At Tule Lake the process was not at all smooth. There every-
one had to act in s~ way. The burden was lightest for the "disloy..
als-; they had no JOOve to make. They were already established now for
~ne duration. But tor all the others~ the great majority, segregation
meant breaking up the household and going to a strange place all over
again~ a sort of second evacuation. Most eventually chose centers
tram those available where they had friends or acquaintances. But
several thousand were not ready to accept the move so easily. Where
in the other nine centers the temptation to go to Tule Lake had been
felt by hundreds, at Tule Lake itself the desire to remain was strong
for thousands. For them, unlike the IMjority in the other centers~
segregation was as much a peremptory order to do something they dis-
liked and feared as had been registration. And there was a tradition
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.at Tule Lake of widespread refusal to comply, represented in the J~909
who never filled out registration forms.
A large ~umber at Tule Lake refused early in ttle program to
choose centers to go to and more pleaded in interviews ~hat they could
not move because of illness or other reasons. Passive resistance de-
veloped in solid units in the blocks which had also resisted registra-
tion. In the discussion of the older people the Japanese word "to
move again" was used both for "segregation movement" and for "reset- 
tlement, or relocation, movement." The two things, distinct in the
minds of the \tRA staff, had identical meanings for large numbers of
Issei, and they were reacting to segregation as they would to "forced
relocation," which had become as widely talked of at Tule Lake as at
other centers. A rumor appeared and spread through the center that
those who remained at 'lUle Lake woold have prisonerl,qf war ,status and
would receive $50 a month for the duration of the war. This was ~al
security and many were acting on a belief in the rwmor.
The WRA staff were farced to take steps which did not enter at
all into the seg~gation process at the other centers. Speakers Went
out to the "ward~," ,as grou~ of four blocks were called in Tule lake,
to try to correct the effects of the latest rumors and to carry qn
educational campaigns to counteract the resistance. The project di-
rector read carefully prepared speeches to mass meetings and interview-
ers worked intensive~ on persons reluctant to make their family plans.
 Early talk a.mo~ older people of "sit-down" resistance to any movement
~radually bec~e restricted to ce~tAin h~ocks and wards. Ultimately,
however, 6,000 people remained in Tule ~e, and only ;2,000 of thes~ 'B9
in the categories of segregants defined by the \fRA regulations. The
other 4000 were "unauthorized.'; they ~ad decided to remain in Tule Lake
not because they had any particular sentiments of loyalty one way or the
other but because they did not like to be pushed around, or they did
not want to leave California, or they did not want to be sent too far
away from home, or because they just did not want to move again.
.
The sorting of the people was accomplished by early November.
All had been classified. All who would go had been. t,ransferred fr~
Tule Lake to six other centers. All but l.3,OOO of the ~,~ scheduled.
to be sent from the other centers had been transferred .to Tule Lake.
OnlY 2,OOO.for whom there was no room at Tule Lake, still remained at
Manzanar to be sent at a later time as soon as sufficient barracks
should have been comtructed at the segregation center. Another major
movement of the evacuees had been carried out without serious incident.
~e meaning of the sorting to the people who had undergone it was quite
different from what it was to the people. o~ the "outside" who saw it in
ter~ of the labels of loyalty and ~lofa1t7. The sorting had little
important effect on people in the nine centers now designaged as
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"relocation centersi" but to those segregated in Tule Lake the effects
were almost imnediately cataclysmic.
Fruits of Segregation
During September and October trains movad westward from
Ar~as, dY°ming, Colorado, Idaho, Utah, and Arizona carrying evacu-
ees back t~ California. After a year of processing since evacuation,
~nearly 9,000 were headed back to their home State to rive in the segre-
gation center. This was the third uprooting, once from. their homes,
once from the assembly centers, and finally now from the relocation .
centers. They were classified as "segregants" and "volu.'1tary segre-'
gants," and no one was precisely sure what that meant, but ~1l were
hopeful that it meant no more uprooting for some time. MOst arrived
in Tule Lake in September, the others (except for those from Manzanar
who were to be transferred later) during October. After further proc-
essing and fingerprinting down to the youngest, they ,settled into the 
strange bloc~ with the 6,000 "Old Tuleans'l who had remained in the segregation center. -
People came to Tule Lake from all the other centers, put there
were fewer from Granada and Minidoka than from any of the others.
They were a more heterogeneous group than had entered any of the
original relocation centers. They came from nearly all the counties
of California where Japanese had formerly lived. There were 656
Hawaiians who had been in Topaz and Jerome, and there were a few hun-
dred evacuees from IYashington and Oregon. An expatriate wrote back
to a friend:
"This center compared to Topaz is a center from all
parts of the "Vest Coast--not just the East Bay Region
of California. You always had some former friends
around at To~z. But here it's very'hard to get to
know people. In my particular block, there are people
from almost e~ery center and every part of California.
"You just can't make friends with just anyone without
knowing a little about their background. Thus it's
hard to get the least bit congenial with your block
people, ward people, center people. One noticeable
thing about the Japanese here, though, and that is if
the Issei came from the same "ken" in Japan tn~y' were
more apt to become friends."
The new population of Tule Lake was different in other ways
from the people left in the nine relocation centers. There was a
great~r proportion among them of poorer, rural people. A large number,
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of unmarried farm laborers who ha d never made any success o~ life- in
the United States and who had no stake in the country in the form of
family or property had cane to Tule Lake, many of them with the idea
of ultimately getting their way paid to Japan where they could live
out their la~t years. There were also poor farm families, often large
ones, who had not been doing well in the United States and were ready
to give up. Tule Lake was noticeably different from the other centers,
\VRA staff felt, in the relatively large nurnbers of such people, less
well off economically, less courageous, less confident in their abil-
ity to make a liying for themselves than the average of the evacuees.
"People with proble~," as staff members phrased it, seemed to have 
come to Tule Lake .
If they had not been extremely different iq their feelings
about the possibility of a future in the United States when they left
the relocation centers, they quickly became so. As the trainloads
came in, there was no mistaking that the United States Government re-
. garded them with intense suspicion. The little camp of military po-
I lice at the border of the center grew steadi~ into a large garrison.
i Barracks for 1,000 officers and men were constructed. Army- engineers
f went to work on a new fence surrounding the center, no simple affair
of a few strands of barbed wire such as had been put up around the
relocation centers the year before, but an eight-foot, heavy wire
mesh, man proof fence with barbed wjre at the top sloping inward.
And as the final trainloads came in, evacuees saw small tanks armed
with machine guns lined up in the military area. The ArIItf was ready
for action against someone whom they evidently regarded as dangerous.
The third uprooting had piled people into a place tar more remote from
the world of normal human relationships than anything they had experi-
enced so far.
As soon as they entered the center the peace and the security
that most had hoped for in Tule Lake seemed to fade farther away than
ever. '1'1le center was more bare and brown than any of the others ex-
cept Topaz. The lack of irrigation water and the tension and con-
fusion through the spring since registration had kept the people from
giving it the greene~ and air of being lived in that characterized
almost eve~ other center by this time. It was crowded, as crowded
as had been any of the early centers. Recreation halls were turned
into barracks for the bachelors. 'nte whole atmosphere pervading the
place was a repetition of the distraught early days in the relocation
centers. But Tule Lake was even more upset, even less of a community
of like-minded and congenial people than had been any of the early
centers. The blocks were more heterogeneous, and the co~I1-'!ity
cross-currents swirled more rapidly and with greater intensity through
them.
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The majority of people who had got on the trains at the reloca-
tion centers were, as those had felt who gave them farewell parties
and waved good-byes, Imlch like all the oth er people in the centers.
They had gone through the settling processes that took place in the
relocation centers during the first half of 1943. 'fhey had learnedto accept the centers as peaceful havens for the duration of the war ..
and differed chiefly in their decisions to seek even greater security
in Tule Lake. But from the moment they stepped into the trains and
then as they stepped out into the segregation center an unsettling
process had begun. They became aware almost immediately of a minority
among them who were determined to give the segregation center a spe-
cial meaning. This group, like the minority of Nisei leaders in early
Manzanar, were determined to bring center life into some direct re-
lationship to the war outside the center, but unlike the Nisei leaders
of Manzanar they wanted to give it meaning in relationship to the
Japanese war effort.
The conflict between conceptions of the segregation center held
by the majority and by the active minority ~s clearly revealed in the
plans for Japanese language schools. As soon as the new people ar-
rived in Tule Lake a group of older men from various centers got to-
gether and organized a Japanese Language School Board. Their position
was that the majority of people who had come to Tule Lake ultimately
intended to go to Japan and that the VillA had said that they would be
free to live "as Japanese" in 'rule Lake. Some felt strongly the need
for preparing their children to live in Japan and recognized as most
importafi~ the need for learning the Japanese language. Others felt
that whether they ultimately went to Japan or not, speaking Japanese
was essential for living "like Japaoose.11 'lhe young people had merely .
a smattering of Japanese or an imperfect knowledge picked up in the
pre~vac~ation Japanese la~uage schools of the ,Vest Coast communities.
The~pard therefore worked out a plan for schools which would be oper-
ated entirely independently of the v'VRA administration and would main-
tain class hours which did not conflict with the vVRA English schools.
There was wide support among the people for this plan. It became ap-
parent immediate~, however, that there were several Japanese lan-
guage teachers who wanted their classes to be places for intensive in-
doctrination of the children in the current Japanese political propa-
ganda. one group set up a private school and called it the Greater
East Afia C~Prosperity Sphere School and posted such a sign on the
door. '£hey were vigorous in their attempts to make their classes into
active schoo~ for the furtherance of Japanese mannerisms. Board me~
bers expressed disapproval. Moreover, as soon as the schools were
established, it became evident that strong pressures were being ap-
plied to get students into them. "Voluntary segregants" who still
had no interest in Japan and did not want to attend Japanese language
schools found themselves under pressure not only from parents but
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also from young men who vlaIrlered about the blocks checking up on at- 
teIrlance am seeming to threaten the stragglers. 
This phenomenon of pressure from rou£ih young men who took it
on themselves to get people "into line" in one way or another was the
first and most vivid expression of the working of the community cross-
currents in Tule Lake. Young men moved about the center in groups,
bursting in on dances of Nisei, breaking up the dances, and denounc-
ing the style of dancing as "not Japanese." Others appeared in wan-
en's shower rooms, announcing that "This is Japan and here men and
.women bathe together." Still others slapped and insulted Nisei girls
serving as c1erks~ in the housing office, asserting that they were not
helping the newcomers suffic~ent1y with their housing problems. 'One
ni~ t in October a gang of ybung men systematically smashed all the
windows in the housing office. This was an unleashing of rowdyism, 
somewhat reminiscent of the gang activities in the centers during the
mov:;i.ng in. It was a different rowdyism, however, aimed not at the
beating up o.f Nisei leaders Who stood as symbols of the miseries
brOught on by evacuation. It was mare raIrlom and undirected, and to
a greater extent represented merely youth running wild in a totally
disorganized community. Nevertheless, there was some purpose in the
activities of tile gangs of young men. The new Tu1e Lake popu].atioD
. differed from that in the nin& centers now in the greater proportion
of young men Who had received same schooling in Japan--the Kibei.
Disapproved by the majority of Nisei in the centers because of their
imperfect English or lack of familiarity with American way.s and eti-
quette, they now found themselves in a majority in the segregation
center. They took as license the designation of the center as a place
. where people could live like Japanese. Their treatment of Nisei girls,
their objection to American dancing, their support of Japanese lan-
guage schools were all expressions of their newly found status, and
they were busy trying to pull into line the "voluntary segregants" and
the other Nisei Who knew little Japanese and had been .in the habit of
looking askance at Kibei. As a Nisei girl said shart1y after her ar-
rival in 'J'u1e Lake:
"Anything can happen in this -dump. It's almost as bad
as being in Gennany. You wonder "Why yoU were born.
No fooling, these guys have no respect for women, and
bay, do they believe in Gestapo methods. You can't
use your own mind. You gotta be on the alert. of what
you say, and on top of that you gotta respect the ~is."
The Nisei "Who had yielded to family sense of duty in going to Tu1e
Lake were even mare unhappy than they had expected to be. They were
encountering pressures now not only from parents but also from young
people of their c..-n age group to "behave like Japanese." The former-
ly disapproved Kibei were in the saddle.
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Cross-currents Which had 1arge~ subsided in the relocation cen-
ters as moderate Issei opinion had become dominant were set in motion
anew in the segregation center. Little groups of men from Jerome,
Heart Mountain, Poston, and Topaz began immediately on arrival in Tule
Lake to seek positions of leadership. They were men who had been rel-
egated to ~ositions of unimportance in the relocation centers, lead-
ers of minority factions in the Buddhist churches or discredited po-
Ii tical leaders. Like the Kibei they felt that here in the segrega-
tion center their view of things could become dominant. There were
many of their kind still in the relocation centers VJho had not come
to Tule Lake for various reasons. Those who did come were the most
deterlnined and vigorous. They were ang~ about evacuation and sub-
ordination in the relocation centers. A few of them were seriously
interested in getting to Japan, but for most of them the dominant
interest was in asserting themselves and their dignity in the face
of mistreatment. Groups of leaders determined among themselves quick-
ly on plans for organizing the people in the upset center. There were
little struggles for position among themselves, with a group from
Jerome emerging as dominant with support of Poston and Heart 1fountain
men. They raised issues which had general appeal for the inCOlalng
segregants--dust control, better block facilities, improvement of
food--all projected against the better conditions in the centers from
which people had come.
Before maqy people had got their bearings in the new center,
the new leadership was organized with a Negotiating Committee and
picked spokesmen for dealing with the administration. Late in Octo-
ber they sought to deve~op popular support. The death of a far~
'rlorker from Topaz in a truclc accident became the occasion for a pub-
lic funeral which was utilized to rouse. and focus public opinion
against the administration and conditions in the center. Trouble
developed between the farm crew and the administration. The crops
of the Tule Lake farms lay unharvested in the fields. An issue grew.
The leadership maintained that the people of Tule Lake did not want
to harvest crops part of which would be sent for use in other centers.
They wanted, the leaders maintained, Tule Lake labor and produce to be
used only for Tuleans who had determined to be Japanese and not for
other evacuees who had determined to be Americans. The administration
proceeded to recruit evacuees from other centers to harvest the Tule
Lake crops. The gulf between the administration and the sudden~
risen evacuee leadership widened.
Finally the leaders decided to make a real show of their
strength. On November I the National Director of the WRA visited
the center. The Negotiating Committee went up to t~e administration
building to present their points to him and the project director--and
behind them came thousands of evacuees up from the blocks to stand
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through the afternQon surrounding the administration buildings \vhile 
the leaders pr~sented their case. Young men worked at the e~es. of 
the crowd keepJ.ng the people there and at the doors of the buJ.l.dJ.ngs
keeping the WRA staff members inside the buildings. The crowd, es-
timated as high as 10,000, stood and sat patiently, men, women, and 
children, for 3 hours. It was the biggest and best organized demon- 
stration of evacuees that had taken place in any center. 
It was also the most premeditated and least spontaneous demon-
stration. The new leadership had worked out the details caref~.
They had planned it as a peaceful show of strong popular support for
their program, but few in the crowd knew all that was being presented
to the National Director. Many had come up as a result of announce-
ments in the messhalls that there was to be a protest over the "bad
food." Others had not even as definite an ideas as that for their
coming, but had simply been told to appear. The leaders began their
presentation with a reque~t for some definite statement as to the
legal and international status of evacuees in Tule Lake. They wanted
to know whether they were prisoners of war, aliens, or what. They
presented their criticisms of living conditions in the center and
ended with a demand for the dismissal of six top center staff includ-
ing the project director. This last was the most positive effort of
an evacuee leadership .to assume some control of the staff under whom
they had to live that had appeared in any center. It represented the
sort of feeling about center life that had been steadily submerged
during the previous year in the relocation centers. In a sense it
was the final direct and organized expression in any center of the re-
bellion against Government supervision .vhich most evacuee leaders felt
but had learned to express less directly and sweepingly. The aggres-
sive expression of the demands for removal of personnel did not have
popular support from the thousands of evacuees VJho came up to the ad-
ministration buildings. It was not ordered by them but was the ex-
pression, as one evacuee said, of "a few leaders who had more push
and 'guts' than common sense."
Planned as a peaceful demonstration, the gathering of evacu-
ees did not go off entirely quietly. \'fuile the crowd 'Was gathered
around the administpation build_ngs, some young men entered the hos-
pital, sought out the very unpopular chief medical officer, and gave
him a severe beati11g. This and the control of a few staff members
who sought to leave the administration building during- the afternoon,
together with the whole spectacle of the evacuees surrounding the ad-
ministration building, had effects which began to work even more
strongly after the crowd had peacefully retired to the blocks with the
I~ationa1 Director's assurance that he would study the Negotiating
CoIrul~tteels points. Fear grew up and spread among the staff. There
was a demand from some 'tJ1at a fence be put up between the administra-
tive and evacuee areas. False rumors spread that there had been
(13B)
~ 
knives and other weapons among the demonstrating evacuees and that
there had been attempts to set the buildings on fire. Many members
of the staff were terrorized and their stories got to newspaper re-
porters who publicized the incident throughout the country as a
dangerous attack by the evacuees of 'l~e Lake on the ¥IRA staff and
as a threat to the nearby towns.
In the atmosphere of tension immediately following the demon-
stration more happened. Some evacuees who had participated or watched
the demonstration were pleased ?lith what had happened. One who saw
it from the hospital wrote to a friend:
"There exists within the center a common idea of unity
that no other center can achieve. The leaders are all
men of ability, high caliber and possess diplo~.tic
talents.i-On Monday, a crowd went to the administration
buildini] similar to the crowd that occurred during the
Santa Anita riot. During the three hours 20,000 of us
waited eagerly, as from time to time one of the repre-
sentatives would state, 'Now's the time for united spirit;
we must not fail or else the whites will take advantage.'
We should be proud of our race. He sure brought up the
morale. At the end, the results were presented by the
Japanese leaders and£:the National Director;! It seems
that our conmittee of eight had won the first round."
The sense of triumph expressed itself in several ways. On November 3,
the anniversary of the birthday of the ~eror Meiji of Japan, a small
celebration was sponsored by a group of the leaders, and pressure was
applied to workers in the administ~ation offices to leave their jobs
during the morning and attend the celebration. This increased the
fears and distrust among the staff.
Then on November 4 violence broke out on a small scale. A
group of young men who had heard that trucks were to leave the ware-
houses during the night to take food to the evacuees recruited to
harvest the Tule Lake crops deter~ed to stop the trucks. There
had been a notice after November 1 that no evacuees could come to the
administration area without passes. In their efforts to locate the
trucks (which were actually bent on another task) the evacuees were
intercepted by internal security. officers and a fight took place.
The movements of the gang and the officers in the admini~tration area
roused other staff members and there was a brief period of excitement.
In the midst of it the internal security chie£ called the commander
of the milita~ police and a contingent of soldiers with guns and
tanks came into the center. Some of the young men were captured after
one internal security man had been bad~ beaten, and the captured men
.
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were in turn beaten by the internal securi ty off~cers.
The Army came in to stay for several weeks. The center was
placed under military. supervision. Jeeps and command cars began
patrolling the center. A fence was put up between the administrative
area and the blocks, and soldiers placed on guard at the gates. A
curfew was instituted. The whole center was systematically searched
for weapons (which were not found) and for the leaders of the demon-
stration. The leaders were placed in a stockade and some were held
for 10 months. 'fhe military police maintained control over the center
for about two months, and the basis for working relations between
evacuees and WRA staff was upset. The segregation center had become
a place of real repression. The peace that people had been looking
for had receded f~~_~~er away than ever. The future loomed dark and
the present became plagued with community cross-currents far more com-
plex and far more destruc~ive to security and individual balance than
had ever existed in the darkest mo~ents of the first months in the re-
location centers. The forces that made Tule Lake what it became had
been present in the other centers, but there they had been channelized
and brought back under control by both the character of a~nistration
and the stabilization of the peopl~ under their leaders. In Tule Lake
they had been stirred into motion again and were not to quiet down
until the final weeks of the center--almost 2 years later.
The incidents at Tule Lake in November provided the last real
material for the movement t~ bring all the evacuees under a regime of
greater repression--the movement that had begun with evacuation and
qad been largely responsible for the program of segregation. Tule
Lake immediate~ became the focus of investigations "by the California
State Senate and the Dies Col.wdttee. The v1RA and the evacuees were
attacked again. Pictures of a threat to the whole Nation were con-
jured up out of the demonstration at Tule Lake. Newspapers everywhere
headlined the incidents. 'l'here was a stir of excitement, in the midst
of war news, from one end of the coW1try- to the-other and particular~
on the iVest Coast. The Dies Committee carried its investigations to
Washington, but in the face of the facts the attack and the charges
gradually petered out. Steadily, as the evacuees of Tule Lake took
up their new life under Army control, what interest there was in the
r~ation in the evacuees turned to the resettlement plans which the WRA
now had for the 73,000 left in the nine centers.
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. CHAPTER III
SETTLlliG D<1VN
The process by which a few hundred of the most bitter and
least well-balanced of the evacuees had been skimmed, along with
thousands of other average people, into the segregation center was
only one aspect of a sorting which had begun in the early months of
the relocation centers. The moment that the rich and poor farmers,
established and struggling business men, students, housewives, and
fishermen had entered the centers they sorted themselves into con-
genial groups. The voices of the ,bitter and the unbalanced stea~
became submerged, as they do in ordinary communi ties which' are not
unbearably oppressed, in those of the sober, the practical, and the
experience-wise. During the process individuals emerged in every
center who could find no peace or satisfaction in the developing
center way of life. As soon as the doors of the centers were opened
a little in August 1942, a sorting began into those who could adapt
themselves to the centers and those who could not. The young men and
women who had never been a part of any Japanese community on the ~~st
Coast in any real sense began to leave the centers in the fall of
1942. A few hundred had left permanently even by January 194.3.
Young people who had been straining against parent.a.l contr~1s for
years broke off and went out. In the spring of 194.3 about f 7,000 left
the centers. Some were young people who were responding to the sit-
uation in typically American individualistic fashion. Some were the
cqilqren of parents who did not feel themselves pa~t of the Japanese
community in the United States. They were people whose identifica-
tions were so completely with the majority group that life in the
. centers was painful. The~e were others, too, who began to leave in
the spring and early summer of 194.3. Some of these still felt some
identification with the Japanese community, through intimate bonds
with parents who were much a part of the community or through a good
understanding of and ~patQy with the problems of the group as a
whole. But despite such feelings (and some of those who left had be-
gun in the centers with a desire to -"serve the ,people" and help them
in the crisis) the framework of center life had defeated them. As
the meaning of Government supervision closed in on them, as they en-
countered the frustration of sharply limited leadership in the frame- '
work of life under an agency, or as they felt the impossibility of
solving the problems of the group so long as the group clung to the
centers, they gave up and moved out. The spring of J. 94.3 was charac-
terized by the disap~arance from the centers of many young men who
had emerged as leaders of the Nisei councils or as vigorous community
organizers. They were no.t men who had rejected the Issei or who had
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antagonized the Issei by any lack of understanding of the problems of
the group as a raci~ minority in the United states. They had vlorked
hard and sympathetically with the center communities as wholes, but
they began to feel that there was nothing important they could do from
wi thin the centers. They sa,q their base of operation~ as on the out-
side and they went out to Chicago, Cleveland, Minneapolis, and else-
where. By no means all such persons left the centers during 1943, but
many did. The centers were well sorted in this respect even before
segregation took place.
',Vhat was left then in the nine centers by the beginning of 1944
was the solid core of the former i1est Coast communities. Almost all
those who had never really belonged to any community had left to merge
themselves with the majority somewhere in the United States. The
greater number of those who could not adjust their'desires for leader-
ship and civic activity to Government supervision had gone out to find
scope elsewhere. Many, possibly a majority, of those who had been
badly adjusted wi thin the Japanese communi ties before had gone to Tule
Lake. Some of those who went to Tule Lake had. been poorly adjusted
merely in the sense that they had not been able to make good livings;
~~ny of the same kind of people stayed behind in the relocation cen-
ters. They were not, whether in Tule Lake or the other genters, much
different from the majority. Others who went to Tule Lake had been
badly adjusted in the Japanese communities on other counts; they were
young people brought up astraddle of Japan and the United States
through schooling in both, they were young and old nursing grievances
and frustrations through having failed for personal or other reasons
to achieve acceptance or status in the former communi ties. But by no
means all such persons went to Tule Lake. Some blocks in each center
continued to be dominated by persons of the kind who had sought ful-
fillment in Tule Lake.
The nine centers-now called "relocation" centers with a new
emphasis by VmA to contrast them as bases for resettlement with the
segregation center--were thus .iVest Coast communities p~ged largely
of the extremes which had lived at their edges in. the years before.
The people in them were the people who had made the Japanese American
minority what it was before evacuation. They were the old comnlunities,
peculiarly refined, set down under the circumstances ,of Government
supervision in strange places. It remained to be seen in what manner
the people and the Government program would adapt themselves to each
other.
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Progr~-Govemment and Evacuee
For more than a year prior to December 1943, two programs for
solving the problem of the future of the evacuees had been developing
in considerable isolation from each other. In Washington a group of
men who composed the top staff of i'mA had been thinking carefully and
planning with determination. They had long since reached the conclu-
sion that the problem of economic rehabilitation of the group would
best be solved by beginning that process immediately without waiting
for the war which had uprooted the people to come to an end. Only,
they believed, if evacuees moved out of the centers and took up life
promptly in normal camnunities could they establish a base for meetingtheir individual problems in a post-war United States. The whole
conception of the program of resettlement, or relocation as these
men called it, rested on this belief. The quicker evacuees moved out
of the restricted and dependent status of the relocation centers, the
bet ter it \vould be in the long run for their morale and their economic
future. These men knew too much about the people in the centers to
accept the easy interpretation of segregation as a separation of the
loyal and the disloyal. But they were convinced that if there were
any dangerous persons among the evacuees, they would either have gone
to Tule Lake or would be sifted out in the process of leave clearance
for those in the nine other centers. Now with segregation completed
and the demands of Congress and segments of the public for a separa-
tion met, the men in :Vashington felt that they could move more vigor-
ously to carry out their plan for general resettlement.
To this end in October while segregation was still in progress,
they had set up a special division of t.he WRA to coordinate the wh6le
program of resettlement--the Relocation Division. Field offices to
find jobs, houses, and public acceptance for evacuees had been estab-
lished in cities allover the United States outside the prohibited
West Coast zone. The VffiA officials had been pleasantly surprised to
find an abundance of requests for evacuees to fill available jobs and
also to discover that there were citizen groups in many places not
only vlill.ing to accept evacuees in their conununities but also to aid
them actively in getting reestablished. In Cincinnati, in Cleveland,
in Chicago, in Milwaukee, and elsewhere it was evident that there
were more places for evacuees than there were evacuees willing to take
them.
The attention of the men in vm therefore turned to the centers.
They felt that their big task was one of informing evacuees ade~tely
of the many jobs, the acceptabl~ living conditions, and the good c~
munity acceptance which they knew existed, but about which evacuees
did not know. They vrere well aware of the evacuees' fears of the
outside and small knowledge of any parts of the United States except
the West Coast. To inform the evacuees leaflets were written and dis-
tributed to the centers describing cities and regions where evacuees
were resettling successfully, movies of resettlers were made and sho\~
in the centers, and in the winter of 1944 "relocation teams" of 11RA
field office staff began to visit the centers to tell evacuees directly
of conditions in their areas. The VRA policy makers were aware that
their program depended on patient persuasion as well as siw.ple pro-
viding of information. rrhey included in the program plans for forma-
tion of committees in which leaders of the evacuee communities could
participate in furthering the program. Finally, they also began in
the winter of 1944 to carry out plans for interviewing every family in
every center to assist and to encourage them to plan for resettlement.
Almost simultaneously with the completion of segregation the Relocation
Division began vigorously to carry the carefully formulated program to
the evacuees in the-relocation centers.
The people in the centers had ever since registration expected
an intensification 9f the resettlement program and felt that they saw
j.t in the tightening up of center employment \vhich was announced in
June and carried out in following months. They were, in accordance
with their distrust of VmA policy makers, looking for evidences of the
, "forced relocation" which they expected. They began to see what tmy
.. felt were signs of it in develoJ:ments during the winter of 1943-44.
In November project directors were advised from ifash~ton to seek
j evacuee aid in the resettlement program by appointing or having the
J c~i ~y councils appoint "relocation commissions composed jointly of
[I! staff members and evacuees. Two centers already had such conmissions-
r Rohwer am GiJa-and most other centers proceeded to form groups, so
that councilmen and other evacuees appointed to the commissions or
j boards became aware of Washington's, interest in more intensive organi-
zation for stimulation of resettlement. In addition, bulletin boards
in the centers were posted with pictures of happily resettled individ-
uals, offers of jobs, and information concerning various parts of the
United States. Relocation teams came and went, showed movies, and
talked to mass meetings and individuals about opportunities outside.
Tovmrd the end of the winter some centers got started on the program
for interview of families concerning plans for resettlement. There
was therefore no doubt in the centers that the V~ was working hard
to persuade people to leave and resettle. Evacuee leaders in constant
contact with staff were well aware of the emphasis on resettlement.
The people in the blocks were much less so, but many got glimpses of
it in block bulletin boards, or in the movies and talks of the reloca-
tion teams, or eventually as a result of being called in for a family
interview. Some were quietly considering jobs and making their deci-
sions to go out. There was a constant trickle of persons through the
relocation offices every week. But for the great majority in the cen-
ters consciousness of the resettlement program amounted to an awareness
(144)
that the WRA staff in the administration area and. the V& in \lJashington
wanted people to leave the centers, which was something they did not
thEmselves want to do.
The WRA program was impinging on another program which had been
developing over the same period during wtdch the men in \~ had been
thinking and planning theirs. In the minds of the evacuee leaders it
was a program for holding on to the security that the centers offered
until the war should end. The main features of the program had been
formulated many months before and the majority in every center had
steadily accepted them as the most practical and realistic approach
to the ominous woblem of their future. In isolation from the policy
makers in Washington the influential Issei in each center had been
weighing their losses, what they knew of the attitudes of Americans
towards them, the extent of the Government t s offers of financial aid
in resettlement, and the possibilities for any future assistance.
Most had decided that the best course was to hold on to the centers
for as long as they could. It was a popular program in the centers
where people had grown accustomed to the restricted life, shrank from
moving again, had many immediate securities, and were fearful of the
outside.
In December at Minidoka, where .the project director had taken
various actions which led evacuees to beli~ve that he wished to force
them to resettle, a group of leaders presented a ~tatement of their
position to the Spanish Consul for submission to the United states
and Japanese Governments. In a section entitled "Spiritual and Mental
Welfare of Evacuee Residents," the statement set forth the reaction of
f the leaders to the resettlement program:
n~elationship between .mA ~ Residents
"The evacueEf resice.T'ts of this project with a sincere
desire to abide by the laws of the United States, to
preserve peace and harmony within tm project" and pur-
suing a policy of patient forbearance, have at no time
resorted to ~proper conduct-. It is fully realized that
in view of war conditions, our feelings of dissatisfac-
tion and uncertainty are to a certain extent unavoidable.
But it is indeed regrettable that certain segments of the
~rican people, press, politicians and government offi-
cials have deliberatel::f and maliciousl::f fanned the flame
of anti-Japanese prejudice. .vIe in these relocation cen-
ters have been used by the~ 6S a t political football, t and
to spread false and inflammatory reports designed to harm
us. Vfithin the center itself, the overbearing attitude
of racial, social and intellectual superiority assumed by
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'most of administrative officers, high and low, 
in violation of the announced ~VRA formula of mutual
cooperation, has undermined the morale of the resi- 
dents. All o£ these factors have severely tested our
confidence in American justice and our sincere desire
and willingness to abide by its laws. \"lith a view to
removing these and other causes of our feeling of un-
certainty from our daily existence, we earnestly desire
a clarification of our wartime status and in particular
our relationship with the IVRA administration. 
~ Relocation Policy ~ 2 Residents' Reactions
"Early in the evacuation stage, the Government announced
that-for the protection of th~ evacuees themselves, it
will retain them in relocation centers for the duration,
and guaranty them food, clothing, shelter, and also rec-
reational and educational facilities. Despite this
promise, the Government abandoned this original policy,
and began to enforce a policy of persuading evacuee~ to
leave the centers and resettle in American communities.
The existence of intense anti-Japanese feelings and its
threat upon the ~rsonal safety and livelihood of the
evacuees are well-known to the authorities in charge of
the evacuees' welfare. Despite those and other unfavor-
able circumstances, the Government, acting through the
Y-/RA, has undertaken to impose upon the evacuees a policy
of sprinkling them unnoticeably across the length and
breadth of the country." 
This statement was signed by a group of 16 Issei leaders in the com-
munity. Several were men who had been serving the project director
as advisers on community organization. Several were men who were
shortly to emerge as the most prominent and effective community
leaders after Minidoka finally established a community council.
They were not extremists, but representative of the sort of men who
were regarded by evacuees as responsible and capable leaders in
dealing with the administration. Their statement to some extent re-
flected s~cial conditions at Minidoka, where the approach of top
staff to resettlement had more than anywhere else roused evacuee op-
position. The statement however may be taken as reflecting the state
of mind of majority leaders in all centers concerning the resettlement
program. It was more than that. It presented what were coming to be
the accepted po5.nts of argument in all centers on behalf of the evac- I
uee program. Broken promises in regard to the security of the centers, 
the impossibility of the situation on the outside for persons of Japa-
nese descent, and the intention of scattering evacuees far from each
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other through the country--~nese oecame cen~r~ points in the state-
ments of evacuee leaders everytyhere as they opposed, at ther in dis-
cussions a.lI).ong themselves or vdth j;'RA staff, t,he Govern.'llent program.
As the weeks passed and the evidences of intensified rRA effort in-
creased, reactions such as these by the Minidoka leaders also inten-
sified. It was program against program. The i~ po~cy makers and
the evacuee leaders had not worked together,in the development of
their programs and now they had moved very far apart.
The resUlting impasse was felt most keenly by the l"/RA staff in
the centers. So long as "forced relocation" did not actually appear,
the evacuee leaders could simply withdravl. The ¥Vashington staff
worried about low resettlement figures, but they were not faced with
daily frustration as were center staff at work on the job of further-
ing the \~A program. To s orne extent, however, center staff also
withdrew from any head-on conflict with the evacuee program. Aware
of the active antagonism of evacuee leaders, staff at Topaz, for'
example, in the tradition of that center began to steer clear of
using the word "relocation." The reasons were indicated in the state-
ment of a staff member:
"Careful observers in camp have long been aware of .a
strange paradox in resident thinking, namely, that al-
most one hundred per-cent of the evacuees express the~
selves as opposed to relocation in theory, 'though in
practice a sizable minority obviously approves the pol-
icy since hundreds actually join the I imr:Ligrant train.'
Thus, even the very mention of the word 'relocation'
makes residents resentful and makes some bristle with
indignation."
It was evident that the evacuee communities were setting themselves
against any general acceptance of the 1~ program. Leaders were
formulating their position, the majority of people were simply ig-
noring resettlement as they went about their affairs in the blocks,
. while a few made plans and went out. Center staff see~ed to lIas hington
not to be pushing relocation vigorously enough. .Center staff them-
selves did not see how it could be pushed vigorously without rousing.
more intense opposition. Some \vere already convinced that there was
"organized resistance," mistaking a solid pattern of. cOlmnunity senti-
ment for a sort of underground movement designed to sabotage the plans
of the Washington administrators. Center staff settled down to chip
away at the edges of the community by helping those who voluntarily
came to the a~strative offices to ask for aid in reestablishing
themselves outside. Steadily during 1944 the mass approach of the re-
location teams gave way to the individual approach of the familycounseling program. .
(147)
To some e~tept the predictions thA+ crvacuees had made during
registration .rere qoming true. Fir~t had come segregation with its
separation of the fiNo" a:Ild the "Yes" answerers. Next had can.e an
intensified resettlement program, which if. it was not forced reloca-
tion was at least motivated by ¥mA's desire to see everyone leave the
centers. Now in January came the draft; the ~1ar Department, like the
VmA, was following through on its program. Nisei, it .vas announced,
were to be drafted as replacements for the Nisei combat te~ which
i:lad been giving such good accounts of themselves in the Italian war
theatre. At Poston, at Heart Mountain, at Topaz, at Granada, at
Minidoka, at Rchwer, at all the centers there were meetings. Block
representative$ were elected to a citizens committee at Topaz to
thrash out the old issue: condi tional or unconditional acceptance of
the draft. A "Voice of Nisei" anonymously posted signs in Poston
urging young 1)!en not to I1eport for ,induction until all civil rights
had been restJred, and almost immediately a counter "Committee for the
Restoration of Civil Rights of United States Citizens of Japanese An-
cestry" was organized to urge acceptance af induction but at the same
tL~e to petition the President for restoration of rights. At Topaz,
as the citi~ens committee worked on petitions, a committee of mothers 
from the blocks also struggled with a decision between a strongly and
a more mildly worded petition to the President. At Heart Mountain the
strongest organization against unconditional acceptance of the draft
appeared--the Fair Play Committee--and speeches were made which echoed
those of the year before at registration. Feeling at Heart Mountain
.yaS if anything more intense among the Nisei than it had been before.
Rumors grew up in the centers that the draft was to be called off,
that all Nisei who reported for induction were being turned back, that
nothing would be done to any who did not report for induction. 
~hrough February as young men reported, the centers continued to be
stirred. In Poston III and other centers there was a mounting pile
of requests for repatriation by parents and new requests for expatri-
ation by sons and daughters. People were resisting the drafting of
their sons by finding a way to go to TUle Lake where they did not face
the threat to family solidarity. Apparently some who had not gone to
Tule Lake before were merely waiting to see .vhether the threat of the
draft would materialize. I~ow it had come and they were ready for Tule.
Lake. More than 200 from all the centers refused to report for induc-
tion or for physical examinations, and the United States marshals
were beginning to came and take the boys away for hearings or to jail.
But as in registration the majority had signed up and now they were
leaving the' centers in little groups. The j1ar Department program,
like the resettlement program, was draining off the young men from
the centers. As spring passed the communities increasingly became
place$ of the old and the very young. 
Resettlement and the draft were two facets of the same program.
The policy makers in the Government offices "/ere carrying through on
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r the plan \~hich they had conceived in 1942 for bringing the evacuees
back into the mainstream of American life. The program struck at the
roots of the security Which had been achieved since evacuation--the
unity of families and the shelter of the relocation centers. The
resistance which the Government program inspired reflected not only
the desire to ret~in this security but also the whole history of the
minority group. Voluntary relinquishment of the centers seemed to
them a further loss of autonomy. \Vhat they phrased as refusal to be
. further "pushed around," the policy makers regarded as short-sighted
"resistance to freedom."
Evacuee Orientation~
The various processes of sorting had, by the wir.ter of 1943-L1J~,
resulted in the achievernent of a high degree of common sentiment and
opinion among the evacuees in all the nine centers. The differences
between early and late centers had been largely leveled. All had I-JOVI
gone through their crises of growth. Every center, particularly.as
regards the evacuee co~,uni ty, was very much like every oth er center.
There was a sense of solidarity and agree~ent on fundamentals. The
feeling of solidarity reached its peak in the winter 01' 1943-44.
Coming into the centers from t.he farming com~uni ties, the
cities, and the small tOVJns of the iVest Coast, th: Japanese irnmigrants
and their children had found themselves for the first time in their
lives facing a common problem on common ground. Domestic workers,
farm laborers, prodUGe merchants, shopkeepers, students, Buddhists,
and Christians had been funneled by evacuation into an identical situa-
tion. Momentarily at least they had felt the same about evacuation--
the.dismay, the anger, the sense of unjust treatment, the distrust of
Caucasians, all these feelj.ngs they shared in greater or less degree
as they moved on into the relocation centers. They cry, "We are all
Japanese together," had risen quickly out of these emotions, but once
the phrase had been formulated, the variety of meanings which people
attached to it revealed the differences ;'/hich during thi1~ty or more
years had criss-crossed the clusters of Issei and Nisei in the l'vest
Coast communities. Volunteering, resettlement, and segregation re-
moved from the nine centers most of the people who held varj.ant inter-
pretations of the phrase, "We are all Japanese together." The nine
centers were now dominated by heads of families who had some common
understanding of the expression. It was heard much less than it had
been in the early months, because people did not need to use it so
much.
A staff member at Poston wrote in January 1944:
"In a recent conference vlhich I called to consider child
welfare and youth guidance procedures, the familiar
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dilemma became evident: whether the pr9.ie9t services
should stand back to be called upon by the residentsl
or the professionals in the project administration
should reach down into the blocks to direct the living
of the residents along the lines which we approve. In
the discussion several interesting observations were
offered by a youngl Japanese-born, American-educatedBlock Manager who has had social work experience in con- .
nection with a California Juvenile Court.
"He agreed that the life of the project is now sharply
seI:6rated in its orientation around two opposite poles:
the California Japanese culture, which, as he reminded
us, is at least 20 years behind the social ~.gress of
. the Mother country which these peo~ left at least 20
years ago; and the professional Americanism of the
schools with their curricula, their recreation and ac-
tivity programs, and their appointed teachers from all
over the country. The first p>le represents the orien-
tation of what he called ~he core of the community.'
To belong to this core, one must have been for years a
member of one of the JaJ8nese cultural clusters from
which the residents came. The process of relocation,
he said, has simply drawn off the individuals who were
farthest from the core-like molecules escaping by evap-
oration from the surface of a liquid. * * * The young
people who are left * * * are increasingly reabsorbed
into the culture of the core. They are learning moreJapanese--with or without Adult Education's sanctions; ,
are conforming more closely t~ family expectations; aremarrying rather unexpectedly with non-Fl1glish sX;Saking ,
Kibei; and for the most part, are' postp>ning' their
plans .tor relocation to some indefinite date."
.
Most staff members were not so clear in their underst~mding' of what
had happened in the p>st-segregation cODlllunitiesl or -did not have
such articulate interpreters of the situation. For the majority there
was merely increasing awapeness that they wre now dealing 111. th Issei
to a much greater extent than Nisei and that the blocks seemed farther
away I more remote from the administration buildings. There was a
consciousness of people "out in the blocks" or "up on ttte hill" going
their way in a world that staff members were inclined to describe as
JaI:8nese. -
Few would have understood the emphasis of the block manager
when he said, "California Japanese culture." What he ~ant was that
the men and women who now dominated the life of the centers were as
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much~ if not more~ Californian than Japanese. They had left Japan~
as the block manager insisted, 20, 30~ or 40 years before. Japan had
been for them~ before evacuation~ more a memory than a reality. The
reality of which they bore the marks in the seams of their faces was
Fresno~ San Francisco~ Hood River~ Imperial Valley~ Seattle. They had
struggled to make their livings in these plaCe8~ adapted themselves
to Irish section gang foremen~ Italian merchants on the produce market~
old American vegetable ranchers ~ and more recently farm laborers from
Oklahoma~ and had schemed to get their children through the city and
country schools and on to the universities in Berkeley and Seattle.
Although they bowed endlessly wl:en they met one another ~ got together
for picnics with Issei from the same Japanese prefecture, drank sake
with relish~ and ate raw fish When they could get it~ the values
around which their lives had shaped were California and Oregon farms~
houses in Los Angeles and Sacramento~ American ranchers and produce
buyers~ and American schools aoo children. For a 'generation since
putting on American clothes t~ had moved along roads and streets
which had led them far from Japan. The core of their experience had
been in America. The Issei world was not a Japanese world.
The minds of the fami~ heads in the relocation centers were
oriented to a constellation of values which had ruled their lives
for 30 years. These values were not different in outline from those
of any other group that one might pick in the United States. They
were deeply interested in their homes ~ property ~ and businesses, their
friends and business associates ~ their children~ their immediate f~
ilies~ and some of their remote relatives. But almost everyone of
these values with which they felt such deep concern was involved in a
complicated milieu lived in by no other group except the Japanese in
the United States. Their homes and property and businesses were~ or
had been~ in States which maintained laws against their owning land
and in a country which prohibited them from assuming the obligations
and privileges of citizenship. Many of their business associates and
even friends were unpredictable in their behavior aoo often maintained
peculiar barriers and attitudes towards them. Their children fre-
quently could not coDmn1nicate 'Wi. th them yery 1vell and obviously looked
askance at some of their ideas and customs~ Their brothers~ or sisters~
or cousins lived in a nation with which the United States was at war.
The complicating factor in connection with all these values was.. of
course~ being JaJ8nese-being Jai:8nese in _rica. From the deep-
going and pervasive insecurity arising out of denial of citizenship
to the little daily frustrations of being unable to communicate with
children~ the fact of being JaI8nese was central and inescaI8ble.It was intertwined with everything of importance in the lives of the .
Issei.
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Being Japanese in the United States, then" had very reaJ.
meaning for the famiJ.y heads who now dominated the nine relocation
centers. The meaning was not to be explained in the simpJ.e concepts
of loyaJ.ty and disloyaJ.ty used by nations at war. In the first place
there was the feeJ.ing of being Japanese which had nothing whatever to
do with JaJ::Bn's place in international affairs. Pride in being Ja}:8-
nese was something which every Issei had. It was a feeling embedded
in each" permanent and unchanging" independent of distance from Japan
or rises or falls in the fortwes of the Jaranese Nation. It was the
sense of pride of being some sort of human being" the sort of human
being that one was. It ~s a simple and basic fact for Issei, but it
was also one of the most difficult spots in the relations between
Issei an.d Nisei; Few Issei had escaped the sharp disappointment and
dismay of finding that their sons did not have a simple pride in being
Jaranese. The gulf between Issei and Nisei on this score was great.
Issei were dismayed and exasperated" although sadJ.y symrathetic" to
find that Nisei had no bulwark against American prejudice and discriJn-.
ination" such as they did" in the rock-like pride of being Japanese.
Being Japanese had other meanings for Issei Which were con-
nected with Ja}:8n--the country. Most had come to the United States
with som idea of returning to Jarsn eventually. Steadily" however"
during the 1920 I S and 1930' s as their families grew and their economic
stake in this country became more solid" the idea. of return faded.
They still ta~ked about it. It had become a sort of habit for some
through the years" but the talk had more the character of. recalling 
a pleasant dream or plan that one had once had. The interest in Japan 
and the possibility of returning there was, however" kept alive to
Sbme extent by the sense of insecurity in this country. Even though 
one knew in his heart that he no longer h.ad any real intention of re-
turning" M stili felt that so~thing could happen to force hjJn to
take his family back. The impossibility of attaining any legal status
in this country" the recurrent rises of hostility between Japan and
the United States" the persistent discriminations against Japanese
by Americans--these things kept alive for Japanese a someWhat more
vivid interest in the Old Country than for other immigrants. It was
a practical interest which nourished the fading sentimental interest.
This interest during the 19)o's became an issue in all the West
Coast Ja}:8nese commU4ities. Nisei who were maturing in the United
States rebelled against it. They felt some sympatqy for their parents I
nostalgic indulgence and for them as aliens. But they felt that the
turning toward Jat:sn endangered the future of the whole group in the
United States. Able to think of Issei merely negative~ as aliens,
they had little or no understanding of What was to the Issei a very
positive side of the matter, namely" that though they might be aliens
in this country they were also citizens of Japan. After the ~~nchurian
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invasion in the early thirties Issei began to make contributions to
Japan and to send soldiers' comfort bags. Some Nisei le,aders and a
few Issei protested. But the contributions went on. The China
"incident" did not seem to be an issue which ~rticularly involved
Japanese interests in the United States. Japan was a good countryl
the Issei had relatives there, and they would like to help out. Only
in early 1941, when, as Issei interpreted Matsuoka's foreign policy~
it began to seem as if the Issei stake in America might be involvedl
did they stop.
Once evacuation had taken place and the Is8ei~ together ~ th
their children, we~e in the relocation centers, being Japanese began
to have additional meanings. They had been attacked by and cut off.
from the United States. The evacuation capped a long series of dis-
criminations against Japanese in America. Now it had been extended 
to ttleir children, -despite the fact that they were American citizens.
With heavy property losses and the prospect of having some time to
start at the bottom again, Japan began to appear as a hope. The Issei
were still Japanese citizens; that was no~ the only clear-cut status
they could see that they or thei~ children had; nothing had happened
to that. During the first months in the relocation centers Japan
seemed to be winning the war. People talked a great deal about what
it would mean if Ja~n should win the war. Some merely took out their
aggressive feelings about evacuation against the American Government
in hoping for a Japanese victory. Others thought about the situation
a little more carefully. The important thing seemed to be not that
one or the other should win. The important thing was that if ~aI:8n
should emerge as a strong nation, either through victory or a neg~
tiated peace, then the Japanese minority in the United States would
have a st.rong nation at its back. Japan could protect their interests
here as she had never done before. They might hope for pressure to
repeal the alien land laws, to permit Japanese to become citizens of
the United States, to lift the restrictions on immigration. The whole
accumulation of discriminations which had handicapped them might be
eliminated. A strong Japan would DEan greater security for the JaJa-
nose in the United States. A few even went so far as to hope for funds
for rehabilitation f~am Japan after the war, but this seemed doubtful
to the more sobe~. The hope for a strong Ja~n loomed large in the
centers during 1942 and early 1943. The hope was tied in closely with
the general desire to remain in the United States and to continue the
lives they had been building without Japan's aid in Oregon, Washington,
and California. This attitude toward the war, rather than the first
burst of identification with Ja~n in evacuation-inspired feelings of
aggression against the United States, was the one that had grown and
brought people under its sway during the two years in the centers.
The majority had come to regard Ja~nese success as the best basis for
their future in the United States.
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As the war developed in the pacific, the people in the centers
realized slowly that' Japan was not so strong as she had first seemed.
The IX>ssibility that she might not win began to be accepted here and
there. The sense of insecurity in this country was increased by such
a possibility. There had been present among the Issei. from the moment
of evacuation the feeling that evacuation might lead to stronger
measures by the United States. Deportation after the war was felt to
be a real possibility. Had not Congressmen and California legislators
brought up such a possibility? There had been deIX>rtation of aliens
after the first World War. It was necessary to plan for such a possi-
bility. For most it seemed merely to reirlforce their feeling that they
should remain in the centers until the war was over and it was clear
What course of action the United States would choose. For some it
seemed to call for a more IX>sitive attitude about remaining in the
centers. At Heart Mountain and elsewhere there was talk of the Japa-
nese criminal code. Someone dug up the fact that the code provided
for two years' imprisonment for any Japanese citizen who voluntarily
aided an ene~ nation in time of war. Resettlement, it was reasoned,
involved a volunta~ decision to go out and contribute to American
manIX>wer. That would make one liable to imprisonment if he were ulti-
mately deported and, if it became laiown in Japan, might result in harm
to one's relatives. This h1gh~ refined argument was not taken too
seriously by very many, but its currency in the centers indicated the
nature of the approach to the issue of resettlement.
Beillg Japanese in the relocation centers in wartiJne thus had
very,definite meanings for the Issei. The end of the war was a key
IX>int in their program in relation to the centers. They could not
accept the view of the IX>licy makers in Washington that the war was
irrelevant to their future in the lfuited States. Too many ele~nts
of that future were bound up with being citizens of the country WL th
which the United States was at war and with the ultimate outcome of
that war. In one center where the comIX>sing of three-line poems,
called Senryu, flourished, an Issei put into a IX>em what he and thou-
sands of others felt about it:
"Balancing the war MWS
With his own future-
Dilemma of dileImrlas &"
The aspect of being Japanese, apart from legal status and the
place of Japan in international affairs, also took on new meanings
in the relocation center world. As it had always been a source of
strength in the milieu of prejudice and discrimination on the West
Coast, it was now more than eve~ . bulwark in the restriction and sub-
ordina tion of center life. It flourished in the blocks, where the
Issei pitied the Nisei a little in their lack of it and tried to build
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it up in them. It nourished old p-ejudice against the hakujins am
was expressed in many ways in center life. There was much talk in
the centers about the spiritual greatness of Japanese as compared with
the mere material greatness of the A1rI3ricans. The spirit of the
Japanese--yamato darnashiil or seishinl .according to the more new-
fangled usage--became a santion for many kinds of behavior. It was
in this spirt t that ~ople urged one another to stand up against the
administration in the Poston strike. But it was also in this spirit.
that they controlled themselves in the face of injustice and obeyed
the laws of the country in which they were living. An Issei used it
to encourage volunteers for the Nisei combat teams in Minidoka.
Buddhist priests invoked it in honoring Nisei dead in the service of
the United States. It was also in this spirit that people urged one
another to present a solid front against being plshed around any fUI'-
ther and to $aintain their right to the relocation centers.
The program of the Issei for their fUture was built solidly on
their stake in the United States. The outcome of the war was a factorl
and therefore Japan was a factor. But the war was an unknown in the
equation. All of the known ~antities were in the United Statesl and
the Issei viewpoint was tied solidly to these. Their program was built
on America; Japan was merely a hope and possibly a necessary last re-
sort. America meant homes I property, business I c~ldrenl and Issei
and American friends. All of these except the children and other Issei
~re in California and the other two States ,of the West Coast. When
they first came to the centers I almost universally Issei had expected
a short war. The centers were to constitute a short vacation and then
they .,uld be back in California. The nostalgia for the Coast during
the early months in the dusty centers was intense; it had not really
been left behind. The idea of moving on somewhere else hardly crossed
an Issei mind. Through the months two trends appeared. The West
i Coast faded a little for a fewl particularly for some who had not been
I very happy there. The tie weakened a little I and here and there de-
cisions were made to have a try at life somewhere else for a little
while. Then the belief grew that it would not be a short war. After
the first predictions of }:sace in April 1943, and then in August 1943,t railed to materialize, ~ople began to think that it might turn out
to be a very long war. A few responded to this belief by planning for
a temporary start somewhere to the east. But this affected very small
numbers of Issei.
The overwhelming majority of Issei in the centers by 1944 were
still looking back to the Coast. Their roots were there. They had
II'o~rty stored there. They )mew their way around. They were in
touch with friends in the former communities. Many still had property
there which they had rented out for the duration of the war. The ties
of 30 01 ~ years had not melted away. Chiefly only the young or the
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.formerly less well established looked eastward. Moreover, there was
beside the emotional and economic ties another point to be considered.
So long as the West Coast remained closed, there was not a free choice
about going someWher~ else. They were being forced, they felt, if they
chose Chicago when San Francisco was not a possible choice. Until the
Coast was open, they said, the Government had no right to send them
elsewhere. Thus California and the other Coast States were more than
home. They were also a symbol of the Government's unfulfilled obliga-
tion to restore their freedom of choice and movement. In this the
thinking of the men in Washington and the Issei coincided; the reloca-
tion centers should be available until the right to return to their
homes should be restored.
One feature of the former stake in the West Coast was not there
any longer. It was now in the relocation centers. This consisted of
the other Issei on whom Issei had depended in their businesses and
fam Jroduction. Every Issei who had been a ~rt of a Japanese com-
munity at all felt strong~ his depeI~ence .on other Issei. It was not
only the very important matter of association in ch1~ches 2nd other
organizations, but also in financial support, in organization to meet
competition and withstand discrimination. Few of the Issei left in
the centers felt abie to go out and start anew without the long stand-
ing mutual support of other Issei. A large 1:8rt of what had made life
both possible and worthwhile on the West Coast had depended on the
relations among Issei. T~s was in the minds of the Minidoka leaders
when they wrote the Spanish Consul that WRA had PLans to scatter the
Issei over the length and breadth of the United States. To them it
seemed on the very face of it an unfair and destructive plan. It did
not even seem necessary to label it as such. In Rohwer during 1944
plans grew for what certain leaders called "colonization. ft This meant
resettlement in large groups in the farming country of Louisiana or
elsewhere. In following months in other centers the idea began to be
talked of more and more. It was an expression of the deep desire to
hold on to that 1:8rt of the stake in the West Coast homeland which
Issei still had with them in the centers, namely, other Issei. It was
not a feature of the most wide~ agreed on Issei program in all cen-
ters, but it indicated one of the essential points of disagreement
between the Issei and the WRA. It was part of the determination to
hold on to the West Coast stake.
The other major value in Issei life which was solid~ a 1:8rt
of America were their children. They had placed an unusual~ high
value on education in American schools and colleges and had more con-
sistently than any other immigrant group seen to it that their children
finished high school and went on for higher instruction. On~ a small
proportion, less than 13 percent, had attempted to have their children
also educated in Ja1:8n. The trem among 'the Issei who were in the
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United States in 1942 when evacuation came was to provide their chil-
dren with the most possible American schooling in order to help them
combat the discrimination which existed on the West Coast. They were,
through their children, planning for a future in the United States,
and recognized that their children's future was in this count~. As
one father in Topaz put it, when he sent back unsigned a~ application
for repatriation which had been sent him:
"As the proud father of nine children-all Americans-
I would like to stay and see What their fate in their
om native count~ will be."
The Nise~ were a value for the Issei, but the Issei genera~
did not 'believe that the Nisei were capable of taking care of their
rights in the American milieu. Many professed to be disappointed
wi th what they regarded as the Nisei leaders' too easy acceptance of
evacuation. Issei groups attempted to inject themselves into the
discussions of the reopening of Selective Service in Topaz and other
centers. Everywhere they felt that although the Nisei had distinct
interests from the Issei in this count~, they needed their fathers
and mothers to guide them and stand up for them. Moreover, Issei,
also felt that they now needed the Nisei in their declining l8ars to
take care of them, and they urged family solidarity in the face of
possible deportation to Japan or "forced relocation" from the centers.
The Issei feeling about Nisei and the relocation.centers resulted in
constant and persistent conflict. The parents repeatedly expressed
fears of what living in the artificial communities wo~ do to the
yoUDg peoples' morale and initiative. They decried the tendencies
in the centers to misbehavior and "delinquency," and yet they felt
that more wes to be lost by breaking up the family through resettle-
ment than by keeping the young people in the centers with them. All
the other points in connection with their program for remaining .in
the centers for the duration of the war were clear and certain. On~
the fl~ture of the Nisei bothered them in the relocation center set-
ting.
The outcome of the war, the West Coast stake, the Issei co~
munity, and family solidarity were the fixed points on Which was
reared the Issei program for their future. The weighing of these
values had resulted in a cammon agreement over two years. They
should hold on to the centers for as long as the war lasted. The
point was clear. But the WRA did not agree. The plan of the ~n in
WRA was not taking into consid.eration the main factors which had made
the Japanese American minority What it had become over a period of
forty years. The WRA therefore loomed as an antagonist in the senti-
ments of the community leaders. They had settled down to a fencing
match with the WRA as the year 1944 began.
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The Stabilization of Staff-Evacu~e~latlons
In the year since registration people had settled deeply into
the blocks. The coming of Tuleans to the eastern centers during seg-
regation had briefly stirred the calm of block life, but since then
they had merged with the older block residents. The daily round of
getting up, going to the messhalls for meals, going to a job some-
where in the center, gossiping or playing baseball or Japanese checkers
in the evenings had become routine. The pattern of living in the lim-
ited world of the blocks while ,vaiting for an unknown future to unfold
seemed to be set. A former WRA Washington staff member ",rote in Feb-
ruary 1944, after a visit to Topaz:
"The most striking impression on revisiting Topaz a
year after registration is the remarkable sameness,
a sameness in the black tar paper barracks, the lack i
of trees, the biting frosts, and the isolated circular :
thinking of the residents." j
Topaz, in common with Heart }fowltain and ~Iinidoka, had changed little
plysically. Because of poor soil or long winters the transformation
from .bare camps into tree- and garden-studded spots which had taken
place in ~lanzanar, and the Arkansas and Arizona centers had not been
possible. But what the outside observer characterized as "circular
thi~" was just as a pparent in the other centers as in T°1:8z. To
outsiders evacuees seemed out of touch with reality, ingrown, nursing
ideas which had no relation to what was taking place in the world
around them. The Washington staff members of WRA felt it every time
;, they dropped in on a center. Evacuees seemed perverse to them, and
they devised plans for info~ng them of current events and bringing
them out of the isolation of the relocation centers.
The people had settled deeply into the blocks. A relocation
center now consisted rough~ of ,9,000 evacuees, or if it vlere one of
the smaller units of 4,000 evacu~es. At its edge was a new~ con-
structed unit of "personnel housing" into which s~aff members who had
been living in neighboring towns or in barracks Viere moving as fast as
they became ready. In these, depending on the size of the center, ,
lived 100 or more Caucasians, men and women who ran the offices in the
administration buildings, supervised the work crews in the warehouses
and on the farms, and struggled to carry out the plans and regulations
that came by teletype and mail from Washington. The social life of
the majority of staff members was confined to their own group. Every
staff had a small group 'tho mingled socially with some evacuees, but
the majority who maintained strictly business relations with evacuees
looked a little askance at such persons. They were marked as a special
group, and occasionally when they attempted to make an issue of opening
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a personnel recreation hall to evacuees as w~ll as Caucasians, or spoke
in favor of "fraternization," there was conflict and little rifts de-
veloped among the staff. Thus although there were friend~ and even
intimate relations betv/een Caucasian and evacuee office workers and'
some developnent of visiting back and forth betv/een a few evacuees and
a few Caucasians, the staff in general constituted a segregated minor-
ity living at the margins of the relocation center commw1ities. They
were walled off by a recognizable line between them and the people who
had now settled so deep~ into the blocks.
Relatively few evacuees came over to the administration area at
all, except for an occasional visit to the post office, the hospital,
the lawyer's or some other office. A couple of hundred evacuees,
most~ young women and men, came to the administration buildings dai~
to work in the offices, went back to their block messhalls for lunch,
and came again to work for the afternoon. They came to know a few
staff mem~rs, but generally learned little about what was going on
outside their own offices. From almost every block a few young men
went out daily to work in the warehouse area, a, little removed from
the administration buildings, where they saw the supplies come into
the center and got to know a superviser or two. Older men went out,
often with no Caucasian superviser, to work in groups on the farms.
The children in the schools were in daily contact with several Cauca-
sian teachers and often the teachers became friendly not only with the
children but also wi th thei.r parents. Aside from such contacts there
was little association between the evacuees and the Caucasians in the
centers~ They were living in worlds which were intermeshed at only a
few points \~ere younger evacuees and a few older made corltact during
office hours. The consciousness of the evacuee world, massive and
solid around them, however, loomed large. for staff who rose every
~.orning to see it stretching out before them and whose daily work
dinned some aspect of it into them constantly. The staff world, on
the other hand, had faded into vagueness for most evacuees, as they
moved out of sight of it in the blocks.
More than half the adults lived almost wholly in the little
rectangular communi ties of their own blocks. The older people and
some of the younger Kibei who lacked confidence in their English
sought jobs within their blocks. They worked in the mesShalls, as
block janitors and gardeners, or in the block manager's offices.
Nearly a third of the working adults were so emPloyed in a block.
They left their blocks only for a visit to the community store, for an
evening of entertairunent at one of the stages or athletic fields set
up in the center, or for visits with friends or relatives in some other
block. They might go for weeks, on end without even seeing a Caucasian.
By 1944, after two ~ars, there were hundreds of people in every cen-
ter, particularly in the larger ones, who had not even walked through
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the administration area after their arrival. They lived in a world of
Japanese faces, makeshift barracks quarters, and opinion and attitudes
which had been formed in that milieu. Vlhat they knew of the busy
little hives of activity in the administrative areas came through co~
menta of block managers or block councilmen, an occasional announce-
ment in Japanese posted on the messhall bulletin board, t'he center
news-sheet, or gossip or ~r based on sour~es even farther removed
from contact with administrators than the block officials. Their
world, however, extended out beyond the center, skipping over the
administration area as it were, through the Japanese language news-
pa pars and some English langua~e pa ~rs ~nd through corres pondence
wi th old friends on the West Coast and wl.th evacuees who had resettled
or sons who had gone into the Army. This was the link with the outside
world on which they chiefly relied. The general tendency was to dis-
count all that they heard about resettled evacuees and about attitudes
towards them on the outside that came through the WRA offices. It was
colored, people felt, by WRA I S anxiety to get them out of the centers
and therefore unreliable.
There was nevertheless a bridge between the center communities
and the periPheral segment of the administration area, a bridge
wrought from the WRA blueprints for "conununity organization.". Out of
the 9,000 evacuees in a large center there wer~ 70 or more me!!, usually
two from each block, Who came into contact -at leas.t wee~ with some
of the top administrators. These men were the block managers and the
members of the community councils. Every center except Manzanar
(which had onl";! block managers) now had its two groups, and the three 
units of Poston and the two units of Gila had in addition over-all
o~ganization at least formal~ linking the units. At Heart Mountain
the council, which had always been composed of Issei, was the more 
important, and the block managers, chief~ Nisei, served more or less
as assistants to the councilman. At other centers both groups served
as important links with administration, and dominant personalities
emerged at different times from among either the block managers or
councilmen and guided staff-evacuee relations. There were manifold
differences from center to center in connection with the esteem in
which either councils or block managers were held at different times
by either the evacuee community or the administrators. There were
differences 'in operation between the two bodies and differences in
conception of function and division of labor. The block managers,
except at Heart MoUntain, had, through the nature of their duties as
dispensers of supplies, better understood and more stable relations
with people in the blocks, and their clear-cut and ~lediately useful
activities generally gave them a stronger position with both evacuees
and administrators. The significant feature of councils and block
managers, however, was that they were both performing the same impor-
tant function--that of liaison between the two groups who made up the
I center communities, administrators and evacuees.
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Individual administrators here and there had a good under-
standing of the dominant sentiments and motives of the people in the
blocks and had developed techniques for getting along with those seg-
ments of the community with which they had some dealings, but the
majority of staff IOOmbers in every center had only a su}:erficial or
partial understanding of the evacuee community. They were, moreover,
constant~ be$et by frustrations arising out of the failure of evacuees
to behave as they thought they should and therefore their vision was
often clouded by at least latent antagonisms. The evacuee community
on the other hand was out of touch with the administrators and the
sentiments and motives which produced the regulations from Yfashington
and detepmined the relations of the administrators with evacuees.
There was also a }:ersistent current of antagonism to WRA among the
evacuees which interfered with their understanding of the administra-
tors. In this situation there had always been an explosive potential
in the centers. The evacuees who served as liaison between the two
groups were therefore in difficult and vital spots.
. The evacuees who assumed these positions were not all the same
kind of men. Some were quiet, unobtrusive men who were serving un-
willingly because their block ~ople could find no one else. For such
DEn the job was routine and they did not make much of the liaison func-
tion. But in each group there was always a small core of men who took
the job seriously and gave leadership to their councilor to their
block manager group. Such men had been elected to office in the case
of the councilmen, or selec~ed and recommended for appointment in the
case of block managers, by block ~ople for the express purpose of
dealing with the administrators. They were chosen because they could
s~ak and understand English and ,because people felt they had q1ali-
ties for getting alO,tlg with the administrators. They had also been
selected because they had demonstrated over a period of months that
they could get along with people in the blocks, which meant not only
that they were regarded as fair-minded and personally pleasant but
also that they were sensitive to block opinion in issues of center
life.
The men who fulfilled these ~lifications and emerged to do~
inate the councils or block managers were very much the same sort of
people in all centers. They were men who had formerly maintained
numerous contacts with Caucasians. They were usually insurance agents,
storekeepers, hotel keepers, business men, doctors or dentists rather,
than farmers, laborers, or fishermen. They were men who had gotten
around more than others in the wider communities in which Japanese
lived, who usually had a better than average education and who had
some ability to express themselves both in English and Japanese. They
were, not, therefore, necessarily men who had Q@en most prominent in the
affairs of the Japanese associations and other purely Japanese
(161)
community organizatipns. Many of the latter were still in internment I
camps and others, although now in the relocation centers, were in the
status of parolees from internment camps. The parolees were not in-
clined to emerge in prominent positions in the relocation centers.
They were not S\Ire it was safe, feeling that there was. danger of being
sent away from their families back to internment.
Thus the men whom the administrators met with as the leaders
of the evacuee commun~ties were not usual~ men who had been the 
molders of public opinion in the Japanese comnunities before evacua-
tion. Nor were they now necessarily the mo1ders of public opinion in
the blocks. Some were actual~ the most influential men in their
! blocks, but most either looked to one or a few other men in the blocks
or were merely one of the several men who determined block opinion.
When issues arose block managers or councilmen discussed them with the
two or three most influential men in their blocks and determined'their
own position only after such discussion. They were in a real sense
go-betweens, mediating between the blocks and the administrators.
The sphere of activity of the liaison men had been pretty
clearly mapped out by the time segregation was over. They had tried
and found that they could not directly influence the hiring and firing
of appointed personnel in the centers. One council had felt that it
had influenced at Heart Mountain the removal of an unpopular Caucasian
chief of police back in 1942 and there were efforts even in 1944 to
get hospital personnel removed or transferred, but generally it was
recognized that project directors would maintain control of hiring and
firing. The evacuee leaders also knew that they could have no influ-
ence on the budget and expenditures in the centers. They knew that ~
there was no possibility of their participation in the dete~mination
of basic policy for the future of themselves or the centers. These
limitations were quite clear by 1944, but there still remained a sphere
of action which seemed to them of great importance. This was bound up
with the conception of "ISaceful centers" or "harmony in the centers"
which some leaders had formulated at the very beginning and had come
to seem more and more important after the crises in" staff-evacuee
re!ations at Poston and t~nzanar in the fall of 1942.
The guiding idea of most of the more prominent liaison men was
that the people in their blocks wanted peaceful centers. What was
involved in maintaining peaceful centers had become clearer through
the months of dealing with administrators. First there was the matter
of harmony in one's own block. ~lost blocks at first had at least a
few outspoken men or women who were vigorously anti-administration in
attitude. In block meetings they urged resistance to building school
buildings, to registration, to Selective Service, to reduction of jani-
tor forces, to most ~..hings that the administration wanted done outside
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the routine of center operation. They urged flat resistance and al-
wsys found same support from among block people. Such thoroughgoing
noncooperation seemed unrealistic and dangerous to the most influential
men in the majority of blocks, to the majority of people, and to the
sort of men who had assumed the liaison jobs. Ways had to be found to
influence people against acceptance of these unco~promising attitudes.
Part of the liaison men's job was to bring anti-administration spokes-
! Ir.en into line by persuasion, by rressures within the block" and by
J maneuvering in block meetings. Block managers and councilmen who were
emerging in center affairs spent a great deal of time in adjusting ~he
attitudes of block people to what they had come to regard as the real-
ities of Government supervision.
The other aspect of their jOQ, as they saw it, was the adjust-
ment of administrators' approaches to the people to what they were
convinced were the Tealities of block life and opinion. 'l'hey sought
information from administrators about new regulations and order so
that they could formulate plans for presenting them to block people
in such a way as to arouse a minimum of resistance and opposition and
. misunderstanding. They tried to persuade administrators to adjust
their plans or the wording of administrative orders so as to make them
more acceptable to block people. At the same time they atte~ed to
weigh and phrase complaints of the people so that they would not an-
tagonize administrators and yet might most- likely. result in action.
Maintaining peace in the centers thus had two sides to it, as the
block managers and councilmen saw it. It involved a continual vigi-
lance to avoid unnecessary and useless conflict between the two groupe
who had to some extent come to regard themselves as pitted 'against
e~ch other.
In order to be able to operate at all in this situation the
liaison men had to be sound" from the point of view of block people"
on a few fundamental points. They must be aware of the people's
general attitude on work in the centers. This was fundamental because
! it was the most recurrent source of conflict between administrators
I
i and evacuees. A block representative had to understand that the
people regarded work as something for the welfare of the community
and nothing more. Working in the center had rJothing to do with an
8-hour day or any standards of efficiency in terms of which the agency
operated. The vital point was that a certain amount of work had to be
done to keep the people reasonably comfortable. The monthly wages
were token payments designed to fulfill some of the Government's obli-
gation for having cut off normal sources of income., Work that went
beyond the routine needs of the center residents was the administra-
tors I interest, and evacuees had no particular obligation in connection
wi th it. Basic constructi,on such as the replacement of the corroded
pipe lines at Topaz involved no evacuee obligation; the Government had
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originally set it up and should replace it as part of the basic fa-
cili ties. A block manager or councilman had to evaluate unerringly
the admin~stratorsr requests for aid in gettir~ jobs done. He hrd to
evaluate them in terms of what the block ISople felt j.t was their ob-
ligation to do and not to do. He must not go wrong on this point very
often.
A block re1:D:"esentative also had to make judgments as to what
the block people regarded as moves which meant loss of ground for
evacuees. In the winter of 1944 es~cially.. when labor reductions
were being pushed by the administration, this was important. The re-
duction of janitors in the mess halls at Gila, of block emPloyees
generally at Poston.. of boilermen and other block emPloyees at Mini~
doka were administrative moves which had deep repercussions in the
blocks. To block ~ople, they stood on the one hand for the disrup-
tion of work routines they had grown accustomed to and presaged longer
hours and harder work for the emPloyees retained. On the other hand..
there seemed to be moves aimed toward making the centers less pleasant
places to live in and therefore part of what they felt was the WRA
campaign to force them out of the center. The council at Gila under-
stood the significance of messhall reduction to the peoPle.. attempted
to work out a compromise, failed.. and sank low in community estimation.
At Poston the block managers retained face with evacuees and also
gained a minor concession from the administration in the reduction of
block emPloyees. The liaison man had constantly to be aware of the
need for obtaining some concession fram the administration, however
small, in any moves that threatened the stability evacuees had so far
attained in the centers.
Finally, es~cially during the winter of 1943-1,4.. block repre-
sentatives had to let the whole issue of resettlement alone. They had
to understand that ~ople did not want to resettle and that they must
not transmit back to their constituencies any sense of the urgency
which im1. staff felt about the matter. They mqst deal ginger~ and
not become i~entified with the staff efforts to ISrsuade ~ople to
resettle. It was all right to help in posting notices for a reloca-
tion team meeting, if the administration wanted that done, but it was
not all right to urge ~ople to go to the meeting or to accept the
picture of the outside which the relocation team presented. A re pre-
sentative had to maintain a constant awareness that no one felt that
everyone should resettle.. even though he might maintain that it was
anyone's right to resettle.. if he wanted to.
If a liaison man was sound on basic points such as these-did
not urge on ~ople work that was the administration's obligation..
worked for the maintenance of the status quo.. ~nd ignored the resettle-
ment program-he could count on support in his block. If he were
(164)
suspected of being out of line on such points he became, or ran the
risk of becoming, an "administration stooge" to his block people, and
therefore without influence. The realization of this by the men who
had emerged in positions of influence among block managers and coun-
cilmen by 1944 provid~d the basis for stable staff-evacuee relations.
So long as they remained sound in the block people's estimation, they
were in a position to work out compromises with the most unpopular
administration measures and hence contribute to the maintenance of
l'harmony in the centers."
To the administrators, the evacuee communities had become
something they had to live with. They wanted harmony as wholeheart-
edly as did the evacuees and boasted about it when they had it. From
the lowest paid foreman up the hierarchy to the project director they
had been learning how to get along with people under relocation center
conditions. After 2 years many had developed their rules of thumb
for getting a maximum amount of cooperation in the jobs the agency set
. them to do. A foreman in one center sumced up the fruits of his
learning as follows: "You've got to treat them all as it; they were
volunteers. If you do that everything is all right." -Ihat he meant
was that crews who worked under him persistently set their own work
periods and rest periods. They, rather than he, determined the amount'
of work they would do. He had found that if he accepted their stand-
ards and adjusted 'his own to theirs there was no conflict. And what
is more, he also found that if he acted according to this rule con-
sistently I his crews would help him out in an emergency by temporarily
working according to his, or the agency'sl standards in order not to
let him down pers onally..
Project directors and higher officials, not working so directly
with individuals but rather with the communities and the public opinion
that dominated them, had a harder job. They chafed at the differences
between running communities and running an organization of Government
employees. They looked for the same sort of obedience and respect for .
regulations and were frustrated when they found that their hierarchy
often broke down at the point where an administrative instruction had
to pass from a civil-service employee into the community. All recog-
nized from the start that th~y must deal with the community through
some chosen group of evacuee advisers. Some welcomed the idea of the
councils and tried hard to work with them. Many had learned by the
time of segregation to rely heavily on their councilsl on their block
managers, or on other specially created committees in accomPlishing
programs that affected or seemed likely to affect the whole community.
In the winter and spring of 1944 they were especially besetl as were
the evacuee communities, with the problems of manpower shortage. The
resettlement and draft programs were drawing off the able-bodied young
men. Retrenchment and readjustment had to take Place all through the
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center organizations. Little s~rikes, resistance to labor cuts, and 
resulting evacuee dissatisfac,tions were constantly up before the
II"oject directors. They turned to the liaison ~n, whether block
managers or councilmen" and dealt with them who in turn dealt with
their communi ties. The project directors who maintained the most
harmony in their centers were the ones who learned to prepare the
communities first through discussion with the liaison men, to bargain
a little with them by beginning from a position from Which they could
concede a little" and to let the liaison men handle the presentation
to the block people. This did not always yield results the adminis-
trators wanted because something often hapJ:sned in the course of the
step that they left up to the liaison IDfln" namel\V" the presentation
to the blocks. They felt that the whole of what they wanted said to
the people was not said" but they nevertheless wer~ tending more and
more to trust the judgment of the liaison men in that step which re-
mained out of their hands. The stability of staff-evacuee relationa
depended heavil\V on II"oject director& I willihgness to rely in this way
on the liaison men. Through 1944 most of the directors of the nine .
centers learned more and more to do so.
In the midst of atJ.mi!\istrat.ors I imIStience with the system aoo
a pervasive belittling of both councilmen and block managers on the
ISrt of the evacuee communities" the liaison fUnctions assumed in-
creasing importance. Block repres~ntatives themselves laughed at
their own powerlessness to deal with basic issues and painted word
pictures of themselves as "administration messenger boys." Neverthe-
less they knew" as did the wiser administrators, that the liaison
fUnctions they had learned how to perform were of solid importance in
the maintenance of peaceful communities. -
The Cente~ Way of Life
As comJSred with the distraught" angry" and fearful agglomer-
ations of people who came into the relocation centers during the first
s~r of the war" the 70,,000 people in the nine centers two years
later were settled and calm. They were so" however" only by camISri-
son, and moreover chiefly qy comISrison of the external features of
daily life. The anxiety about the future was as strong as it had been
before, but the future had been set a little distanc& away. The an-
tagonism to the Government was only a little weaker, but it had been
channelized into set phrases and attitudes. The peacefulness of cen-
ter life was based on a postponement" not on a resolution of the ques-
tions 'Iilich had remained unanswered since 1942. The surface calm
overlay thousands of individual and family problems with which men and
wonmn .went to sleep at night and with which they woke up in the morn-
ing.
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.I Life jj} the centers had been accepted by the maj ori ty of older
people as an interlude. It had become more than bearable. For many
it had become pleasant as it took on meaning through association with
other Isseil but it was still felt to be an interlude between acts in
their real lives. This sense of its unimportancel of its lack of
meaning in relation to real life 1 colored most of the activities in
the centers. People tried not to take events in the centers too seri-
ously. The leaders and the liaison men increasingly took this attitude.
They had moved from the ideal pf "model cities" to the conception of
"play-toy councils 1 " as the realization of the artifici.ality of the
communities grew more clear. Life in the centers led nowhere in par-
ticular; it was a waiting. Nevertheless the time could be passed
pleasantly.
One of the early doctrines which Issei men had enunciated when
they first came to the centers was that they had come tlfor a vacation.
In the first months they stated this view repeatedlYI and as the months
went by it became evident what they meant. They tried to do what
people do on vacations. They put worries into the backs of their minds.
They let themselves go; they shunned discipline; they indulged sup-
pressed fancies; they took it easy. Fo~ the first year and a half it
had not been easy. The issues among evacuees were too urgent; the
. probleu~ of getting along with the Caucasians were too insistent. But
by the winter of 1944 issues seemed to have been settled and the Gov-
ernment program had became less insistent. The older people who were
still in the centers were takingl or t~g to take 1 their vacations.
A small number of men and women in every center found that va-
cstions were impossible. Their training and experience was needed by
the people. Doctorsl dentists, and other professionally trained per-
sons in the ~lospitals found themselves lmder a constant heavy load of
mrk. Few l.efused to accept the resJX)nsibilities. Men who could cook
and manage the IDSsshalls were in similar JX)sitions. Ministers, both
Buddhist and Christianl found demands on them heavy. Others felt
deeply t.he needs of young people or of the women for guidance and
I leadership and worked ceaselessly organizing and guiding their activi-
ties. For such persons life in the centers was the most intense period
of their lives and satisfactions came chief~ from the respect which
the evacuees accorded them. They were a group apart and periodically
the communi ties became concerned about theml presenting them with giftsl
raising community funds to add to their $19 wages 1 and otherwise making
it clear that their services were valued and appreciated.
Other persons found that they were incapable of vacations. Al-
though there was no particular social pressure on theml they found that
they had no resources to develop outside their old business or other
work-a-day interests. "Despite original intentions of ta~ng vacations,
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.they found themselves getting more and more deeply involved in various
aspects of center operations. Former business men took increasing
resIX>nsibilities in the comImmity stores" keeping abreast of the mar-
lcets" and learning new fields. Farmers got themselves involved in the
chicken farms" the hog ranches" or the center crop production and
found little time for loafing. Councilmen and block managers sometimes
found themselves too deeply involved in the :{X)lit.1cs of center life to
have much leisure or time with their families.
The great majority of older men" however" did not have such
oPIX>rtunities or shUnned them deliberately when they arose. They
stuck to ~tiginal plans and gradually found their vacations satisfying
and worthwhile. They took little jobs that carried no responsibility
and demanded a minimum of time. They took jobs as janitors or helpers
in the messhalls. Successful business men and farmers puttered around
their blocks a few hours a day for their $16 or $19 am felt that their
duty in behalf of the welfare of the people was fulfilled. Farm la-
borers and others took jobs outside their blocks on the farms or in
the warehouses or elsewhere" worked not too hard" and enjoyed their
evenings am Sundays. In their abundance of free time many merely sat
around the "bachelors' barracks" or the laundry rooms and talked" spec-
ulating on Japanese and American strategy in the Pacific war" discus-
sing bits of news from the "outside,," or spreading rumors about what.
WRA was going to do or not going to do. Some spent a lot of time
carving wood" especially in centers where wood was to be had easi~
in the country near the center.
A majority of older men spent IUOst of their time playing "goh"
(a Japanese checker-like game),,' cards" or baseball. Every block had
its little groups in the evenings and afternoons, in laundry rooms"
in barracks" or under the trees in the southern centers" devotedly
play1rlg goh. For hours the men sat IX>ring over the boards with their
black and white counters and 361 squares. Interest in the game
deepened steadily. Men Who had rarely played learned the game. 0r-
ganizations grew up for the purpose of ranking players and determining
handicai:8" arranging tournaments" and even putting out little booklets
diagraming strategy am classic moves and ga~s. The gSD13 becam an
obsession with many. The chess-like game of shogi had relatively
little vogue" but goh claimed more and more devotees. The goh clubs
became the focus of the social life of the older men.
Card' games also flourished-the Japanese game of "hana"
(flowers) and the American game of IX>ker am others. 1!.s gambling had
been a major interest of a large humber of men before they came into
the centers" it continued to be inside the centers. There were small
friendly games and there were organized" rings" of gamblers. Some
blocks became Imown as "Chinatowns... n usually where a card-playing
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group had hollowed a little room out of the dirt under a barrack floor
Where they conducted their games. Farm laborers coming back from
seasonal leave had money to gamble. Young and old joined in the
games and much money changed hands. Public opinion rose now and
again against the gambling. Community councils somet~s joined the
protest and made efforts to curb it. An evacuee chief of police in
one center was ousted from his job because of talk linking him with
the gambling. But" as on the outside, in the midst of the rise am
fall of public disapproval" the games went on.
The older men also went in for baseball. ~very center had
block teams comwsed of Issei and most centers had "Old Mel:\ '.8 Leagues. 11
Through the SUIDIOOr they played or went to the several diamonds in the
centers- and watched and rooted in Japanese-English for their teams.
Whole Sundays were spent at baseball and whole evenings devoted to dis-
cussing the games. Between goh" cards" baseball, and woodcarving
propab~ a majority of older men in every center passed their time.
It constituted their vacation.
In every center there was a smaller group of older men Whose
interests ranged more widely. Although enjo~ an occasional game
of goh" they devoted most of their tiDE to indulging interests which
they had never before had sufficient leisure to indulge. They took-
advantage of the concentration of men like.themse~ves and of Japanese
books in the centers to read widely, their interests turning to JaIS-
nese history, and Japanese-American international relatioas. Somebecame in~erested in group activities such as singing and the composi- .
t;on of poetry. Classes sprang up in utai singing" where men and
women practiced the intoning of classical poetry--an accomplishment
important in social gatherings of the more highly educated :I:8ople
where :I:8rsons were often ' called on to make impromptu recitations.
Groups got together in every center for the plrpose also of composing
poetry. The most IX>pular forms were "tanka" and "senryu." . Senryu ~e
lyrics three lines long, e'ach line consisting of a fixed number of
syllables, five in the first, seven in the second, and five in the
third. The group of amateur IX>ets worked with a leader" or critic"
who gave instruction\~ graded the - composi tio~. Each week a number
of themes were submitted -by members of the group, one was chosen" and
the whole group came together to write their poems on the same chosen
theme.
In the formalized senryu the relocation center poets expressed
vividly and succinctly the meaning of center life a~ they felt it.
The greater number of poems produced had nothing s:I:8cifically to do
with life in the centers" and many felt that the composition of poems
should be a deliberate escape from the centers. Nevertheless almost
every theme suggested to a few some aspect of center life. Thu.s the
.
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theme "Acclimatization" moved a member of a ~etry circle in one
center to write:
"Inured to ~n.ury"
The sixteen dollars
Is more than sufficient."
The theme of "Service" led another ~et to write:
"At the hospital -
An angel of mercy
At $16.00 a month."
While "Arms" inspired: 
"Every arm 
Evaluated --
Sixteen dollars." .
The se~ ~ets ranged through every aspect of center life:
"Now" after two whole years"
Everyone can distinguish
The sound of his own messha11 gong."
"Tomorrow in some other form"
A piece of scrap 1wnber
Is laid away today."
"Man~wer shortage-- .
Again today wearing, The sh es of Se vice."
"The cooperating block
Rings harmoniously
With laughter."
The war" both as thought of across the Pacific and as they knew it
through their sons in the American Army" was a recurrent theme.
"All-out Effort" inspired one group to write many p:>ems on the theme
of Japan gambling her national existence for a place in the sun in
Asia" While "Worry" moved a IX>6t to write:
" Tre~ing hands"
As the mother opens
The V-Mail."
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and "Wrinkles" gave rise to:
"The cream of the crop-
Nisei soldiers--raisedBy wrinkles on the 1:Brents I brow."
Less frequently the poets wrote of the outside and even of
resettlement. One poet, letting himself go on the theme of "Numbers,"
wrote:
"Endlessly,
Ja ~ophobes
List of their grievances. I'
and "Arms" gave rise to:
"Re10cation-
To the east, to the west?
Folded arms."
Sen~ poets, men and women, became well-organized during 1944
and got in touch with each other in the various centers. On January
15, 1944, the results of a Continental United Sen~ Mutual Selection
were announced in the Japanese language section of a center newspaper,
the Rohwer Outpost. There were contestants from most centers and also
from outside the centers. The best poem submitted was written by a
se~ poet in Tule Lake. The five next best, in order of excellence,
came from Manzanar, Santa Fe Internment Camp, two from Rohwer, and
Poston. & JUJ.y 1944, }!nltua1 selection on the theme "Smoke" again re-
sulted in a Tu1e Lake- poet in first place and a Poston one in last.
Rohwer and Santa Fe were again in the top selections, but now poets
from Minidoka and Heart Mountain had also placed as third and fifth
respective~. The sen~ art continued to floUrish on into the first
six months of 1945.
As some of the mDre highly educated turned to poetry, others
turned to drama. Dramatics groups were organized, wi th the aid of the
WRA recreation staff, in every center. Sometimes a small, exclusive
group ran them, but at the Canal unit of Gila there was camp-wide
organization with representatives from each block participating in the
planning and policy making of the organization. }.bst of the grouI:8 ~
set as their aim the productlon of entertainment which would appeal to c;
the wide variety of tastes among the center people. They ~ecured the
elaborate costumes for and trained young and old in classical drama
of the feudal period--kabuki. They arranged vaudeville dialogue
called "Manzai." They 'M>rked out musical pl"ograms in both classical
and ~odern Japanese music. In their productions there was what often
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seemed to outsiders a peculiar hodgepodge and medley of things Japa-
nese am things American. In March 1944" at Minidoka" for example a
"fujiyose, II or variety show, was given. The program" ~ th program
notes by a Nisei spectator, followsl
"1. Vocal solos entitled 'Cucaracha' and 'El Rancho
Grande.' (These songs were sung by a Kibei in
Spanish.)
"2. A Japanese modern comedy entitled 'Borrowed
Wives.' (This is the story of t~ men who
made a wager that the wonen he married would '
be better than the other. In order to win the
wager, both men substituted good looking women"
to pose as his wife. The climax of the play was
reached when it became knO1fIl both had borrowed
wives.)
"3. A modern dance by a Kibei.
(A Kibei dressed as a Chinese girl danced to the
tune of a recording entitled' A Flower-Vendor of
Nanking.')
"4. The Star Band composed of Kibei boys.
(There were saxoPhone" harmonica, guitar" and
vocal solos 'Which were extremely popllar 'With
the audience who applauded lQudly for an encore.)
"5. A classical drama 'Komamonoya Hikobei.-"
(This is the story of a young man who went through
. i much hardships to acquit his father's innocent
crime. )"
The whole program except for the Spanisb songs was in Japanese. The
audience in the messhall where it was held consisted almost wholly ofIssei. The mixture of new and old" of Japanese, - of regional West
Coast, and of general American traditions was fairly typical of relo-
cation center entertainment :lII1terests. This sort of variety show
flourished. In the southern centers, as a Rohwer senryu poet wrote I
i
"At an outdoor theatre- II
Craning ne cks
One behind the other."
became a characteristic feature of center life.
The women in general 'VVer.e having the best vacations. For the
first time since arrival in this country most of them were experiencing
an abundance of leisure, less isolation in their 01fIl homes, and oppor-
tunities for daily association with other Issei women. For most their
lives had steadily become richer and £Ullerthan they had ever been.
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wpmen's clubs of various kinds grew up in the centers. Their inte~
ests turned to sewing, the making of artificial flowers, flower a~
rangement, and learning to read and write English. The last was im-
portant for writing letters to sons in the Army, and many mothers
learned in the centers for the first time to write letters that their
sons could read in English. The groups interested in sewing and
flower arrangement met frequently and filled the need of long-starved
women for social contacts with ~rsons of their own kind. As one
wrote in a tanka poem:
"Fortunate me! Indifferent
To the fierce fighting
Allover the world,
Here I am, learning
Flower arrangement, writing, and embroidery."
The meaning of the centers to many of the older women was summed up in
this verse. Later as they left the centers to return with a feeling
of deep loss to lives of work and relative IOneliness, many found
themselves weeping.
The vacation in the centers was for the Issei a vacation in a 
deeper sense than they had at first conceived it. Their satisfaction
in it did not derive only from the release from. work and the constant
press of problems in making a.living. It was also as one center ob-
server Phrased it, a vacati~n from assimilation. Placement in the
relocation centers among thousands of other Japanese Americans had
resulted in an enforced retirement into Issei communities. This meant,
except for a few, no daily adjustment to hakujin customers, hakujin
business competitors, even hakujin friends. However small the contacts
with Caucasians before, there had always been some, especially for the
men. There had always been the consciousness of language, the effort
to s~ak and to understand, the consciousness of not fully understand-
ing. There had always been the caution, the need to act and express
oneself in ways that would not be misunderstood, even for the most
"assimilated." The relocation centers meant relaxation fran this con-
stant, however slight, strain of being regarded as--and of feeling--a
little different. In one's block there were Issei all around, Issei
of different backgrounds and views to be sure, but Issei whose words
and whose thoughts were }:Srt of the continuum of one I s own. In theirpresence it was possible to lower the guard, relax, and ex}:Snd. The 
older people were, however unconsciously, taking the most thoroughgoing
vacations that they had ever had since :cpming to the United States.
For the younger peo~ the relocation centers had no such
meaning. They had not wanted or needed vacations. Through the sPring
of 1944 more and more of the older boys anq gir1s left, many of the
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.young men to the Army" the young women to "take jobs in midwestern and
eastern cities. Graduation from high school in the relocation cent~rs
meant prompt resettlement for many. But many stayed on" un1dlling to
leave rarents whose oldest sons had gone into the Army or unable to
J:ersuade parents to let them leave. Although the oldest stratum of
Nisei" and particularly of the males" were gone" the b~ and girls
of high school age and younger were still in the centers. A large 
number of the oldest ones were unhaPRY and dissatisfied. They blamed
their being in the centers on their }::arents and withdrew from their
fathers. They drifted about the centers in little groups" not taking
their classwork seriously" and developing a sense of futility. When
asked" they said they had no plans for the future" that they could not
plan" that they did not lmow what to p1an for. They loafed about when
not in classes" and some of them began to get into trouble" stealing a
little money somewhere, breaking up a recreation hall a little" or
beating up another boy. They were aimless and up a dead em" am the
people in the centers" both staff and evacuees" be~n to feel that they
had a considerable problem of "juvenile delinquency" on their hands.
The internal security officers thought it was pretty mild delinq1ency
as com}::ared with what was going on in normal communi ties outside the
centers.
The younger boys and girls were getting along better. They
formed innumerable clubs" the Starlites" the Bombadettes" the Exclu-
sive Blues" the Jayhawks" the Wbizzers" the Sagebrush Clan" am carried
on their interests in groups" with the help of older J:eople as advisers
from both staff and evacuees. The WRA staff encouraged all possible
or~nization to tie in with national groups--the Girl Reserves, the 
Girl Scouts" the Boy Scouts, the Brownies I as well as the YWCA and 
YMCA. Baseball and basketball te~ sprang up by the dozens; at first
they had been or~nized on a basis of the former localities, now it was
~sual1y on a basis of blocks. Participation in athletics became wider
and wider. Similarly more and more young J:eople learned to dance. As
they said.. the shy ones were "coming out in the centers.1t Dances #
parties" picnics" and hikes were frequent. There was a wider }::artici-
pation in social life among younger Nisei than there had ever been be-
fore coming to the centers. They had more time for it. They were
living in much larger comrmmities, and they had no complications with
a color line. It was their own social 11£e. Farm girls and boys liked
. the mw life.
Although the flowering of social life among the younger Nisei
was carried on in concentrated Issei communities and many people talked
of the Nisei becoming ItJapanicized,," there was littlA real evidence of
such a trend. Their radios were on full blast in the evenings and the
songs they listened to were the latest hits. The magazines they looked
at from the community stores were what all the other young people in the
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United states were looking at. The movies they went to provided by
the WRA or the community stores although often a little old, were the
usual American movies. They were hearing more Japanese spoken than
they had ever heard before and were using a little more of it than .
they had before. But the major effect was merely to produce a pe~ul-
iar set of dialect terms, combining Japanese and English, character-
istic of the relocation centers. Many still protested that they
couldn't understand "that lingo" of Japanese. They scorned the Issei
entertainments and even the Kibei who went to them. If they were in-
fluenced by the Issei, it was chiefly to accept their resentments
against the Government and Government supervision. Their world was
still the world of American schools, movies, comics, radio, sports, and
socials--not the world of the Issei.
The cen~er way of life, in family, block, social club, and
church was a quiet one, rather richer in many respects than life had
been in the pre-evacuation Japanese American communities. At its core,
however, lay insecurity. Already by the summer of 1944 the people who
had adopted it were ceasing to find satisfaction in it. The first
burst of interest in thiqgs Japanese was fading a little. Issei and
Nisei were becoming restless, and a new orientation tow~ the outside
was slowly asserting itself.
Tule Lake
Living in Tule Lake during the year following segregation was a
very different experience from living in any of the ,nine relocation
centers. The evacuees found no points of orientation on which the ~
jority could agree as a basis for life in the center. No way ot life
developed for a peaceful accommodation to the meaninglessness of the
interlude and the wait for the future to unfold. With no real conmu-
nity life among evacuees, the relations of staff and evacuees could not
be stabilized. In short, the people in the segregation center did not
settle dC1lln during the year as those in the relocation centers had
settled down. They were, on the contrary, more at odds with one another
and with center staff by the end of the year than had been evacuees in
any center at any time.
The differences between Tule Lake and the other centers arose
less from the nature of the people 'who lived there than from the nature
of the Government supervision and control which they experienced. Most
of the people, up to the time they arrived at Tule Lake, were much like
the people in the other centers. Moreover, their reactions to what
happened to them in Tule 'Lake were different in degree rather than in
kind from the reaction of people in the relocation centers.
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The conditions of life in Tule Lake constituted extreme develop-
ments of the most disturbing features of life in the relocation cen-
ters. The line between evacuees and Caucasians was much more sharply
drawn. It was drawn not only by the manproof fence around the center,
but also by the manproof fence between the" colony" and the administra-
tion area through which an evacuee could go only with a gate pass and
after being individually checked. It was dra1m in the first weeks
following the incident by supervision by soldiers in uniform, at the
gates and in charge of work crews. At all points the line was tangible
and unyielding and gave rise to attitudes of antagonism and suspicion
on both sides. The world of rumor throve on the extreme isolation of
the people behind the fences, out of touch not only with the outside
but even with the center staff. It battened also on the new anxieties
of being segregants, of not knowing whether that meant deportati~n or
what. The correctives for rumor in the other centers through the
coming and going of resettlers hardly existed, although a few Tuleans
were cleared and resettled. The community cross-currents, brought
into adjustment under Issei leadership in the other centers, were in
motion again with an intensity greater than in the first months of the
most disturbed early centers. No leadership arose that could adjust
and control them. The desire for harmony in the blocks was just as
strong as it had been in the relocation centers, but under the condi-
tions of life in the segregation center no leadership could come for-
ward effectively. The reasons for this were complex.
Following the incident at Tule Lake the military police assumed
control of the center. From the first the response of the people was
. withdrawal and passive non-cooperation. A few days after the Army
took control, the commander of the military police announced that he
would address a mass meeting of evacuees for the purpose of informing
them as to what would be involved ii1 military supervision. When the
day came for the meeting, the commander and WRA officials drove into
the center, went to an open air stage in the main firebreak, and pre-
pared to address the evacuees. A cordon of soldiers with drawn bayo-
nets formed a ring around the space in which the evacuees were to
assemble. On schedule the commander of the military police proceeded
to give his speech through the loud-speaker, but no evacuee came near
the stage. Evacuees in nearby blocks could see and hear that something
was going on, but none came over. As the speech continued6 evacuees
went on with their daily affairs. A few young people gathered sane
distance away and looked curiously at the soldiers, 'While the speakers
addressed the anpty firebreak. The military police were being ignorfd
by everyone in the center.
This pattern or beha~or in relation to the Army occupation 
continued on a wider basis. People made no resistance of any kind
when the military police carried out an intensive search of the whole
I
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center for weapons and for those leaders of the November 1 demonstra-
tion who had not already given themselves up. A general strike, stimu-
lated by the leadership of the Novem~er 1 demonstration, had begun after
the first pick-up' of leaders. It continued now. No evacuees went to
work except in the few essential services necessary for the welfare of
the community. Army officers acted as foremen over evacuee crews haul-
ing coal and distributing food to the messhalls. Otherwise people sat
in the blocks and waited to see what would happen. The strike went on
for over two months.
The passive non-cooperation was a reaction to the curfew imposed .
after the incident, to the patrolling of the center by ~ed soldiers
in jeeps and com&and cars, to the rigorous search of everyone's apart-
ments, to t.he mere fact of Army control itself. But it was a great
deal more than that. It was a demonstration against the holding of the
men picked up by the military police. These men were the leaders of
the November 1 demonstration and several hundred others who had been
picked up on suspicion of implication in that incident. At first they
were placed in tents in the administration area and later in a group
9f barracks surrounded by a manproof fence in another part of the area.
Their place of confinement came to be called "the stockade." Pick-ups
continued during the months of Army control of the center. The orig-
inal group of leaders of the November 1 demonstration were men whom
many in the center regarded as their duly elected representatives who
had championed their interests against the adminiitration. Others re-
garded them as self-appointed and not proper representatives. Whether
or not people thought of them as authorized representatives, however,
large numbers felt some loyalty to them as evacuees who had stood up
! for evacuee rights. Cons.equently, like the men who had been picked up
in Jlanzanar and Poston at the time of the crises there, they quickly
became symbols aramd which large numbers of evacuees could rally. The
strike at Tule Lake during the period of Army control was basically a
demonstration like the general strike at Poston.
The chief differences fram the Poston strike lay in the lesser
integration of the evacuees and in the protracted length of the denon-
stration. The fact that evacuees were not unified in their attitudes
towards the holding of the men was apparent in the failure of the com-
munity fully to back representatives picked by the men now in the
stockade for dealing with the administration. These men urged contin-
uance of the strike until the stockade should be li~dated. In
January the Army sponsored a center-wide vote on the question of con-
tinuing the strike. The results indicated that the community was
deeply split on the issue. The vote was in terms of maintaining the
status quo, that is, the strike, or ~bandoning the status quo, that is,
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discontinuing the strike. Almost as many voted one way as the other,
but a slight majority favoring the end of the strike led to the forma-
tion of a group of evacuees, c~ed the Coordinating Committee, which
undertook to restore the center to normal. Shortly after, the military
police withdrew from direct control of the center. As this took place,
people gradu~y went back to work, indicating in part that they had
felt the strike to be directed against Army control and in part that
they could no longer bear the lack of incane and disruption of center
life that the strike entailed. The issue of the stockade nevertheless
rematQed, and the large numbers who had voted to continue the strike
before still maintained a position against cooperation with the WRA
administration so long as the stockade existed.
The coordinating cOlrlnittee attempted to work with the WRA admin-
istrators. The position that they assumed was that if the community
should abandon the strike and get things back on a normal basis, re-
pressive measures might be reduced and existence in the center would be
easier and more pleasant. They also felt that a normally functioning
community would provide a better basis for negotiation for release of
the men in the stockade. The administrators of course wanted a return
to normal in center operations and encouraged the coordinating commit-
tee to enlist the cooperation of evacuees who held or formerly had held
key positions in the center organization. The administrators, however,
were not ready to negotiate the release of ~ the men in the stockade.
Their view was that the release of the leaders who had organized the
November 1 demonstration and others whom they regarded as trouble
makers or potential trouble makers would result in new disturbances.
Their retention in the stockade was designed as a measure for promoting
peace in the center.
The stockade was not easily forgotten by evacuees and remained
as the major source of disharmony in the center. Months after the
!November in~ident it stood, with more than 350 inmates, fenced within
the administration area but in plain sight of the center residents.
Watch towers were erected at its edges and soldiers guarded it day and
night. Wives and children of the family heads held within it came to
the center fence daily, looking across the administrative ares, and
waving or calling to their husbands or fathers. The waving i.'fond signal-
ling between center and stockade became a prominent feature of Tule
Lake life. As time went on same men in the stockade brokr) down. One
morning a young Kibei was found weeping on the wire gate of the com- 
pound. Some let their beards grow as a gesture of anger and defiance.
Some kept the fires in their barracks banked low so as to emit no
smoke, which, it was said, signified a cry for bslp. Some of the men
in the stockade wanted desperately to rouse thr; paople in the center to
some sort of demonstration that would result J~ their releaseo
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The stockade was not forgotten. The coordinating committee, on
shaky ground at the very beginning of its negotiation with the adminis-
tration, found itself in an increasingly bad position with the evac..;
uees as the months passed. It had tried to take leadership in the
unpopular cause of establishing working relations with administration.It had made no important. headway in the matter of liquidating the .
stockade. From time to time a few inmates of the stockade had been .
released, but all the formerly important leaders were still there. In
the center, the coordinating committee members were widely spoken of
as administration stooges and inu. Most of the members of the commit-
tee were prominent in the Cooperative community stores. Criticism had
been leveled at them at the start as persons who wanted the stores to
operate .so that they could make money from the evacuees. Their work
to return the center to normal operation was regarded by many as
playing into the hands of the administration. The release of a few
from the stockade was regarded as evidence of playing along with ad-
ministration for the release of some of their personal friends. Vlith
the stockade continuing on through the spring after the Army had relin-
quished control to the WRA, it seemed to those who regarded the stock-
ade as the paramount issue that the coordinating committee had sold the
evacuees out.
Yet, except for block managers -and others employed b,y mA in the
routine operations of the center, the admtnistrat~on had working rela-
tions only with the coordinating committee. The administrators were
therefore not working with the community in any real sense. They were
working with men who had no recognized status as representatives of the
people in their blocks. They could not function as did liaison men in
tne relocation centers, because they had no solid base in the community. .
They were not a product of the adjustment of person to person in the
blocks. They represented only a small group in the center who believed
that evacuees would suffer less if there was some show of cooperation
with the administration. They had not worked to coordinate the senti-
ments of the people in the center, where blocks were split over the
issue of the stockade and where no settling down process had yet taken
place.
In this atmosphere there could be no stabilization of staff-
evacuee relations. The relations of the coordinating committee
members with th~ people in the blocks became more and more difficult.
The routine activities of operating the center went on sufficiently
well to keep evacuees housed and fed, but there was no leadership ef-
fectively relating the center residents as a whole to the administra-
tion. Eventually the coordinating committee resigned from its impossi-
ble situation. The evacuees - had withdrawn to the narrow life of the
blocks with a completeness unmatched in the relocation centers, and the .
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cent~r staff had withdrawn to confine itself to the business of
routine center operations. Neither group seemed to have a program
any longer so far as the other was concerned.
. Life in the blocks in Tule Lake bore much superficial rese~
blance to life in the blocks in the relocation centers. Men passed
the time with goh, baseball, and other games. The women went in for
flower arrangement and sewing. There were poetry circles and utai
singing groups. Everyone found something to do, and in general the
patterns of behavior were much the same as they were in the relocation
centers, with a similar mixture of Japanese and American customs. But
even these externals of life were roiled by the cross-currents which
arose in Tule Lake. Pressures of various sorts had developed from the
time of the arrival of the first segregants in the center. The early
efforts of rowdy youths to break up Nisei dances and to force attend-
ance at Japanese language schools continued with increased intensity.
Nisei felt pressures against their speaking English at any time. Here
and there all through the center there were little groups who were
taking very seriously the revival of Japanese customs and activities.
They did not regard the turn to Japanese games, dances, and entertain-
ment as merely a pleasant relaxation. To them it seemed that such
things should be cultivated with a purpose. Children must be trained
for a life in Ja~ and adults must return to ways of behaving that
woUld make them' acceptable in Japan. Nearly every block had its resi-
dents who adopted this serious approach to the revival of customs.
They were emotional about it. Under their influence more and more
people wer~ coming to regard as a discipline such activities as people
had turned to for pleasure in the relocation centers. A program was
steadily developing with preparation to live in Japan as the basis for
unity in the segregation center.
As the months went by, the program was pushed with increasing ,vigor. It became more and more obvious to those who pushed it, how- . 
ever, that a majority of the people in Tule Lake were not disposed to 
take it up. Some Nisei tried to rebel, or at least did not respond
to the pressures. The parents of many Nisei clearly did not take the
program very seriously either. The attitudes towards activities de-
signed to prepare for life in Japan became tangled with attitudes
towards center issues. On the one hand were the people in every block
who urged preparation to live in Japan, no cooperation with administra-
tion, and the liquidation of'the stockade. On the other hand were the
many in every block who seemed largely indifferent to both matters, who
seemed not to care much about the stockade and even said that they had
never really supported the men in the stockade and who did not take
- Japanese customs with much seriousness. Harmony in the blocks began to
seem impossible to the people with the program, and to the others seemed
to be fading farther and farther away as tpey felt the insistent pres-
sures.
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As the sense of differences increased and factionalism sharpened
in the blocks and all t1n-ough the center, an organized moveme~t devel-
oped. It was not wholly new, for it had been suggested in the program
of the leaders who organized the November incident. But now in the
summer of 1944 it grew to proportions which steadily overshadowed the
stockade and every other internal center issue. It took the fom at
first of the circulation of petitions for a new segregation. Its
spokesmen took up the point raised on November 1: what is the status
, of evacuees in Tule Lake? They had wanted as soon as they got to Tule
Lake to know what their legal status was in relation to Japan and to
the United States. Some had asked then whether citizens of the United
States who had asked for expatriation could break their ties with the
United States by renouncing their citizenship. Now they urged that the
people in Tule Lake should be separated from each other on the basis 01.
whether or not they really wanted ultimately to go to Japan or not.
They had recognized increasingly that many of the people in Tule Lake
were there for temporary security from the draft or from hosti1~ war-
time feeling in the United States. They recognized that a great many
had not declared themselves once and for all for Japan, but were wait-
ing things out. The spokesmen for re-segregation wanted to be separated
from all such people. They wanted to be in a separate center where they
could take seriously the preparation for living in Japan and where they
could live uncontaminated by the people who were not really interested
in Japan as a place to go and live.
A small group at first, the spokesmen for re-segregation circu-
lated petitions among the evacuees in an effort to find out how many
people in Tule Lake were ready to go all the way to Japan. They
claimed 10,000 signatures on the first petitions requesting a re-segre-
gation. People in the blocks began to feel a new pressure. Spokesmen
of the program went about talking with Nisei and their parents, urging
them to think of a corner of the Japanes~ empire where they could go
and live as real Japanese after the war. They denounced the "fence
sitters" who they said were merely waiting out the war. They shuddered
at being contaminat,ed in the center with men who were merely dodging
the draft, the "No-Yes-No" men who had wavered since registration.
'rhey spoke of "puritr' of race and of intention to serve Japan. More
and more persons listened to them, as the outside world receded farther
and farther away on the other side of the fences and life in the blocks
seemed more and more sterile and empty. The new current-the movement
for re-segregation-was growing all through the summer in Tule Lake.
There was no leadership for any counter trend. The most vigor-
ous Nisei and Issei who had, like the liaison men in the relocation
centers, been concerned with center issues were still in the stockade.
Others who had tried to establish "harmony in the center" by negotiating
with the administration had run up against the stone wall of
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administration determination to keep the stockade. They were now
generally branded as inu in the center and were even becoming fearful
for their safety. Early in the summer the manager (Hitomi) of the Co-
operative stores, which had all along been associated with the coordi-
nating committee, was murdered with a knife thrust. His murderer was
never found. Former members of the coordinating committee, and others
who had been prominent in cooperation with administration, sought
shelter with the administration in the hospital and some left the cen-
ter. Dealing with the administration had become impossibly dangerous.
The field for leadership was left open to the men with the program for
return to Japan.
By the end of the summer the issue of the stockade within the
center had died down in the face of the larger issue of the future in
Japan. Even the administration had come to feel that the stockade was
not so important. Besides, the men in it were becoming troublesome.
Some at tempted a hunger strike. The administration sat the hunger
strike out, which fizzled, and then decided -to release the men who had
been held for ten months. Their return to the center caused hardly a
stir. A few who had been most active in the leadership of the November
demonstration felt that the growing influence of the "Back-to-Japan't
movement was bad and attempted some organization against it. But they
had no following after the months in the stockade and their activities
did not stem the tide.
By September the movement for re-segregation had become a well
organized affair. It was not unified at first, but gradually became
so. Spokesmen organized several hundred young men in a group called 
"Society for the Study of the Customs of the Fatherland." It drew 
more and more young men and some women into its influence during the 
fall. The young men cropped their hair short and began to appear in
the firebreaks with headbands with Japanese emblems on them. There 
they marched and drilled and carried out exercises under the command 
of leaders. ~ November the organization had altered its name to j
"Society to Serve the Emperor on Speedy Repatriation." It had a mElnber-
ship running over a thousand ~d its activities were more and more
prominent in center life. Every morning groups of. young men marching
and drilling, and now with plastic bugles announcing the forJlS.tions,
came out and 'lent through their maneuvers. In every ,block in Tule Lake
the young men were feeling the pressures of the organization. And for
many it seemed to offer a path to something meaningful in the a~ess
dead end of the segregation center. They were joining up, in many
cases, out of a feeling that here was something which led somewhere.
Others were joining up because their friends and brothers did. It was
a movanent that was sweeping confused young men along who had had
nothing worthwhile to do since evacuation, men who had begun with a
"No" at registration which meant defiance at mistreatment and who now
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,were saying "Yes" to something which seemed to have more meaning than
anything they had encountered for two and a half years. It was much
more than something to do in the center; it was action toward what
seemed at last a clearly defined goal.
As the year 1944 drew to an end it seemed possible to distin-
guish three quite different systems of sentiments, or orientations, .
among the people of Tule Lake. A Nisei observer summed up the situa-
tion in a description of one block, which seemed to the Nisei to be
fairly typical:
"This blook, like all the others, has a few people who
mi~ht be called relocation prospects. Because people are
loyal to the United States, have property or other hold-
ings , outside, I or believe that d~ocracy is the proper
form of Government, they will eventually desire to relocate
and start life anew. Now they are waiting for the present
war hysteria and racial prejudice to subside or be con-
trolled. They are a minority group in the block, but so
far as their loyalty is concerned, there can be no doubt.
Many of these families have already given their sons to
the war effort of this country. They are willing to fi"ght
and stand by their principles * * * Some are bachelors and
have relatives elsewhere. These people are. cool towards
all actions aggressively aimed at the vmA, and they con-
sistently follow the group that is conservative, if I poli-
tical' pressure makes it seem necessary to follow a given
course. Sometimes these people are referred to as the
fence-sitters, who ~e waiting for the clouds to clear.
Then there are the two groups, called 'disloyal,' which
consist of people who have expressed their desire to re-
patriate or to expatriate to Japan; the majority of these
desire to be included at the earliest possible date in an
exchange if possible. These two groups do not under any
circumstances desire to relocate. Because they fear forced
relocation and compulsory draft, they are taking whatever
action they believe helpful to prevent such situations.
They frequently state that such action on their part is
, necessary because of inconsistencies in the policies of the
U. S. Government which they claim to have experienced.
They will probably continue to be distrustful of future
policies of the U. S. Government. Though both groups have
similar ideals in mind, t heir means of attaining their
goals are altogether opposite. These two elements consti-
tute the majority who command the respect of the people of
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the center. Of the two, one is radical in its views
and actions, 'while the other is conservative and law-
abiding .
Radical GrO:llcP. These people show their canp]Jete hate
apd distrust of the U. S. Government by drastic actions
which are both detrimental to other law-abiding Japanese
within the center and also undesirable from the point of
view of the rules and regulations of the WRA * * * Al-
though it is the minority group when canpared with the
'conservative' disloyal group, the individuals are high-
strung and uncontrollable. Their stock remark is that
they are the only" 'true Japanese,' although the great
majority of the residents hardly agree. The radicals
even go to the extent of using force and violence within
their own group to hold it intact by" putting pressure
upon its members. They seem unreasonable and 'one-track'
and appear to care not in the least for the welfare of
their fellow-residents. They" further eXhibit hostile and
disagreeable attitudes which make social functions impos- 
sible in many blocks. The majority of the membership in
the radical group consists of ~d country" folk who respond
to the pressure of a few extreme leaders * * * who seem to
be iJlUnune to camnon sense and gentlemanly- ways, but who,
in some cases, carry the country people along with them
***
Conservative GrouP. In this group are the people who
have requested repatriation or expatriation to Japan.
.They" would prefer an excpa~, if possible, at the
earliest date. About three-fifths of the people of the
center fall in this category. Al though there is no ques- .
tion of their 10y"alty to Japan, they" feel that the coun-
tries involved are at war and that people are sacrificing
their lives to protect their respective nations. While
many were evacuated from their homes in a sudden action
which often resulted in losing practically everything they"
had, they figure that this is now so much water under the
bridge and that it's too late to do much about the past.
Now that they have chosen to become Japanese subjects,
they believe it is up to them to canport themselves in
peaceful and law-abiding fashion. Being thankful for the
shelter and food provided by the Government, and realizing
that the tax-paying citizens of this country are being de-
prived of many luxuries, this group is anything but wil-
tully antagonistic. As long as the policies of the VffiA
make for livable conditions here, this group sees no reason
(184)
-why they 'should act in a manner hostile to their guardian.
They ask no favor but to be left alone to pursue their
ambition of returning to Japan. But should the attitude
of the WRA or the Justice Department change in such a way
as to interfere with their possibility of remaining in the
center as disloyals waiting for exchange, they will no
,doubt respond in a manner of utmost hostility to whatever
administration exists at the time. These people are com-
plying with every request which is reasona~e. They are
'taking their medicine' quietly. But if aroused by unfair
treatment, they will certainly respond. If this law-
abiding, conservative group is aroused, it would easily
enlist the sympathy of the center.
Because of their desire to be pleasant and understanding,
these people keep the block on an even keel and earn the
respect of 811 concerned. They desire to aid the majority
of their fellow-residents and at the same time wish to
respect and be respected by the people of this nation and
its administration. These. people want to say when they
do go to Japan that they left friends in the United States
who regarded them as decent, self-respecting individuals.
They think hopefully of a better future abroad, but do not
turn away from this nation in hate and passion."
The orientations in Tule Lake could be duplicated in the blocks
in the relocation centers. The extremes of opinion and behavior pres-
ent in Tule Lake were present also in the other centers. An important
difference lay in the "conservative" groups. In the relocation centers
the conservative group which stabilized block life was oriented not
towards some concept of Japan but towards the relocation centers them-
selves. The security they sought during the war period had come to be
identified with the relocation centers. In Tule Lake there was a simi-
lar orientation to the center as a place of greater security than the
outside, but the repression, the disharmony, the general unsatisfactori-
ness of the segregation center, together with the steps already taken
toward disassociation with the United States, had led the conservatives
to identify future security more and more with a present orientation to
Japan. That seemed still to be the path away from forced relocation
and the draft. Consequently conservative opinion in Tule Lake had
moved steadily toward the very definite identification of security with
a future in Japan_. This was the chief point of contrast between the
majority in Tule Lake at the end of 1944 and the majority in the reloca-
tion centers.
The other major contrast was the role of what the Nisei observer
called the "radicals." In some blocks in every relocation center there
were people of a similA1" kind" who upset the harmoD1' of block life from
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time to time by uncompro1I1ising anti-administration expressions and
actions. They ~re, however, generally submerged in the dominant con-
servative opinion and kept under control in. various ways by the liaison
men and other leaders among the evacuees. In Tule Lake, on the other
hand, the influence of such perso~ had thrived on the succession of
events which had upset the equilibrium of the center. As the Nisei
observer indicated, they found support from the considerable number of
people in Tule Lake who had no stake in the United States, largely
poor and unsuccessful farm workers. Anti-administration attitudes had
spread widely and been encouraged by the strike following the incident
and the constant agitation of the stockade issue during the spring and
summer. Such attitudes had become set and crystallized in the center
and formed a matrix in which spokesmen could continue to operate in al-
most every block. Instead of becoming submerged, as in the relocation
centers, they had grown all through the year.
In Tule Lake, then, there had been no smoothing of differences
among evacuees. There had been rather a sharpening of differences and
people in the blocks stood aligned against one another, uncompro1I1isingly
antagonistic and anxious to be separated from one another so that some
sort of harmony 1I1ight be achieved. It was this. condition that produced
support for the idea of re-segregation which ultimately took t.he form
of organized groups in the fall of 1944. In the basic conception of re-
segregation the conservatives and radicals of the blocks were at one
with each other. They did not want to be associated with people who
could look favorably on resettlement, who had no orientati.on toward
Japan. But the conservatives did not want to be associ~ted either with
the emotional spokesmen of the "Society to Serve the Emperor on Speedy
Repatriation." As the Nisei observer wrote: I
"Though they believe themselves to be the only "true 
.Japanese" in the center, this claim is received with
skepticism on the part of the majority of residents who
believe their actions to be contrary to their words.
Indeed, their antics are frequently contrast~ with the
ways of the old Japanese samurais (warriors) 'who kept
their word once it was spok~, and never drew a sword
unless for a purpose.' Parading and flag-waving in a cen-
ter still under a lenient care is looked upon as cheap
exhibitionism and a disgrace to the Japanese people. The
majority believe in working things out in a g~ntlemanly
fashion' QS proud people of a first-class nation'."
In December, events moved to bring large numbers in Tule lAke
under the sway of the extremists who had built up the Society to Serve
the Emperor on Speedy Repatriation, called Sokuji Kikoku Hoshidan in Jap-
&nes.,. Congress had passed a law permitting citizens of the United
(186)
IStates to renounce their citizenship if. they wished to. The Hoshidan
adopted the renunciation of citizenship as its own program. To them
it se8I1ed to be the fulfillment of the steps that many Nisei had al-
ready taken: first, the "No" at the time of registration, then the
decision to go as a segregant to Tule Lake, then the request for expa-
triation to Japan. The renunciation of United States citizenship now
seemed to leaders of the Hoshidan to be the necessary final act in the
dissolution of ties with the United States in preparation for the ul-
timate identification with Japan. Their viewpoint during the fall did
not seem realistic to most people in Tule Lake, but by' the time repre-
sentatives of the Department of Justice arrived to hold hearings for
those who had applied for renunciation of citizenship, events had taken
place which gave new meaning to the program of the Hoshidan.
About the t~e that the Justice Department representatives came
to Tule Lake the Army announced that the mass exclusion. of evacuees
from the \'lest Coast was lifted. The WRA simultaneously announced that
I all the relocation centers would be closed within a year. Renunciation
of citizenship began~to seem to the young men the only means left to
avoid resettlement and the draft. The stage was now set for a wide-
- spread acceptance of the Hoshidan program. Promptly with the inaugura-
tion of the Justice Department hearings an hysterical movement began
for renunciation of citizenship. The movement was backed not only by
the organized 1ea-aership of the Hoshidan, but also by the conservatives.
As the Nisei observer had pointed out, the threat of forced relocation
could easily lead the majority in Tule Lake to act in extrane ways.
Thousands of young men flocked to join the Hoshidan and to de-
clare to the Justice Department representatives that they wanted to
renounce their citizenship. The Hoshidan flourished. What had seemed
curious antics and exhibitionism a few weeks before now began to have
meaning for an increasing number. The fear of the outside led parents
and sons to actions which would have seemed hysterical to them in the
months before-and which did seem so again a few months later. Well-
organized now, the Hoshidan worked hard to bring the young men into
line with its program. Renunciation hearings were called for by more
and more young men.
Disintep:ratin~ Factors-the War and Resettlement
Meanwhile during the year 1944 the nine relocation centers had
been undergoing changes. Even as sentiment in them had crystallized
in the winter of 1943-44 behind the evacuee program, the communities
from which it sprang were changing. The basic feature of the program--
retention of the centers for the duration of the war--continued to ha""e
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general acceptance in all the centers. It continued to be the basis
of group relations with staff and the guiding principle of block life
and politics. For more than a year after it attained its position of
highest ascendancy in center life it continued to dominate majority I
action and thought. Nevertheless out from under it, as .it were, ~ople
were moving into the world outside the centers. From month to month
the population of each center declined just a little. The changes were
small, but the cumulative effects were profound. ~oreover, the signi-
ficant effects had little or nothing to do with the numbers of ~rsons
who left. It was the kind of persons and what they were doing on the
outside that was important. By the summer of 1944 it was evident that
the process that was taking place had begun not on~ to affect physi-
cal conditions in the centers, such as the easing of crowding in the
blocks and the creation of manpower crises, but also to alter in far
reaching ways the community sentiment on which evacuee solidarity had
been based.
The movement of young men out of the centers into the armed
forces was numerically small, but it had by the summer of 1944 been
going on for one and a half years. About 1,200 had volunteered fram
the centers at the time of registration and shortly after. Since
then there had been a few more volunteers, and with the reo~ning of
Selective Service in February the numbers of young men in the uniform
of the Armw had steadi~ increased,. In the single month of June 1944,
166 Nisei left the centers for Army service. Every month there were
some from each center.- By December 1944, the total number who had been
accepted for service and were on active duty somewhere was not large.
It amounted to on~ 1,543 individuals, ranging from less than 100 to
nearly 300 from each center. These men, however~ by that time had
been coming and going from the re10c~ion centers for more than a year.
While undergoing training at Camp Shelby ~ Vississippi, or Fort Snelling,
Minnesota, they had been coming back to the relocation centers on fur-
10ughfor visits with their families and friends. They had come back
in uniform, and portions of barracks had been set up in all centers as
USO entertainment centers. Thus there was a feature of life in the
relocation centers linking them with all the communities of the United
States. Soldier sons and brothers and friends were going and coming.
Parents, and sisters and friends in the centers busied themselves
making the visits of the soldiers pleasant. Women worked on 1000-
s+itch belts, in the Buddhist tradition, for the protection of the
, oldiers on the battle fields. Mothers spent time pr8psring food for
parties and their daughters arranged dances and other affairs. Young
peoPle clustered around the USO's and talked with the soldiers. The
sen~ poets, beginning in 1944, began to write of the uniformed Nisei
8n~ the feelings of their parents about them.
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At first the coming and going of soldiers affected only rela-
tively fe\'f persons in each center, but many of those affected were
parents who had themselves accepted the centers as war duration homes.
They were men and women who belon~ed to the core of Issei who had
formulated community sentiment. With reopening of Selective Service
in the spring of 1944 more and more began to be affected as sons
whose parents had opposed volunteering were taken in the draft. The
activities of the USO's were increasingly ~icipated in by at least
mothers and sisters of f~ies who had steadfastly kept their atten-
tion averted from resettlement and the outside. Farewell parties for
drafted young men increased, sometimes merely family affairs, but
more and more whole blocks became interested in the outgoing young
men. The recurring farewells became a more and more prominent feature
of relocation center life, and to a greater extent than in outside
towns of similar size the whole community began to be affected and to .
give some recognition to the departing young men.
Inevitably casualty lists began to have some meaning for
people in the relocation centers. Ey early 1944 Nisei in the combat
teams in Italy had been in action and there were dead and wounded.
The news came back to the parents in the centers. Here and there the
feeling developed that the communities as wholes should pay tribute
in some way. At first there was resistance to such ideas. Then
gradually as the ~ffiA administration encouraged the erection of honor
roll tablets listing all the men in the a~ed forces in each center,
sentiment swung behind the idea of community ceremonies. Buddhist and
Christian ministers and community council chairmen and other evacuee
spokesmen arranged ceremonies in honor of Nisei who nad been killed.
Memorial services became more and more frequent during the year and
interest in them became wider. The relocation centers were now like
normal communities outside with their honor rolls, and memorial serv-
ices for war dead were an even more prominent feature of community
life.
By midsummer of 1944 the effects of the Nisei soldiers on the
people in the centers had become marked. An Issei mother in J~
said:
"You know things are a lot different than they were a
while ago. People really rebelled at the time of regis-
tration. They said awful things about the government,
and they sPQke of the boys who volunteered almost as if
they were traitors to the Japanese for serving a country
that had treated the Japanese so badly. When Selective
Service was re-instituted all one heard was that the
Government had no right to draft men out of a camp like
this. At first when the boys left, their mothers wept
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with bitterness and resentment. They didn't +,hink their
sons should go. This week five have gone from our block.
I tell you I'm surprised at the difference. Wives and
mothers are sorry and they weep a lot. But now they
really feel it is a man's duty to serve his country.
They wouldn1 t want him not to go when he is called. When
they talk among themselves, they tell each other these
things. They feel more as they did before evacuation."
The women in the laundry rooms were talking less now about the discom-
forts imposed on them by the Government and the stupidity or arrogance
of staff members they had encountered or heard about. They were talk-
ing about the casualties in Italy and about their own sons training
somewhere or ab~ut to go overseas.
Block sentiment was changing in response to this impact of the
war on parents. A block leader described what had happened in his
block during the spring of 1944:
"At first our block was a little slow in giving some
recognition to the boys who went for induction. Then we
started giving $10 to each inductee, provided they left
from the block. But many of them took indefinite leave
after they passed their physicals in order to get thecash grant and trip somewhere at WRA expense. These .
youngsters are smart boys. Last week we held a biock
meeting to decide if our policy was right. There were a
lot of women pre~ent. They were interested in this ques-
tion. We voted that all boys should receive a block pres-
ent whether they went out on indefinite tJeaviJ or not.
After all# they were going to the A~. So now# before
a boy leaves for induction or goes out of the center on
indefinite after passing his physical, five or six lead-
ing men of the block dress up in their good clothes and
call on him to present the gift and the best wishes of
the block."
By no means all blocks acted in this way # but it was becoming less and
less popular for anyone to suggest that Nisei who had gone into the
armed forces were foolish or were being hoodwinked by a basically an-
tagonistic Government. The feelings of the mothers were more and more
a factor to be reckoned with in block opinion. At Heart Mountain par-
ents who had encouraged their sons a few months before to resist induc-
tion in the Army were confessing that they felt differently and thatthey had advised their sons wrongly. '
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These changes did not mean that there had been any universal
alteration of opinion about the war in general. The general feeling
persisted that the end of the war was a key point in the evacuee fu-
ture and that Issei. generally could not make a decision about their
future until the war should have ended. There was still widespread
expectation that the war would end in a. negotiated peace with neither
Japan or the United States wholly broken and defeated. It was still
impossible for an Issei who had become conviQced that Japan was des-
tined to lose decisively to say so in the centers. One such Issei who
had resettled in Chicago and wished, as he said, "to re-orient Issei
thinking" about their future and their clinging to the centers, wrote
a series of articles for a Denver Japanese language newspaper, the
Rocky Sn1mpo. He wrote that the future of the Issei was in the United
States and that they would be wise to leave the centers promptly and
begin to reestablish their economic foundations before the end of the
war. A group of Issei in one center wrote to the Shimpo protesting the
articles and they were discontinued. When the man himself visited
Heart Mountain and Granada in August to e~ress his views from the
platform, he found that only a tiny minority of Issei were ready to
pay any attention to his ideas. The interest in and concern about the
Nisei soldiers had by no means resulted in a complete reorientation of
thought in the centers.
Nevertheless the course of the war was also having a subtle
effect on community sentiment in the relocation centers. As a poet
wrote:
lIThe colors of the war maps
Having lately changed,
No longer can we smile."
The news of the war came into the centers in various ways--from letters
from sons in the Pacific and. in Italy, from the official communiques
from both l!lashington and Tokyo which were selected and published in the
Japanese language papers I from materials sent to the centers by the
Washington \~ office. There was no real lack of information in the
centers. There was a difference, however, between center and outside
interpretation of the war news. Tokyo claims were generally discounted
less as propaganda than Washington claims. Even with such int~rpreta-
tion, however, doubt of the possibility of Japanese success was growing,
and as this happened the need for waiting to see how the war came out
was less important for a growing number of Issei. Here and there a few
began to make plans for leaving the centers without reference to the
outcome of the war. Very slowly th~ turn of events in the Pacific was
affecting the views of influential men. It was still not popular to
say that Japan could be d~feated and very few talked that way, but some
were acting nevertheless as if they had accepted that probabilitye
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r Moreover, allnost daily in each center there were a few people depart-
ing. Friends and relatives went down to the departure stations to see
them off. The farewells for soldiers and for resettlers were a more
and more characteristic feature of relocation center life during 1944.
Then some resettlers began coming back for visits. They came with new
clothes and possessions that looked good to the people in the centers.
All of these developments had begun to have an effect.
In June a staff member at Poston wrote:
"There is a growing feeling in some Issei circles that
there's just a little sanething wrong with a young per-
son who is still in the center. The time may come when
speculative gossip will surround most * * * able-bodied
people who are still in Poston.
"Prestige had once been attached to making a successful 
adjustment to center life. People in good, but not con-
spicuous, center jobs were admired, as were those who had
made great improvements in their apartments and yards.
Community leaders universally advocated remaining in the.
center. In fact, a 'leader', from the vantage point of
the administration, seemed to be definitely definable as
a man who had committed himself publicly against reloca-
tion. 
"There have been more and more older men who were con-
sidered leaders~en who had advocated remaining in
Poston--who have departed. Some of them were leaders of
Issei cultural activities; they were most improbable can-
didates for relocation. Their departure may well make
their admirers question the wisdom of staying."
Not many months before people who had decided to resettle had been
leaving quietly. They had said nothing to anyone about it, because
they felt that their action would be unpopular. Tpey slipped out of
the centers as unobtrusively as they could. Not it was a little dif-
ferent. People were less fearful of incurring disapproval and shared
their plans with friends. It was evident that public opinion had
changed. Most evacuee leaders had earlier decided that anyone who
wanted to resettle had the right to do so, that no one should be forced
to remain in a center any more than one should be forced to leave. The
fruits of that decision were being reaped. People had left and commu-
nity sentiment toward leaving was steadily changing. The departure of
some who had publicly opposed resettlement was, more than anything
else, WQrking changes in general acceptance of the program against re-
settlement.
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A year before, in the spring and summer of 1943, there had also
been an interest in the outside world on the part of evacuees, but it
had been totally different frorn that that was now developing. It had
been an interest in the stateIaents of public officials and others an-
tagonistic to Japanese Americans. People had read them and they had
been an important factor in the consolidation of evacuee opinion
against resettlement. Now the interest was in specific individuals,
family and friends, who were outside the centers, in the visible evi-
dence of advantages that they were enjoying, and in the possibility of
enjoying similar advantages. It was an interest with direct reference
to oneself and possiblities for oneself. It was working deeply against
the vision of the outside world as an implacably hostile one on which
much of communit' sentiment had been built. It was being fostered by
contacts 'with friendly and interested center staff as well as with
evacuees who had resettled.
In late 1944 the relqcation center communities were still fun-
damentally what they had been a year before. The forces for change
were working deeply, but community sent~ent was still oriented around
the end of the war, the West Coast stake, and the security of the re-
location centers. What was happening was that the meaning of two of
the points of orientation to many people in the communities had changed
during the course of the year. For an increasing number of parents
"the war" had begun to be felt as "our war~" Their sons were in it.
That fact, together with the increasing difficulty in interpreting the
war as going "fell for Japan, was opening the way for more persons to
think about the future without referehce to the outcome of the war.
The changes were not decisive, but the feeling about the war was chang-ing. Then the West Coast stake had slowly broadened. Sons and daugh- 
ters resettled in the Middle We'st and East had extended the stake in
America beyond the old limits. The orientation to the West Coast was
still strong, but for many economic security was no longer necessarily
centered there. They were looking both there and to family members who
were trying to get reestablished elsewhere. Some in the centers even
had a few Issei friends and associates who were outside the centers
somewhere to the east. The West Coast communities and the stake of
friends and families formerly in th~ had spread beyond the narrow
strip of coast. The old orientation was changing. The war and reset-
tlement were subtly at work influencing the whole framework of communi-
ty sentiment which had been reared the year before.
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CHAPTER IV
. GETrING OUT
The 3 years following the attack on Pearl Harbor had been a
period of recurring crisis for the 30,000 families of Japanese Americans.
At intervals of 4 to 6 months had came successive "decisions by the Gov-
ernment, each of which demanded sweeping new adjustments for every fa-
I mily. The evacuation decision in March 1.942, and the swift transfer
from homes to assembly centers; the movement in the summer of 1942 from
assembly to relocation centers; registration in February 1943; segrega-
tio~. in the fall of 194); the reopening of Selective Service in January
1944--relentlesslyone official decision led to ~~othe~ and each meant
crisis, reorientation.of plans for the future, and new decisions for
every family.
For 3 years the group had been 'acted on by the forces determining
official policy; for 3 years, as the evacuees" themselves said, they had
betjn "F /1- ed around." The settling down in the centers when the chance
seemed to come, had been one reaction to the successive upsets of equi-libri~ in the wake of previous Government actions. The period of -
set tling in th~ cen~ers during 1944 had - been the longest period during
which there was no decisive Government action pushing the thousands of
families in some directio~ in which they had not planned and ~d not
want to go. !For almost a ye~r those who stayed in the centers had been'
free to respond to the currents of opinion among themselves, to proceed
from a relatively stabilized base of known Government policy. An adjust-
ment was beinE worked out both to t~e relocation center way of life andalso to the outside world as contacts with it redeveloped.
The expectation of further Government action during the period of
relative calm had, however, continued. People had been conditioned
during the previous months to expect not to be let alone. The presenti-
ment of forced relocation had never died since registration. People
felt that at any time the WRA would make a new move to get them out of
the centers. In the late ~pring of 1944 there were rumors that the Army
would lift the exclusion orders which kept evacuees out of the ~est
Coast defense zone. The rumors grew, then died down. As the Jerome cen-
ter closed in June, rumors began to appear concerning the closing of
other centers. Dates and the order of closing were discussed, with
rumors differj,ng from c'enter to center. Rut nothing happened.
The rumors reflected not only the state of mind of people living
under Government supervision. They reflected also the actualities of
policy formulation in Vfashington. For many months the men who made WRA
policy in Washington had held the v,iew that the key point for their pro-
gram would be such time as the 1!ar Department decided to lift the
.
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exclusion orders on the West Coast. In contrast with the majority of
evacuees, who held that the existence of the relocation centers shonid
be assured until the end of the war, they believed that the liquidation
of the centers could be planned promptly with the lifting of exclusion.
As soon as evacuees should be free to move back to their home localities,
the men in WRA believed, dates should be set for the closing of all cen-
ters. They were convinced that living in the centers was doing no
evacuee any good and that the continuance of segregation in center life
complicated rather than aided the solution of the ultimate problems of
the minority group. Consequently they had been planning a course of
action quring 1944 in the event that the exclusion orders should be
lifted before the end of the war. They had themselves expected that
they might be lifted in June, at the very time that rumors were thickest
in the relocation centers.
It was not, however, until December that the key event occ~rred.
The War Department on December 17 announced the lifting of exclusion
orders to take effect on January 2, 1945. Almost at the same time a
Supreme Court decision was handed down ruling th~ detention of citizens
in the relocation centers to be unconstitutional. The policy basis for
setting definite closinG dates for the centers had been established.
The WRA proceeded to announce simultaneously with the War Department
announcement that no relocation center would be maintained longer than a
year following the effective date of the lifting of the exclusion orders.
The date for the dissolution of the centers was no longer indefinite.
The Government agency was clear in its program and now had a goal to
work to with a deadline a year hence. The agency had already begun to
gear its organization to meet the deadline.
Holding the Centers
The simultaneous announcement of the opening of the West Coast
and the closing of the centers fell on people partially prepared for
both. They were prepared in the sense that th-eir anxieties about the
.f\1ture had kept both possibilities before them for many months. They
had wanted the opening of the Coast. Some wer~ alr~ady prepared to go
back immediately and take over their farms or resume old jobs. But the
closing of the centers had been something that the great majority who
had remained in them had faced only in the curious world of relocation
center rumor. For a f~ days after the announcement th~re was little
apparent reaction as people struggled to put the official phrases into
everyday words and to grasp the: sig~ificance in tenns of their own lives.
Then slowly opinion in the blocks began to crystallize as the meaning of
the new Government action sank home.
On the one hand there was disbelief. As a high school girl in
one center said: "This is a town. You can't close a town." The people
who talked together in the laundry rooms of the northern centers and
.
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under trees in the southern centers did not feel that the centers could
be closed. They were too solid a reality and also too necessary for
one's security. They were still .full of people and moreover just those
people who could never resettle--the older persons over 50 and the
children under 17. The long-nourished a tti tudes to the Government and
the WRA came up. This was a scheme, people said, to frighten the evac-
uees who had so far resisted the resettlement program into resettling.
The Government wouldn rt really carry through; they couldnrt. They
might close some centers, but they could never close all of them. Some
said tfiat the Japanese translation of the WRA announcement indicated
that Gila and Poston would continue their agricultural program. Ob-
viously then these two centers would stay open. Rumors began to appear
concerning Which centers would be closed and which ones would be kept
open indefinitely. People even talked about which centers they would
ultimately transfer to.
On the other hand there were people who began to react as if the
announcement were true. Men sitting in the block managers' offices be-
came angry as they talked about the possibility. They called center
closure another evacuation and the old feelings rose again. The thought
of being forced out made men bitter. Some declared that they would not
be pushed around again. A man in one center who had been planning to
resettle suddenly cancelled his arrangements; he was determined not to
go out if the Government was going to force people out. He would stay
and at least be the last person to be "shoved through the gate." The
feeling grew that the evacuees had "a right to the centers." The
Government had put tJ1em in the centers after taking away tlleir homes and
therefore the Government was obligated to maintain homes for them.
There was talk here and there of a sit-down movement to retain
the centers, if the Government turned! out to be really serious in its
announcement of center closure. Men listened to speeches in block meet-
ings at Heart Mountain and Topaz. Speakers called attention to the WRA
folder issued in 1942 describing the centers as war 'duration homes.
They became more angry; in a block meeting a man said:
"If the evacuees would just stick together, if nobody
would budge out of here, we would get somewhere. We
could force the Government to keep the centers open or
give us some real assistance * * * a lot of softies leave
here for railway fare and $25. And now that WRA has said
it is going to close the centers, probably more will crawl
out of the place like beaten animals."
The sanctions of block opinion were being applied. A few months before
it had become possible to plan resettlement openly. Now'in the face of
the new program for center closure there was a sudden, although brief,
revival of the anti-resettlement sentiment of the winter before. The
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The Topaz and the Heart Mountain block meetings were tempestuous, and
the new program was denounced as brutal and inhumane.
.
At the same time that the majority of people were taking refuge
in the idea that center closure could not happen and others were angrily
planning resistance, the block managers and the councilmen were in con-
stant contact with center staff. They were reading the administrative
instructions and the information bulletins from Washington designed to
acquaint evacuees with the nature of the resettlement assistance offered
by the WRA. They were talking with the administrators and coming into
direct contact with the plans that were emanating fran Washington for an
all-out resettlement program. They were not able to take refuge in the
disbelief: of the -majority and they were convinced, as they had been for
many months, that orgarized resistance could lead only from bad to worse.
Many of them during their months of contact with center staff had come
to believe, even though they had not voiced such sentiments to the
people, that eve~one who could ought to resettle as soon as possible.
They were sure that the WRA meant what it said and felt a responsibility
to help people face a serious problem realistically. They began to take
leadership in the formulation of community sentiment in meeting the
common problem.
The community councils of Granac;ia and Topaz suggested to the
councils of the other centers that a g ener~l conference be held at which
representatives from all centers could meet and discuss a course of ac-
tion. The Heart Mountain councilmen joined the proposal enthusiastical-
ly. The Poston Community Council had already made a similar suggestion.
The other councils agreed to~nd delegates. Only the Manzanar block
managers declined, saying that WRA had already considered the whole
problem and there was nothing to discuss. ~ the end of January it had
been agreed to hold an All Center~onference in Salt Lake City on
February 16.
During the period"Qf discussion in the councils and block meet-
\ ings concerning the conference, groups with differing opinions became
distinguishable among the blQck representatives. At first the meetings
were dominated by those who categorically refused to accept center Jlq-
uidation as a possibility. ISsei who wanted to petition the $panish
Consul to 1ntercede to keep at least "one or two centers were told by
other Issei that it was better to remember that their children IS inter-
ests and future were in America and should come first. Some representa-
tives talked in te~s of accepting center closure conditionally, declar-
ing that the WRA policy might be carried out in part, at least, if the
evacuees were indemnified for ~acuatioh losses or were giveD enough
financial and other aid by the agency to see the resettling people
through one year of outside life. Such representatives regarded the con-
ference less as a medium of protest than as a pressure group to win con-
cessions fran VffiA and to present constructive criticisms "of the resettle-
ment pro'p;rarn.
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;The various proposals that came up in the meetings in each center
were passed on to the other centers to be digested for the conference
agenda. In the end those Who advocated general resettlement on condi-
tion of more aid from the Government assumed dominance and leadership
among the center representatives. Time worked for them because it was
only as time passed that center residents slowly came to realize that
WRA fully intended to try to close the centers within a year. When the
-delegates met in Salt Lake City, there was a strong minority .ho wanted
to sit tight on the proposition of retaining some centers. The dele-
gates who finally dominated the discussicns, however, drew up a long
list of the needs of evacuees for more assistance than they were getting
from WRA--a list which was formally presented to the National Director
of WRA. They had adopted the c curse of channeling evacuee opposition to
the whole program into the form of specific proposals for increased as-
sistance in reestablishing themselves outside the centers. The WRA re-
plied that the agency had gone the limit and that there could be no sig-
nificant modification of the program as already outlined.
. The All Center Conference delegates returned to their centers to
find people largely indifferent to them and what they had done in their
meeting. Interest had not been very intense anlong the majority of evac-
uees even before the conferenoe. Moreover before, during, and after the
conference the National Director of WRA had visited the centers and ad-
dressed mass meetings. He had told people that VffiA was indeed in ear-
nest about closing the centers, that he did not believe it was good for
anyone to remain in the centers, and that there was no other course ex-
cept to close them. His visits and personal assumption of responsibjli-
ty for the program had influenced many people. The belief that WRA
would really try to close the centers now began to spread and increasing
numbers of people were beginning to act on the belief.
The organized effort which began in the emotional reaction against.
being pushed around again had moved, under the leadership of the liaison
men, from ad esperate movement to hold on to the security of the centers
to a strong statement of disagreement with WRA's methods of closing the
centers. The liaison men now took the view that WRA's methods would not
work to the end that WRA wanted. They maintained in every center ,that
with the amount of assistance that WRA was giving only a portion of the
people in the centers could ever reestablish themselves. The idea de-
veloped and received increasing expression from evacuee leaders that
there would inevitably be a residue of people in the centers at the time
of WRA's deadline. Most of the liaison men began to work hard to assist
all who wanted to leave the centers, but they were confident for the
most part that a large number would be ultimately lef,t.
Once accepted, the idea of the residue led necessarily to further
questions. During the spring the matter of the final closing of schools
was raised as an issue witr. the WRA. Closing them by the end of the
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summer was regarded as a broken promise and as unjust to those "who
couldn't relocate." Tne Minidoka council sought legal grounds for re-
quiring 'vVRA to continue the schools. The Parent-Teachers' Association and
other groups in various centers protested and cast about for reeans of
continuing the schools under evacuee management. In mos~ centers groups
of parents continued through August to make plans for giving their
children schooling in the centers.
Another import~t question on eve~Jone' s lips was 'ryfuat will be
done witt the residue after IVRA closes out?" Speculation developed
along innumerable lines: Gila and Poston would finally remain open;
Manzanar would be retained as an old people's home; the Justice Depart-
ment would take over remaining centers; a new agency would be created to
provide for tl1e "unrelocatables." The feeling was strong that WRA had
some undisclosed plan for taking care of the Tesidue. . This feeling grew
and the issue was taken up in sorne councils. Y1RA's refusal to admit a
residue was called unrealistic. As discussion continued, feeling agair.st
WRA ha,rdened. Councilmen in Top~z held that it was, inhumane not to re-
veal the plan for ultimate disposal of the people .who could not resettle.
VffiA, they s aid, should let people know their tate. If on the other hand'
there was no plan, that was even more inhumane, for it would mean that
the residue would be forced out at the end with nowhere to go. Feeling
of this sort was strong all through the centers by the end of July.
The residue had become an ~unanalyzed stereotype which for many was
something to lean on in their search for the security which the reloca-
tion centers offered. Liaison men and others did not think of them-
selves as members of the residue. They felt that they would ultimately
be able to make tl1e new start, but they saw large numbers as being un-
able to do so. The relocation centers had during the course of the pre-
vious three years become a fixed point of orientation in the thinking of
evacuees. They were real and tangible before theJll. They had become,
. for those who had remained in them, the only security in a world thqt
had been made completely insecure as a result of the evacuation. The
conviction that they must continue to exist had become a fixed and set-
tled belief in the minds of almost everyone. The concept of the residue
was the ultimate form taken by the relocation center value in the ori~n-
tation 'of commun~ty sentiment which had crystallized in the wi~.ter of
194)-44. If there had been complete isolation in the centers, it is
likely that the residue viewpoint would have been the only one of any
consequence, and the overwhelming majority would have settled back to
regard themselves all as members of the residue. There were, however,
other forces working against any universal acceptance of the idea, and
these gathered momentum during June and Ju~.
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The Stake in America .
Although the majority of evacuees during the spring of 1945 were
clinging in desperation to the relocation centers, for many the opening
. of the west Coast was an immediate impetus to a ction. A nurseryman who
had been biding his time at Manzanar was back in Los Angeles promptly the
first week in January taking up the reins of his nursery business. A
Nisei fruit rancher who had been a liaison man in Heart Mountain was back.
within a few weeks, reestablished in his orchard and a few months later
calling for laborers from the centers. All up and down the Coast evac-
uees were moving back quickly to take up their interrupted lives. In
numbers they were small, and many hung back to wait and see what would
happen to the most adventurous, but those who ~1l1 had their hqmes, their
farms, or their businesses were at least planning definitely how to go
back and when. They constituted a small minority and their movement out
during the late winter and spring had 11 ttle effect on community senti-
ment in the centers.
The experiences of some of them, however, immediately had reper-
cussions in the centers which temporarily consolidated opinion against
leaving the centers. During the first months after the lifting of exclu-
sion there was a series of attacks by West Coast people on evacuees who
had returned. Im Placer County a barn was burned. l~ar Fresno and in
other places night riders shot into the homes of newly returned families.
The American Legion of Hood River, Oregon, erased the names of Nisei in
the armed forces from the town Honor Roll, and anti-Japanese organiza-
tions sprang up in the Northwest and in California. With such facts to
~o on, the world of rumor in the centere flourished anew. Evacuees who
had just left a center fol the West Coast were said to have been murdered.
The number of real incidents was multiplied' into a host of imaginary in-
cidents. Fear grew in the centers. The existing hostility outside was
magnified many times. People imagined what could happen to themselves if
they should go back to the Coasp. Even if no evacuee had yet been killed,
the first to be killed might b, oneself. Each new incident increased the
fears and many who had ~hought of going back to the Coast decided against
it. Most who were going out continued to follow the lead of family mem-
bers and friends and left the centers for the East rather than the West.
By the end of February about 700 had left all centers for the West Coast,
while three times that number had gone east since the lifting of exclu-
sion. The orientation to the outside was still predominantly to that
portion of the. outside not in the forrner1yexc1uded area.
With the coming of spring, however, it was apparent that old con-
tacts with the West Coast were bethg renewed in ways that the volume of
permanent resettlers to the region did not reveal. Many more persons
were going out for the purpose of exploring and looking around than were
going back to already secure places on the Coast with homes and
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.businesses ready to walk into. As spring wore on these "scouts," as 
they had come to be called, increased in numbers. ']hey were men who
wished to explore for themselves and Qthers the nature of their old com-
munities, the possibilities for housing, the attitudes of friends and
competitors. They went out for a week .or two, looked over their old
towns, interviewed many people, canvassed the possibilities for renewing
their old lines of activity. They came back to the centers to add to
the store of information that evacuees had been accumulating through 
correspondence with friends on the West Coast and through reading the ho home town newspapers. They came back with good and bad stories of their 
reception and of the possibilities far getting started again. They came
back with accounts of their own experiences which people felt could be
relied on. They~had known the scout for a long time; they c.ould accept
what he said, as they felt they could not accept the infonnation sup-
plied by the worl<ers of the agency.
. Slowly the rumor world began to alter. The intense fear inspired
by the shooting and arson on the West Coast began to die down by June.
There was still fear, but too many evacuees had got reestablished and
too many had been able to go about unharmed, meeting only friendly re-
ceptions. It was no longer possible to believe the wilder rumors of
hostility. People had facts about their own communities, details about
what it was like back there. A basis ~or distinguishing rumor fram
actuality had grown up. All through the spring and early summer people
gathered around returned scouts and listened to tlieir storieS. A solid
contact was being built up which rested on all the old memories a~d was tied in intirrlately with one's past life. . 
Not only individuals were beginning to be affected here and there. 
Groups of people fram the same former locality on the West Coast were
beginning to think and plan together for the best way to proceed in re-
turning. Such groups, which had been largely in suspended animation as
groups during the life in the centers, now began to ~erge as units
again. They were assessing the chances in the old localities, mobiliz-
ing their resources as a group, and planning to go back together or at
least relating individual plans one to another. The Buddhist Church
organization, centered at Topaz, began to urge and plan for return. The
lines of action within the centers were slowly'changing in response to
the new stimulus. The relocation center community organization still
rested on the program that centers must be retained--at least for the
residue. The old, teff,porarily submerged former orgapizations were be-
ginnulg to operate again largely outside the center structure of leader-
ship and in terms of the orientation to the old V,rest Coast stake.
In May the shift in attitudes about the v{est Coast was striking.
A minister who had returned to his former locality in Vlashington State
came back to his congregation in the centers and urged prompt resettle-
ment on the ground that hostility could thrive i~ the old co~~nity on
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.imaginary, suspicion-inspired pictures of the evacuees, but that the
presence of some real former Japanese residents would work to dispel the
hostility. He wrote letters recounting his experience and distributed
the~ widely in the centers. Some evacuees everywhere were n~{ out of
the world of rumor, and back in the world of reality, but it was still a
minority. Some were working outside the lines of action or inaction
still stimulated by the center'organizatian and sentiments. The West
Coast stake was no longer merely an abstract value in the center system
of sentiments. It had become an increasingly concrete reality.
Toward the end of May enough evacuees had reestablished their old
lines of contact in the West Coast communities to make it possible for
the ~~A to arrange for whole carloads of returning people to go back
together. Railroad coaches were chartered. At Rohwer, Granada, Heart
Mountain, and the other centers the coaches were filled with evacuees,
amid the farewells of the hundreds who had come to see them off, and de-
parted to take the people back home. Througp June and on into ~~e sum-
mer the departing cars and the crmtds waving good-byes became a more and
more prominent feature of center life. The large scale embarkations for.
the hO!T:el3.rld were viewed hostalgically by those remaining. There were
many questior.s ot: "Vlhen are you going?" as people stood around waiting
for the cars or buses to pullout. The reality of large numbers actually
rct:urning to the c~st had materialized. Not only had the homeland be-
come concrete through the stories of tl1e exploring scouts, but also
friends and neighbors were really going there, and the people who were
remaining in the centers co~ld see it with their own eyes. In the midst
of the still widespread conviction that most people could not go out,
the orientation to the Coast was becoming more and more definite.
The Disintegration of the Centers
All dur ing the spri ng people had been worrying, and thinking, and
planring. The Wave of solidarity behind the idea of holding on to the
centers had lasted for hardly two montrJ.s after the lifting of exclusion.
People then began to swing in thejr worrying and thir-king between two
poles--between the relocation centers as places of known security and
the outside as a place of LYlcreasi~g reality. More and more people
swung to the latter pole and atte~~ted to transform their worrying and
thL~king into planning. But the orientation to the centers was still
strong. By surraner the populatj.on of any.center could be divided into
fo\n' groups. . At one extreme were trie peo;)le who se plans were all made,
with dates for depal'ture set~ At the other extreme were those who were
determined to sit tight, same of whom were telling others to do the same.
Between these extremes were the majority of people, some with plans that
were not yet definite as to date of departure, but most of them, as a
center observer said, "sitting, worrying, l1opi~g for a miracle that will
either save thenl from relocation or make relocation a less difficult
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.. undertaking." The state of mind of the majority by this time was de-
scribed by an Issei woman:
"When WRA announced that the centers would close, a lot of 
people said they didn't want to go out, scmle of them said 
they wouldn't. During the next two months, many, many of
them changed their minds. They decided they did want to
go out and they thought they could. They talked this way
more a little while before my husband left LIn late March?
than at any other time. Since then, what they have heara
about the Coast has made them change their minds again.
They still want to go, but they say they can't. And * * *
they don't just say this. It is true. They really can't.
They want to go, but there is no place to live and jobs
are hard to get. Employers are afraid to hire Ja.panese."
She could have added that lack of housing in the places where people
. wanted to go had almost completely replaced the earlier fear of vio1erice
as an obstacle to making any sort of decisio~ about a return to the :Vest
Coast. 
The desperation of people who could not see, from the distance of
the centers, any way to move back home was now steadily increased by the
crumbling of the relocation centers. The security of the centers had
not, since 1942, been merely the security of shelter and three meals a
day. It was in a much more important way the security of other" people
to live with. The association of Issei with o~e another, the solid rou-
tine of block life, the indulgence of submerged interests with 1ike-
minded men and women--these constituted the meaning of the relocation
centers. When people had formed their ideas about staying in the centers
for the dur ation of the war, they had d one so in the context of the warm
socia11ife of the centers. Ho1di~ the centers had meant holding that.
But the relocation centers were now becoming, almost imperceptibly at
first, something different.
The changes that were transforming the centers had set in months
before. Early in 1945 they were accelerated. The WRA"had adopted the
policy of closing messhalls in blocks in which the population fell below
a certain figure, usually when it dropped below 125. The closing of a
messhal1 ordinarily meant the consolidation of the messhal1s of two
blocks. At first such merging was resisted. People resisted stubbornly
as though aware that it spelled doom for the centers. They resisted for
more ordinary reasons, tOO} they did not want to go and eat the cooking
" of another chef or go through the process of getting used to some other
block's messhall after spending 3 years getting used to their own. In-
exorably, however, the administrators negotiated the closing of u!esshal1s
as people went out to resettle and block populations dropped. They met
the resistance by postponing dates of closure, making minor concessions
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'on methods, and finally getting agreement to this plan or that. E1 the
end of April people in every center had experienced the process. Once
adjusted to the idea; they tried to make it as pleasant as possible.
Usually the merging of two messhalls became the occasion far a little
ceremony, with welcoming speeches and a special meal. The closing of
, the messhalls, like the farewells to departing carloads of people, was
becoming a part of center life; arid in the process, as in the departures,
the people remuning in the blocks lost sanething. The block with a
closed messhall was not the same. There was a different, empty feel
about living in such a block. The heart of the block had faltered.
Also there was now a great turnover in block personnel. Block
managers here and there were packing up and leaving. Other block warker~
were dropping out. People filled in to do the necessary work. The block
organization was beginning to give way to miscellaneous vol'xnteering to
do specific jobs. People began to feel that the substance of block life
was disintegrating. It was not only the closed messhall and the vacant
apartments; much more important in the effect on the people was the
growing sense that block affairs were being taken care of in a makeshi~
way. There was a feeling of decay and decline in the air that weighed
m,ore and more on people through the summer. Although the barracks and
the block manager's office and a good many people were still there, the
block as a social group WaS crumbling. As the blocks crumbled, the re-
location centers began to disintegrate before people's eyes and under
their feet.
Despite the changes in thinking about the war since the first
entry into the relocation centers, the end of the war as a key point in
planning for the future had persisted even into 1945. With Allied vic-
tory in Europe in May and the progressive loss of ground by Japan in tile
Pacific during the SUI:JTler of 1945, attitudes to the war underwent fur-
ther changes. The scouts who had been bringing people back into touch
with the reality of the outside also began to bring them a new point of
view to the war. An ISsei woman in one center said as early as May:
"When Mr. X cane back fran Spokane, I was talking to him
one day. I wanted to find out 'What he thought abrot the
war. I had to go carefully, because I didn't want to start
an argument, and I knew how he used to think. So I just
asked him if th e people in the center had the right idea.
. 'They droIt know what is going on, t he said. 'In Spokane
I was in just a little pin point of this country. But
what I saw changed my mind. Trainloads of war material,
week after week, all of it on tile way to the Pacific. Then
I realized what Japan was up against. The industrial power
of this country is too great. If Japan is not beaten down,
if peace ccmes in sane way, we can be thaI'kfu1. But we
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must expect the worst and act accordingly. We must go out
and re-establish olJrselves. Japan can rever halp us."
As the realization of the way the war was going grew stronger in the
centers, many Issei were growing sad and gloany.
" It. s hard to tell you how an Issei feels. I have a line
that runs through me. On one side are my feelings for
this country. It has dore a lot for me. ~y kids are all-
American and I want them to be. I have enjoyed my life
here. On the other side are my feelings about Japan.
Before the war, it was allright. I never thought of it.
After Pearr Harbor, I felt pulled apart inside * * *.
NOIf I feel awfully sorry for Japan. If I am truthful, I
must say that I feel more for Japan than for this country.
Not that I want cr ever wanted Japan to "win * * *. I
wanted nobody to win; I wanted the war to stop; I didn't
want it to start in the first place. I would feel
terrible if this country was in danger of being crushed down.
I guess I feel most for the country that is going to suffer
most."
The hope for help through the country of their citizenship in the road
ahead to rehabilitation h8.d faded far. "Eve!! the few in some blocks who
clung to a be1ief in Japarese success talked littl& about the aid to
themselves, as they nursed their fixed idea. As the summer wore on, it
became possible to speak freely of the few of this sort in 'the blocks as
the "lunatic fringe." Their views could be doubted with impuIJity.
Thus the points of orientation of coDmlunity sentiment had shifted
sharply. The end of the war was less significant,. because so many people
had begun to feel, whether they admitted it or not, that they already
knew the outcome. The relocation centers were still a vital point of
reference, but they were not the same thing that people had oriented
themselves to 2 years before; they were fading slowly, but nevertheless
unmistakably, as values to hold on to. The West Coast stake had risen
as the dominant point of orientation_in the constellation. People were
responding all through the centers to the new alignment of values. Cen-
te.- relocation officers could operate as they never had before. Their
interest in getting people out was beginning to be matched by people's
desire to get out. Moreover, those who were left of the liaison men .
were responding to the shift in cOmmunity sentiment. . They were working
hard fran late spring on throu~ the summer to assist, and even at times
to urge, people who they thougpt could go out to go. They worked more
and more closely with" center ~taff in helping people to get inforrna tion,
to make their plans, and to find their way out of the centers. They
were still convincet- that ultimately there would be a residue. They
were also convinced, however, that it was their civic duty to help
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resettle everyone Who could be at all expected to make a go of it out-
side, before the gates of the centers closed on the "unre1ocatab1es."
A councilman in one center expressed his point of view:
,
"Many * * * of my block people have asked me if I thought
the WRA would really close the centers. I always tell them
the same thing--that the fUture of the centers and of the
evacuees is no longer under the control ofWRA. WRA itself
is being abolished by the Government. It can't help what
it is doing. It is actua11y{Elpeewee organization--set up
by the President and Congress to take care of the evacuees,
now to be wiped out. It may be that WRA had more to do with 
closing the centers than this indicates. I try to protect
YntA a little. I do not do this because I like WRA or be-
cause I think it has done all it could or should for evac-
uees. But I don't want people to blame WRA too much. WRA
can do some things to help, and it will work out better if
peo?le do not hate the administration too much. I don't
know what other councilmen tell their block people."
In July and August the agency moved inexorably toward its dead-
line. Closi~,g dates, ranging from September to December, were set for
aJ.l the centers except Tu1e Lake. Then in early August came an announce-
ment that a few weeks in advance of those dates all persons still in the
centers who had not already ~ade their departure plans would be scheduled
for departure by the project directors. Almost at the same time came the
end of the Pacific war with decisive American victory. ~ some stroke of
fate, the application of pressures to meet the deadline had been geared
almost precisely to coincide with the disappearance of what was left of
one of the old points of reference in the evacuee program to hold the
centers.
By the first of September the movement outward from those centers
nearest to their closing dates was reaching great volume. Evacuees were
leaving at the rate of more than 2,000, a week. The facilities for pro-
cessing people ir. the centers Were heavily taxed. Blocks were piled with
pa~ ing crates. Few people were thinking of anything beyond the immedi-
ate steps to get out of the cent~rs. The administration offices were
full of people getting information and filling out foms. The sit-tight.-
ers who still announced intentions to stay were ignored or laughed at bythe busy people in the blodcs. '
In the final weeks the centers more and more took on the character
they had had 3 years before when people first moved into them. There was
no real communit~r orgar!ization any longer. It was organization for get-
ting little things done promptly, not for tpe expression of anyone f,S
~eelj~ngs about tr.ings. It was temporary and improvised organization.
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.More than ever councilmen were errand boys, running about seeing' tbat
this and that got done. Many block managers, out of a sense of duty to
the people, had decided to stay and help to the last. Others left and
people in the blocks urxiertod< their work. EveryWhere work was being
done by volunteers. Lines between staff members and evacuees broke down.
The distance between administrative and evacuee areas' became narrower.
The two areas were merging and center staff .found themselves able to
perform liaison duties. Even before the accelerated disintegration of
the communities set in in August this had begun to be apparent. In late
July an assistant project director said, describing B. morning session he
had held with the community council:
"They LF;he councilmen7were more rels.xed, more at ease.
Before, they seemed always on the defensive, sort of lined
up against me. They watched what they said; tried never
to commit themselves, and appeared interested in me mostly
for what they could get out of me. This morning a bunch
of men sat down to talk things over. I was one of them. I~
In the face of disintegration the centel's had made the complete circle
back to improvised teamwork to meet the basic individual needs.
As the centers emptied they became bleakl~. dismal places. People,
as they left them, talked a little nostalgically of coming back to them
some time. Sonle left with tears. 'nle communities theywere thinking of,
however, were no longer there. They were taking them with them. The
places were still there, but the communit~es they had clung to were now 
only in their minds and memories. The vacstion frcm .assimilation was
over. The rows of barracks in the moonlight seemed to one departing man 
to be hardly real. Had this been the place where so much agony had been
endured, where so much of the spirit of a people had been expressed,
where communities had been built and torn down?
SYstemat_t~~ly center by center, the people met the deadlines for
the agency. ~J mid-December only Tule Lake remained to be closed. Man-
zanar, Poston, Gila, Minidoka, Granada, Topaz, RohWer, Jerome had become
names on the land, to crop up here and there on beauty parlors, social
clubs, barber shops and cafes all over America.
Confusion in Tule Lake
The period to November 1944, at Tule Lake had been one of warring
factions and sharp conflicts. Each in its turn, at first the stockade
faction and then later the coordinating committee, rose to ascendancy and
influenced center thinking only to be swept aside. The year 1945, by
contrast, was to belong wholly to the resegregationists, who by November
had settled into an extremist position consistent with the war fever,
the exaggerated consciousness of discrimination and race, and the
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boundless distrust of. GOVernm-ent which had grown up in 1944.
A1ti'.ough the transition to extremism was J.n this sense impersonal
and inevitable, the control over and pressure upon center residents to
confo~. to the tenets of resegregationist thinking was in the making.
Yet the real or original background of the movement was to be found in
the conflict which developed in the ~gregation center, a conflict which
marked the period of sett1j.ng down, of November incidents, of 10 long
months of the stockade during part of which the stockade following and
coordinating committee supporters stood face to face in open opposition
in the center.
The main fact of 1mpor~ance about this conflict was its confine-
ment to a sqpare mile of fenced-in area. Here people were born, married
and died, meals were prepared and eaten daily, wood was carved and gaI-
dens were planted. But the conflict, like the factors making for sta-
bi1ity, ran through e very ward and block, sometime~ even through a fa-
mily group. There was consequently no way of escaping it. The fence
afforded no outlet for mass emotions, but rather leveled the responses to
administrative handling and governmental programs to a few simple stereo-
types. One opened the door to his barrack apartment--too small for re-
tirement or solitude--and immediately felt the limited horizons, the
magnified gossip and the uncompromising line-up of opinion.
Since there was, in addition, no outlet for conflicting responses
to Governmental controls, it seemed to many that the conflicting groups
groups had, to date, won nothing. It was known that without final center
unity in the face of a unified administration and policy, murder had been
committed, and reputations ruined, lost causes were ever~here, and fu-
tures remained indeterminate. Besides this, it seemed to any bystander
that the coordinating committee, in overstaying its welcome, had served
to show that there was no middle ground in dealing with administration,
no escape for the ttdog" or "informer", real or putative, no further
point in maintaining disharmo~, and no real safety from the relocation
channel so quickly arranged for the men of allegedly unsavory reputation
who fled the project and their coordinating committee group once Hitomi
was killed. With the manproof fence for a sounding board, and the least
whispers of dissatisfaction echoing back from four walled-in sides, the
reaction against relocation and disunity, or obversely, tlle cry for cen-
ter security and harmo~ reverberated through the blocks.
It was in the resegregationist camp, of course, that the cry was
loudest, for there unity and harmony were linked with the widely accepted
theme of escape fran America. Theirs was a program of organized cultur-
al revivalism or a design to study and promote the customs of Japan.
This retreat from defeat and frustration into the romantic world of the
Issei was launched under the banner of unity, faced away from American
so~l for resettlement, and provided the solace of fighting against
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repression with the only weapons available, namely the world of custom.
The objective of a future abroad was, in the final analysis, one which
transcended the war of cliques, the fear of Government and the immediate,
dull concerns and monotonous gossip that hemmed in center life. So said
the resegregationist and so echoed his following.
Whereas the escape motif of se~ poet~ and utai singing associ-
ations could help to solve the problems of the Issei bachelor, or lan~
~~age sChools and Japanese checkers, respectively, take up the time of
perplexed Nisei and simple, common men, the majority of families, poised
between dissatisfaction with center life and future uncertainty, were for
the most part willing to cast their lot with the organized resegregation-
1sts Who provided ~he bulwark against relocation, championed the cause of
haDmony, and arranged the speeches and meetings promoting their study of
custom. The speeches on Japanese customs and affairs were, to be sure,
reassuring. "We are Japanese together." "Our -customs are worthy of
respect." "Our ideals are ideals of unity and progress." By August of
1944, the tight and fast-moving celltral organization cla~ed it had
garnered 10,000 signatures for resegregation. The hopeful, but not ac-
tively participating, multitude of 7,000 was'being towed in its wake.
By November, however, the program for the removal from the center
, of pro-American, "unsympathetic" elements reached a new peak. 'New lead-
ership, pushing ahead from cultural revivalism to patriotism had taken
hold. Unity became a phalanx of marching youth, harmony became intimi-
dation or fervor in winning recruits, customs became uniforms of a sort
--emblems on sweatshirts, a shaved head for boys and braids for girls,
the red-bordered "hachimaki" or sweat-band worn for drill. The aim was
physical preparation of the male youth, and to warp determination into a 
new and defiant attitude. As time passed, a bugle corps intoned the
. foreign anthem) a mimeographed paper sang the praises of the Japanese
spirit, cabinets were developed to guide physical, social and cultural
training wi th Is~ei advisors in the background prodded by Kibei drill-
masters menacingly in front. Defiance of a relocation program of
Government had by now Changed qualitatively, becoming an organized request
for speedy repatriation to serve Japan. There were thousands who quiet-
ly backed out before the next sign-UR or petition for resegregation went
the rounds. But others fearfully rationalized their continuing member-
ship by convincing themselves that these objectives were good and proper
so long as violence was visited upon Japanese relocatees outside, and so
long as a secure fUture lay nowhere on this soil.
In December, events moved swiftly in the other centers with the
lifting of rescission of mass exclusion on the West Coast b-J Amy order.
At Tule, a stable minority welcomed the opportunity to appeal status, or 
if cleared, to escape the rising tide of hysteria byrelocation outside.
The bulk of Tulean males and heads of families fell, by virtue of regis-
tration answers, into the excludee or segregee s.tatus, the fonDer able
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to go out to eastern and midwestern areas, the lat ter having some chance
to relocate through the appealing of status to the 'fjestern Defense Com-
mand. The process was slow and tedious, appeals al-ays outstripping
clearances, and the new factor, the resegregationist clique, was now
sufficiently entrer.ched to menace the application of rescission to TU1e
LaKe. Most important, by January, the Department of Justice had insti-
tutea two programs: first, the renunciation of citizenshiu and second,
the counter-attack on resegregationism. In a letter addressp~ to the
"hoshidan" or serve-Japan group, a representative of the Attorney Gener-
al, attacked the organization, insisted that it must cease activities,
remarked upon his doubts as to the true measure of its patriotic motiva-
tion, and ended, after noting the violence and pressure employed to force
loyalty to Japan upon residents of the center, by promising that tile
"intolerable" activities of the organization "will cease." A pattern of
removal of renunclant and ISsei ~"embers to internment was inau~urated.
Nisei, again under the banner of harmony and solidarity, were swept into
the renunciation program. The rumors of draft and forced relocation for
non-renunci.~nts were broadcast. And as trainloads of men and youths
left for internment centers, hundreds were coaxed, Wheedled, or coerced
into filling the ranks, renouncing ci tizenship, drilling, and entraining
for internment in theil' turn. To prove the pattern of defiance to the
Attorney General's representative in the center, the drill and exercise
of the boys and the~ the girls was moved to the front area of the project
and on Sundays moved back to 9 o'clock for his "benefit and edification."
To the lifting of exclusion, to fears of relocation and the draft,
to insistent pressures of hyste~ical men, must again be added the isola-
tion of the cent,er. It was by now a center not simply fenced off from
contact with the outside and from governmental personnel, but one in
which the ordinary community sanctions of the outside were choked off
while the short wave was turned on in-hundreds of apartments, Where Issei
moved on from their horror of resettlement in America and family break-
up down the path of magnifying a future elsewhere to dream-like propor-
tions. There were now the blood and bones justifications of the order
to children to renounce and to find a future in supporting parents in an
Orient among "their own kind." The burning of the Doi barn, the Hood
River racist rejection of Nisei heroes, or the newspaper clamor about
"disloyals at 'rule Lake" turned th~ argument away from the theme of es-
cape to Japanese culture to one of escape from American soil. To the
Nisei the statement: "Renounce because you are Japanese," replaced the
earlier: "Remain in Tule Lake because you will be drafted or menaced on
the outside." The typical Nisei response in renunciation hearings, over
6,000 strong was: "I renounce because I want to be Japanese." The
Kibei version: "* * * because I am Japanese-with Japanese face and
hair." The Issei wishful thj,nking back in the center included a fund-
raising campaign to buy a "nanyo" or island in t.he South Pacific pending
the outcome of war. Leaders of the hoshidan. promised a continuation of
group enterprise and esprit de corps, long into the future. Nisei,
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perplexed by the magic ritual of drill, language class, and renunciation
argued that if parents, inelj.gible even to American citizenship and ex-
cluded by the taint of race and foreign language from equal participa-
tion in American life--~ they had succeeded against odds in building a
life here (it was now degtroyed), then could not the Nisei of acceptable
race and language in Japan achieve far more?
To summarize, Tule Lake was still moving in a framework of cul-
tural revivalism. This trend had developed, or at least could be
traced back to its first phase in the assembly centers from which it had
been transpianted to all relocation centers a?d, of course, to Tule Lake
as well. It was initially, a type of cultural revivalism Which could be
duplicated among any American Indian ghost dance cult in the early stages
of reservation life, the first manifestation, from instance to instance,
being the revival and preservation of arts, crafts, folkways and mores,
and the refurbishing of the habitual .stock in trade of a defea~ed or
frl1strated older generation. In this case, the patriarchs confined and 
in a sense imprisoned by Governmental action were th~ Issei bent upon
preserving--in the face of disappointments anQ anxieties occasioned by
evacuation--the poetrJ, music, carved wood or flower arrangement, or
possibly the Japanese-style dance, which they felt was threatened, along
with all things culturally Japanese, in the war-conscious world outsid~.
Theirs had been in the nature of a social response to the hysteria,
racism and prejudice which backgrounded evacuation. It was, indeed,
their first real answer to the reported taunt of the Commander of the
Western Defense Conunand, ItA Jap's a Jap." 
At Tule, even after segregation, this romantic dalliance with 
Japanese customs continued in such forms at first as senryu poetry~
clubs, utai singing societies, ~~d in the Japanese-style theatricals of
the Issei. But such clubs and associations as were devoted to these
. interests (and others of a similar nature) were scattered throughout the
project, limited in space and membership, and circ~~scribed in interest.
In the .face of the sharpening up of post-segregation conflicts, it was
hardly such typical group activity which could conceivably bring about
center ~armony and unity vis-a-vis administratio~. And nOYI, 8S the out-
side receded more and more into the past, local administration became
America, the Government, and the General,in their modern form.
As we have said, it was the study-of-cust~roup:which first
suceeded in providing unity and harmony by offering a refuge from fears
.of relocation and inu and by pro~lioing an escape from boredom, defeatism
and frustration in the hoped-for rev,ival of Japanese customs. Of course,
private classes in J8~anese musical1nstruHlents, tailoring, painting,
etiquette and ca11igraphy continued and associations for senryu, utai, 
goh, ,judo, kendo and sumo multiplied. But from ward to ward and group .I
to group there was no constant mecharism, except for the study-of-customs 
group, to chal1~nge local admir~stration and the Government. CIUy here, 
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\ with its 10,000 signatures representing more than half the population,
were the most deep seated fears, wishes and responses to Governmental
ha~dling effectively expressed.
Up to the November period of reorganizin~ in the study-of-customs
group, one could notice that in the extreme wing of the organization
something was happening. Those who had been extremists in the pro-
stockade faction, the aberrant Kibei wing who had been labeled "trouble-
makers" in other camps, and per~~ns...mo had figured prominently j.n the
Poston incident J 8,11 lined up vri th TenIlina1 Island boys headed by a
former leader of the Fisherman's Union there, a man Who happened to be a
most disgruntled veteran of World War I. The five-man Issei top commit-
tee of resegregationists now appeared to be following their lead. While
successive sign-ups or petitions of the resegregationists netted fewer
and fewer signatures, the e~tremists were mobilizing to take over the
organization, a step ,vhich they managed to accomplish in the November
election of cabinets.
At this juncture, the change was felt up and down the line. New
hoshidan headquarters were set up. Drill became more prominent. The
theme of "preparation through study" gave way to the hysterical one of
"speedy repatriation." .The above-mentioned hair-styles, some new sig-
naling devices and a bugle corps appeared. The tightly organized minor-
ity agita ting for resegregation shifted to repatrj.ation as a prime ob-
jective on the basis of two programs: the lifting of exclusion which of
course opened the door to the possible relocation of Tuleans, and the
renunciation program which sounded w.uch as if it gqaranteed a means for
Nisei as well as Issei to adopt a status which! ruled out the draft,
forced relocation, family separation, or the much-abused stigma of 'loyal-
inu or fence-sitters--as the case might be. Since the renunciation law,
as first written, did not even contain age limitations, whole families
were sWUng very early into the program on the basis of the fears and
motivations listed above. It is curious that as the Government's pro-
gram became resettlement, the residents' reaction favored renunciation
and repatriation.
While resegregationism (and even renunciation of citizenship) was
not clearly or simply a matter of loyalty, the lines were again being
drawn in the center between resegregationist and anti-resegregationist.
Consistent with the program of resettlement, repatriation and expatria-
tion requests were being cancelled by a few people, in this case through
the instrumentality of a staff welfare office located in an unadvertised
and undesignated barrack room in Ward III. Those anti-resegregationists
~o could do so, relocated in the course of time, leaving the' stragglers
~mo~g the Nisei to be caught up in the renunciation program. A resettler
was said to be a loyal administration man. A resegregationist had the
courage of his convictions. Obviously loyalty lost any generally signi-
ficant. meaning.
. I
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Of the renunciation program, seen retrospectively, one Nisei, not
in the resegregationistst camp, later wrote:
'It was funny, the.mentality of the people in here then. I
mean both Issei and Nisei. '!he Army, by lifting the exclu-
sion order, had opened the door to relocation. You remember
how people relocated then. '!he camp, however, wasntt ready
for it, so people went out practically in the dead of night.
Two Niseis actually did this. Remember? Anyway, the Jus- 
tice (department) gave the hot-heads their reason for de- 
fiance when they began sending hundreds of renuncees to in-
ternment. To defy that, internment became an honor. Any-
way, it meant no relocation and no draft."
l
There was, moreover, a qualitative difference between going to a
place of infamy like a jail, and being sent to ~ an internment center to
which many well-respected community leaders among the Japanese had been
sent and released from over a period of warti.$e years. '!he formula of
transfer to internment was apparently too simple. Handled by the De-
partment of Justice and .applied to an organization of 6,000 persons at 
Tule Lake, it brought together two factors which had hitherto been im-
portant in the community but which had, up to then, been fortunately un-
connected: (1) the iuportance of cultural revivalism, now in its third
or patriotic phase of escape to Japan; and (2) the desire to exhibit
open defiance to Gove,~ent by accepting renunciation and internment as
escapes framthe intdlerable conditions of center life, possible reloca-
tion and the draft. Since the transfer of literally thousands to intern-
ment was obvicusly wedding these 'two psychological and mass responses,
it was tovlard the end" of this process, but as soon as feasible, that 
local administration intervened. The process of splitting families by
the interning of lrisei renunciants ana Issei hoshidan members ~J the
hundreds, had, it seemed, gone far enou~. Unfortu~ately, hysterical or
. coerced renunciations had been accepted by the Attorney General, in many
cased contrary to the recommendation on the scene of the Justice Depart-
II'lent's own hearing officer. It was further unfortunate that the 'I\1le
Lake ghost-dance cult l.of revivalism had been taken as prima facie evi-
dence of disloyalty~thout proper investigation into individual cases
or into the bases of renunciation or resegregationist thinking in the
center. It therefore seemed important to administration at Tule to pre-
sent to evacuees a clearer picture of the consequences of their action 
using as a frame of reference one which would broaden the picture beyond 
the repression. and defiance patterIJ. 
. 
~1th only a remnant of the hospidan left, and before further con- 
tingents were "horlored" by internment, administrative officials decided 
to deal d:j.rectly with the organization, first through a set of special 
project regulations, and later by means of? series of logical pro-
posa.ls. 7he reb~lations interdicted marching, bu~lir!g, the wearing of
(214)
iemblems, the attendance at orgarizational meetings, and coercion upon
youth to take part in organizational activities. This notice, or pro-
scription, let to many withdrawals fr~ the orgar~zation, but, as was
exp~cted, no slackening of resistange to the ultimatum on the part of
those remaining--a situation Which differed from defiance of the Depart-
ment of Justice or~y on one important respect: loss of membership inthe group. -
.
The next step, therefore, following court trials of dozens of
violators of the special project regulations, was to propose three logi-
c.al alternatives to the organization, the proposals called propositions.
Proposition No.1 was to cease all prohibited activities and remain in
Tule Lake ~ithout -further family separ~tion. Proposition No.2 was to
cease violations of the regulations pending an attempt by VffiA to arrange
an internment trip of eligible males. Proposition No.3 was to continue
the pattern of defiance and take the consequen~s. As was anticipated,
the first proposal, although attractive to ~"any personally, could not be
fitted into the ~ost dance pattern of defiance tc "white officialdom."
The second, a compromise, fared better.
1n the organization, a spli~ occurred as between groups 2 and 3.
Since splits had already occurred in the contingents already in intet"n-
ment, this particular one destroyed fin~ly or complet~ly the unity and
harmony which had been the main asset of th~ organization. Perhaps most
important was the amount of administrative contact ~eveloped with the
aggrieved and confUsed hoshidan.in the presentation of these points.
Unlike the tactic of the Department of Justice in simply arranging
transfers to interr~ent, the neW method was one of attachi~g conditions
of ' compliance with administration, while at the same time arguing against
family separation. This new tactic produced immediate and visible re-
sults. Group 2'?:ithdrew from morning drill. Without fanfare, they
left the project after individually and collectively signing to comply
with these special project regulations." Their bugles were turned in to
internal security. Their more radical confreres in group 3 were left in
a ridiculous position in Tule Lake except for a top leadership forcibly
ejected.
The importance of this action, the fact .that administration had
broken the £ront of unity.and shattered the code of defiance cannot be
minimized. From then on, defiance and unity were again disconnected and
the r.oshidan d.wind1ed in size. Unfortunately, this was not the result
of earlier Department of Justice transfers to internment.
Following the renunciation program of January by a few months,
therefore, withdrawals from the hoshidan and a counter-movement against
unreasoning fanaticism were begun.. The long road back to center normal-
cy had reached its second and final cycle. Administrative contacts with
the center were again multiplied. Restrictions were loosened and
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shopping passes issued. For once, resettlement became the program both I
of the Authority ar;d bf the center residents.
An analysis of this last trend is important since TUle Lake as a
community completely reversed its character. A portion of the Proposi-.
tion 3 group, once their confreres of group 2 had left aejectedly for
internment, managed to gain control of the busiooss enterprises coopera-
tive, the very co-op Which the organized resegregationists, long before
.Hitomi's death, had originally hoped to close. Moreover, the language
schools not only cooperated with officials of the American public and 
hi~~ school administrative system, but willingly curtailed activities
and curricula as the latter sys~em grew in enrollment. The Greater East
Asia Language School became the Tule Lake Language School. The wards
which originally opposed the institution of American nursery schools now
disbanded their Japanese nurseries.in:favor of the administrative systeI:l.
In activities, Japanese movies gave way to the familiar Hollywood\ type,
the project director was invited to throw in the first ball of the base-
ball season, and shaved heads and braids gave way to usual hair styles.
Nisei dances were again arranged. Renunciants, in some instances,
attempted to join the ~rmy before final victory was assured" their Nisei
soldier friends, on fUrlough, being feted in the blocks. Resettlers '
were given farewell dinners. - The Issei began to relocate in advance of
their Children, and there were no more sumo tournaments, kendo practices,
or judo clubs. The recoil from relocation fears and escapism was com-
plete. The center ceased to be a walled-in place of confinement. Ex-
cept for the stalwar:ts who repatriated, there was no longer anyalterna-
tive choice for the £utu~ other than on American soil.
In keeping with the swing in sentiment at Tule Lake, the r~action 
against renunciation wascomplete.a~d final. On November 1, 1945, 
~pproximately a year after the hoshidan reorganization, steps were taken
by outside individuals to mobilize approximately 1,300 Nisei into a
legal suit against the Department of Justice renunciation program. At
this time, the feeling was tilat all renunciants were slated for deporta-
tion, and on November 14, when the original suit was filed, it appeared
that: (1) the suit would attempt to prevent deportation; (2) win re-
lease from the confinement of Tule Lake; and {3) restore citizenship.
The only major reason given by non-members for remaining outside tile
legal group was that ~vernment would brook no further defiance even in
this legal form and t}1at the blame for any coerc~on which entered w,to 
the renunciation progra.'U would be placed, by Jovernment, on the gulli- 
ble followers of the hoshidan. This final phrasing of the theme~-mwe 
are Japanese together"-died out, as fear of deportation and continued 
confinement became the final fears of Tule Lake. 
By the time the Justice Department instituted mitigation hearings "
designed to release renunciants through a rehearing process, the confu-
sions at Tule Lake--between cultural and political affiliation,
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between government and racism outside. between un1ty which spelled
progress and Unity which spelle~ defiance~-were not clear. The final
months at 'rule Lake were a counterpoint of detention, resettlement, and
release. While ma~y repatriate~ throu~h a feeling of helplessness, in
general most energies were now bent toward achievipg self-preservation
through a-concerted effort to obtain a future in America. The "dis--
loyal" center, its residents now facing only concrete and realistic al-
ternatives, once more became a reloca.tion center. The fears attached tc
the status of economic and social refugee no longer had meaning. A
final contingent of over 400, -most~y renunciants, was t~en involun-
tarily to internment. And after a few final resettlers heard 'of their
releases in the eleventh hour, the perimeter lights went out on a
refugee world which had begun its pilgrimage for security in Fresno,
Salinas or Los Angeles, and traveled far in dreams and hopes only to
return.
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Almost from the beginning of the relocation centers people were
leaving to resettle "outside" away from Govermnent supervision. While
this was happening, the canps continued to exist and to function as com- i
munities u~ti1 they were actually depopulated. The outward movement is 
significant in the account of the centers only as the departure of the 
resettlers and the reports that came back fram them affected the organi-
~ation and attitudes of those who remained. When a person went through
the gate for good.. he was off the stage. This epilogue will follow the.
resett1ers..
The Journey ContliUu~d.
'When the .po1icy makers in WRA began to formulate the relocation
program, they redefimd the function of the centers. Instead of serving 
as war duration homes, the camps were to be temporary stopping places. 
As soon as eligibility for release could be determined, ~ would urge 
those who were free to go to leave the centers am would assist them to
resettle. The journey the evacuees had started on the West Co~st When
they were moved to:assemb1y centers and .then to relocation centers was
to be continued until as ~'as possible were established in normal
communities outside of the area of exclusion.
In administrative thinking, resettlement would bring many obvious
benefits. NOt the least of these was that it would disperse persons of
Japanese ancestry throughout the country. It.was recognized that their 
concentration on the West Coast was a factor back of the decision to
evacuate them. If they could be widely scattered, theywouldbecane in-
tegrated with the American majority more rapidly and more fuLly. The
prevailing national prejudice against Japanese Americans as a co11ective
- abst~ction would decline as Americans in many different communities saw
them in the flesh and came to know them as persons. So the relocation
program really had three objectives: to get the evacuees out of the
centers, to disperse them, and to integrate them into the communi ties
where they settled.
It may be hard for the peaceful citizens of Colorado, Ohio, New 
York, or other states to .imagine themselves and their communities as the 
evacuees saw them in late 1942 and during 1943. Sitting in the relative 
safety of the camps, center residents relived evacuation, read the news-
papers (mostly W~st Coast papers), and recounted the. occasional unpleas-
ant experiences of early resett1ers. Innumerable conversations reen-
forced the fears they felt and strengthened their impression that America 
.as almost universally hostile toward them. It seemed to them that most
of the public had interpreted evacuation as tantamount to a declaration
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by the Army that all-Japanese Americans were guilty of potential sabo-
tage. While this was the prevailing tone of thinking and feeling in the
centers, evacuees understood that many Americans were friendly or neu-
tral toward them. This was comforting to know but not too reassuring to
a would-be resett1er. He had no way of telling in advance' what "attiltude
a particular individual might take toward a person who had been ordered
from his home and confined in a camp due to military necessity. Even if
no outright hostility'were encountered, there might be special difficul-
ty in obtaining a sui table job or hoosing.
The journey out into America, therefore, was considered quite ha-
zardous. The sense of uncertainty was increased by reason of the fact
that the territory open for resettlement was strange. Few evacuees had
ever visited the Middle West or East; fewer still had lived there. 'nle
intermountain region appeared a little more familiar. It was nearer the
West Coast both in miles and U1 social-economic conditions. A fair num-
ber of the evacuees had resided or worked in the area at some point in
their careers. Moreover, there were small Japanese communities in sev- -
era1 of the cities and Japanese farmers in some rural districts, affect-
ed - by the war in certain ways but not evacuated.
The earliest relocation tended to concentrate in the intermoun-
tain region. The Japanese communities in the cities--especially in
Denver and Salt Lake--expanded greatly. Farmers and farm workers sought
out the rural sections where Japanese were already established. Denver
and vicinity, for instance, had had about 800 persons of Japanese ances-
try before the war. Between ~earl Harbor and the Army-directed evacua-
tion, some 800 voluntary evacuees from the West Coast came in. Reloca-
tion from the centers added approximately 1,800 more within a few mor;ths.
The influx stirred up so much local antagonism that by t he summer of ~943
WRA was taking steps to curb the flow,
It may be noted in passing that the established Japanese residents
shared the local antagonism toward the incoming evacuees to some degree.
Theywere afrai~ that the newcomers might upset the relatively good re-
lations with their Caucasian neighbors that had continued in spite of I
the war. 'Ihen, too, people frqm the centers bid'up the price of land
and leases and increased competition in the lines of economic activity
in Which Japanese customarily engaged. It is true that many of the old-
timers helped their friends in the camps to relocate, but they felt dif-
ferently toward the strangers who were arriving from the centers.
While the majority of the early resettlers were limiting their
.attention to the Intermountain States, the more venturesome were going
farther from home. They survived 'and others took courage. The setti~
up of Relocation Field Offices helped to instill added confidence. B7
I mid~1943 Chicago had surpassed all other cities, including Denver a'f;11:
Salt Lake, in the number of resett1ers. ~ler contj.ngents were to be
. ~nd irl dozens of communities in Middle West and East.
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With the lifting of the exclusion order in December 1944, it 00- 
came possible for resett1ers to return to the area from wr.ich they had
been evacuated. Instead of continuing their journey, they could retrace
their steps. By that time more than 30, OOO--over a quarter of the total
. number of evacuees--had left the centers. The path of relocation to
points outside tile West Coast was quite well worn. There were friends
the resettler could join. Public sentiment was known to be favorable
and jobs were abundant. Housing was still a problem, but a Rractica1
and tangible problem now. Although cutting loose from a center remained
something of an adven~ure, it was not a hazardous undertaking, at least
for an able-bodied person with no or few dependents.
All this makes it unders:tandab1e that many c enter residents did
not return to the West Coast during the period the cepters were being
closed. About a third of those who left the camps in 1945 decided, that
resett1emeu G elsewhere offered fewer difficulties than reestablishing
themselves where they formerly lived.
i The objective of WRA to disperse the Japanese has been partially
realized. There are some in almost every State. But the dispersion is
not as complete as this statement suggests. Chicago and vicinity has
about 20,000 resettlers, almost a half of those outside of the evacuated
area. There are lesser concentrations in a few other cities and, in the
intezmountain region, in some rural districts. Moreover, during the 3
years relocation was taking place, concentration tended to increase. It
was common for a person to go first, to Omaha or Milwaukee and then move
on to Chicago after awhile.
'What kind of people resettled away from their former homes? Be-f~re the closing period, relocation was a highly selective migration. 
Until t~ end of ~~44, 31 percent of the relocatees were 20-24 years old
~ and 61 percent fell in the age group 15-29. Most were single. "Married
persons were usually men who left their wives and children in the cen-
ters or young couples with no or very few offspring. In view of the age
distribution, it is obvious that Nisei constituted the great majority.
The selective character of the migration went beyond these demo-
~aphic matters. Individuals who relocated while relocation was vo1un-
~ary had motives for doing so. Most adolescent and adult Nisei were not
~atisfied in the centers. They had grown up on the periphery of the West
Coast Japanese coDllluni ties, dividing their participation between the
~ife of the minority community al~ tne life of the larger society. When
th~y arrived in the centers, the minority community was there. True, it
had been disrupted in transit, but Nisei 4ssociates and familiar ISsei
faces we~~present. In the centers, Issei proceeded to develop communi-
ties, resting on their past common experiences, that provided them with
a rather full and pleasant day-by-day existence. Nisei could not build
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a corresponding Nisei-society. Too much had been left behind at evacua-
tion. They were too dependent on the larger comnmnity.
Relocation offered them a way out. '!hey could leave the centers
and participate again in the life of the American majority. But this
raised another problem. 'llIey had to give up the Nisei-Issei world which
had furnished a part of their social and emotional "home" since birth.
The adjustment to the "new outside" was least difficult f'or a
very few people who had lived largely or completely indepetdent of the
Japanese community before. Such persons generally left the centers as
soon as they could since the center communities offered them almost no-
thing. Except for the possibility that they mig;ht meet some anti-
Japanese prejudice, relocation meant little more than it means to a mem-
ber of the American majority to move into a strange town. A young man
who went from Heart Mountain to Atlanta soon had a good job and a circle
of friends. He liked the city. The fact that he did not see another
Nisei for months on end disturbed him not at all.
His case is unusual. Most Nise:!. missed the association of Japa-
nese Americans. Even one who resettled in the intermoun~ain region had
his troubles. The Japanese he met, both the e~tab11she~residents and
other resettlers, were strangers. In the getting acquainted process he
did not have the social and moral support of his family. What his life
experience had really fitted him for was participation in a particular
West Coast community--a familiar system of relations in which he had
status in a family, in friendship groupings, in a minority society, and
in a more inclusive society.
Nevertheless, the adjustments to Denver or Salt Lak~ were easx-
compared to the adjustments faced by those who went ou'(, early to the
Middle W6St and East. Most of them felt acutely lonely, out of place,
and self-conscious. They tended to contact the Relocation Office quite
frequently during the first few weeks. It was one known item in their
strange new environmen~. They obtained such solace as they could from
companionship with other Nisei. The cottVention of formal introductions
was generally ignored. Two r esettlers who- had never seen each other
would exchange greetings. Soon would come the questions, "What center
are you from?:" and then "Where did you live before that?" Thereafter,
there was a reciprocal search for common acquaintarees. "So you 're from
Gila. I knew a few people who went there. Did you happen to meet n
Or, "San Jose. I was there a couple of weeks once, visiting my uncle.
. You probably know some of the fellOW's I met * * *." They were trying to I
establish quickly some common ground so that they could relax with each
other and reminisce together about the old days before evacuation.
Even a iter Nisei had found some friends, they could not do things
the way they used to on the West Coast. T1:'.ere were few places they
7000..80-46-16 .
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could go where just ~!isei would be present; where they could be natural
and have a good time. Always other kinds of people were around, making
them feel conspicuous and a t least a little. uncomfortable. They ,'{ere
inclined to feel this way even if other people paid n~ attention to
them. If they attempted to gain reassurance by seeking entertainment in
fairly large groups, then they were conspicuous.
Nisei were helped and their troubles were increased by their
friends and well-wishers. WRA, local resettlement committees, religious
groups, and other organizations welcomed them, aided them to find hous-
ing and jobs, and attempted to integrate them into the life of the com-
munity. Nisei appreciated these efforts. At the same time .they found
it hard to behave the way they were supposed to or were expected to. At
the time when public relations were still delicate and adverse reaction
easily aroused, the word was passed around in some cities that no more
than three iN~8ei should walk along the street. together and that no more
th~ five should be together in a restaurant. They were urged to avoid
all-Nisei gatherings. Now was the time for the Japanese to integrate
with the larger society and get away from the subsociety in which they
had lived.
Nisei responded in differing ways to these suggestions. and e 11-
forts. Those who relocated early generally tried to conform. They de-
liberately denied themselves Nisei company- 'they longed for. They attend-
e d mixed-race parties at which they were inwardly ill at ease. Some of
them became quite well adjusted to this sort of participation after
awhile so that they continued it from choice. Others grew discouraged
~d turned again to other Nisei for social satisfactions or found some
c~mpromise acceptable to them. Quite a few never made any serious at-
tempt to integrate. They simply ignored the program and associated with
non-Nisei or Nisei as practical expediency or their personal inclina-
tions dictated. Usually this meant work relations were with the former,
leisure-time relations with the la tter.
It sanetimes happened that integration became an issue. The word
acquired emotional connotations and was even used as a label for classi-
fying Nise.1. One girl said:
"For awhile in Cleveland it was really funny. Integration
was the sub.ject of no end of arguments. One girl would
say pf another, 'Ob yes, I know her. But I don't have
much to do wi th her. She's not inte gra ted, you know.' Or,
it might be the other w~y. One group of girls seemed to
be the pride and joy of some Cleveland people. who wanted
us to integrate. These girls got along all right with
each other but they avoided the r est of us. They always
went around with Caucasians."
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1I'or a great many early resettlers, the first weeks or months were
an uncomfortable period. Their lack of adjustment w~s expressed in nu-
merous ways. They did not like their jobs. A largepercentage han had
little or no work experience. Even 1nose who had worked for some years
usually found themselves in jobs different from any they had held. But
their criticisms of their employment went beyond what would have been
evoked by the employment itself. Their reactions in that field were a
part of their total reactions to the difficulties of adjustment. It was
the same with other aspects. Housing was terrible. The climate was aw-
ful. The city was noisy and dirty. The local people were Quite nice,
many of them, but they did not understand. Conversations among Nisei
tended to be gripe sessions. Many longed to return to the center. Few
went except for visits. They knew that would not satisfy them either.
Some, especially boys, flitted from job to job, even from city to city,
trying to locate a bt!tter situation. Other Nisei heard that this be-
havior was giving the Nisei a reputation for instability and affecting
employers 1 at ti tudes adversely. So they determined to stick to their
jobs tenaciously and work diligently, partly to establish a good record
for themselves and partly to improve the reputation of the Nisei group.
There were those who sought to make themselves feel better by earning
and saving all they could. Others spent all of their wages inexpensive
and exciting entertainment and sent "home" to the center for more funds.
Most of these responses seem to have been symptoms of the big
thing they missed in the new environment. They missed the old Japanese
American community--their families, Issei support and direction, Nisei
groups .with established orggnization and ways. To a degree they even
missed the discrimination they had lived with and under on the West
Coast. Now, they were free to do many things they could not do before,
but they did not know what they could and could not do. The limits and
I restrictions they met seemed ill de~ined and inconsistent. They felt
uncertain.
The process of adjustment was probably made more difficult by the
sense of temporariness most resettlers felt. The West Coast was home;
they intended to return someday. There was no use going to too much
bother to make life more satisfactory. The "outside" was just a little
better, or less bad, than the centers as a place in which to put in time
until they could go home.
\
During 1944 conditions changed a good deal. Reset tlers became
quite numerou~ in New York, Cleveland, and Minneapolis. Chicago was
the mecca. The early r esettlers grew accustomed to the places they
lived. They not only had objectively better .;obs and housing, but their
jobs and ~o~sing seemed better. There were Nisei clubs and meeting plac-
ces where they could be by themselves. The natives got used to seeing
them, even in fairly large groups. Among same Nisei and local people,
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there was still talk of the need for integration. But the program was
no longer pressed with the urgency it had been.
As Nisei societies emerged, less assimilated Nisei left the cen-
ter and were able to get along. A few ISsei parents joined their chil-
dren. They wrote back to their Issei friends and one now and again de-
cided to come aut. In 1945 this movement continued with increased vol-
ume. At first it was mostly more adolescent and adult Nisei. Then, as
the closing dates of ~e centers drew nearer, wives and children, par-
ents, and whole families swelled the migration.
Now, the BEring oof 191.6, in the points of concentration in the
middle western aria eastern cities there is no lack of Japanese American
associates. Even ISsei can find friends with whom they can relax. It
is not as easy to get together as it used to be on the West Coast. That
is, although t."ere has been a tendency for Japanese to congreg~te in
certain sectiope of cities they are not compact settlements of the sort
characteristic of pre-evacuation california. In spite of the presence
of a fair percentage of Issei, such organization as local Japanese pop-
ulations have developed reflects the Nisei rather than the ISsei. Clubs
abound. For the most part their membership expresses sorting on the
bases of income, occupation, sophistication, degree of assimilation, and
so forth. Relocation center background is manifested weakly in social
participation. Whether one's pre-evacuation home was California or the
Northwest makes more difference, but this factorappears to be of declin-
ing importance. There is no formal over-all organization of the minori-
ty. JACL, where there is a chapter~ speaks for the minority and is al-
lowed to do so. But its membership is small and many Nisei are not very
well posted on its program.
In economic matters, in matters of survival, the Japanese are a
relatively undifferentiated segment of the population of the cities in
which they have settled. True~ there are same Japanese stores, restau-
rants, and professionals that cater to the Japanese. But the income
that supports these services to consumers is derived from diversified
kirrls of activity carried .on in maIl)" different lines. There is nothing
comparable to the well-knft complex of growing~ wholesalingl and re-'
tailing produce that. the Japanese had built up on the West Coast. Prob-
ably the lack of cammon interests in income-getting activities is a fac-
tor in absence of formal over-all organization.
There is an over-all collective sentiment. Japanese Americans
feel they are a kind of people, and they recognize that members of the
larger society think of them as a category. The public behavior of any
Japanese is of CODCern to all Japan~se. They are interested in protect-
ing and improving their status as a category. Not many persons are J.n-
~erested enough, however~ to devote much time and effort to an organized
program to that end. Those who are very 1Pt_erest.ed compose JACL.
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Fonnal organizations, except for JACL, exist for recreational and
religious purposes. They divide the minority along many different lines.
Japanese American communities in the Middle West and East have a
fairly settled air about them. Nisei are not changing jobs rapidly; IS-
sei and Nisei are buying property. Adjustmen t is still going on and
there is much adjusting left to do. There remain some vital unanswered
questions. One of the biggest is what will happen when and if depression
comes. Will they meet discrimination and find themselves in a more vul-"
nerable position than when they had a strong minority social-economic or-
ganization? There is much looking toward the West Coast. ISsei talk
about it more, but many Nisei think they may go back someday. Individu.
als and families are leaving all the time and others are working on plans.
More commonly, they are disposed to wait and see how those who are there
get along. If the reports are favorable, maybe then they will return.
But perhaps by then many of the relocated Californians and Northwestern-
ers will have become Middle Westerners am Easterners--no more Ijkely to
migrate to the Pacific Coast than their non-evacuated neighbors.
The Journey Back
-
"When the West Coast is open to us again" was a frequently repeat-
ed condition to resettlemen,t. The people who said it composed the core
of the center communities. What they had in mind primarily was the pos-
sibility of going back to their old localities and reconstituting their
former communities. When the exclusion order was rescinded and the clo-
sing of the centers was announced, they were deeply disturbed. At first
it seemed that West Coast histility might continue to keep them out. Af-
ter the hostility began to subside, another problem became uppermost.
They ofter, spoke of it in terms of survival. They just couldn't live.
fut most perso~ were not really afraid of failing to survive. They
figured they could be domestics, work on the railroad, be farm hands, or
resort to casual labor. They could manage to eat all right. What troub-
led them most was how they could reestablish the broken economic systems
on Which their old communities rested. The systems and the communities
would not have to be exactly as they used to be. EVerybody knew that was
out of the question. But Issei especially felt that the main fe~tutes
would have to be restored before they could have anywhere near adequate
economic security and a satisfying way of life. To a much gre$l.ter degree
than the Nisei who resettled eastward, their sense of belonging~ of fit-
ting in somewhere, depended on being able to participate in a Japanese
community. Moreover, a good many knew that their standard of living
would be definitely lower if they could not operate in a Japanese econom-
ic system as well. Produce wholesalers had both bought from and sold to
Japanese. '!hey am some other business men and professio!1als saw no sub-
stitute for their previous economic roles that would not involve a sharp
decline in their economic status or, at best, expose a~ savings they hao
to great risk. They had "know-how" within the old framework; outside of
it they were less sure of themselves.
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JHow even the main features could be rebuilt appeared to be an in-
soluble problem. In the centers there was much discUssion and many ex-
pressions of discouragement. As time passed and the agency reiterated
its intention to close the camps, an increasing number of people con-
cluded they would have to relocate, accept What they could get, and work
toward the conditions of existence they wanted.
Characteristically, those who left the centers for the West Coast
early in 1945 were persons who felt they could get along without other
Japanese. They were not like the assimilated Nisei who fled from the
centers to the Middle West and East as soon as they were allowed to
-leave. These 1945 resettlers who were going back home were emotionally
tied to the Japanese community. But they could live without it. They
had farms or businesses that could function as part of the general West
Coast economy. Their sense of responsibility to the group seemed to be
weak. They were concerned primarily wit!! themselves and their own
fUtures. Other Japanese would have to take care of themselves. An
]ssei stated before he left Heart Mountain for his orchard in Hood
River, Oregon, that he did not intend to employ Japanese on his place.
Their presence might damage his relations wi th the Caucasian comnnlni ty ,
already stirred up against the return of eyacuees. A similar assertion
was made by an older Nisei who was going back, with his ]ssei parents,
to his farm in Santa Clara Valley. The Nisei went on to add that he
hoped no returning evacuees would settle on his side of the river.
There had been none there before evacuation and he. thought his own situ-
ation would be easier if none came.
I I
. T-his individualistic thinking which abandoned the idea of the I
Japanese community and economy, though common at fir$t, was not univer- sale In March, Hollywood evacuees held meetings in one center. Two 
successful contract gardeners offered to go back to see if they could
get started again themselves and to develop opportunities for others.
In the months that followed they called out many of their friends who in
turn helped their friends.
During the mass exodus of the summer and fall collective s enti-
ments --ere reaffirmed and cooperation became marked. The journey back,
as thousands joined the movement, created what amounted to a protracted
crisis. People with nowhere else to go jammed temporarily into hostels
--churches, former Japanese language schools, and similar buildings
filled with row on row of cots. For a short period in one hostel, 300
men, women, and children were fed out of a single kitchen and depended
on two small bathrooms. Housing was tight, the s~arch for it frantic.
Jobs were needed too, and in a hurry since subsistence was no longer
furnished by the Government except in cases where eligibility for wel-fare assistance could be established. WRA did what it could, other 
Federal and local agencies generally cooperated, and interested private
groups and organizations lent their aid. But perhaps most of all, the
returning evacuees helped each other.
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This crisis, like others in the past, served to call attention to ,
the common problems of the Japanese. But unlike evacuation or registra-
tion, the concrete and specific problems posed by resettlement were ex-
tremely diversified. Different people in different places faced a wide
variety of situations. There was a general spirit of mutual sympathy
and mutual helpfulness, but active and sustained cooperation tended to
be limited to groups living in the same locality who had a particular
set of practical and immediate needs. The whole locality group was too
disorganized to function very effectively.
What happened was that people Who owned houses or were able to
get housing shared their space with later corners While they hunted for a
place to live. Japanese did give employment to other Japanese. This
was true of the Hood River orchardist and the Nisei farmer in Santa
Clara Valley. Of course, they needed labor and labor was scarce. But
that was not the whole story. When the pinch came as people poured back
to the West Coast, they were "all Japanese together." Some individuals
who were well-fixed themselves devoted much time to findin~ opportuni-
; ties for resettlers. In March 1946, a prospefous.man in Palo Alto said
~ ' jokingly:
!
: "I'm still working for WRA helping relocation. I've been
i doing it all along since I came back last June. The only
difference is that When I was in the center WRA paid me$19 a month for my work. Here I get nothing." .
Nothing, that is, except the gratitude of his fellow Japanese.
~ Not all of the assistance r~settlers gave and are giving each .
other is motivated by good will and the cooperative spirit. Everyone
feels a sense of urgency to get started again~ to obt~in some income, to
build up a reserve. Strategically placed individuals are under strong
temptation to seek economic security for themselves by exploiting the
often desperate needs of others. Among the resettlers bitter complaints
can be heard against certain Japanese who have made a lucrative business
out of "helping" their fellows.
The adjustments imposed by the journey back are too diverse and
complicated to be described very well in general terms. Most Hood River
Valley Japanese owned their farms. Their chief problem was opposition
to their return on the part of some of the inhabitants of the Valley. A
vigorous campaign to s care them array was launched as soon as the West
Coast was opened. Even their friends in Hood River teared for their
safety should they come back. The pioneers, three Nisei who returned to
- widely separated farms in January 1946, recall their sense of isolation,
I their feeling of being in hostile territory. A strange sort of home-
coming! One Nisei tells of the long quiet evenings, too long and too
quiet, as he lived alone in the house where he grew up. It helped when
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a stray dog joined him. -He named the dog "Friend." It also helped
when the man represent~ng WRA in the Valley called to give him encou~
agement and assure him that the agency was doing what it could to im-
prove public sentiment. Some of the neighbors he had known all his life
treated him all right. But they seemed a little self-conscious, as if
they behaved cordially toward a Nisei. After awhile the scare campaign
subsided. More neighbors seemed to accept him. He notified the rest of
the family to come on out of the center. Other scouts reported and
other families arrived. Almost all who were evacuated are back, plus a
few more who are there as farm workers. According to one man speaking
in February 1946'
"We are getting along. Some of the orchards are not in very
good shape. They weren't taken care of right. Everybody is
working hard trying to get them fixed up again. As long as
prices stay the way they are, we'll be able to make money.
We have trouble getting equipment, but so do all the farmers
I guess. It isn't the way it used to be though. The people
of the Valley don't treat us the same as gefore evacuation.
But it's a lot better than i~ was a year ago and is getting
bet ter all the time."
Incidentally, the dog named "Friend" is still with the family whose re-
location he aided. He is a tiny factor in the readjustment of the
Japanese in Hood River.
1n no other place was ownership as general as in Hood River.
,
"In Santa Clara Valley very few owned their farms. Mostly
they leased on a cash basis, put some share cropped. A few
of the Japanese were pretty big operators. More of them
worked on a smaller scale am there were a lot of little
places. The 1mpo!tant thing to remember is that, big or
little, almost everybody had a farm which he operated on his
own account. I would say no more than five percent worked
for somebody else as farm workers. Ka.ybe not eveD 'tbat
many.
"Except for those who awned their places, now we are all
farm laborers, working for somebody else for wages. A few
have been able to bUY' land or get leases. B.1t the prices
are high. And if you sold your equipment at evacuation the
, way I did, you're stuck.- So here I am. The wages I get are
good and the people I work for treat me .eU- But I don't
like it. I would sooner be on my own. But what else can I
dot I have a family and we have to live." ';
I
!
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~ The speaker' was an older Nisei, a block manager in one of the
i centers. Another Nisei of about the same age expressed many of the
same attitudes and gave some of his views of the future:
"I am doing the ,kind of work I hadn't done for 15 to 20
years before evacuation. I used to hire other men to do it
for me. But I'm not proud. I'll do anything that comes
!I along. The only thing is that I want to be paid for it.
.\ I want all I can g,t. The whOle family went ou t into the
orchards and fields when we first came back. For five
months starting in July, we averaged a thousand dollars a
month. Of course, we couldn't keep on doing that well.
That was the fruit picking season. The girls kicked at
doing farm work. I guess I spoiled them before evacua-
tion. The relocation camp spoiled them too. They got
ideas there about white-collar jobs. A girl can make more
picking .fruit and there is no question about her being
hired ev~n if she does have slant eyes.
\ "Right now there is no chance of getting back into farm-
I ing on my own. The way I figure is that there won't be a
I chance until we begin to get a depression. Until then,! those who have land will hang on to it or boost the price
sky high. As soon as the selling price of fruit and T8ge-
tables slips a little, you'll see. The way some people
farm these days--just a little fall and they'll start to
lose. Then they'll be glad to sell or lease. That's why
I want to get as much money as I can n~. I want to have
a little capital for when the chance come~.."
In Santa Clara Valley public sentiment toward the returning
evacuees has been consistently better than in many areas. There are
more Japanese than there were before evacuation. Their predominant
economic adjustment has been to become fa~ laborers. The adjustment
has been accepted qy them as a temporary expedient.
IIn several other rural sections - where evacuees used to operate
as tenant farmers, only a small percentage have returned. Local h08-
tility during the main exodus from ~he centers or the kind of agricul-
ture carried on limited their oppo~unities even as farm workers. They
have had to look elsewhere. Same have gone to places like Santa Clara
Valley; others to cities; still others to the railroads, Where they
work chiefly in section crews or extra gangs.
. In the cities, the first and biggest problem was housing. Re-
turning evacuees had to have somewhere to live before they could begin
to adjust in other ways. Most of them, throu~h diligent search and
much mutual aid, have found living ~arter8 of some sort in di8tricts
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where the Japanese are allowed ~ live. Their distribution is similar
to the pre-evacuation pattern, though they are somewhat more scattered.
Many who were unable to locate a place have solved the difficulty Qy
taking jobs where housing is furnished-- jobs as domestics and gardeners
who live in. Sometimes this means the dispersion of families. A coup-
le lives and works at one place, their daughter at another, and their
son has a roam downtown near the shop that employs him. The pay is
good and expenses are low. But Thursday family reunions are a poor
substitute for having a home Where the family can be by itself. Even .
when there is no family split, there is the matter of isolation. Do-
mestics work mostly in the "better" sections where Japanese cannot have
homes. On Thursdays Japanese restaurants are crowded with people
visiting with their friends and, perhaps, eating their first Japanese
food s1nbe the previous Thursday. Living-in as domestics and gardeners
is as much a temporary expedient to many urban people as farm labor is
to rural people.
Another solution to the housing problem was provided by WRA in
cooperation with Federal Public Housing Au.thority. A number of tempora-
ry housing projects were made available to returning evacuees. "Reset-
t:J,.einent camps" they might be called~ WRA considered them to be an emer-
gency solution; they would afford living quarters until resett1ers could
find something else. It proved difti~lt to carry through wi"th tilis
conception. The CaJI!pS, though def~1tely lIlakeshift in most cases, were
places to stay. Faced with the dtrt1CUlty of finding anything else,
people tended to settle down. Sin-c8 the projects were gepera1ly situated
at SQlle distance fraIl the main areas of employment th1S often meant that
they took inferior j~bs nearby or were unemployed. That is, the emer-
gency so'1Ution as regard~ housing frequently interfered with adjustment
in other fields. By the spring of 1946, practically all of the projects
were closed and the remaining ones. were fixed up so as to be less make-
shift. For the occupants of the camps, this was the final "pushing
around" they suffered at the hands of WRA.
The reemergence of Japanese communi ties and the economic adjust-
ment in cities can best be seen in Los Angeles. The former Japanese
business district was taken over ~~wartime Negro in-migrants. Little
Tokyo became Bronzeville. The central part of it is rapidly becoming
Little Tokyo again. Resett1ers themselves have been astonished by the
speed of the transformation. An Issei said in April 1946:
"When I came back in Janua~ last year, it was solid
!legroes around here. I womered if this would ever be
Japanese town again. Nothing much happened .for quiteawhile. Even during the ~er, there were just a few 
places opened by Japanese. I figured it would be at
least three or four years before we .cou1d take over.
Then du ring the late summer and fall, they really
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started to come back. Soon there were .ore Japanese than
Negroes, and JapaDese bueinesses all UR and down the streets.
I was surprised."
He told this in one of the eeveral Japanese restaurants that are
now operating. If he desired to do so, he could obtain from other
Japanese most of the goods and services he would ever need within three
blocks of the intersection of East First am San Pedro streets. Re-
settlers also point out that the district is far from being what it used
to be. But it does ~ontain much that is familiar aId gives people a
sense of being home. In other areas of the city Where less compact
settlements of Japanese existed the same process is going on. The war-
time occupants are being displaced and some of the former businesses are
being established.
I
But it is not in stores and restaurants that the main business
come-back is bei ng staged. Japanese who have some capital to invest
seem most interested in small hotels and ap~rtment houses. This was an
important economic activity before evacuation. Now the preoccupation
with the field is intense. Quite a number of men make their ,living
lining up deals for others. Hotels and apartment houses are being ac~
quired not only in and near the old Japanese district but all over the
de~eriorated area.of the city.
Two factors account for this extraordinary interest. This is one
way to obtain both housing- and income and no insurmountable legal or
customary obstacles are encountered.
The usual method of getting hold of hotels and other busil1esS
property is to b~ up leases. The prices that have to be paid are high.
In the case of hotels and apartment houses competitive bidding by
Japanese themselves has doubled or tripled the prices during the past
year. Resett1ers explain that this is another chapter in the losses
that evacuation caused them. A number of sma~l hotels were thrown on
the marlcet all at once when they had to leave in 1942. Now they are all
in the'market again trying to buy them back. Men who sold the furnish-
ings and lease of a hotel for $1,000 to $1,500 have to pay about 10
times that much now to get control of the same business.
Even at such inflated prices, hotel and apartment men are making
money. They admit it is a risk. Unless Los Angeles maintains its pres-
ent level of prosperity for two more years, they stand to lose. But
they feel they have to do something to try to get started again and that
they must take the chance. The fa! th they share with other Los
Angelenos in the bright future of the city helps buoy their spirits.
Hotel men and other downtown businessmen call attention to the
difference in their customers before evacuation and now. Before, the
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customers of restaurants and stores were chiefly other Japanese--cit~
people or farmers from the outlying districts. This was less true of
hotels. They were patronized by Caucasian transients and pensioners,
mostly single men, as well as Japanese. Now customers are predominantly
Negroes. After some initial hesitation, Japanese business~'en have con-
cluded that Negroes are good customers. Some of the resettlers are t'
talk~g of a new economic role for the Japanese. Maybe, they say, pro- ~
virling goods and certain kinds of services to ~groes is a new field b
that should be developed. \
t;
So far, the really big pre-evacuation business--vegetable market- k
ing--has not been I!"'entioned. For many monthS after the opening of the !
, V[est Coast, the interests that controlled vegetable marketing maintained
a solid front against returning evacuees. It w as the. original intentian
to exclude them entirely. Not only wo~ld they be kept out as dealers,
but they would not be bought from, so~d to, or employed. This extreme
position has broken down. Resettlers are working in the market. Farm-
ers have no trouble selling their crops and retailers can buy produce.
But they have not gone far in the field that interests them most--whole-
saling, Shipping, and working as b~ers and salesmen on commission. ~
..
Reentering the produce market, of course, is more than a problem
of overcoming the organized opposition to Japanese by those who control
it. There are few Japanese farmers and few Japanese retailers. The
whole complex of relations that used to exist is gone. Even if there
were no opposition, this fact would be an effective obstacle. As
Japanese succeed in being admitted to the more lucrative aspects of
market operations, they will have to do business within a new framework.
,
The circumstance that the -returned evacuees are still largefy
outside of the produce market has had repercussions on many phases of
their economic adjustment. It is partly responsible for the concentra-
tion on hotels and apartment houses. The interest in providing goods
and services for the Negro community reflects a search for substitute
business opportunities in another direction. Contract gardening was a
profitable occupation before evacuation; now it is even better. The
field is not crowded yet, but only the limitations of skill, housing,
and equipment keep it from being overcrowded. The situation with 
reference to the produce market reenforces the housing shortage as a
fact.or in inducing people to accept jobs as domestics. 1!'[ith reference
to the Nisei, ma~ Who would formerly have been working for and with
other Japanese, processing or selling vegetables, have sought and found
employment here and there in factories, shops, and offices that did not
hire Nisei before the war. A few have obtained white-collar positions
of a kind that were definitely closed to t.l1em before evacuation. 
There is a Japanese community in Los Angeles again. only a few
of the early resettlers had the experience of living in isolation from
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~ other Japanese. BUt. the community is not the same as it used to be.
Nisei complaired during much of the period of moving back that there
were not enough Nisei. Too many had relocated to places outside of
the West Coast and were staying there. The complaint is heard less now.
This is partly because a considerable number of Nisei have returned from
the East. A more important factor is that t.he Nisei who were back in
Los Angeles all along have become acquainted or reacquainted, developed
some organization, and found places to go and things to do. They do
not feel. life is as it should be yet. Too maI!Y girls are domestics who
. live in. Tl"leir hours arid scattered locatjon interfere with their con-
ta.cts with other Nisei. Many boys are so preoccupied with their jobs
and wj_th helping their families tllat they h8.ve little time to mix with
their friends. And there is so~,ething rarely known before evacuation--
qui te a flew Nisei do not like Los Angeles. SolT'.e came back at the
urging of ,their f,arnilies to find that they had to take employment that
is inferi~r to the jobs they had iniChj_cago or Cleveland. They are
pleased to be reunited with their families, but they miss the l~isei
world th.ey had been living in.
When Issei have time, they can go to a Japanese restaurant to eat
~ and talk with their friends. They can also visit each other at home--
providing the home to be visited is not too crowded. Ordinary casual
social satisfactions with other Issei are there to be had. There is
even an occ;:asional dinner arranged for some special purpose. At least
two 'utai gro~p. are functioning and there is talk of trying to get up
a Japar.ese dra~a group. But life is too busy and too confused to do
much that requires time, money" or organization. In the course of
visiting" the kind of organization that should be worked toward is con-
sidered. There are differences of opinion. Some hold that something
comparable to the old Japarese Chamber of Commerce--predominantly or
wholly Issei--will be needed. Otbers are afraid of j. ts possj.ble
adverse influence on public relations. Such persons advocate staying
in the background and letting Nisei do the organ1zing. The di.strust of
Nisei leadership and especially of JACL comes up. But the question is
discussed more calmly than it was in the centers. In spite of the
inadequacies of Nisei.leadetshjp, maybe it has to be .depended on.
;iaybe JACL should be supported more. Almost everybody agrees on one
point, "We should wait and see how tllings turn out before we do any-
thing." Then someone usually adds in one way or another, "We are too
busy and our resources too limited to 00 anything now anyway. Now
what we have to do is to plan and work and try to rebuild our economic
foundation."
More than 50,,000 evacuees have made the journey back. They have
relocated from the centers, but they can hardly be said to have re-
settled. Both their spatj_al and their occupational distribution has
been profoundly altered. They are still largely outside of their two
major pre-evacuation economic pursuits--farm;ing on their own account
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and the marketing of vegetables. It follows that relAtively few have
arrived at what they would be willing to consider a pernanevt or fairly
permanent adjustment. Not many,. on th'e other c..and, are still flounder-
ing around as far from an adjustment as when they left the center. Most
people have accepted some expedient which provides them a living and
often permits them to save. They view the expedient as a temporary base
from which they can work toward the economic position and the kind of !
life they want.
,
,
The three most common of these expedient adjustments are .employ- ~
ment as farm laborers, railroad laborers, and domestics. '!he direction
~he farm laborers want to move and how they intend to do it ~s quite
clear . ~y have~ come to the unhappy conclusion that most of them will
have to work for someone else as long as profits in agriculture are
high. When a depression approaches, they will be able to get back into
farming on their own account. In the case of the Issei, there is a
chance that they may not be able to do this. Laws against leasing land
to Japanese aliens are being enforced more vigilantly than before
evac',ation.
.What will happen to the domestics and the railroad workers as
they try to leave their temporary bases is not so plain. Both, of these
,expedients are chiefly the result of a pervasive factor in the
situation--the housing shortage. The people in these groups have rather
diversified backgrounds and probably equally diversified goals.
The returned evacuees have not proceeded very fa~ in rebui~ding
their economic system. There are businessmen and professionals who make
their living dealing wi th other Japanese. But most income-getting
activities on the West Coast, as1elsewhere, go on with reference to the ~
larger' economy. The hope of recreating something along the line of the
former produce marketing complex has not been given up and persistent
efforts will probably be made in the future. The immediate economic
objective is to accumulate as much as possible in any way that presents
itself. People feel that while they were in the camps they missed a
good opportunity to improve their fortunes and that now they must get
all they can before a postwar depression sets in.
'!here are Japanese communities in cities and towns all up and down
the Pacific Coast. As yet they have not taken on much organization.
'!he relations between Issei and Nisei, the kind of formal organizations
that should exist, and the sort of orientation that should be maintained
toward the rest of society are subjects for discussion. Action, it is
generally felt, should wait.
In every way things are in a state of flux. Few people are \
satisfied with their awn si tuationj nobody is satisfied with the con~i- ~
tion of the group. Nany changes can be expected in the next few yea~s. f
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Some persons are much discouraged about the future. Others see possi-
bili ties for something better than used to be. Meanwhile, almost
everybody plans and works.
Discontinuities and Continuities
As they sat in the centers and looked at the past, Issei reviewed
evacuation in the perspective of their history in America. Their inter-
pretation reflected their oW'n biases in some degree. "After a half
century of discrimination and persecution, this came," they often said.
That is, evacuation was just the last and most drastic thing that had
been done to them. They found it all very hard to understand. Their
labors had helped develop the West. They had tried to be good resi-
dents--to obey the laws, to be self-supporting, to take care of their
own economic failures, to keep all members of the group in line:.
Especially after they got J~rican children, it seemed to them that
~~ey had gone out of their way to do What they should. They sacri-
ficed to educate their children and trained them so well that there
was very little juvenile delinquency among Nisei. Issei organizations
, always ha~ as a part of their program the promotion of friendship and
understanding with the American public.
Still, year after year, some of the newspapers spoke of them as
. a menace. The land laws made their life difficult. They were considered
unworthy to become citizens. Politicians occasionally "shook them down"
as a price for not increasing the pressure. Worst of all, they saw the
attitudes toward them being'extended to their children. For all they
could do to shield them, they noticed that many of the Nisei were
growing uP. to feel inferior because their parents were Japanese.
When the war started, Issei soon found themselves viewed as
~eing really dangerous, or at least potentially dangerous. And under
the simple formula, "Once a Jap, always a Jap," their children and
grandchildren were included with them. This, too, was hard to under-
stand. Said an ISsei earnestly:
"We aren't dangerous. Really we aren't. I know. As
for the Nisei--if it wasn't so tragj.c, it would be
funny. Couldn't the Government find out how we were
before they did thlS to us?"
There is a feelir.g here that the Occidental mind is a little inscrutable.
! In the centers, the war was followed with intense interest.
I Kaybe it would make a difference in the life of the Japanese in America.
~ If the United States could not win, if a stalemate and. a negotiated
peace were the outcome, perhaps Japan as a clearly recognized first-rate
! power could intercede regarding the land laws and the denial of
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rcitizenship. Even ordinary Americar1s might have more respect for
persons of Japanese ancestry. Issei had not wanted the war. The gt"ow-
ing possibility that it would come had filled then with dread. But now
that it was here, they hoped that it might improve their status am
make the future of Issei and Nisei in this country less difficult.
It was not to be. Japan was defeated. Back on the West Coast
they have to face the same lard laws and the same anti-Japanese
prejudice. There are even same new things. .Oregon has a more stringent
land law. The meclianisms of evasion that had been developed to permit
leasing and ownership are under official scrutiny. California is carry-
ing on a campaign to escheat land already held. The city of Portland
will not issue business licenses to Japanese aliens. And until a new
trade treaty with Japan is negotiated, Issei feel that their business
operations are vulnerable to attack at any time. Moreover, they take
up the struggle with depleted resources and without the economic
strength they used to deri~e from their well-organized system for
growing and distributing produce.
Most of the core of the Japanese community accepted this prospect.
America and the West Coast was home to them and they would make the best
of it. Some Issei and many Nisei, at first perforce and later by choice,
settled away from the West Coast, encountering some Pew problems and
avoiding some old ones.
A very few evacuees sought escape into unreality. 'I'ney could not
resume the struggle under the conditions that existed. '!here are
persons--a few hundred, with rare exceptions ]ssei--who persist in
believing that Japan was not defeated. They have resettled and live on
in a dream world, waiting for the truth about how the war ended to be
made known. A large proportion of those who requested repatriation
from Tule Lake had similar ideas at the time they left. This is the
obvious human wreckage that the war and evacuation produced among the
evacuees. To be added to the account is a small percentage of resettlers
who are oriented in reality but who are so overcome by the difficulties
of the struggle to get started again that they are flound~ring about
ineffectually or putting forth only feeble effort.
Most of the evacuees have come through the experience with sur-
prisingly undamaged personalities. Issei especially seem to be the
same kind of persons they used to be. In a sense, they had had some
preparation for evacuation. It was expected that something might be
done to them, not because they were dangerous but just because such
things are likely to be done during a war. Then, the communities they
developed in the centers helped them. They were able to maintain a
certain degree of self-determination and to fill their tj_me wi th satis~
fying activities. Through their social solidarity they gave each other
supportard strength. Evacuation, life in the centers, and resettlement
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were shared experiences. -This does not mean-that there are not some
persistent inward hurts and some bitterness. It is th~ir children, and
Nisei in general, that affect the Issei most. An Issei woman said:
"We worked hard all our lives so that we could leave
. the Nisei a good foundation for their future. Now it
is mostly gone. 110 matter how hard we work, we can't
rebuild it. There just isn't time in the years we
have left to live."
An Issei man expressed a more fundamental worry:
"iVe Issei used to talk among ourselves and say that if
war ever came with Japan, the Government might do some-
thing to us. But we didn't think our children would be
touched. ~~y two sons were bitter when they heard they
had to go. One of them refused. He said the Government
could put him in prison or shoot him. Almost all might
I plead with him. The next day I went to see his
teacher in college that he liked and respected most and
asked the ~acher to talk with him. They were together
for several hours. After that he said he would go.
That was all he said. The look on his face made me
afraid. He behaved strangely in the assembly center
and in the relocation center. The other boy was not
hin:self either.
"I sent both boys out to college as soon as possible.
They have been outside for three years now. The older
one~ the one who refused to be evacuated, is in medical
sc~ool. They are better, but it seems to me there is
stilJ a little warping in ~em. Maybe they will get
over it sometime."
The Nlisei were definitely more vulnerable thaIJ the Issei, but
tbe effects which persist are hard to measure. There are instances of
marked cynicism ,regarding civic and social obligations which seem to
date from evacuation. - There are also some over-aggressive tendencies
and some tendencies to withdraw readily from any situation where expres-
sions of prejudice are encountered or may be encountered. For the most
part, though, Nisei as well as Issei live and work and approach problems
generally like normal people. Of course, the results of evacuation are
not all in yet. Getting started again may take its toll. Experiences
in this phase are not shared as fully as were the experiences in the
camps. Ihe situations faced by different families and individuals vary
a gooo neal.
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"Nobody recalls the actual evacuation--the moving out of homes-- 
with pleasure. Memories of the relocation centers evoke a considerable
range of emotional responses. Many Nisei and a few Issei speak of them
as places. of C0nfinement. A resettler in Ar"izona who vis;_ted Los Angeles
reported that she had seen "many foI7.er inmates of my camp." The
majority of ISsei, on the other hand, remember some of the favorable
things and show signs of nostalgia. In either case, the ~~mories are
of an interruption to the rest of life. 
j
There has been almost no carry-over of the commuhity organization.
Liaison men--block managers and councilmen--are just some more returned
. evacuees working hard to get on their feet again. A few who have
attempted to turrf such prestige as they gained in the centers into
leadership on the outside have been received with indifference. All
that persists are some friendships and a vague bond of sentiment among
those Who were in the same camp. When people have more time, there may
be some poston or Heart Mountain picnics or parties; or there may not be.
Resettled Issei manifest a new orientation toward Japan. In the
centers they tended to think of how Japan might be able to help them
after the war. Now they are considering how they can help Japan--by relief shipments as soon s that b comes p ssibl  and by tryir.g to 
promote better understanding between the United States and Japan in the
years to come.
Issei also have a new orientation toward the United States. For
a time in the centers, the value tr.at was Japan, their stake in this
country, and the security and neutrality of the centers were balanced
ag~inst each other. Even before the war was over, their stake in this 
country--represented by their children, their property, and their long 
experience here--had emerged as dominant. This dcmi~ance is now com-
plete, so complete in fact that it is a change from the prewar situa-
tion. Before the war, Issei weighed continued residence in the United
States agaj nst eventual return to Japan. Anti-Japanese campaigns
periodically made them wonder if they might be forced to go back. So
the question was kept open.
Today the question appears to be settled once and for all. The
great majority of Issei have concluded they are here to stay. Fram
Seattle to Los Angeles, one can hear such statements as:
"'Ihj.ngs are different now. People have made up their
minds. They may think of taking a trip to Japan some-
time to visit their relatives and to see how conditions
are. But this is where they are going to live. They
are more settled on this than they have ever been."
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r This settling makes a difference in the way they approach the .
problems of readjustment. Before, many preferred to keep such assets
as they acquired in easily transferable form. Now they would like to
buy fixed property. Before, it was common for them to plan their
economic lives in terms of a number of years. Now their planning is
for an indefinite future.
The settling modifies views in other directions. Said an Issei:
"Maybe we made a mistake before the war tl"Ying to make
too much money. 1le should have taken some of the time
we spent working to visit our neighbors. I hope that
we have learned and that we do this in the future.
rhat is the best kind of public relatj.ons."
In the centers the legal action Issei appeared to want most from
the United States was provision for compensation for their losses at .
evacuation. They still hope something along this line will be done.
But this is unimportant compared to another 1egal reform they desire.
niey want to be declared eligible for citizenship. '!his would do more
than anything else to help them settle doWn in this countT'J the way
they wish to. At one stroke it would destroy' all of the West Coast
legal disabilities that rest on ineligibility to citizenship.
They are not very confident that the United States will extend
the privilege of naturalization to them. Still they hope. '!hey wonder
if they have not suffered enough to satisfy the most anti-Japanese.
Maybe too, they think, their generally cooperative behavior under the
stress of evacuation and the service of almost 26,000 Nisei soldiers
will convince Americans that they too are worthy to become Americans.
ISsei have followed their children. For a brief period after
evacuation, some of them pulled the other way. Now.the war is over,
they have joined their children in America.
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